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Introduction
Reasons for action are ubiquitous in our thought and talk about what peo-
ple do or should do. They explain, predict and justify our conduct. With-
out reasons, there would be no intentional agency. Yet for the longest
time — with the exception of the perennial question whether reasons can
be causes — contemporary philosophy of action has paid little attention
to the nature of practical reasons. It is only in recent decades that prac-
tical reasons have emerged as a subject of philosophical interest in their
own right. Reasons are considerations which motivate us and in the light
of which we act. But just what is it that we attribute to a person when
we credit her with a good reason? What sort of entity is on our minds
when we deliberate about what we have reason to do?
Two comprehensive proposals — and two contrasting pairs of positions
— shape the debate. In the first place, normative realism sees reasons as
things or states of affairs in the world to which we respond when we act
intentionally. On this view, the agent’s reasons are largely independent of
his subjective state. Psychologism denies this. It takes the opposing view
that reasons for action are psychological states of the agent. A common
psychologistic theory holds that when an agent acts for a reason, he is
motivated by a belief and a desire which jointly rationalize his action.
In the second place, the 800 pound gorilla among theories of practical
reasons is Humeanism. According to the Humean proposal, desires are
the only source of our reasons. Furthermore, Humeans argue that prac-
tical reason as a faculty is powerless to assess our ends as irrational or
rational unless they result from faulty causal or means-end reasoning.
By contrast, rationalists or anti-Humeans assign practical reason a more
extensive role, and they question the assumption that all our reasons are
grounded in desires.
Some recent writers have championed normative realism as against psy-
chologism while others have sought to defend Humeanism against ratio-
6nalism. In this dissertation, I will argue that both normative realism and
Humeanism fall short as comprehensive pictures of intentional agency.
The first two chapters are devoted to the discussion of normative realism
and Humeanism respectively. In the two chapters that follow, I develop
and defend High Brow, an alternative view of agency that is superior to
normative realism and, in particular, to Humeanism. In the final part,
consisting of chapters 5 and 6, I proceed to putting High Brow to use. I
take up important questions in the contemporary debate with the goal of
showing that High Brow can help see the difficulties raised by these ques-
tions more clearly. If the conceptual tools developed in the course of the
dissertation enable us to solve these difficulties, this may lend additional
support to High Brow as a theory of reasons.
Throughout this dissertation, I make liberal use of ideas and approaches,
distinctions and arguments that originate in the philosophy of Wilfrid
Sellars. After fading into relative obscurity in the 1980’s, Sellars’s writ-
ings have recently regained a larger audience. The renaissance, however,
has only been partial, being mostly restricted to his contributions to epis-
temology and the philosophy of mind. In addition to these fields, I draw
on Sellarsian ideas from the philosophy of language and action theory as
well. In particular, I rely on Sellars’s inferentialist conception of semantic
content and on his conception of intentions as the principal mental states
of the practical realm. This thesis aims to highlight these lesser-known
aspects of Sellars’s view, though it should not be seen as an exercise in
exegesis. Even if my view is not intended to represent Sellars’s view, my
positive suggestion, High Brow, is inspired by Sellarsian themes. I also
rely heavily on Robert Brandom’s elaboration and further development
of the Sellarsian project.
Chapter 1 weighs the respective merits of normative realism and psychol-
ogism. I consider recent arguments for and against normative realism. As
I argue, it is a general condition of adequacy of any theory of reasons that
it must explain that judgments about reasons are related internally to mo-
tivation. Normative realism, as it turns out, fails to satisfy this condition.
The upshot is that a theory of reasons must avoid the pitfalls of norma-
tive realism and psychologism alike while preserving the insights behind
both views.
In chapter 2, I turn to a criticism of the Humean conception of agency,
focusing on the claim that reasons are based on desires. Is it true, as
Humeans hold, that wanting to do φ is sufficient for having a reason to
do φ? Since what an affirmative answer would entail depends crucially
on what exactly is meant by “wanting”, I review a number of conceptions
of desire that Humeans have traditionally relied on. Following a termi-
7nology proposed by Peter Railton, we may say that the major Humean
conceptions of desire are low-brow. According to this view — Low Brow
— desires need not involve an evaluation of the object desired as good.
The basic problem with Humeanism is that a low-brow interpretation of
desire cannot support the far-reaching Humean principle that desires ra-
tionalize our conduct.
Criticism of Humeanism is hollow unless accompanied by an alternative.
To supplant the Humean’s Low Brow theory of desire, Chapter 3 moti-
vates and develops a High Brow conception of agency. The key to under-
standing what it is for human agents to act for a reason — and the corner-
stone of the High Brow view — is the concept of a practical commitment.
In developing this view, I take my cue from Saul Krikpe’s Wittgenstein-
inspired critique of dispositional theories of meaning which, I contend,
appliesmutatismutandis to dispositional theories of desires aswell. I con-
clude thatwe should understand the principalmental state in the practical
realm to be, not, as Humeans claim, desire but rather practical commit-
ment, an essentially rule-governed, normative state.
As philosophers since antiquity have held, intentional agents necessarily
act under the guise of some good. Despite its long pedigree, this doctrine
— which is entailed by High Brow — has attracted criticism from various
quarters. In chapter 4, I take up a number of arguments against the Guise
of the Good. Some philosophers take issue with the assumption that act-
ing for a reason is rule-governed activity. It may appear that acting for
a reason cannot be accounted for in terms of guidance by a rule because
any such account would generate an infinite regress. To counter this ap-
pearance, I explain in greater detail what it is to be guided by a conceptual
rule. Next, I consider objections to the thought that intentional action in-
variably occurs with an evaluative view toward the good. I show that an
agent may act on an evaluative stance without thereby acting reflectively
by providing a High Brow account of practical reasoning.
Of the final two chapters, which apply High Brow to much-debated prob-
lems, the first focuses on two different theses commonly subsumed under
the rubric “internalism”: judgment-internalism and existence-internalism.
While I agree with many writers that the former thesis is true, the prob-
lem is to show how High Brow makes sense of this intuitive truth. I un-
dertake this task by showing how the upbringing of a rational being lays
the foundation for the relevant conceptual connections. Next, I turn to
Bernard Williams’s internal reasons doctrine or existence-internalism. A
review of his argument shows it to fail to provide independent grounds
for believing the internalist conclusion. But Williams’s presentation of
the issue also contains valuable insights about our practices of reason-
8ascription, which, I argue, High Brow is in a particularly good position
to accommodate.
Finally, chapter 6 addresses the ongoing debate over the nature of so-
called rational requirements. Two puzzles have emerged from the litera-
ture. First, it seems that principles of rationality such as the instrumental
principle allow us to derive patently false conclusions about what rea-
sons an agent actually has from seemingly harmless premises. Second,
though it seems plausible that we must have some reason to be rational,
it is hard to pinpoint the sense in which rationality can be normative. I
argue that High Brow allows us to make headway toward a solution of
both puzzles if we understand the process of practical reasoning and the
role of rational requirements in it.
Chapter 1
Psychologism and realism
1.1 Psychologism and normative realism
When we act intentionally, we act for a reason. But what is a reason
for action?¹ In one sense of the question, the answer is obvious. When
we deliberate about what to do, we ask ourselves what we have reason
to do. A reason, then, is the object of deliberation. Often in order to
decide what to do, we weigh different reasons of varying strengths. We
may not always do what we have most reason to do, yet we often let
our actions be guided by our reasons, or what we take our reasons to be.
We are sometimes wrong, sometimes right about our own reasons. As
agents, we are interested not just in our own reasons but in the reasons
of other agents as well. Every day, we take note of what other agents do,
and when we do, we usually try to make sense of their doings in terms of
reasons. The intelligibility of a person’s actions depends on the possibility
of discovering the reasons in the light of which he saw what he did when
he did it. We ascribe reasons to others and justify our own conduct by
revealing our own reasons. Reasons can be shared, but they can become
the object of criticism as well.
We can, and often do, disagree about the existence of particular rea-
sons for doing things, both our own reasons and those of other agents.
Nonetheless, as agents we feel competent — even in the face of disagree-
¹The topic of this dissertation is reasons for action, or practical reasons. Unless other-
wise noted, I will use the term “reason” to mean practical reasons rather than reasons for
belief, or theoretical or epistemic reasons.
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ment — in our dealings with reasons in their various forms. It is not
surprising that the various linguistic and nonlinguistic practices related
to reasons for action are easy for us to follow, for the ability to do so
is part of what it takes to be an intentional agent. We all know what
reasons are, at least in the sense that we know our way around reasons.
However, in a metaphysical sense, the question remains baffling: what
kind of thing, what type of entity is a reason for action? To elaborate an
answer to this philosophical question is to develop what we may call a
theory of reasons. In this chapter, I compare and evaluate two theories
of reason: psychologism and normative realism. After explaining the dif-
ferences between the two competing views (§1), I consider fundamental
arguments against the viability of normative realism (§§2–3). Next, I dis-
cuss a possible advantage of normative realism (§4). I continue by taking
up the crucial point, i.e. the question whether normative realism can ac-
commodate judgment internalism (§§4–5). I end the chapter by raising a
final difficulty for psychologism (§6).
A prominent statement of psychologism, arguably the most commonly
held theory of reasons today, is due to Donald Davidson:
R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A
under the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude
of the agent towards actions with a certain property, and a
belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that
property. (Davidson 2001a: 5)
According to Davidson, any action can be seen as the joint product of two
intentional states of the agent: a pro-attitude and an instrumental belief.
“Pro-attitude” is his catch-all term for all members of a heterogeneous
class of desire-like attitudes, each of which constitutes a way of being
attracted to an object or state of affairs.² Davidson conceives intentional
action on the belief-desire model: roughly, whenever an agent performs
an action for a reason, he desires some object, in the wide sense of having
a pro-attitude towards it, and he believes that performing the action will
help him obtain the object desired.
²Davidson includes under the umbrella term “pro-attitude” states as diverse as “desires,
wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, eco-
nomic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far as
these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed towards actions of a certain kind”
(Davidson 2001a: 3–4). The Humean definition of the conative component of action will be
elaborated in chapter 2.
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For Davidson, to give the primary reason of a doing is to provide a full
explanation or, as he calls it, “rationalization” by referencing a pair of
psychological states. His view is paradigmatic for psychologism:
Psychologism Reasons for action are psychological states of the agent.
What does it mean to reject psychologism? Over the years, Davidson’s
view has been subjected to much criticism. First, a number of writers
have taken issue with Davidson’s contention that an action is bodily be-
havior caused by a belief-desire pair. Some writers have insisted that the
agent’s reasons stand to his action in a non-causal relation, while others
have argued that it is in the agent himself, rather than in his intentional
states, that we find the real causes of intentional action. Second, some
philosophers disagreed with Davidson over the composition of primary
reasons. Whereas on Davidson’s view, in order to move an agent a rea-
son must always contain a conative component as well as a cognitive
one, some philosophers have insisted that a belief may suffice to moti-
vate an action. Although both of these objections are interesting in their
own right, they do not constitute ways of opposing psychologism. Crit-
ics of causalism argue that our beliefs or desires are not the causes of
our action or that their causation of our behavior is insufficient to pro-
duce an intentional action, but they agree with Davidson that beliefs or
desires are reasons for action. Similarly, pure cognitivists, as the propo-
nents of purely belief-based reasons have been called, disagree as to the
sufficiency of cognitive mental states to produce action, but they do not
dispute Davidson’s identification of reasons with mental attitudes.
Rejecting psychologism is the more radical supposition that reasons are
not located in the agent’s mental life at all. Recent writers have defended
the anti-psychologistic view that psychological states, whether desire-
like or belief-like, cannot, at least in normal cases, be reasons.³ In one
of the earliest explicit defenses of normative realism, Joseph Raz faces
the question about the nature of reasons head-on.⁴ He starts by men-
tioning three candidates for the job performed by reasons. As he notes,
³Psychologism has without doubt been the dominant position in analytic action theory
at least since Davidson (2001a). In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have
endorsed versions of normative realism as against the psychologistic alternative. Joseph Raz
was one of the first writers to explicitly make the case for normative realism (Raz 1975). He
further elaborates his position in his later (2002: especially ch. 2 and 3). For a more recent
defense of realism, see Scanlon (1998: ch. 1) and Scanlon (2010). Bittner (2001) and Dancy
(2000) are two recent monographs devoted to versions of what I call normative realism.
Because Dancy’s exposition contains the most worked out version of the view, much of the
discussion in this chapter takes its cue from his book. Further defenses of normative realism
include Parfit (1997) and Hyman (1999).
⁴Raz (1975: ch. 1).
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reasons have been variously identified by different authors as statements,
as beliefs or as facts. Raz immediately rules out statements as implausible
candidates on the grounds that it would be highly unnatural to say that
the reason for doing φ is the statement that p. The choice between beliefs
and facts is more difficult. On Raz’s view, reasons are to be conceived
realistically:
Normative Realism Except for rare cases, reasons for action are not psy-
chological items but facts or states of affairs in the world.⁵
To borrow a phrase by McDowell, normative realism holds that reasons
do not stop short of the facts.⁶ For normative realists, reasons are objec-
tively out there in the world for the agents to discover. They hold that
when Jim puts on his raincoat as the first drops start falling from the sky,
his reason is not, as psychologism takes it, his belief about the weather
but the non-psychological fact in the world that it is raining. His reaction
is not to something happening in the domain of psychology but rather
something that occurs outside the agent. Thus against the view that our
reasons are constituted by beliefs, Raz writes:
Beliefs are sometimes reasons, but it would be wrong to re-
gard all reasons as beliefs. It should be remembered that rea-
sons are used to guide behaviour, and people are to be guided
by what is the case, not by what they believe to be the case.
To be sure, in order to be guided by what is the case the per-
son must come to believe that it is the case. Nevertheless it
is the fact and not his belief in it which should guide him
and which is a reason. If p is the case, then the fact that I
do not believe that p does not establish that p is not a reason
for me to perform some action. The fact that I am not aware
⁵The term “normative realism” is borrowed from Wallace (2006b), who calls a similar
position “normative moral realism”. Dancy, who expounds his anti-psychologistic views in
a monograph with the title “Practical Reality” defends a kind of practical realism. Similarly,
David Enoch calls his own view “robust metanormative realism” (Enoch 2007). The term
“metanormativity” is apt because it derives from the view that moral realism, as defended
by philosophers like G.E. Moore, is part of metaethics rather than normative ethics (Moore
1959). Accordingly, normative realism is a second-order view, one that remains silent on
substantive questions as to the specific normative reasons agents have and instead confines
itself to the question how we use expressions that ascribe reasons, what these expressions
refer to metaphysically, their epistemological status, and so on. The topic of metanorma-
tivity is not just, for instance, the kind of objectivity or intersubjectivity found in moral
judgments but normativity of reasons in general. The term “normative realism” is intended
to convey a similarly broad scope.
⁶Cf. McDowell (1996: 33).
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of any reason does not show that there is none. If reasons
are to serve for guiding and evaluating behavior then not all
reasons are beliefs. (Raz 1975: 17)
In this passage, Raz makes two points against the view that reasons are,
in typical cases, psychological states. First, psychologism seems to paint
an implausible picture of how reasons are related to deliberation. Raz em-
phasizes as defining features of reasons their ability to guide our activity
from the first-person perspective and their role in evaluating behavior.
Explaining the agent’s process of deciding what to do solely in terms of
his own mental states conveys a mistaken picture of deliberation. What
an agent saw in a given action is not confined to aspects of his inner life
but includes the various features of his environment that could influence
his choice. It would be solipsistic to think that the agent’s sole guide of
action is his own psychology. Intentional action properly speaking is a
matter of being responsive to circumstances in the world rather than to a
mere conception of them. Similarly, when we assess a person’s actions,
we see them as a reflection of events and objects in the world, rather
than his own thinking. In Raz’s eyes, the problem with psychologism is
its blindness to the important evaluative or normative dimension of rea-
sons. The world, not our conception of it, determines whether or not an
action is justified.
For Raz, that deliberation and evaluation are guided by facts, not appear-
ances of facts, shows that, at least most of the time, our reasons are facts.
Raz’s second point is that the existence of a particular reason does not
depend on the agent’s psychological state. To him, this contradicts psy-
chologism. He seems to assume that a psychologistic view of reasons
would be committed to saying that a person cannot have a reason with-
out being consciously aware of having it, given that we are for the most
part aware of our intentional states. Psychologism couldn’t be true if it
had this implication because we clearly are often unaware of the reasons
we have, as for instance a child searching for hidden easter eggsmay have
a reason to look under the mailbox without having a clue that it is there
he should be looking. As Raz’s argument suggests, the fact that an agent
is unaware of a reason to φ in no way shows that he does not have such
a reason.
However, the two arguments in Raz’s passage speak against psycholo-
gism only on a simplistic interpretation of the view. Consider a distinc-
tion between two types of reason-ascribing constructions. On the one
hand, there are statements of the form “X has a reason to φ” or “That p
is a reason for X to φ”, on the other statements of the form “The reason
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why X φ’ed was that p” or “X ’s reason for φ’ing was that p”⁷. In the first
kind of reason-statement, we ascribe normative reasons: we say that the
agent has a good reason for φ’ing or that the fact that p counts in favor of
doing φ. We do not necessarily mean that the reason compels the agent:
good reasons can be overridden or defeated in some other way by differ-
ent, stronger reasons. Nonetheless ascribing a reason in this way implies
that there is something to be said for φ’ing, something that has weight
on the scale of reasons, something that, other things being equal, makes
it reasonable to φ.
By contrast, the second kind of reason-statement mentions, not necessar-
ily what counts in favor of φ’ing, but the agent’s reason for φ’ing — the
consideration in the light of which the agent acted⁸. When we ascribe
motivating reasons, we identify the consideration that was operative in
the agent at the time of action. Motivating reasons are conceptually dis-
tinct from normative reasons. That S φ’d because p does not entail that
the fact that pwas a good reason for φ’ing. The ascription to an agent of a
motivating reason to φ does not require that φ’ing was in fact reasonable
in the light of the fact that p.⁹
Conversely, it does not follow from the fact that S has a normative rea-
son p to φ that he in fact φ’s or even that he is motivated to do so: just as
motivating reasons do not in every case imply normative reasons, nor-
mative reasons do not in every case imply motivating reasons. For one
thing, there may not be a good opportunity to φ or S may not notice that
he has an opportunity; he may be distracted by other activities; he may
have other stronger reasons than his reason that p. Importantly, S may
not be aware of the fact that he has a normative reason to do φ. All these
cases involve a gap between normative and motivating reasons.
This distinction shows why Raz’s first argument is faulty. Psychologism
may grant that, when deliberating, we do not examine our own inner
mental landscape but look outside into the world to determine what we
⁷Not all statements of the form “the reason why X φ’d was that p” are reason-statements
in my sense. Consider: “The reason why the building collapsed was that low-grade concrete
was used in its construction.” The building, not being a person, cannot perform actions
intentionally, nor can it do anything for a reason. Evidently what is ascribed here is not
an agential reason but a mere cause. To complicate things further, we sometimes ascribe
mere causes to persons as well as to objects, as in “The reason why he tripped over the dog
was that the streetlight was broken”. The word “reason” as used in the text always refers to
agential reasons in the emphatic sense, not simple causation.
⁸Cf. Dancy (2000: 2).
⁹Other writers use the term “explanatory reasons” instead of “motivating reasons”. The
term “justifying reasons” is common as an alternative to “normative reasons” or “good rea-
sons”.
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have reason to do. But we deliberate about normative reasons, not moti-
vating reasons. Psychologism need not argue that our normative reasons
are psychological states. Making use of the distinction, it can agree with
the normative realist that our normative reasons are located outside the
agent but insist that our motivating reasons are beliefs or desires. On the
psychologistic view, we are guided by the world as we are guided by our
normative reasons, which are related to but distinct from our motivating
reasons. However, the view goes on, when we explain an action in terms
of its motivating reasons, we necessarily explain it in terms of the agent’s
psychology.
Equippedwith the disambiguation, the defender of psychologism can also
disarm Raz’s second argument. It is true, he may say, that we are intro-
spectively aware of our reasons, but only if we understand “reasons” to
refer to motivating reasons. Of course an agent motivated by a reason
knows of the belief or desire moving him. But this doesn’t show that we
have intimate introspective knowledge concerning what we have most
reason to do. Normative reasons can diverge substantially from motivat-
ing reasons, so knowing the latter does not imply knowing the former.
Psychologism holds that motivating reasons are beliefs and desires, but
on a sensible interpretation, it does not hold the same view about norma-
tive reasons; it is free to interpret the latter in such a way as to explain
why the child looking for easter eggs may have a normative reason to
look under the mailbox without knowing that he does.
In other words, psychologism is best understood as a claim about moti-
vating reasons.¹⁰ Psychologism is not touched by the arguments found in
Raz’s passage, provided it comes with a satisfactory commentary which
explains how it proposes to understand normative reasons. If it is to es-
cape the simple counter-examples mentioned, psychologism must com-
ment on the relation between normative and motivating reasons. In fact,
it is clear that any theory of reasons must include an account of this re-
lation. It has to answer two distinct but related questions:
1. What is the metaphysical status of motivating reasons or, alter-
natively, how should we understand statements about motivating
reasons?
2. What is the metaphysical status of normative reasons or, alterna-
tively, how should we understand statements about normative rea-
sons?¹¹
¹⁰Cf. Dancy (2000: 98).
¹¹The twofold formulation is designed to leave open the possibility of answering either
question by resorting to “semantic ascent”, as is common practice in metathics.
16 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REALISM
Psychologism and normative realism give different answers to these two
questions. The first question inquires about the kind of itemwe talk about
when we ask what the reason was for which an agent acted. As we
have seen, psychologism holds that motivating reasons are psycholog-
ical states. For Davidson and many others, reasons necessarily include
a conative state, although others hold that the reason behind an action
may only consist of a cognitive state. Normative realism holds, instead,
that motivating reasons are facts in the world or states of affairs. But a
theory of reason should also tell us how to understand statements about
good reasons for actions such as “The fact that it is raining is a reason for
Tom to open his umbrella” and “Claire ought to sell her house because
the real estate prices are falling.” Normative realism does not only say
that motivating reasons are facts in the world, it also posits the existence
of facts of the form “X has a reason to φ”. So its interpretation of state-
ments ascribing normative reasons is straightforward: they are true if, as
a matter of fact, it is the case that X has a reason to φ. Normative realism
posits independent and at least potentially subject-independent reason-
facts. By consequence, the view understands the act of coming to believe
that one has a good reason to φ — that a reason-statement is true — as an
act of grasping an independent reality.
Psychologism’s answer to question (2), by contrast, is broadly reduc-
tionist. Whereas normative realism holds statements about normative
reasons to enjoy independence from whatever particular motivations an
agent has, psychologism explains normative reason statements in terms
of motivating reasons. A general way of providing such an analysis is
to paraphrase “X has a reason to φ” as a hypothetical statement about
motivation.¹² In its account of normative reasons, psychologism is led by
two considerations. First, it gives pride of place, in the order of explana-
tion, to motivating reasons rather than normative reasons. Whereas nor-
mative realism focuses on the role of normative reasons in deliberation,
psychologism bases its account on the third-person ascription of reasons
in accounting for action. Second, psychologism is impressed by what has
been called the placement problem concerning normativity.¹³ Scientific
naturalism holds that the entirety of reality is constituted by the world as
described by the natural sciences, in particular by physics. On a common
view, the list of constituents of the world as provided by science does
not leave room for normative phenomena. Facts about someone’s hav-
ing a good reason to do something are normative phenomena in a sense
¹²The details of psychologism’s hypothetical analysis of normative reasons are filled in
in §4 below.
¹³Cf. De Caro and Macarthur (2010) and Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton (1992: 126).
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that appears incompatible with the scientific naturalist contention that
the world is devoid of genuinely normative significance.
If we accept naturalism in this sense, the question of how and where to
place normative reasons leaves only two options.¹⁴ The first is to con-
clude that, contrary to the common assumption, normative phenomena
do not in fact exist, at least in the sense inwhichwe suppose them to exist.
However, eliminating reasons from our picture of the world is highly re-
visionist: it requires giving up many assumptions we make about agency,
a prospect that is unattractive to most philosophers. The alternative is to
attempt to give an account of the normative phenomena which shows
them to be unproblematic. Psychologism takes this approach when it
analyzes statements about normative reasons in terms of motivating rea-
sons. On a hypothetical analysis of normative reasons, the only facts
that have to be accepted as real are actual and hypothetical facts about
psychological states. This reduces the problem of “placing” normative
reasons to the less formidable one of finding a place in the natural order
for psychological states.¹⁵
By contrast, normative realism, which does not share psychologism’s nat-
uralist conception of what there is, is happy to accept elements with ir-
reducibly prescriptive authority in its picture of the world. As a result it
does not take there to be a special problem of “placing” normative ele-
ments in our world view. Accordingly, it does not see a need to provide
a reductive analysis of normative reason statements. It can understand
“having a reason” as a relation between an agent and a proposed action.
Furthermore it can understand this relation in a fashion similar to the
way in which moral realism traditionally understands the property of
goodness. It can understand having a reason as a non-natural relation.
This last difference between the two theories of reasons highlights the
parallels between normative realism and the traditional metaethical doc-
trine of moral realism, which regards moral statements as expressions of
cognitive truth-apt judgments that are true or false depending onwhether
the action-type in question really has the non-natural property of good-
¹⁴For further discussion of naturalism, see §4.
¹⁵Michael Smith advances a hypothetical analysis of normative reasons that fits the de-
scription in the text. He does not, however, think that such an analysis can be made “fully
reductive and explicit” (Smith 1994: 161). The trouble is that a statement of the analysis —
in terms of full rationality — requires using other normative concepts. Still, he is commit-
ted to making “the legitimacy of moral talk depend on squaring such talk with a broader
naturalism” and he adds that “[i]f there are any moral properties, such properties must just
be natural properties” (Smith 1994: 57). Given this goal, it seems fair to say that, like most
other psychologistic theorists, Smith advocates a genuinely reductionist theory.
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ness.¹⁶ Thus both views imply ontological commitments that are apt to
cause worries for defenders of an austere naturalism, and both face par-
allel objections.¹⁷ It is important to note, however, that although the two
views are related in spirit and expressive of a similar philosophical tem-
perament, they are not at all identical. Normative realism, as defined
above, is a view primarily about the nature of reasons for action. Moral
realism does not entail any particular view on what it is we talk about
when addressing the topic of someone’s reason for doing something. It is
also possible to defend normative realism while at the same time defend-
ing a non-realist metaethical theory. To give an example, Thomas Scan-
lon’s view of reasons for action is realist in this sense, but he also proposes
a contractualist analysis of what makes an actionmorally wrong based on
the concept of the action as reasonably rejected by other rational agents.¹⁸
Thus although reasons having to do with, say, the person’s well-being are
independent objective existences, he does not propose a realistic account
of specifically moral reasons. Moreover the normative concepts which
are the subject of moral realism are specifically moral concepts such as
obligation; what is right or wrong; and our duties towards others. The
many non-moral reasons, including hedonistic reasons, prudential rea-
sons, reasons of etiquette or beauty and so on, are within the scope of
normative realism but outside that of moral realism. Thus although con-
siderations originating in metaethical discussion can elucidate questions
about the viability of normative realism, we have to be careful to keep
separate what is specific to the moral sort of normativity, and careful not
to confuse the topic of ethics with the topic of the normativity of reasons
in general.
1.2 Arguments against normative realism
As a first step towards an assessment of normative realism as a theory of
reasons, consider the observation that acting on a reason requires aware-
ness of the reason. Suppose Jim quits smoking because it is damaging his
health. If we attribute his action to this reason, we must also suppose that
he has the belief that smoking is an unhealthy habit. Unless an agent is
¹⁶By “moral realism” I mean the non-reductionist doctrine defended by non-naturalists
such as Moore (1959) rather than the different class of views also sometimes called by the
same name which combines a cognitivist view of the moral with a program of naturalist
reduction, e.g. Boyd (1989).
¹⁷I will return to these difficulties in §4 below.
¹⁸Cf. Scanlon (1998: ch. 4–5).
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aware of a consideration at least in some sense, the consideration cannot
be his reason as an agent to do what he does.
This observation is correct, though its statement requires some care as
there are apparent counter-examples. It is true that sometimes we say
that somebody did φ because of p without knowing (or believing) that p
is true. In this sense, a person may buy a house because of the bubble
in the real estate market without knowing of its existence. However, in
such cases we are not attributing to the person an agential reason in the
relevant sense but rather amere cause, albeit a complex and psychological
and social one.
It is true that one can act in accordance with a reason without noticing
the reason if, for instance, without my knowledge, the motor oil is run-
ning low and this is a reason for me to take my car to the garage. If I then
do drive my car there, perhaps because I think the tire pressure needs
checking, I do what I have reason to do, viz. take the car to the garage,
but I am not aware of the reason. But although I act in accordance with
this reason, I do not act for this reason; the oil is not my reason for doing
it. Acting for a specific reason requires that I have formed an intention as
a result of grasping the consideration. Intentional action involves aware-
ness of what one is doing and knowledge of the reasons for which one is
doing it.
But can we not also act for a reason, in the emphatic sense, without the
relevant belief? Skepticism may derive from examples of people acting
from unconscious assumptions. A gambler bets a large sum on one horse
in the race. Here we may say that he makes the bet because the horse
is likely to win, while at the same time, perhaps, we say that he does
not quite believe that the horse will win. In fact the man may protest
vehemently that he does not have this belief, and later he may explain
his own action in terms of rather different motives.
However, we should not see this as an example of someone unaware of p
acting because of p. On the contrary, the example shows that agents can
be mistaken about their own states of mind. The observation that acting
for a reason requires awareness of p does not imply that the agent needs
to be conscious of the reason in a clear and reflective way, in the sense of
correctly being able to answer with authority all questions about what he
thinks. There is a presumption in favor of self-knowledge, but there are
cases, many of which involve irrationality or self-deception, where we
are less than perfectly aware of our own psychological states. Moreover,
when it comes to giving reasons for past actions, we enter the somewhat
murky waters of the agent’s retrospective interpretation of his own ac-
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tions. Just as we can be mistaken in our second-order beliefs about what
we believe, there is room for mistakes concerning what actually moti-
vates our own actions. The complex psychology involved in examples of
this type does not disprove the sound principle that, whenever we have
reasons and proceed to act on them, we also need some degree of aware-
ness of those reasons.
Coming back to the main topic, criticism of normative realism may start
from an application of the awareness principle. Although according to
realism reasons are facts in the world, whenever an agent responds to a
motivating reason by performing an action, he must also grasp the reason
as a reason — that is what the principle entails. A reason-ascription “X
φ’ed because p” can be shown to be false if it can be demonstrated that at
the time X didn’t believe that p was the case.
This observation can be turned into an argument. If it is impossible to φ
because p without being aware that p is the case, should we not conclude
that motivating reasons are beliefs? It is not hard to see that this is not
a sound argument for psychologism. The fact that one cannot act for a
reason p without having the belief that p does not entail that the reason
and the belief are one and the same. Holding that I can only do φ because
p if I believe that p is perfectly compatible with the claim that the belief,
far from being the reason, is only a causal concomitant of the action. In
order to act for a reason, it is necessary to grasp the consideration, which
itself is not a psychological state. It may be said that there is a relation of
counterfactual dependence between having the motivating reason p and
being aware of p: if one didn’t have the belief, one would not have the
motivating reason either. While true, again this does not show normative
realism to be false. The most it shows is that having the relevant belief is
an enabling condition of acting for a reason and of having a motivating
reason. According to the normative realist, stating such a condition is just
to point out something without which the action could not have taken
place. It achieves no more than saying that if my heart didn’t work, I
would not be conscious, which does not in any way show that a properly
working heart is to be equated with having consciousness. Similarly, the
fact that the belief that the reason obtains plays an enabling role, causal
or otherwise, in the process leading to an action has no tendency to show
that the reason is constituted by the belief.¹⁹
A second question about the viability of normative realism is raised by the
way Raz qualifies his view in the passage cited above, where hewrites that
¹⁹Dancy appeals to enabling conditions to counter the psychologistic point in Dancy
(2000: 127–8).
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“[b]eliefs can sometimes be reasons, although it would bewrong to regard
all reasons as beliefs” (Raz 1975: 17). Although Raz clearly thinks that, by
and large, motivating reasons are facts, here he seems to concede that this
is not universally true. However, it is not clear what kinds of exceptions
he has in mind. Two types of cases in which it would be acceptable to say
that the agent’s reason for acting was his belief that p suggest themselves.
To illustrate the first kind of case, suppose that an agent believes that he
is being followed by the C.I.A. If the belief persists despite the fact that
there is little or no evidence for this suspicion, a friend advises him to go
see a psychiatrist, take anti-anxiety medication, etc. because of his belief.
In this scenario, the agent’s reason for doing these actions would be a
psychological state. In a second type of case, an agent takes himself to
have a reason p that speaks in favor of doing φ, but his assessment of the
situation is mistaken because, as it turns out, it is in fact not the case that
p. In this sort of case, as in the first, it is common to say that the agent’s
reason for φ’ing was his belief that p, although the circumstances as well
as the implications are different.
Putting to one side for the moment the second type of case, what should
normative realism say concerning the obvious fact that we sometimes
refer to, as we might call them, mental reasons?²⁰ Compare two cases.
Suppose Carl notices suspicious figures in trench coats following him,
finds that his living room is bugged, and so on. Given these pieces of
evidence, it is reasonable for him to take appropriate measures: change
taxis often to shake off his followers, check into a hotel under a false
name, and so on. Wewould recommend him to do these things. If he does,
the reason why he acts in this way, we may say, is that he believes that he
is being followed by the C.I.A., though the belief seems to be a reason only
in an indirect way. But now change the example and suppose that Carl
is paranoid and reads too many spy novels. In this case, we know that he
is in fact not being followed by the C.I.A., and we would not advise him
to assume a false name or to try to cover his tracks but rather to seek the
services of a psychiatrist. If he does go see a specialist, we might again
say that his reason for doing so is his belief that spies are chasing him,
but this time our meaning would be different: we would mean that his
being in a psychological state itself was a good reason to do something.²¹
Perhaps, then, in leaving open the possibility that a reason may, in some
instances, be a belief, Raz is thinking of cases like Paranoid Carl’s. It may
be thought, however, that admitting cases such as these, although rare, as
exceptions to the rule that psychological states cannot be reasons places
²⁰The second type of case, what I call an “isolated case”, is the topic of the next section.
²¹Cf. Ammereller (2005), Hyman (1999).
22 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REALISM
one on a slippery slope towards psychologism. If the theory admits be-
liefs as reasons in some cases, onemay argue that it could equally identify
reasons with beliefs across the board. It may be said that if having a be-
lief can be a reason in Carl’s case, it cannot be true, as the realist believes,
that we can reject on principled grounds the possibility of psychological
states as reasons in normal cases.
Such an argument, however, if it were put forward, would be unconvinc-
ing. To begin with, if it generalizes from a special case to the general
thesis that reasons are beliefs, it fails to take into consideration that, if
Paranoid Carl has a mental reason, it is a peculiar type of reason. In or-
der to discover his reasons, he needs to reflect on his own state of mind
and on his own lack of sanity, but agents in ordinary cases do not have to
engage in this type of introspection when deliberating. The belief about
spies comes into focus in a way it does not in everyday actions. In normal
deliberation, beliefs are transparent to the agent, so that what he reacts to
are features of his environment. His beliefs are only the medium through
which he grasps the facts. Paranoid Carl’s case is special in that his belief
becomes opaque to himself.
Moreover, in normal cases when an agent acts for a reason that p and
therefore has the belief that p, he acts because he takes p to be true rather
than false. It is of course true that when an agent acts on a reason, what
he considers a reasonmay ormay not be true; we are all occasionally mis-
taken in taking something to be a reason which in fact isn’t. Nonetheless,
even if an agent’s action is based on a mistaken belief it matters whether
or not the agent believes what is in fact the case. If the agent acts because
of what he believed was a reason, the action is bound to be considered, in
some sense, a failure. Had Cautious Carl known that his belief about the
secret agents was wrong, he would not have changed taxis. By contrast,
Paranoid Carl’s action is not sensitive to the truth or falsity of his own
belief. The fact that he has the belief despite half-suspecting it to be false
may be all the more reason to see a psychiatrist. What matters is not, as
it does in ordinary cases, the truth of the belief but the belief itself qua
psychological state.
The fact that in the opaque case, whether or not the belief represents
the world as it is does not play the role it normally does is an indication
that the agent in such a scenario is alienated from his own beliefs. He
does not treat them as part of his epistemic apparatus, as he normally
would. Instead he sees them as something separate from his epistemic
self. Generalizing from the opaque case to normal intentional actions
fails because to do so is to put both types of cases in the same category.
Yet it is essential to preserve a contrast between the alienated and the
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non-alienated reasons.
The normative realist need have no qualms about holding Paranoid Carl’s
reason to be his belief that he is being followed by spies. We can after all
understand this as a variant of the standard realist formula: the reason
is the fact that he believes that p. Although psychological factors enter
into the explanation here, they do so in the same way that any other
facts, psychological or non-psychological, do.²² Realism need not deny
that psychological factors can be reasons in this way, which resembles the
way other people’s beliefs or desires can be a reason for doing something.
On the other hand, if psychologism holds that both Cautious Carl and
Paranoid Carl act because of their belief about secret agents it obscures
the distinction between transparent and opaque reasons. The former in
fact does not react in the same way to his belief as the latter. What holds
in the peculiar case cannot be what holds in the general case.
If anything, then, the existence of opaque reasons poses a difficulty for
psychologism, rather than constituting a point in favor of it. To preserve
the contrast, it seems, what psychologism needs to say is that the agent
with the opaque reason is really acting because he believes that he be-
lieves that he is being followed by secret agents. That Paranoid Carl’s
reason is really a second-order belief may seem unintuitive at first glance.
Still, as has been noted, the opaque cases involve taking a reflective atti-
tude towards one’s own mental state. Consequently it is not implausible
that although reasons are always a psychological affair, opaque cases are
distinguished by being as it were doubly psychological. The cases there-
fore do not constitute genuine counterexamples for either view: for psy-
chologism, reasons are always inside as part of the agent’s psychology,
²²Dancy (2000: 102) draws a distinction between the psychological state of the agent and
the fact that the agent has the psychological state. The point is that it is not quite the same
to say that the agent’s reason is his belief that p and to say that his reason is the fact that
he believes that p. This distinction, however, seems too subtle. There is of course a simple
metaphysical distinction here. Whereas in the one case, we point to a state of the agent,
in the other case we refer to a state of affairs or fact. As Dancy points out, these two are
not the same thing. However, this distinction does not seem of any consequence in this
context. We have no problem translating from the one form of words to the other. Dancy
thinks that we need to treat the theory that takes reasons to be psychological states and the
theory that takes reasons to be psychological states of affairs differently. But if we say that
the agent’s reason is his belief, we necessarily mean that the reason is his belief at some
particular time or period of time, i.e. the agent’s believing that p at time t. For something
to be able to serve as a reason, it needs to have propositional structure. If I say that my
reason for selling the car is my belief that it would be too expensive to repair, then surely
this implies that my reason is that fact, the fact that I believe that it would be too expensive
to repair. Although states of affairs and psychological states are ontologically different, in
the context of assigning reasons, we always really mean psychological states of affairs, for
which the other idea is just a shortcut.
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though in the special cases doubly so; for realism reasons are always facts
outside in the world, though in special cases about the part of the world,
the agent’s psychology.
1.3 Isolated cases
Normative realism emerges unscathed from the argument from opaque
cases. This leaves the second interpretation of Raz’s admission that beliefs
can sometimes be reasons. If true beliefs aren’t reasons, perhapsmistaken
beliefs are. As an illustration, take Christopher Columbus who, believ-
ing that there was a short westward route to India, decided to sail West
across the Atlantic. The difficulty for normative realism is summed up in
the question: When Columbus set sail, what was his reason for doing so?
Or, to put things another way, what seems important for normative real-
ism is apt to be expressed using the rhetoric of being in contact with what
is in fact true or desirable. Acting for a reason, realism insists, is reacting
to an event or object in the environment, rather than to the merely psy-
chological veil of beliefs and desire. Our actions are motivated not just
by a representation of facts but by the facts themselves. But sometimes,
as for Columbus, the agent’s factual mistake isolates his action from the
reality. Call these cases, in which the false belief seems to play an im-
portant role, isolated cases. The objection is that realism cannot give an
explanation of isolated cases.
The objection is a phenomenological argument based on observations
about the way we use reason-assigning locutions in everyday language.
Do we refer to mental states when giving a reason? The first thing to note
is that, with respect to normative reasons, we rarely say that an agent
ought to do φ because he believes that p.²³ Mention of mental states is
more common only when we turn to explaining actions, i.e. giving an
agent’s motivating reasons. These explanations have two basic forms.
On the one hand, we use explanations of the form
²³This is true, at least, when we consider only what can be called objective reasons. We
sometimes say that the reason why S ought to do φ is his belief that p, but in these cases
we mean that he has a subjective reason to do so. As an example, we may say of an agent
that he ought to do, or intend to do, φ because of his belief that p despite the fact that it
is not the case that p. Rather than giving substantive advice, the recommendation would
have the force of urging the agent to comply with requirements he is under in virtue of
being a rational agent. The reason would be only subjective because, in such a case from
the point of view of the speaker the agent does not really have a reason to φ. Because these
interesting cases will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, we can disregard them here.
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(A) He φ’d because p.
where the verb represented by the letter “φ” is used in the past tense
because we are dealing with an occurrence that has already happened.²⁴
This statement contains no apparent reference to any psychological states
of the agent. By contrast, the second form,
(B) He φ’d because he believed that p.
explicitlymentions the agent’s belief that p. Both statements have various
alternatives formulation, including
(A0) His reason for φ’ing was that p.
and
(B0) His reason for φ’ing was his belief that p (was that he
believed that p).
Different formulations within the groups — (A) and (A0) or (B) and (B0) —
are essentially equivalent in use and meaning, but there are substantial
differences between what we may call A-type explanations and B-type
explanations. Crucially, they differ with respect to their factive impli-
cations. The verbs “know” and “remember” are factive. To say that S
knows that p or that S remembers that p implies the truth of p. Causal
explanations are also factive. The statement “(The fact) that I opened the
oven door caused the soufflé to collapse” could not be true unless it was
also true that I opened the oven door. It can be disputed whether the
rational explanation of intentional action is a type of causal explanation.
Whether or not that is true, A-type explanations share with non-rational
causal explanations the property of factivity. This makes A-type expla-
nations unsuitable for what we called “isolated cases” above. Thus we
cannot say without contradiction:
Jack offered the job to Mary because she is a Harvard gradu-
ate but in fact she doesn’t have a college degree at all.
Because this statement is a contradiction, where the first part of the sen-
tence asserts something that the second part denies, we cannot useA-type
explanations in this case. With B-type explanations, on the other hand,
we can express the thought:
²⁴We can also explain actions which are, at this instant, in the process of happening. For
simplicity’s sake, present-tense explanations are ignored in what follows.
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Jack offered the job to Mary because he thought she was a
Harvard graduate, but in fact she doesn’t have a college de-
gree at all.
We can say this because explanations of the form “because he thought
that p” do not imply the truth of p. It is of course true that they are factive
in another sense: they entail the existence of a belief that p. However, this
is a feature shared by the non-psychologized version. Keeping in mind,
then, that a B-type explanation does entail the fact that the agent believes
that p, I will say that such an explanation is not factive in the important
sense.
An argument for psychologism constructed on the phenomenology of
language could run as follows. We frequently use both A-type and B-type
explanations. Isolated cases, a subset of the set of intentional actions, are
such that their account can be given only by using B-type statements. As
far as ordinary cases are concerned, although we can use A-type explana-
tions, we are also free to use B-type. Thus only B-type explanations cover
both isolated and regular cases. Because it is more generally applicable,
the B-type explanation represents the more fundamental form of expla-
nation. The argument concludes that the more fundamental explanation
of all cases, isolated or non-isolated, involves reference to an agent’s psy-
chological state. Therefore, whether or not the case is isolated, the reason
with which an intentional action is done must be a psychological state.
According to this line of reasoning, B-type explanations are primary com-
pared to A-type explanations because they are more universal; A-type
explanations should be thought of as derivative. “X φ’d because p” is
understood as elliptical, a mere shorthand for the more complete “X φ’d
because he thought that p”. Now it is certainly true that B-type expla-
nations are more universal than their counterparts. But a defender of
normative realism might point out that B-type explanations sometimes
feel forced or unnatural. Thus, asserting that
Don put on rubber boots because he thought that it was rain-
ing outside.
while not logically implying that it isn’t in fact raining, seems to carry
a strong suggestion that Don was mistaken in his belief. In any event,
picking this form of explanation would be an odd choice if Don’s case
was not a known or suspected isolated case. Type B is used mostly in
isolated cases, when the agent acted on a belief that we, as the attributer,
know was mistaken. We also use it when we are skeptical about the
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agent’s motivation, when we suspect but do not know for a fact that the
belief is not true. In general, we use B-type explanations only if we think
that something is amiss with the action in question. By psychologizing
the account, we signal reservations about the agent’s action. Use of this
style of action-explanation is unlikely to be left standing on its own since
it invites further questions along the lines of “In which way do you think
was the agent wrong to believe what he did? In which sense was the
agent unjustified, acting as he did?”
Absent special circumstances, it is more natural to choose A-type expla-
nations. Although we are sometimes forced to retreat to the more re-
stricted B-type, the full A-type explanation always remains the default.
If an answer to the question of what form of explanation is primary is
a clue to the nature of reasons, this idea yields two opposed arguments.
On the one hand, normative realism may appeal to the observation that
A-type explanations are more natural to argue that they constitute the
primary form of action-explanation, as well as the one that reveals the
true structure of reasons.²⁵ The normative realist objects to the psychol-
ogistic proposal that it is bad policy to model one’s theory of reasons on
the form of explanation natural or required only in a special subset of in-
tentional actions. Instead we ought to take the more natural explanation
as the model case. But as the A-type mentions no psychology but instead
includes a bare dependent clause, often prefixed with the expression “the
fact that…”, reasons for action are to be equated with facts or states of
affairs. In this spirit Dancy writes that “the most revealing form, perhaps
I should say, the form least likely to mislead philosophers, is the simple
form which contains no visible reference to belief at all” (Dancy 2000:
135).
On the other hand, the defender of psychologism can appeal to the uni-
versal applicability of B-type explanations to support his claim that they
are primary and conclude that, because this form explicitly mentions be-
liefs and other mental states, reasons for action must in general be men-
tal states. Given that both sides claim primacy, how can we break this
stalemate? Neither argument is strong enough to defeat its target as it
stands, so if we are to pick between the two theories of reasons on of-
fer on phenomenological grounds, it is necessary to strengthen one of
the arguments substantially. The normative realist’s argument relies on
comparative naturalness of the two explanation types. The mere fact that
²⁵See e.g. Jennifer Hornsby’s claim that, while both what I have called A-type and B-type
explanations generate reasons, the normativity of the reasons behind B-type explanations
is inherited from the normativity of the reasons behind A-type explanations (Hornsby 2008:
258).
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using one form is less natural than the other is not sufficient for rejecting
the opposing theory outright. Although the argument is suggestive, it
does not hold the prospect of a knock-down argument against psycholo-
gism. This leaves the psychologistic line of thought which, if sound, has
as its conclusion that normative realism is not just unnatural but unten-
able. The next step, then, is to spell out the argument in greater detail.
How do we explain Columbus’s setting sail in 1492? According to the
objection, the A-type explanation
(1) Columbus sailed West because there is (or was) a short
western route from Europe to India.
cannot be used because A-type explanations are necessarily factive and
there is no non-psychological fact in the vicinity that we could appeal to.
Instead, we have to resort to a psychologized form of explanation:
(2) Columbus sailed West because he thought there was a
short western route from Europe to India.
This example shows, according to the objection, that not all intentional
actions can be explained using A-type explanations. But if this is true,
realist explanation cannot reflect the true nature of the action even in
normal, non-isolated cases. If a theory of reasons is right to insist on
non-psychologized forms of explanation, these explanations should be
able to deal with all cases, including the isolated examples. But this is
shown false. According to the argument, if A-type explanations fail in
some cases, they aren’t fit to reveal the true nature of reasons. Therefore,
the argument concludes, reasons cannot be facts. This argument relies
on three important assumptions:
(i) Any adequate theory of reasons must be completely general.
(ii) A-type explanations are necessarily factive.
(iii) The structure of reason-explanations reflects the nature of reasons.
Each of the assumptions can be questioned individually. Let us examine
each in order. The first proposition, which is clearly a principle in the
psychologistic argument, is the assumption that any explanation that re-
flects the nature of reasons must be capable of being applied to all cases
of intentional actions. Columbus’s reason for going to sea cannot be the
fact that there is a short westward route to India because there is no such
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fact. In this case type A cannot be used because it implies a false propo-
sition. The argument concludes that across the board type A is not the
true form of explanation and that facts are never reasons.
One way to defend realism is to block this final step. The defense con-
cedes that A-type explanations cannot be used in isolated cases but denies
that the existence of isolated cases shows that realism is false in general.
The objection shows that realism is false for isolated cases but it leaves
untouched the view that in cases where all goes well the agent is still in
contact with reality. In those cases, the reason is the fact in the world
that p. When an agent is mistaken in his conception of the situation, im-
mediate contact with the facts is lost. Isolated cases are precisely those
in which the agent does not appropriately react to his environment. Ac-
cording to the defense, in such a case although the objector is right to say
that the reason for action is only a belief, this has no tendency to show
that reasons can’t be facts in the vast majority of cases.
If viable, this proposal would permit realism to take isolated cases in its
stride. Furthermore, it would do so without the need to question the fac-
tivity of reason explanations. The realist attributes to the objector a line
of thought according to which a uniform type of explanation is applica-
ble to all cases. In fact, no less a defender of psychologism than Bernard
Williams spells out just this thought in his highly influential paper “In-
ternal and External Reasons” where he states, as a general principle, that
“[t]he difference between false and true beliefs on the agent’s part can-
not alter the form of the explanation which will be appropriate to his ac-
tion” (Williams 1981a: 102).²⁶ According to the principle, for the question
whether type A or type B is appropriate to a given case, it cannot make a
difference whether or not the agent conceives his situation correctly. But
a realist may insist that this is not a valid principle. He can protest that
a comparatively small number of exceptional cases cannot undercut the
realist theory as a whole. Rather than assuming that a single theory of
reasons can cover all cases, we should accept that different explanations
are appropriate for different cases.
According to this proposal, both psychologized and non-psychologized
explanations have their place and neither is reducible or inferior to the
other. In good cases, the reason-explanation shows the agent’s connec-
tion with the facts. This proposal can take inspiration from disjunctivism,
a conception in perception theory. Philosophers who defend disjunc-
tivism are drawn to direct realism, the view that perception allows us to
enter into direct contact with our environment. On this view, the content
²⁶Emphasis in the original.
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of our sensory perception is not, as has often been held, a state represent-
ing reality but an actual fact in the world. While this seems plausible in
“good” cases where a subject, for instance, actually sees a red object in
front of him, it has the problem of being unable to account for “bad” cases
where, although the agent may think he sees the object, it only appears
to him as if he saw the object. The existence of bad cases like illusions
here leads many to reject direct realism. To disjunctivists, however, this
assumes falsely that good cases should be assimilated to bad cases or that
our job as theorists is to identify an element — the immediate object of
perception — which is common to both illusion and veridical perception.
Jennifer Hornsby has proposed to adapt a view of this sort to action the-
ory. According to her, perceptual disjunctivism allows us to understand
statements about perceptual appearing disjunctively:
It appears to X as if it was true that p if either X sees that p
so that X is well-placed to know how things objectively are
or it merely appears to X as if it was true that p so that X is
not in such a position.²⁷
If Hornsby is right, we can transfer this idea to action theory. She em-
phasizes the importance of knowledge for acting for a reason.²⁸ If X acts
because p, this is adequately captured in the idea that X acts because he
knows that p, but not by the idea that X acts because he believes that p.
In Hornsby’s view, the former, but not the latter, is something that can
actually provide the agent with a reason. She introduces the disjunctive
element by giving an account or analysis of acting for a reason in which
“acting from knowledge belongs under the head of acting from belief”:
If X φ-d because X believed that p, then either X φ-d because
X knew that p, so that X φ-d because p or X φ-d because X
merely believed that p.²⁹
Here “X merely believes that p” is intended to imply that X did not know
that p. To Hornsby, this account explains the neutral type of explanation
²⁷Cf. Hornsby (2008: 253). I have simplified Hornsby’s formulation somewhat.
²⁸Hornsby (2008: 251) points out that it is possible that (i) an agent X performs an action
φ thinking that p and (ii) it is true that p yet (iii) it is still wrong to say that X φ’ed because
p. This is true in circumstances in which the agent does not know that p even though
he believes it and it is true. This can happen when the agent’s belief is true although it
is derived from an unreliable epistemic source such as the testimony of a speaker who
cannot be trusted. This is an interesting point worth exploring which, as Hornsby points
out, suggests that there is a connection between acting for the reason that p and knowing
that p.
²⁹Cf. Hornsby (2008: 252).
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— B-type explanations are applicable whether or not the belief is true —
in terms of more committive formulations that imply that the agent was
right or wrong, respectively. Furthermore Hornsby argues that A-type
explanations derive their explanatory power from B-type explanations
so that we would not be able to understand the former without a prior
understanding of the latter. If the neutral explanation is itself an amalga-
mation of good and bad cases, we can assume that the more substantive
disjuncts reflect the nature of reasons better. In particular, acting because
p, or acting because of the knowledge that p, is a way of being in direct
contact with the facts, in away that is similar to how according to disjunc-
tivism we should say that seeing that p is having the fact that p manifest
to one without worrying that a more universal neutral description of the
perceptual experience is available.
Does a disjunctivist approach help normative realism find a place for iso-
lated cases? The disjunctive account of the neutral explanations holds
that there are two different accounts which are applicable depending on
the nature of the case. The proposal concedes that Columbus’s reason for
going to sea is his mere belief that there is a short route to India while
insisting that in non-isolated cases reasons are facts in the world. How-
ever, to grant that, in Raz’s phrase, reasons are sometimes beliefs, is a
major concession. Normative realism holds that it matters whether we
say, in any given case, that the reason is a fact or a belief: the latter con-
veys a misleading picture of agency. To act intentionally is not to turn
inward but to regard some external consideration as a reason. For this it
does not seem to make a difference whether the agent is mistaken in his
conception of the situation. The realist point, if it is valid, must be the
principled one that whenever we act for a reason, our reason cannot be a
psychological state. If reasons, except in opaque cases, cannot be beliefs,
it seems impossible to make room for exceptions in isolated cases.
Furthermore, the normative realist needs to take into account the possi-
bility of opaque cases. Paranoid Carl’s reason for going to see a psychia-
trist is his belief that international spies are out to get him. As we have
seen, this is not an isolated case because Carl’s reason, unlike Colum-
bus’s, is genuine. But if realism accepts the disjunctive proposal, it seems
unable to make the distinction between opaque cases and isolated cases:
in either case, the reason is constituted by a psychological state. Not to
be able to make this crucial distinction is a major deficiency.
This suggests that Williams’s principle that the truth or falsehood of the
agent’s beliefs ought not to be allowed to affect the form of the explana-
tion applicable is in fact sound. We should be careful not to assume in
general that good and bad cases necessarily share a common form, but the
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argument for a disjunctive conception in the theory of action is weak. The
proposal seems committed to the claim that there are considerable meta-
physical differences between isolated cases and regular cases. A regular
case of acting for a reason involves the agent’s standing in a relation to a
fact in the world, whereas in an isolated case, according to the proposal,
the agent stands in a relation to his own belief or desire. What is more,
the relation in the good case seems to be that the fact makes the actions in
some way reasonable. The disjunctive conception appears to say that it is
equally possible for a psychological state to stand in this relation. But it
is incredible that, depending on the truth of the belief, one of the relata is
either the belief that p or the fact that p. The connection between reason
and action is a rational one, and it seems that good and bad cases have
at least enough in common to support the notion that recognizably the
same rational sort of connection holds in both types of cases.
It seems, then, that normative realism cannot escape the argument we
are considering by attacking the assumption that the form of explana-
tion must be general. To move on to the second assumption, is it true,
as the psychologistic argument has it, that reason-explanations are nec-
essarily factive? According to Dancy this is a mistake: although some
A-type explanations are factive, we have no reason to think that all non-
psychologized explanations uniformly imply the truth of what is taken to
be a reason. Dancy concedes that some explanations of this type are in-
compatible with the agent’s conception of the situation being mistaken.³⁰
However, Dancy holds, there is choice between a number of locutions,
some of which do not have this property. He mentions two examples:
(3) His reason for doing it was that it would increase his
pension, but in fact he was quite wrong about that.
(4) The ground on which he acted was that she had lied to
him, though actually she had done nothing of the sort.³¹
Because the statements do not mention any of the agent’s psychological
states, they seem to belong to type A. According to Dancy these locutions
differ from regular A-type explanations in that explaining the action does
not commit one to the truth of the reasons. This is purportedly shown by
the fact that, as in (3) and (4), a conjunction consisting of the reason state-
ment and the negation of the proposition in question does not constitute
a contradiction. Dancy takes the existence of these locutions as evidence
³⁰Cf. Dancy (2000: 133).
³¹Dancy (2000: 132).
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for his claim that “the purposes of explanation of action in terms of the
agent’s reasons do not require such explanations to be factive” (Dancy
2000: 133). In particular, he invites us not to feel forced by the alleged
factivity of intentional explanation to abandon A-type explanations in fa-
vor of B-type explanations. Some of the locutions we use are factive, but
others aren’t. We ought not to think that action explanation is by its very
nature factive.
What are we to make of Dancy’s attempt to reinforce the realist position?
The present dialectical situation is that there are isolated cases which can-
not be explained using a factive form of explanation. Therefore to help
normative realism escape the argument from isolated cases, it is neces-
sary to show that a non-factive non-psychologized explanation is avail-
able in every possible case. The examples adduced by Dancy are intended
to show that such an explanation is sometimes available, but they do not
show that there is a systematic way of translating A-type explanations
into non-factive B-type explanations. In fact we have reason to doubt
that such a translation is generally available. Thus as Dancy’s examples
are in the past tense, it seems fair to ask for a non-psychologized A-type
explanation of an action happening at the time of speech. Transposed to
the present tense, the sentences become:
(30) His reason for doing it is that it will increase his pension,
but in fact he is quite wrong about that.
(40) The ground on which he is acting is that she has lied to
him, though actually she has done nothing of the sort.
While (3) and (4) are acceptable, (30) and (40) have an air of logical con-
tradiction about them. The first half seems to imply the negation of the
second. The difference that explains why (3) and (4) have no factive im-
plications is that because the main verb of the sentence is in the past
tense the dependent clause uses the verb forms “would increase” and “had
lied”, following the grammatical rules of the sequence of tenses, whereas
(30) and (40) contain a main verb in the present tense and a subordinate
clause verb in the future tense, “will increase”, or in the present perfect,
“has lied”. If this is true, the fact that some explanation forms lack fac-
tive implications depends on the particular grammatical construction of
dependent clauses used in these sentences, a construction that is only
available when describing actions that have occurred in the past. For ac-
tions that are in the process of being performed, no such grammatical
device is available: “He does it because it would increase his pension” is
ungrammatical. At least with present-tense explanations, the only form
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of explanation we are left with is factive. But then we can repeat the psy-
chologistic challenge to ask the realist how to treat action-explanations
like (30) and (40).
Noting the particular grammatical forms used in Dancy’s examples leads
to a second point. Given that (3) and (4) show the grammatical phe-
nomenon of backshifting (“will increase” becomes “would increase”, “has
lied” becomes “had lied”), it is likely that, in the English grammar at least,
reason-giving explanation take the grammatical form of indirect speech:
“his reason was that …” has the same underlying form as “he said that
…”. Though it is clearly not correct that when we say that someone acted
for a reason p, we claim that the agent said that p, it is more plausible
that assigning a motivating reason asserts that the agent believed that p.
Indeed the sentences (3) to (4) can be read as shortcuts for:
(300) His reason for doing it was his belief that it would in-
crease his pension.
(400) The ground on which he acted was his belief that she
had lied to him.
But if the grammatical form used in Dancy’s formulations are indicative
of the ascription of indirect speech, it does not seem that Dancy can ap-
peal to these forms of words to support his view that the reference to
psychological elements in non-factive explanations can be eliminated. In-
stead (3) and (4) can be seen as incorporating a covert reference to the
agent’s psychological states.
In a second attempt at demonstrating that non-factive and non-psycholo-
gized explanations are not mutually exclusive, Dancy appeals to the pos-
sibility of canceling the factive implications in A-type explanations using
an apposition.³² On this proposal, the explanation
(5) He drinks the contents of the glass because, as he be-
lieves, it contains gin, although in fact in contains petrol
is both non-psychologized and non-factive. Here Dancy is right to claim
that the explanation succeeds without self-contradiction; the use of “as he
believes” and “as he thinks” is particularly common and useful when re-
porting in academic prose the reasoning of an author without committing
oneself to its truth, often because one disagrees with him. But again the
connection to indirect speech is strong: the locution clearly reports what
³²Dancy (2000: 128–31).
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is going on in the agent’s mind. There is a reference to a psychological
state in the dependent clause, although it does not seem to be straightfor-
wardly part of the propositional content. Dancy’s appositional account
gives us little reason not to think of (5) as a mere notational variant of “…
because of his belief that it contains gin”, with its explicit mention of the
psychological state.
We can conclude that appealing to Dancy’s special examples and to his
appositional account does not succeed at dislodging the second assump-
tion we have been considering. As a matter of fact, the English language
does not seem to contain, for any given set of circumstances, a means
of explaining an action which both is non-factive and belongs to type
A: in some cases of non-factive explanations, we have to resort to im-
plicitly or explicitly psychologized explanations. If we take the reasons-
statements at face value, this conclusion implies that reasons really are
sometimes psychological states. Nonetheless, despite the linguistic ap-
pearances, Dancy is right to insist that reason-explanations are not es-
sentially factive. In other words, we should reject the third assumption
in the list above, according to which the linguistic structure of reason-
explanations automatically reveals the status of reasons. Although we
must of course partly take our cue from the linguistic structure of our ex-
planations, we are well advised to keep a certain philosophical distance.
One reason to be careful is that our language, the product of an organic
development spanning millennia and responding to various pressures, is
not perspicuous. Some features of the language are contingent on ex-
traneous factors, such as pragmatic considerations. Thus the fact that
our action-explanations are either non-psychologized or non-factive but
never both may be a historical consequence of conditions relating to use-
fulness or simplicity. Such speculation aside, it does not seem impossible
to introduce, by fiat, a new word “because” into our language where “x
φ’ed because p” has the same use as the English word “because” except
that it does not imply that p is the case. If this possibility is genuine,
it suggests that the fact that the word “because” and its cognates have
the factive implications they do is at least to some extent an artificial or
accidental feature of our language.³³
Although it is true that non-factive explanations contain a reference to
³³It is another matter whether there could be a language that contained only “because”
and not “because”. Perhaps this is impossible because of the way in which talk about rea-
sons, which is essentially a social practice, is learned. However, whether or not “because”
as a connective could stand on its own, its possibility even alongside “because” shows that
it is not an indispensable feature of reason-attribution that endorsement of the reason is
shared with the agent.
36 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REALISM
the agent’s psychological states, we should not rashly conclude on mere
linguistic grounds that reasons must be psychological states in general or
even in isolated cases. To draw this conclusion would be to take the form
of words we use in the explanation of intentional action too literally.³⁴
Instead we should change tack and focus on what we do when we ex-
plain an action by reference to a reason. As has emerged from what has
been said, the primary function of action explanation is not, as in the ex-
planation of natural events in terms of their causes, to show a causal link
between two events — though it may also do that — but to display a ra-
tional relation between a consideration, on the one hand, and the action,
on the other. This rational relation does not have the intelligibility char-
acteristic of explanations in the sciences, paradigmatically in physics, but
the sort of intelligibility characteristic that is at home in the logical space
of reasons, paradigmatically in the explanation of speech and action in
terms of propositional attitudes.³⁵ Suppose that when asked “Why did
John eat the tofu?” we answer, “Because it contains protein.” What we
do is to exhibit a sample piece of practical reasoning. Thus an explana-
tion of John’s action points toward a practical argument concluding in
the intention to perform the action in question, along the following lines:
This cube of tofu contains proteins. (p)
Proteins are good for me.
Thus, I shall eat this cube of tofu. (q)
In giving the reason we point out that, along with ancillary hypotheses,
the consideration that is advanced as the reason, p, implies the conclu-
sion, q. Thus given that proteins are good for John, p implies q, i.e. that
this cube of tofu contains protein implies (for John) “I shall eat this cube of
tofu”. What the action-explanation does is to show how the move from p
to q is, or could be seen as, a reasonable inference and thus to make sense
of the action from the perspective of the agent.³⁶
Over and above this first job, our most common form of explanation, type
A, also performs a secondary function, which is to endorse the truth of the
proposition picked out by the explanation as a reason. This has a parallel
³⁴See Dancy (2000: 133ff) for remarks that go into a similar direction.
³⁵See McDowell’s remarks on the “understanding we can achieve by employing the con-
ceptual apparatus that is governed by the constitutive force of rationality” (McDowell 1998b:
328). He also asks us to picture “a particular instantiation of deductive rationality as a more
or less approximate grasp of a normative structure, determining what follows from what
and thus what ought to be believed, given other beliefs, for deductively connected reasons”
(McDowell 1998b: 327). The kind of intelligibility proper to phenomena in the logical space
of reasons will be the topic of chapter 3.
³⁶The topic of practical reasoning will be explored in greater detail in chapter 4.
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in talk about implications in general. It is natural to read “p implies q” as
committing the speaker, not just to the implication, but also to the truth
of p. Similarly, when we use type A explanations, we not only point out
the existence of an inference from p to q but also assert p ourselves. In
choosing this type of explanation we choose to endorse the existence of
the reason itself as a fact. But this further function is hardly essential
and perfectly separable from the first. This can be seen from the fact
that, as we have noted, there are a variety of means of canceling this
secondary function. We can, with Dancy’s examples, use grammatical
constructions similar to indirect speech; we can use a parenthetical “as
he believed”; and, most importantly, we can use B-type explanations. If
B-type explanations lack the secondary function, they still have the same
primary or essential task of pointing out a rational relation. We ought to
think of them as a species of A-type explanation where the functionally
inessential endorsement of the proposition p is suppressed.³⁷
To conclude, we should not interpret the use of B-type explanations in
Columbus’s case as a sign that in this instance his reason must be a men-
tal state. Even if cases of this sort require grammatically psychologized
locutions, what is asserted is the same as in A-type explanations. If this is
true, the phenomenological observations adduced by psychologism rely
on the unwarranted assumption that the mention of psychological states
in B-type explanations licenses immediate conclusions about the status
of reasons and thus fail to show realism to be false.
1.4 Normative realism, pros and cons
We have seen that the psychologistic argument fails to establish that rea-
sons must be psychological states. The next step is to consider an ar-
gument advanced by Dancy which purports to show that reasons can-
not be psychological states. Although in my view this argument also
³⁷As mentioned above, Hornsby (2008) suggests that there is a connection between act-
ing for the reason that p and knowing that p. In this context, it should be noted that “X φ’ed
because p” is similar to “X knows that p”. In ascribing knowledge to an agent, we not only
say that the agent believes that p but also commit ourselves to the truth of the proposition
that p. In Brandom’s terminology, ascribing knowledge is not just attributing a commit-
ment that p but also undertaking a commitment that p (see Brandom 2000: ch. 3). A-type
explanations have a similar social aspect involving two scorekeepers, the property of simul-
taneously attributing commitments to another and to oneself. Knowledge has an important
role in the theoretical sphere which goes beyond that of mere belief (and even justified
true belief). Similarly, it may be suspected that in the practical sphere A-type explanations
have an essential role that goes beyond that of non-committive B-type explanations. The
connection between reasons and knowledge is also stressed by Hyman (1999).
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fails to achieve its purpose, seeing what is correct and incorrect about
it brings into relief an important point that has been present in the pre-
ceding discussion. Dancy’s argument begins by noting a contrast in how
the two theories of reasons account for motivation. Normative realism
straightforwardly holds that motivating reasons, like normative reasons,
are facts. If S acts because of p, the fact that p can be invoked directly
as S’s motivating reason. Psychologism, on the other hand, holds that,
although normative reasons do not necessarily correspond to the agent’s
beliefs and desires, motivating reasons are psychological states of the
agent. This means that it has to give a slightly more complicated ex-
planation of what happens in motivation. According to Dancy, it has to
tell what he calls a three-part story. This story can be expressed symboli-
cally as “normative reasons→motivating reason→ action”, where each
arrow represents a relation of explanation.³⁸ Thus when an agent reacts
to a fact in the world, the defender of psychologism needs to explain the
existence of the motivating reason, a psychological state, by reference to
the normative reason, which even according to psychologism may be a
fact in the world; and the motivating reason for its part explains that the
action is performed. For instance, if Joan climbs up the tree because of
a nearby grizzly, then her motivating reason is the belief that there is a
grizzly in front of her. Joan’s belief is explained by the fact that there is
in fact a grizzly in front of her; this fact both makes the belief reasonable
and explains it. The motivating reason, in turn, explains Joan’s actual
climbing up the tree. The normative reason is involved in the explana-
tion of the action only indirectly, with the motivating reason acting as a
proxy.
Now for Dancy, the trouble is that a theory of reasons is subject to what
he calls the “normativity constraint”, viz. the requirement that
a motivating reason, that in the light of which one acts, must
be the sort of thing that is capable of being among the reasons
in favour of so acting; it must, in this sense, be possible to act
for a good reason. (Dancy 2000: 103)
In other words, Dancy’s constraint requires that motivating reasons be
the right sort of things to be normative reasons. The three-part story
holds that beliefs are motivating reasons, but except in opaque cases, be-
liefs themselves cannot speak in favor of performing a certain action:
they cannot be normative in the sense required. If this is so, then psy-
chologism’s story clearly fails the normative constraint.
³⁸Dancy (2000: 101).
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What do we make of the objection that psychologism fails the normative
constraint? Intuitively there is some substance to the normative require-
ment: even if normative reasons on occasion diverge from motivating
reasons, plausibly motivating reasons and normative reasons should of-
ten come together. But Dancy is wrong to set up a requirement for nor-
mative reasons and motivating reasons to be, at least potentially, identi-
cal. The trouble with this objection to psychologism is that the norma-
tive constraint is not an independent requirement: it is tailor-made to
rule out psychologism. It begs the question against psychologism as we
have defined it by assuming from the outset what psychologism denies:
the potential identity of normative and motivating reasons. But it is pre-
cisely the relationship between the two sorts of reasons that is at issue
between the two theories of reasons. It is hardly clear that Dancy is right
to impose on theories of reasons the requirement that they must assume,
as he does, a possible identity between the two sorts of reasons.
It does, however, seem a fair request to ask such a theory to provide an
account of the relationship between the two kinds of reasons that does
not pry them apart too far. If a theory drove a wedge between normative
and motivating reasons which makes it hard to see how the two are re-
lated, this would be a ground for rejecting it. The requirement could be
explained in this way. The two sorts of reasons have a different focus.
Motivating reasons are primary retrospective. When we ascribe a moti-
vating reason to an agent, we talk about an action that has already taken
place (or perhaps is taking place right now), and our goal is to render the
action intelligible. We take the action as a given and seek to understand
it. Normative reasons, on the other hand, have a forward-looking goal.
In ascribing a normative reason, our goal is to justify an action that has
not yet taken place, and we can talk about normative reasons for actions
that may never happen. Our goal is, not to give an account of something
given, but rather to show what it is rational to do.
As a consequence, to understand reasons we have to understand them
in relation to two projects or perspectives, a problem clearly seen by
Bernard Williams, a defender of psychologism.³⁹ On the one hand, rea-
sons figure in first-person deliberation about what to do: they are what
makes doing one thing rather than another reasonable. We may call this
aspect, in which we consider questions of justification, the rational di-
mension of reasons. For Williams, the conception of reasons for action
he considers correct “is concerned with the agent’s rationality. What we
can correctly ascribe to him in a third-personal internal reason statement
is also what he can ascribe to himself as a result of deliberation” (Williams
³⁹Williams (1981a).
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1981a: 103). The deliberative perspective is important but not exclusive.
AsWilliams also rightly points out, “if there are reasons for action, it must
be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they do, their rea-
sons must figure in some correct explanation of their action” (Williams
1981a: 102). Williams calls this aspect the explanatory dimension of rea-
sons. From this intentional perspective, reasons are what we cite in the
explanation of action.⁴⁰ Reasons do not belong to either of the perspec-
tives exclusively but have their place at their intersection. If, as we can
assume, the duality of two perspectives corresponds to the duality of nor-
mative and motivating reasons, we can conclude that it is a requirement
of any adequate theory of reasons to show that normative andmotivating
reasons are two sides of the same coin, rather than disjointed elements.
We can, then, interpret Dancy’s objection as raising the valid question
whether psychologism can bring together the intentional and deliberative
perspective. To answer this question, we need to turn to psychologism’s
three-part story. As we have pointed out, a theory of reason must, in ad-
dition to explaining the ontological status of motivating reasons, provide
an account of statements attributing normative reasons. Psychologism is
committed to explaining normative reasons in terms of motivation. Be-
ing motivated, however, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
of having a reason: on all accounts we are often motivated to do some-
thing we have little reason to do, as we also often fail to be motivated by a
normative reason. Psychologism needs to acknowledge a certain distance
between having a reason and being motivated. As has been mentioned,
this means identifying normative reasons, not with the agent’s actual mo-
tivation, but with his hypothetical motivation. Such an analysis has the
following general form:
X has a normative reason to do φ iff he would be motivated
to do φ in conditions C.
Of course, everything here depends on how the conditions C are filled
in. Williams gives a particular clear exposition of the idea. According to
Williams, the gist of a normative reason statement is that “if the agent
rationally deliberated, then, whatever motivations he originally had, he
would come to be motivated to φ” (Williams 1981a: 109). More specifi-
cally, an agent has a normative reason to φ if he has some desire D and
there is a sound deliberative route from D to doing φ. For Williams, three
conditions have to be met: the practical reasoning leading to the decision
⁴⁰For the distinction between the intentional and deliberative perspectives and its relation
to normative and motivating reasons, see Smith (1994: 131f).
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to φmust not be based on a false belief; the agent must have access to, and
make use of, all relevant factual information; and he must not exhibit any
faulty reasoning. For Williams, the condition of correct deliberation is to
be construed narrowly: it consists chiefly of correct means-end delibera-
tion and using one’s imagination to discover ways in which a given goal
may be satisfied — a style of reasoning that has been called “constitutive
reasoning”.
I will return to the details of Williams’s account later.⁴¹ The question
now is not whether an account of normative reasons like Williams’s is
true but rather whether it would, if true, divorce normative reasons from
motivating reasons in a damaging way. Williams’s psychologistic view is
that what we posit in explaining action from the intentional perspective
is recognizably related to what we attribute to an agent when explaining
his action. He conceives of having a normative reason to φ as being such
that if one followed certain rational procedures, one would arrive at the
decision to do φ. In explaining action, we base our account partly on
the assumption that the agent is deliberating from motivation he already
has. This does not mean that motivating reasons and normative reasons
can be identical. But if having a normative reason is related, by way of
rational deliberation, to being motivated, psychologism is able to explain
how a motivating reason is the consequence of a normative reason. Far
from divorcing the two explanatory and rational dimensions of action,
Williams’s account allows us to see how the intentional and deliberative
perspectives are related.
Dancy’s claim that normative reasons and motivating reasons must be,
at least potentially, identical is too strong. Perhaps in recognition of this
problem, he glosses his own objection in a different way. He says that
motivating reasons must be “of the right sort to be good reasons” and that
this is not true on the psychologistic identification of motivating reasons
with beliefs as the latter are “the wrong sorts of thing to be good rea-
sons” (Dancy 2000: 106–7). Here Dancy is making ametaphysical distinc-
tion. Facts in the world belong to one ontological category, psychological
states to another; and he emphatically asserts that only the former cate-
gory, and not the latter, contains things that can speak in favor of doing
something.⁴² Now although it is true that these are two separate ontolog-
ical categories, it is hard to see how this distinction matters with respect
to the question at hand. Dancy seems to be basing his claim on his ob-
servation of how we talk about these two kinds of things. However, as
we have pointed out, something, p, is a good reason for φ’ing if there is a
⁴¹See chapter 5.
⁴²Dancy (2000: 107–8).
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good practical argument from p to the decision to φ. So in order to be a
candidate for a reason, p must be something which can be said to imply
φ’ing, assuming certain ancillary hypothesis. But if it is correct to say
that φ’ing follows from the fact that such and such is the case, it seems
equally correct to say that φ’ing is implied by the agent’s belief that such
and such is the case. If so, Dancy’s point that motivating reasons must
be among the things that can speak in favor of φ’ing is compatible with
psychologism.
Rather than engage in ontological subtleties, we should consider a dis-
tinction in the vicinity that matters in the context of this argument. In
the philosophy of mind, it is crucial to distinguish between the act that is
a mental episode and its content or intentional object. This is the differ-
ence between the taking of an attitude towards an object and the object
towards which one takes to attitude. Although the distinction is basic, it
has proved surprisingly easy to commit the fallacy of confusing the one
with the other. This possibility of confusion is related to what Sellars calls
the “notorious -ing/-end ambiguity”.⁴³ The word “representation” is am-
biguous as it can either mean the act of representing a state of affairs or
the content represented in the act. Accordingly, it is easy to be confused
as to what one means when talking about representations.
This difficulty is not restricted to the word “representation” but is shared
by much mental vocabulary. When we talk about a person’s intentions,
we may refer to what he intends to do, or we may refer to his psychologi-
cal attitudes of intending. Similarly, “belief” may refer to what is believed
but also to the mental act of believing. Concepts of contentful states seem
to be systematically ambiguous. We leave it open to interpret the word in
the sense supplied by the content. However, automatic disambiguation
sometimes fails.
The act-content distinction can be seen as the core of Dancy’s positive
point. He says that, metaphysically speaking, reasons are states of affairs
rather than states of mind because only the former can be good reason.
But it is more accurate to say that reasons are the contents of beliefs
rather than the believings.⁴⁴ The problem is not with the metaphysical
features of states of affairs but rather with two aspects of mental states.
Thus if we, as we should, understand reasons in terms of their roles in
practical arguments, it is clear that what we reason from is not a belief in
⁴³Sellars (1963a: §24, 154).
⁴⁴Dancy himself distinguishes between the believing and the things believed when he
says that “[t]he crucial point here is that believing that p is never (or hardly ever) a good
reason for φ-ing. It is what is believed, that p, that is the good reason for φ-in, if there is
one” (Dancy 2000: 107).
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the sense of an act but in the sense of a content believed.⁴⁵ Reasons of any
kind clearly fall on the content side of the act-content divide.⁴⁶ From the
true observation that motivating reasons must be able to count in favor
of doing something it does not follow that motivating reasons must be
facts but only that they must be believeds rather than believings.
The amended version of Dancy’s objection fails to rule out psychologism.
Of course, some philosophers with psychologistic viewsmay take reasons
to be acts of believing. After all, it is natural to understand “His reason
was his belief that p” to refer to the believing rather than to its intentional
content. However, it would be rash to dismiss psychologism outright.
After all, if psychologism holds that reasons are beliefs, this may also
be construed as meaning that reasons are things believed. The lesson
to draw from Dancy’s normative constraint, then, is that, although act-
psychologism is ruled out, content-psychologism is still in the race.
After noting the negative payoff of normative realism — its insistence
on seeing reasons on the content side of the act-content divide — we can
turn towhat it offers on the positive side. Normative realism identifies the
things believed, which constitute reasons, with facts or states of affairs.
This raises two difficulties. First, we have seen that in isolated cases, there
simply is no fact that could be cited as constituting the agent’s motivating
reason. Given that it is not the case that there is a short westward route
to India, what could explain the fact that Columbus sails west?
Second, according to normative realism’s straightforward interpretation
of statements about normative reasons, they are true in virtue of corre-
sponding to facts about reasons in the world. To know that there is a
reason to φ is to know a fact, so normative realism must posit normative
facts. An agent who recognizes that he ought to do φ first becomes aware
of the fact that he as a reason to do φ and then if all goes well this fact
becomes his motivating reason. According to the realist, these facts not
only make it reasonable that something is worth doing, they also serve
to explain the action when it has occurred. By having explanatory sig-
nificance, they play a rather important role in our picture of the world.
As the normative realist might put it, in action, we react to the reasons
we discover in the world as independent of us. This gives rise to worries
about the kinds of facts we should posit. What makes it sensible to as-
sume that there are non-descriptive facts? If reasons can be evaluative
and reasons are facts, this theorist incurs the ontological commitment
⁴⁵See also chapter 6.
⁴⁶See Alvarez (2008) for a similar conclusion.
44 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REALISM
that there are evaluative facts. It can be objected that it is metaphysically
dubious to assume the existence of evaluative facts.
In order to accommodate the first point, the normative realist needs to
find an ontological alternative to the fact that there is a westward pas-
sage, something that can play the role of a reason. We can rule out facts
about the agent’s psychological state because, as we have seen, this choice
would not allow the realist to differentiate between opaque and isolated
cases. The realist’s best option therefore seems to retreat to saying that
Columbus’s reason for setting sail was, not a fact, but the non-actual state
of affairs that a westward route exists. This commits the theorist to the
existence of non-obtaining states of affairs, an assumption that is con-
troversial. Defending this assumption is not easy because realists regard
intentional actions as reactions to the facts in the world that constitute
reasons, so that Columbus’s going to sea would have to be thought of as
a reaction to a non-obtaining state of affairs. Like normative facts, non-
obtaining states of affairs must be appealed to in explanations of purpose-
ful behavior. The realist must claim that states of affairs can account for
an action even if they are not actual.
Nonetheless, in order not to get caught up in questions relating to the pre-
cise nature of states of affairs, let us waive this ontological difficulty to
focus on the second issue.⁴⁷ Even if normative realism can provide a sat-
isfactory solution to the problem of isolated cases, it still faces a challenge
regarding specifically normative facts. We have already noted that plac-
ing normative elements in a picture of the world largely determined by
scientific naturalism is often found to be problematic. Perhaps the most
prominent attack against the idea that we can reconcile a naturalistic
world-view with the existence of normative facts is found in J.L. Mackie’s
Ethics. In this book Mackie criticizes what he calls “objectivisim”, the
view that there are objective values in the world independent of our sub-
jective inclinations and goals.⁴⁸ In the book, he puts forwardwhat he calls
the argument from “queerness”.⁴⁹ Mackie’s central claim is that values are
not part of the furniture of the world. The argument has an epistemolog-
ical and a metaphysical strand. To begin with the former, if there are
moral truths, clearly we must have a means of epistemically accessing
⁴⁷Perhaps the issue is not as much a problem as it may be thought. In Dancy’s eyes,
the problem of isolated cases is one the realist can cheerfully take in his stride. He tells us
that “something that is not the case can explain an action” is something that “we should
countenance without too much reluctance. In doing so, we will be giving one sense to the
idea that reality is practical” (Dancy 2000: 137).
⁴⁸Mackie (1976: ch. 1).
⁴⁹The second argument he proposes, the argument from relativity, is not relevant to non-
moral values.
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them. But defenders of realism have difficulties explaining how we can
“be aware of […] authoritative prescriptivity” (Mackie 1976: 39). Suppos-
ing that normative truths exist, what sort of knowledge do we have of
them? It seems incredible to suppose that we have sensory perception of
these facts in the sameway in which we know about empirical or descrip-
tive states of affairs. Neither can other well-known sources of knowledge,
such as introspection, inferential reasoning or the testing of empirical hy-
potheses explain our knowledge. The defender of realism seems forced
to accept the existence of a special epistemic faculty of moral or rational
intuition. For Mackie the mental faculty thus posited would be peculiar
as it deviates from the other sources of knowledge.
But to account for knowledge of causally inert, non-natural facts is not
as great a challenge as Mackie seems to assume. The charge that our way
of knowing moral facts is peculiar presupposes that we have a firm grasp
of which epistemic faculty are natural and which are peculiar. But there
is much disagreement about our sources of knowledge. Indeed Mackie
assumes a strictly empiricist view of the world, a view that can no longer
claim to be the uncontested default position. It is hardly clear, as Mackie
appears to suppose, that a defender of the existence of objective values
is committed to the existence of a faculty of normative perception which
functions in a way analogous to sensory perception.⁵⁰ In particular, in-
stead of adhering to the roughly foundationalist picture of knowledge
presupposed by Mackie, it may be argued that we gain our knowledge of
normative truths by considerations of coherence.⁵¹ Moreover, as Mackie
himself points out, moral values are hardly the only entities that are not
easily accommodated in his empiricist scheme. For instance, our knowl-
edge of the axioms of mathematics or of philosophical truths doesn’t fol-
low the model of the knowledge obtained through sense-perception or
simple logical deduction. Thus it is possible to defend our knowledge of
values by appeal to “companions in guilt”: if the existence of values is
ruled out because of their “queerness” then so are a good number of non-
normative entities such as numbers or propositions. At any rate, with
the epistemological argument Mackie accepts the burden of proof that
these non-normative truths, if they are truths, do not equally constitute
a difficulty for an empiricist epistemology.
The second, metaphysical strand of Mackie’s argument is more convinc-
ing. Mackie argues that the fabric of the universe does not include values
because they are “of quite a different order from anything with which
⁵⁰Even the idea of rational intuition has had a recent comeback. Intuitionism in ethics
has been the subject of a book-length defense. Cf. Huemer (2007).
⁵¹Cf. Schmidt (2004: 124–5).
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we are acquainted” (Mackie 1976: 40). One aspect in which values differ
from the paradigmatic properties that on Mackie’s view do populate the
universe — empirical, natural properties — is that they are not in the same
way integrated causally. To mark values as peculiar based on their causal
irrelevance, however, requires an extremely narrow view of what exists.
As with the epistemological argument, this would rule out many other
entities such as numbers. What, then, is the feature that leads Mackie
to describe them as “entities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly
different from anything in the universe”? (Mackie 1976: 38) The answer
lies is the relation of these entities with motivation. As Mackie writes:
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was ac-
quainted with it, not because of any contingent fact that this
person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this
end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness some-
how built into it. (Mackie 1976: 40)
If there was something like an objective good or value in the world, it
would have to be able, as such, to incite our motivation. It would have to
have a built-in property of to-be-pursuedness. But to Mackie this con-
clusion is absurd: nothing in the world has such a property. Having
this property would make values vastly different from other things in
the world, including mathematical objects.
Note that Mackie objects only to the existence of objective goods. A sub-
jective good or value is one whose validity depends on the existence, in
the agent, of a prior aim, an aim that is furthered by doing the good or
valuable thing. For Mackie, the existence of things which are good in
this sense is not problematic. Paying my debts is an action which is good
relative to my desire to keep my contract. But the goodness depends on
my wanting to keep my contract, a goal I have only contingently and as a
matter of my preferences. Absent a subjective goal, it is no longer true to
say that the action is good. For Mackie, then, the only reasons that exist
have the force of hypothetical imperatives. To him, categorical impera-
tives are an illusion perpetuated by our tendency to objectify subjective
values.
Mackie’s goal is to argue against the viability of ethical theories that pre-
suppose the existence of objectively valid values or an objective concep-
tion of goodness. He explicitly targets theMoorean view that moral prop-
erties are non-natural qualities. However, his criticism is also clearly ap-
plicable to the view that there are objectively valid reasons for action,
which after all normative realism conceives as entities with prescriptive
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authority. The argument from “queerness” applies also to normative re-
alism. This is true, it must be added, only to the extent that the real-
ist assumes that the reasons involve “oughts” which have the force of
categorical imperatives. But clearly this is part of the conception of the
version of normative realism we have been considering, which stresses
the authority of reasons without regard to subjective aims. According to
normative realism, reasons for action can, and often do, exist indepen-
dent of any desires the agent has or may have. Our normative reasons
are objective in just this sense.
To see what in Mackie’s eyes is incredible about the alleged to-be-pur-
suedness built into goodness, consider the following line of reasoning. As
we have seen, normative realism assumes that we can have knowledge of
facts about normative reasons. Suppose then that it is a fact that I have
a good reason to help my neighbor move, and suppose also that, perhaps
because he asks me for help, I come to believe that I do; now I’m carrying
a box. Given that I judge that this is what I have reason to do, how do we
explain my actually coming to do so? It clearly is a feature of normative
judgment, as opposed to empirical judgments, that they systematically
cause us to act, and this feature demands explanation. As an explanation,
we should say that there is a tie between judgments about reasons and
motivation. This feature, which is often called internalism, is captured
roughly by the assumption that it is true — and true in a non-accidental
way — that if an agent judges that he has a good reason to do φ, he is apt
to become motivated to do φ. The internalist principle is a description
of the fact that we often become motivated to do as we take ourselves to
have reason to do.⁵²
That this principle poses a problem for normative realism is a result of
the fact that on this view, whether P has a reason to do φ is independent
of his actual state of motivation. This raises the question how realism can
explain that the agent acts on his reason-judgments. If realism appeals,
as it should, to the view that there is an internal connection between
normative judgment and action, it needs to present us with an account
of how normative judgments necessarily give rise to motivation. But its
options are severely limited by the fact that it holds normative facts to
be independent from the agent’s aims. This is a difference between the
two theories of reasons. Psychologism holds that what an agent has good
reasons to do is a function of the agent’s motivation, for, as we have seen,
it assumes the primacy of motivating reasons over normative reasons.
By contrast, realism has a realistic interpretation of normative reason
⁵²More specifically, this could be called reason-motive judgment internalism. See also
chapter 5.
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statements, according to which these statements are true no matter what
the agent happens to desire. Accordingly, it seems mere coincidence if
an agent’s motivation closely matches what he believes he has reason
to do. After all, on this view beliefs about reasons are beliefs about an
independent matter of fact.
Thus the realist view seems to imply that being motivated by norma-
tive judgments seems to depend on the agent’s having some further an-
tecedent desire which supplies the motivational force. For instance, the
view could posit a general desire to do what one has a reason to do. Yet
if this move can establish a connection between judgment and action,
such a connection would not be internal. The existence of this link would
be a matter of the individual psychological makeup, or perhaps it would
amount to a tendency as a part of human psychology in general, with
the possible exception of pathological cases. But even a desire that is em-
bedded deeply in our nature would not explain that it is a non-accidental
truth that normative judgment leads to action, for the connection would
not be a consequence of the meaning of the normative vocabulary but
depend on a contingent motivational disposition.
To meet the internalist condition, the realist may dig in his heels and
stipulate that there is, after all, a link between normative belief and mo-
tivation which is not contingent on human psychology. As a last resort,
he may proclaim that it simply is a brute necessary truth about the rele-
vant concepts that an agent who grasps the fact that she has a reason is
accordingly motivated. To do so is to point to an unexplained truth that
normative facts have a built-in property of to-be-pursuedness. However
if the realist is forced to say that, he does not provide a genuine explana-
tion of the internal connection anymore. One cannot without circular-
ity explain the necessary tie between normative judgment and action by
saying that normative facts have a built-in property of to-be-pursuedness
where to-be-pursuedness is the property of necessarily giving rise to mo-
tivation. Appeal to a property like to-be-pursuedness appears ad hoc and
leaves the tie between normative thought and action utterly mysterious.
That realism divorces normative facts from motivation means that, on
pain of resorting to a “non-explanation” involving to-be-pursuedness, it
must admit that something further is required when moving from the
realization that there is a reason to φ to the corresponding motivation.
Compare the psychologistic theory we have examined. Recall that on this
view statements about normative reasons can be understood in terms of
motivating reasons. On Williams’s view, X has a reason to φ just in case
he would desire φ’ing if he were fully informed, had no false beliefs and
deliberated correctly. If so, for an agent to come to believe that she has
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reason to φ is for her to become convinced that she would desire to φ
if she had access to the relevant facts and made all the inferences that
practical rationality required. This realization is enough for her to im-
mediately move to being motivated to φ; no further goal is required. She
only has to follow out the consequences of what she already believes. One
cannot consistently accept that one would be motivated to φ and still be
unmoved to φ. To do so is to incur charges of irrationality. For psycholo-
gism, there is a conceptual connection between normative judgment and
motivation.⁵³
Mackie’s argument that normative facts would be epistemologically or
metaphysically “queer” is not by itself convincing because once we aban-
don an overly rigid naturalism, we no longer need to see normative facts
as such as problematic. But insofar as Mackie’s point is that realism must
explain the internalist tie, the argument displays a decisive weakness of
realism. If what was said is right, Mackie’s point that a realist viewwould
have to posit a peculiar property of to-be-pursuedness derives its persua-
siveness from the need of every theory of reasons to account for inter-
nalism. The realist’s metaphysical commitments, which alone would not
constitute a decisive argument against the view, stand in the realist’s way
of an illuminating explanation of the internal connection between nor-
mative judgment and motivation. We should interpret Mackie’s argu-
ment as pointing out that normative realism doesn’t have the conceptual
resources required to support the claim that there is an internal motiva-
tional link of beliefs about reasons. On the assumption that there is such
an internal link, we can conclude that realism is not an adequate theory
of reasons.
⁵³Smith (1994: ch. 5) proposes a theory of normative reasons that has much in common
with Williams’s proposal. Building on Williams’s view, Smith replaces the individual con-
straints by what he calls a “summary” analysis. He holds that an agent has a normative
reason to do φ just in case she would desire to φ if she were fully rational. The conditions
of full rationality, he says, cannot be made fully explicit. They include but go beyond the
types of reasoning Williams countenances. Instead of the narrow view held by Williams,
Smith allows for what he calls “systematic justification” of desires. Deliberation of this kind
makes use of the Rawlsian idea of reflective equilibrium. In other words, we can rationally
come to have a new belief by considering how well the new desire would fit in or cohere
with the existing set of desires, an idea that also involves explanatory relations between
general and specific desires.
This proposal is more liberal than Williams’s because it allows for greater differences
between an agent’s normative reasons and his actual existing motivational set. But like
Williams’s view, Smith’s more liberal conception of normative reasons can account for the
fact that in reasons the intentional and deliberative perspectives come together. For him X
has a reason to φ iff she would desire to φ if fully rational. Given this analysis, it is even
plainer that failure to be moved by the thought that there is a reason to φ is impossible with-
out incurring charges of irrationality. Smith explicitly takes this feature as an advantage of
his theory (Smith 1994: 177ff).
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1.5 Internalism
What has been shown by the preceding discussion is the conditional claim
that if internalism judgments is right, realism fails to fulfill its task of
explaining the conceptual connection. What can be said in favor if this
view?
“Internalism” means different views to different writers.⁵⁴ In this section,
we will be concerned exclusively with what is often called judgment in-
ternalism.⁵⁵ According to judgment internalism, an agent’s judgments
about reasons are related to his or her motivation.⁵⁶ It follows that a
person cannot candidly assert, or believe, that he ought to do an action
without, in a sense to be specified, being motivated to do so. Judgment
externalists typically agree that agents who judge that there is a reason
often are motivated to comply with it, but deny that this connection is
as tight as internalism claims. Agents regularly comply with their own
reason-judgments but the fact that they do is not a matter of necessity.
For externalists, agents who are motivated by their own normative judg-
ment have a further motivation that is relevantly related to their reason.⁵⁷
It is intuitively plausible that prescriptive concepts such as “ought” or
⁵⁴Cf. Darwall (1997).
⁵⁵Judgment internalism must be distinguished from existence internalism, the view that
whether or not an agent has a reason depends on his motivational states, i.e. on his desires.
For a discussion of existence internalism, see §5.2–3.
⁵⁶The internalist principle under that namewas introduced into the debate by Falk (1947).
However ideas in the vicinity such as the claim that goodness has “a certain magnetism”
(Stevenson 1952: 417) were common even before Falk’s article. As Darwall, Gibbard, and
Railton (1992) point out, the topic is already present in an inchoate form in Moore’s open
question argument (Moore 1959: ch. 1). We can find the idea that rationalist theories of
moral terms are open to objections based on judgment-internalism already in Hume’s Trea-
tise:
In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are eter-
nal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, it is not sufficient to shew the
relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connex-
ion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is
so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take place and have
its influence; though the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects
immense and infinite. (Hume 1978: 3.1.1, 465–6)
Hume adds that “we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they really existed and
were perceiv’d, wou’d be universally forcible and obligatory” (Hume 1978: 3.1.1, 466). Dar-
wall (2002) calls the difficulty of rationalists moral theories to accommodate the internal
links “Hume’s challenge”. For an attempt to develop a topology of the different internalist
views, see Robertson (2001).
⁵⁷“Internalism” in the rest of this chapter should be understood as referring to judgment
internalism rather than existence internalism.
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“reason” have an internal connection to motivation. It seems part of the
essence of these notions that self-directed judgments involving “ought”
and “reason” affect our motivation. Furthermore, we can observe that
the connection between normative judgment and action is strong and re-
liable.⁵⁸ At least in the majority of cases, motivation reliably tracks nor-
mative judgment. If an agent changes his normative beliefs about what to
do, we typically expect his motivation to shift accordingly. Internalism is
in a particularly good position to explain the reliability because it posits
an internal connection.
For this reason, judgment internalism has been regarded as the standard
view for most of 20th-century moral psychology, a view that hardly re-
quires argument. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, judgment
internalism is sometimes challenged.⁵⁹ According to judgment internal-
ism, an agent who judges that she ought to do φ has a motivation to do so;
and it is not merely accidentally true. What does it mean, in this context,
that the agent has a motivation? Clearly it cannot mean that the agent ac-
tually does φ. There are many circumstances that may prevent an agent
from φ’ing. If these circumstances are present, the fact that the agent
doesn’t φ is no indication that he doesn’t judge that he ought to φ. For
instance, the agent may be physically prevented from φ’ing, through the
actions of another person, physical force or even through paralysis. Here
we would say that, despite his inaction, S nonetheless has a motivation to
do φ. Still, motivation is close to behavior: if no preventing circumstances
are present, there is a strong expectation that an agent with motivation
to φ will in fact φ.
An action is typically the product of practical reasoning, in which the
thoughts involved can be arranged on a scale, depending on how close
to action they are. The one extreme is action or being motivated to act.
This motivation which is apt to be turned into reality is the intention to
do φ here and now. The agent typically doesn’t form intentions spon-
taneously, however. Instead the process leading to a decision, the pro-
cess which concludes in motivation and (typically) action, involves other
thoughts. One such thought may be that one has a reason to bring about
state of affair X and that doing φ is one way, perhaps the best way, to
achieve X. This belief, too, is a normative judgment, albeit one which
is one or more places removed from action. Of course not all normative
⁵⁸As Smith writes, “it is a striking fact about moral motivation that a change in motivation
follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgment, at least in the good and strong-
willed person. A plausible theory of moral judgment must therefore explain this striking
fact” (Smith 1994: 71). For Smith, externalism has great difficulties in accounting for this
observation.
⁵⁹For a discussion of the challenges, see Smith (1994: ch. 3).
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judgments automatically move us to action. Amayor can judge that there
is a reason to repair potholes in the streets without being so motivated
if he also judges that there is another, stronger prima facie reason to do
something else, perhaps to keep the fire department from running out of
funds. A reason-judgment is only necessarily motivating, as demanded
by internalism, if the reason involved is a conclusive reason. The deliber-
ative chain leading to the decision may incorporate different prima facie
goals and different means, in the form of another normative judgment at
some distance from the action.
Now this array of normative judgments is linked to the action logically.
Judgments about relative strengths of reasons lead to judgments about
what to do, and we move from one judgment to the other by practical
arguments. The thought that the only options available are φ and ψ and
the thought that φ’ing is better than ψ’ing all things considered entails
the all-out conclusion that φ’ing is what ought to be done. Sometimes,
as when in reasoning about what to do this evening we decide between
two attractive options, the choice is free, but often, through practical rea-
soning, we find ourselves compelled logically to do something. The force
of these lines of thought is logical force. The various normative thoughts
in this deliberative chains are linked by inferential connections. Now we
might say that depending on the proximity to the action, the different
normative judgments have a closer conceptual proximity to the action.
There is a conceptual connection between a desirability-judgment and
the corresponding judgment, but this connection is comparatively weak.
A stronger connection exists between the judgment that φ’ing is better
than all other alternatives and φ’ing, and yet a stronger connection be-
tween forming the intention to φ and doing φ. There are, then, various
internal connections in the vicinity of varying degree.
To return to the internal connection we are discussing primarily, can an
agent assert sincerely that there is a conclusive reason to do φ and at
the same time show no sign of being motivated to φ? Externalists have
affirmed this possibility.⁶⁰ They insist that being motivated requires, in
the agent, a certain antecedent desire or motivational disposition to do
what one ought to do. Without such a tendency, an agent would not
in fact be motivated to do φ when he judges this to be what he ought
to do. Moreover, the fact that human beings have such a tendency (if
they do) is merely a contingent fact about human psychology, albeit one
widely shared. If so, it may still be the case that our normative judgments
are reliably efficacious, but such a psychological regularity would only
⁶⁰Cf. Brink (1989).
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support an accidental connection between normative thought and action;
this would not license talk of an internal connection.
Here, however, it is important to clarify the claim of externalists. Exter-
nalists deny that there is a conceptual connection between S’s judgments
about what she ought to do and motivation. Because internalism origi-
nates in the discussion of moral psychology, what is typically meant by
the word “ought” in the statement of internalism is a distinctly moral
obligation. Externalists are skeptical about the necessary nature of moral
motivation: for them it is possible, if perhaps unlikely, for an agent to
think that doing something is right without taking this as something that
has normative force for him. This can be seen by the kinds of counterex-
amples which externalists have taken to support their claims. Thus we
may imagine an agent who judges that φ’ing would be morally right but
has stopped caring about doing the right thing. In order to be able tomake
the transition from judging that φ’ing is right to doing φ, according to the
externalist, an additional conative state is required. An imagined amoral-
ist does not possess this optional motivational tendency. There has been
much debate about whether an amoralist is in fact a genuine possibility —
whether an agent could be entirely unmoved by an acknowledged moral
good. An internalist reply might be that we have reason to deny that the
unmoved agent really is making moral judgments; one might claim that
the agent is using the moral expressions merely in an inverted-comma
sense. Such an agent, the argument might run, does not really believe
the action to be right but only that it is “right” in the sense of being the
consequence of certain moral standards — standards that the agent may
not endorse. The externalist, in turn, can reply that, if we can imagine an
unmotivated person who sincerely asserts that the action is right, such a
person cannot be a conceptual impossibility.
Notice, however, that the question whether internalism in this sense —
concerning judgments about what is right — is true is distinct from a
rather different internalism, the view that judgments about what one has
a conclusive reason to do are non-accidentally connected to motivation.
This latter view, which concerns normative judgments in general as op-
posed to specifically moral judgments, is the focus of the present discus-
sion. This latter view, which may be called reasons-motivation internal-
ism, is more easily defended than its ambitious moral cousin. Consider an
attempt to sketch a counterexample to this view. This would be an agent
who judges that she has a conclusive reason to φ but does not show any
sign of being motivated to φ. If the amoralist classifies actions as right
or wrong but does not care about what it is right to do, the arational-
ist would classify things as the things it would be rational or irrational
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for him to do but does not care about what it is rational to do. To do so
would amount to opting out of the project of being responsive to reasons.
It is much harder to imagine such a person, who would be indifferent to
her own reasons while staying, so to speak, in the business of intentional
action. Here, even more than in the moral case, it seems plausible to con-
clude that the arationalist does not really make the normative judgment
we are tentatively attributing to him. If a person persistently displays
motivationally inert reasons-judgments, we are likely to look for expla-
nations for his behavior other than indifference to his own rationality.
The agent’s assertions may be insincere, or he may not have mastered
the normative concepts properly.⁶¹
Internalism about morality has the ring of truth, but as the existence
of counterexamples shows, we cannot assume the truth of this position
without detailed criticism of externalist proposals. The answer to the
question depends on whether it can be shown that moral demands are a
species of rational demands — whether to say that φ is morally called for
is to say that it would be irrational not to φ. Externalists are apt to deny
this relationship. According to them, it is possible for someone, without
loss of rationality, to hold that φ is morally correct while taking himself
not to have a reason to do φ.⁶² Nothing we have said rules this possibil-
ity out.⁶³ Rather than deciding the question one way or another, I will
instead point out here only that, at least on many views, the possibility
of moral externalism rests on an internalism about normative judgments
more generally. Even among moral externalists, normative judgment in-
ternalism is a commonly held view.⁶⁴
It has, however, been pointed out that even normative judgment internal-
ism faces counterexamples.⁶⁵ The view we have been considering holds
that, by conceptual necessity, any agent who judges that she ought to do φ
is motivated to φ, where the ought in the claim is the generic ought of ra-
tionality rather than a moral ought. This view seems too strong, as can be
seen from two types of counterexamples commonly given. First, consider
a losing squash player who values fair play and sportsmanship.⁶⁶ In a fit
of uncontrollable anger, however, he wildly thrusts his racket at his op-
ponent. He does this although he believes that it is not the correct thing
to do, even by his own standards, and that it would be irrational to do
⁶¹Cf. Scanlon (2010: 14).
⁶²A view that takes this to be impossible can be called judgment-reasons internalism.
⁶³Wallace (2005) rejects moral judgment internalism while maintaining that there are
substantial conditions on moral judgments.
⁶⁴Cf. Darwall (1997: 307).
⁶⁵Cf. Smith (1994: 137ff).
⁶⁶The example is adapted from Watson (1982).
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so. Even though he has every opportunity to remain friendly, the player
acts against his normative judgment. According to the strong internalism
we have been working with, the situation must be badly described. The
view says that it is impossible to genuinely make the judgment in ques-
tion without being motivated to remain calm. Should we say that in this
case, the agent did not really judge that he had a reason not to throw the
racket? Second, consider a student who judges that he has a conclusive
reason, vividly present to him, to study for his exams but instead keeps
lying on his couch. Does that mean that his assertion that he ought to
study is not genuine? This reproach may well be justified: he may be lazy
or in fact not invested in his work. This would mean that his real pref-
erence is to do nothing. However, it also seems possible that the case is
more serious. Thus the agent may find it impossible to muster the will to
study because of a profound sense of despair or desperation. Such a psy-
chological malady would in effect prevent the agent from developing the
relevant motivation. Michael Stocker lists a number of conditions that
can have this effect:
Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie, through
weakness of body, through illness, through general apathy,
through despair, through inability to concentrate, through
a feeling of uselessness or futility, and so on, one may feel
less and less motivated to seek what is good. One’s lessened
desire need not signal, much less be the product of, the fact
that, or one’s belief that, there is less good to be obtained or
produced, as in the case of a universalWeltschmerz. (Stocker
1979: 744)
According to Stocker, we can describe an agent who fails to be motivated
to φ by a normative assessment because of some form of depression as one
who still judges that φ’ing is desirable despite his total lack of motivation.
Depression is a state where what is seen as good is not felt as having
any motivating effect. It would be a mistake to say that because of his
inaction, the agent doesn’t really believe that he ought to φ. If Stocker’s
description of the case is correct, it is after all possible to judge sincerely
that there is a conclusive reason to φ and yet lack a motivation.
Both cases point to a deficiency in internalism aswe have conceived it. As
the squash player and student show, it is not true without exception that
an agent who believes he should φ is automatically motivated accord-
ingly. Still, the cases are somewhat special in that in either case there
seems to be something amiss with the agent. The agent’s motivation is
out of step with his normative assessment of the situation. The squash
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player finds it impossible to resist the urge to thrust the racket at his op-
ponent even though he thinks that this is not what he ought to do. This
points to a rational tension in the agent: the akratic gap between judg-
ment and motivation is not just the failure of a regularity but a case of
the agent failing to do what he knows is rationally required to do.⁶⁷ The
student, while not having an irresistible urge, also fails to be responsive
to his own normative judgment, even if he is not physically prevented
from doing so. To begin, this means that these cases deviate from normal
situations. The examples are clear because we suppose that, in their nor-
mal non-akratic state, agents would be motivated appropriately. Suppose
that the squash player is just a choleric person in general who never holds
his emotions in check. If the player consistently acts angrily and aggres-
sively, we would, after some time, stop treating him as weak-willed; we
would, in effect, begin to treat his claims that he has a reason to be mod-
erate as spurious. The depressed student is only in a temporary phase of
indifference. The attribution of a genuine judgment that studying is the
thing to do is apt to become doubtful and eventually cease if the agent
continues in his ineffectual assertions for too long, remaining indiffer-
ent to his own professed good. Judging an agent to be akratic requires
a background of successful attributions enough of which lead to motiva-
tion; otherwise the attributions become hollow. It seems essential that
we have in mind a normal case with which to contrast the behavior.⁶⁸
Nonetheless these cases involving weakness of the will illustrate an im-
portant point about our normative judgments. On the one hand, we have
a justified expectation that these judgments are followed by the moti-
vation they are connected with. The connection is reliable, but, more
strongly, it is also a conceptual connection. It is essential to beliefs about
one’s own reasons that these beliefs are connected to action by way of
inferential connections. Such a belief would not be the mental state it
is if it didn’t stand in the inferential relations to immediately motivat-
ing intentions.⁶⁹ There are, as we may say, implications running from
reasons-judgments to motivation. The naive expression of such a princi-
ple is:
Strong Internalism If X judges that he has a conclusive reason to φ, then
he is ipso facto motivated to φ.
We can call this version of the thesis strong internalism. However as is
⁶⁷Akrasia will be the subject of §4.2.
⁶⁸The relation to normal conditions is stressed by Dreier (1990).
⁶⁹For an account of the puzzling idea that the relation between a reasons-judgment and
the corresponding motivation can be conceptual, see §5.1.
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now clear, this view cannot be true as it stands because there are agents
who make the judgments without being appropriately motivated. The
connection is not as strict as the formulation implies. The principle needs
to be qualified:
Weak Internalism If X judges that he has a conclusive reason to φ, then,
ceteris paribus, he is motivated to do φ.
According to weak internalism, there are exceptions to the general thesis.
In other words, there are conditions that prevent the agents from making
the correct step leading from the normative judgment to the motivation.
Although there is a strong relation, the relation is defeasible if certain
conditions are present. The exceptions, of course, include at least the
two kinds of counterexamples we have been considering. An intensely
emotional state such as anger may prevent the squash player from being
able to stop himself from doing something that he deems wrong. In such
an agitated state of mind, he fails to be rational by his own lights. He does
not react to his own judgment in the way that, as he is aware, reason calls
for. Similarly, the depressed student is prevented by his disaffected state
from developingmotivations that are rationally required, even by his own
lights. Accidie is a form of irrationality.
To summarize, strong internalism is the view that ifX judges that he has a
conclusive reason to φ, he is ipso factomotivated to do so. Thismeans that
such a judgment is a kind of motivation. Strong internalism implies that
the scenarios of the squash player and the depressed student are badly
described, but we have good reasons to say that these cases are genuine.
If strong internalism posits too rigid a connection between the two, we
should replace it by weak internalism. On this view there is an internal
connection between reason-judgment andmotivation, but it is defeasible.
Normative judgment and motivation are separate states which can come
apart.
Hence it is impossible only for a rational agent to assert candidly that
there is conclusive reason to φ without being motivated to φ. There is
a requirement of rationality that the agent become motivated in accor-
dance with his normative beliefs, a requirement that, like any genuine
requirement, it is possible to violate.⁷⁰ One may object that the relation
posited by weak internalism is not a conceptual connection. But this ob-
jection is groundless. The fact that statement has a ceteris paribus rider
does not in any way affect its status as a truth about the logic of the con-
cepts and states involved. Though it leaves the possibility of exceptions
⁷⁰For an elaboration of the notion of a rational requirements, see chapter 6.
58 CHAPTER 1. PSYCHOLOGISM AND REALISM
due to akrasia, it is still true that a rational agent is necessarily motivated
by his normative judgments. It is a matter of conceptual truth that if you
judge you have a conclusive reason to φ, either you are motivated to φ or
you are irrational. Far from being implausible, it is in fact to be expected
that there is the possibility of having the one state without the other.
As these conceptual connections are rational links, they are not without
exception, but neither are other conceptual connections such as “If you
believe that X is a triangle, then also believe that it is a polygon”. Even
for someone who has mastered the concepts, the two beliefs can come
apart, though not without impacting the subject’s rationality.⁷¹
It may be thought that weak internalism presents a smaller challenge for
normative realism than the stronger variant. But realism is in no posi-
tion to explain weak internalism. For how can it explain that an agent
who grasps a reason-fact without being motivated must be irrational? It
can, of course, simply stipulate that these facts are such that it would
be irrational to look them in the eye unmoved. But instead of giving
an explanation, it assumes a property of to-be-pursuedness-on-pain-of-
irrationality, which once again leaves the phenomenon of motivation by
normative considerations mysterious.
1.6 A Sellarsian conclusion
In this chapter, we have compared two theories of reasons. We have dis-
cussed a series of arguments. The phenomenological argument against
normative realism has been found inconclusive. On the other side, Dancy’s
argument against the three-part story did not survive critical scrutiny.
Next, Mackie’s objections against the metaphysics and epistemology of
normative realism, though themselves not convincing, prompted us to
examine the ability of realism to provide an explanation of the internal
connection between normative judgment and motivation. Normative re-
alism proved unable to explain internalism.
Even with normative realism ruled out, we should not uncritically accept
psychologism. We have already seen a difficulty with some versions of
psychologism: act-psychologism fails to reveal the sense in which nor-
mative reasons and motivating reasons are two sides of the same coin.
Content-psychologism avoids this difficulty.⁷² However, act-psychologim
⁷¹For more on this point, see §5.1.
⁷²That the theory of reasons developed below is a version of content-psychologism will
also be clear from the discussion of rational requirements in chapter 6.
1.6. A SELLARSIAN CONCLUSION 59
has historically had numerous defenders, many which subscribe to some
form of Humeanism. In chapter 2, we will explore the broadly Humean
approach taken by most contemporary defenders of the thesis that rea-
sons are constituted by states such as beliefs and desires. Chapters 2 to 4
constitute an extended argument that Humeanism, as it is mostly under-
stood, is unsatisfactory.⁷³
A short digression to Wilfrid Sellars’s metaethics will be helpful to map
out a course for the argument of the following chapters. In his article “Im-
peratives, Intentions, and the Logic of ‘Ought’”, Sellars sets up a contrast
between two polar opposites and two of the most important metaethical
views of his time, rationalist intuitionism on the one hand and empiricist
emotivism on the other.⁷⁴ He discusses both positions with a view to the
question of how they relate to judgment-internalism. Like normative re-
alism as we have conceived it, intuitionism regards normative or moral
facts as objectively independent states of affairs we can grasp, whereas
emotivism provides a non-cognitive analysis ofmoral statements in terms
of the expression of attitudes of approval or disapproval.⁷⁵ For the emo-
tivist, the linguistic performance one produces when asserting that one
ought to φ is not an assertion, or the expression of a belief, but the ex-
pression of a non-cognitive state of motivation. So on the emotivist view,
there is a trivially internal connection between normative judgments and
motivation. In fact, emotivism can claim with some justification that ac-
cording to it judging that one ought to φ is a way to be motivated to
do φ. The emotivist analysis has the great virtue of accounting for the
phenomenon of judgment-internalism.
There is a strong resemblance between the dispute between intuition-
ism and emotivism, as reported by Sellars, and the dispute we have been
considering, between normative realism and psychologism. Normative
realism, just like intuitionism, is facing great difficulties regarding the
relation of normative judgments to motivation. Now for Sellars, the ar-
gument has a flip side. Emotivism, even if it excels at explaining the re-
lation of prescriptive thought to motivation, has difficulties of its own as
its analysis of normative judgments sees them as “judgments” really only
in an attenuated sense, indeed in a sense that bears little resemblance to
full-blown theoretical judgments. It conceives sentences containing the
word “ought” as the expressions of favorable attitudes towards a certain
state of affairs which themselves are not integrated into our reasoning
⁷³For a tentative return to the topic of psychologism, see §3.5.
⁷⁴Sellars (1963b).
⁷⁵Ayer (1990: ch. 6) was influential for the development of emotivism. Ross (1973: ch. 1–
2) is a sophisticated statement of intuitionist non-naturalism.
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processes. According to emotivism, as compared to descriptive discourse
prescriptive vocabulary is a second-class citizen, which has only “emo-
tive meaning” rather than descriptive meaning. But for Sellars, this is
a profound mistake. He considers it important that “‘ought’ has as dis-
tinguished a role in discourse as descriptive and logical terms” (Sellars
1957: 282). He stresses that “we reason rather than ‘reason’ concerning
ought”. In other words, emotivism mistakes normative judgments for the
expressions of brute inclinations or tendencies without bona fide rational
relations connecting them.
Yet as Sellars points out this is manifestly false: we reason about the nor-
mative — after all, we know not just the theoretical syllogism but also
the practical syllogism —, we argue and disagree among ourselves, our
methods of reasoning are rich and we have at our disposal substantial
resources of normative concepts which are no less inferentially articu-
lated than their empirical counterparts. Judgments about reasons obey
the standard rules of quantificational and propositional logic.⁷⁶ The part
of the intuitionist in Sellars’s dialectic is to insist on precisely these dis-
cursive features of prescriptive discourse. The intuitionist captures this
point well by insisting “on the truly propositional character of prescrip-
tive statements, as over and against the emotivist contention that eth-
ical concepts are ‘pseudo-concepts’ and the logic of moral discourse is
‘pseudo-logic’” (Sellars 1963b: 162). Intuitionism emphasizes the paral-
lels between theoretical — e.g. mathematical — reasoning and practical
reasoning and is thereby in a good position to explain the argumenta-
tive, discursive phenomenology of practical discourse. This is as much a
difficulty for emotivism as it is a merit of intuitionism.
Emotivism is in danger of underestimating the cognitive nature of nor-
mative judgments and of practical attitudes in general. An analogous line
of reasoning suggests that a similar danger threatens psychologism, and
in particular Humean varieties of psychologism. There are, of course,
disanalogies between contemporary Humeanism and the emotivism of
Sellars’s day.⁷⁷ The modest point now is that there is a structural analogy
between the two polar opposites that Sellars compares, on the one hand,
and the views discussed here, on the other. Lines of thought similar to
those brought to bear by Sellars also apply, with the appropriate modifi-
cations, to normative realism and psychologism. We have already seen
⁷⁶Cf. Scanlon (2010: 10).
⁷⁷The views under discussion, psychologism and normative realism, are theories about
reasons and the rational ought in general, whereas the views Sellars is concerned with are
primarily interested in moral obligations. What is more, psychologism does not propose the
same analysis of prescriptive discourse as emotivism, and in any event expressivist philos-
ophy has come a long way since its emotivist roots in the writings of Ayer and Stevenson.
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that normative realism suffers from inadequacies not unlike those Sell-
ars found in intuitionism: the metaphysical and epistemological extrav-
agances make a mystery out of the crucial relation between normative
judgment and motivation. As I will attempt to show in the next chapter,
we have reason to object to many versions of psychologism on grounds
that are similar to those Sellars has for being dissatisfied with empiricist
view of practical discourse.
Sellars presents the controversy between intuitionists and emotivists as a
dilemma. If we choose the intuitionist’s view of normative judgments, we
are able to account for the discursive nature of prescriptive language. To
do so, however, is also to accept metaphysical commitments that make it
impossible to elucidate that the connection between thinking and doing
is “a matter of strict logic” (Sellars 1963b: 162). On the other hand, adopt-
ing the emotivist analysis of prescriptive ‘judgments’ allows us to clarify
the connection between the meaning of normative vocabulary and moti-
vation. But if we accept this view, we obscure the rational integration of
practical discourse, the fact that moral propositions logically entail, and
are logically entailed by, other propositions. For Sellars, we do not need
to embrace either horn of the dilemma. Neither extreme allows us to ap-
preciate the idea that practical reasoning actually deserves its name by
at once being practical in its outcome and, at the same time, a genuine
form of reasoning. Intuitionism fails the first requirement, emotivism the
second.
The suggestion made by Sellars is that there is a metaethical theory that
combines the strengths of both positions while avoiding their respec-
tive pitfalls. Although the details of how his account of metaethics can
achieve this dual goal are far from clear, he emphasizes the importance of
an “adequate philosophy of mind” for this project and spends the rest of
his discussion sketching an account of the inferential interrelations be-
tween normative concepts and concepts expressing practically oriented
psychological states, in particular intentions.
The analogy furnishes us, not with an argument against psychologism,
but with a plan of how to develop an adequate theory of reasons. For
the present topic, the Sellarsian conception allows us to draw three ten-
tative lessons. As in Sellars’s discussion, the choice between normative
realism and psychologism in its most common form represents a false di-
chotomy. There is a via media between the rationalist normative realism
and empiricist psychologism. As in Sellars’s story, there are two cru-
cial requirements. First, an adequate theory of reasons needs to account
for the internal connection between reasons-judgments and motivation.
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As we have seen, normative realism falls short of this goal.⁷⁸ Second,
an adequate theory of reasons needs to show how reason-judgments are
essentially integrated into our practices of reasoning. If there is a struc-
tural analogy between Sellars’s discussion and ours, we have reason to
suspect that there are analogous problemswith psychologism in this area.
Along these lines, the second chapter will argue for the conclusion that
Humeanism has difficulties meeting this second goal. If neither Humean
psychologism nor normative realism are adequate, we need to look for an
alternative that meets both conditions simultaneously. The third chapter
offers an attempt to sketch an alternative theory of reasons of this sort.
Finally, we can draw from Sellars’s article the further lesson that in order
to remove the appearance of a dilemma, we need to question assumptions
in the philosophy of mind. As a reflection of this point, the criticism
against psychologism in chapter 2 will proceed by examining critically
the notion of desire, the psychological state Humeanism sees as central
to its project. The goal of the rest of this thesis will be to meet Sellars’s
twin requirements — illuminating internalism and showing intentional
action to be the result of reasoning in the full-blooded sense of the term
— by developing, even if only in outline, a theory of reasons based on a
more adequate conception of an action-rationalizing state of mind.⁷⁹
⁷⁸See §5.1 on how to meet this goal.
⁷⁹A crucial part of this project will be the introduction of the notion of a practical com-
mitment, which is defended in §3.4.
Chapter 2
Low-brow desires
2.1 Skepticism about practical reasons
Humeanism — perhaps the dominant form of psychologism in the theory
of action— assigns desires, or desire-like states, a critical role in its view of
intentional agency. On a Humean view, reasons for action are inexorably
linked with desires. To explore the nature of reasons further, we need to
assess the Humean conception of reasons as well as the nature of desires.
The present chapter begins this task by introducing (§1) the distinctive
view Humeans take on practical reasons (in the plural) as well on prac-
tical reason (in the singular). Next we explore common motivations for
the Humean view (§2). As the mental state of desire plays a crucial role
in the Humean account, we proceed to two common conceptions of the
mental state of desire. After showing inadequacies of the phenomeno-
logical conception (§3), we focus on dispositionalism, the most defensi-
ble conception of desire proposed by Humeans (§4). The emerging sus-
picion that even dispositionalism cannot support the Humean thesis is
confirmed as we discuss a number of defenses of a dispositionalist ver-
sion of Humeanism (§5). The discussion of a final attempt to leverage the
instrumental principle to strengthen the Humean view of agency, which
again turns out to fall short of achieving its goal, concludes our review of
Humean ways to understand desire (§6).
As I understand it, Humeanism consists of two related claims, the first
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about reasons, the second about reason:¹
Desire-based reasons thesis Desires, and only desires, provide agentswith
reasons.
Instrumentalism There is a form of genuinely practical use of reason, but
it is restricted to means-end rationality.
The first claim is that all our practical reasons have their source in the
agent’s desires.² This involves the negative point that an agent has a rea-
son only when he also has a desire of the relevant sort, as well as the
positive point that we have our reasons by virtue of wanting to do things.
What does the Humean mean when he says that desires provide us with
reasons? To see this we have to turn to the second thesis associated with
Humeanism. Humeanism is at least partly defined by a skeptical attitude
towards reasons for doing things but also towards the process of reason-
ing and the associated mental faculty of reason or rationality.³ It should
be clear from the outset that talk about reasons cannot be divorced from
talk about reasoning — and indeed from talk about the faculty of reason.
An answer to the question “What reasons for acting do we have?” is also
an answer to the question “How do we reason about action?” as well as
the question “What is the scope of practical reason?”
Humean skepticism is directed at what is perceived as an overly inclusive
conception of practical rationality. We can understand this, historically,
as a response to rationalists who often took it for granted that we can ar-
rive at practical conclusions through purely rational procedures, by being
¹See the end of this section for reservations about the term “Humeanism”.
²Citing Gilbert Harman, Stephen Darwall, who coined the expression but doesn’t es-
pouse the view, defines the desire-based reasons thesis as “the doctrine that the only reasons
for an agent to act are those which […] ‘have their source in the agent’s desires’” (Darwall
1985: 27). Defending a version of this thesis, Harman writers:
If S says that (morally) A ought to do D, S implies that A has reasons to do
D which S endorses. I shall assume that such reasons would have to have
their source in goals, desires, or intentions that S takes A to have and that S
approves of A’s having because S shares those goals, desires, or intentions
(Harman 2007: 38).
³Korsgaard lays stress on the phrase “skepticism about practical reason” in her seminal
Korsgaard (1996). It should be noted, however, that while Korsgaard, who revisits the theme
in Korsgaard (2008), calls Hume a skeptic about practical reasoning, in the earlier essay she
does not fully acknowledge the full extent to which Hume is skeptical about the scope of
reason. In the later essay, she sees Hume in a more radical light. Below I will distinguish
skepticism tout court, which applies to contemporary instrumentalists as well as to Hume,
from the more radical practical skepticism defended by Hume himself.
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in contact with eternal truths and without thereby relying on any preex-
isting attitudes. The Humean queries the justification of these allegedly
rational procedures. Instead of thinking, as the rationalist does, that rea-
son alone can arrive at a particular practical conclusion, the Humean im-
poses strict constraints on what counts as the proper use of rationality.
The instrumentalist view of practical reason gives expression to Humean
skepticism about excessive conceptions of what constitutes proper rea-
soning. Jean Hampton usefully proposes a definition of instrumentalism
as making three claims:
1. An action is rational to the extent that an agent believes
(reasonably) that it furthers the attainment of an end;
and
2. Human reasoning involves the determination of means
to achieve ends in a way described by the theory; and
3. These ends are in noway fixed by reason operating non-
instrumentally, i.e., what makes them our ends is some-
thing other than reason. (Hampton 1995: 57)
Hampton’s second point is a recognition of the fact that human beings
engage in practical reasoning: they make inferences leading to practical
conclusions. Virtually everyone accepts that we, as agents, frequently
engage in this type of mental process:
I shall do φ. Doing φ requires that I do ψ. So I shall do ψ.
is accepted by all parties. What is not uncontroversial is the exact way of
demarcating practical reasoning. However, there is no doubt that “To kill
my aunt, I need to poison her” counts as a piece of instrumental reason-
ing, so despite any quibbles, we have a fairly clear idea what instrumental
rationality consists in.⁴
⁴The core or, for some, even the whole of instrumental reasoning is a species of (or
application of) causal reasoning. Its primary or only purpose is to discover what it takes
to bring about a certain state of affairs, and to answer this question, causal knowledge is
required. In this way, instrumental reasoning is very similar to regular theoretical reasoning
about causes and effects, so we could call it the flip side of theoretical reasoning. Some
authors have a narrow conception of what constitutes instrumental reasoning (restricting it
tomeans-end relationships strictly speaking), while others count other sorts of relationships
as instrumental as well. For instance, Williams (1981a) argues that an important element
of practical — thus for him, instrumental — reasoning is reasoning about what constitutes
doing a certain activity. If the agent’s goal is to spend a pleasant evening in town, his going
to the opera may or may not conform to his understanding of this; but if it is, it would not
be entirely correct to say that going to the opera is a means towards spending a pleasant
evening. Instead, the latter consists in the former activity.
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According to the first point in Hampton’s list, an action is rational only
to the extent that, on the agent’s view, it is instrumentally useful to the
attainment of an end. The instrumentalist view is that reason can only
dictate or veto an action insofar as it is seen as the only way, or best way,
to attain a given end. This principle limits the ways in which we can
evaluate an action as rational or irrational, correct or incorrect. Instru-
mentalists regard it as inappropriate to criticize an action as irrational, or
commend it as demanded rationally, unless we can point to an end that
is purportedly promoted by the means. It follows that an action can be
rational or irrational only in a restricted sense. Whereas instrumentalists
countenance only rationality depending on predetermined ends, ratio-
nalists hold that there are further, non-instrumental ways for an action
to be rational or irrational and, as a result, ways of criticizing or recom-
mending action which are not relative to an end. Humeanism treats these
claims with skepticism.
It is important to see, however, that in addition to the negative point,
the second point also has a positive component. Rather than denying the
applicability of questions of rationality to actions altogether, instrumen-
talism holds that it is possible to recommend or criticize an action ratio-
nally. On the instrumentalist view, reason can be practical, if only in a
strictly limited sense: it can be practical insofar as it depends essentially
on the starting point of a prior end. This, of course, is a severe limitation,
but the view does not amount to a radical skepticism about practical ra-
tionality. A radical skeptic questions the idea of practical rationality in
general. Instrumentalism stops short of the radical contention that prac-
tical reason is an illusion; it only asks us to agree that practical reason
does not possess the scope rationalists would have us believe it does.
If, for instrumentalism, practical rationality is always contingent on the
existence of prior ends, what kinds of ends are capable of making ac-
tions rational or irrational? How are they determined? The third point in
Hampton’s list stipulates that these ends cannot themselves be the prod-
uct of reason acting in any way except through causal or instrumental
considerations. It is easy to see that this provision is necessary to rule
out certain rationalist views. Suppose that we could answer the question
“Which ends does the agent have?” by pointing to facts about what it
is reasonable for the agent to do, viz. facts that are themselves deemed
independent of the agent’s prior motivations. If so, the rationalist could
easily short-circuit the first instrumentalist claim by arguing that what
ends the agent has is a matter of their being rationally required. As a
result, it would still nominally be true that only means-end relationships
give a proposed action the cachet of being rational, but the ends in ques-
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tionwould themselves be open to further rational criticism and argument.
Consequently, the question what it is for an action to be rational or ir-
rational would be deferred to the question what ultimately determines
ends, leaving it open to the rationalist to introduce a crucial active role
for reason.
To block this possibility, Humeanism concedes that rationality can come
into play concerning the question what ends an agent has, but hastens to
add that the possible role of reason is very limited. There are derived ends
and underived ends, a derived end being one that is held as a consequence
of having another end, by way of its means-end relations. Thus even for
the instrumentalist, a derived end can be unreasonable, but only in the
limited sense that it is derived from a further end by way of improper
instrumental reasoning. The agent may have made a mistake of fact in
supposing that there is a relevant causal relation between φ’ing and ψ’ing.
Derived ends are ends only insofar as they can be traced to an ultimate,
underived end. On the other hand, an underived end is entirely outside
the scope of rational criticism. If the agent has an end, not because of
its being instrumentally useful to promote another end, but because he
pursues it as an end in itself, it is inappropriate to criticize him rationally.⁵
Criticism of ultimate ends would be entirely improper, akin to a category
mistake. Nor can the ultimate end itself be recommended as the right
end; this, too, is ruled out by the third point. Practical rationality does
not fix ends except instrumentally.
Instrumentalism, then, amounts to a reassessment of the role of the fac-
ulty of reason in deciding what it is rational for an agent to do: the faculty
of rationality — what Hume calls the understanding — has only a limited
say in deciding what it is rational to do; the question is mostly decided,
not by reason, but by predetermined extra-rational ends. Instrumental-
ists often take inspiration from Hume’s famous remark in the section of
the Treatise entitled “Of the influencing motives of the will” that
reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and
can never aspire to any other office than to serve and obey
them. (Hume 1978: 2.3.3, 415)
In this passage, Hume’s topic is the comparative importance of two men-
tal faculties vying for control: reason or the understanding, on the one
hand, and sentiment or the passions, on the other. Before the famous
passage, Hume mentions the tendency of earlier writers to emphasize
⁵This leaves open the possibility of other, non-rational forms of changing a person’s
ends such as bullying, persuading, brainwashing and so on. See chapter 5.
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the struggle between these two faculties.⁶ According to this traditional
model, when we are faced with unpleasant choices, our passions often
threaten to overwhelm our ability to control our actions. When this hap-
pens, we often give in to our passion although we are aware that do-
ing so is contrary to what rationality tells us, thus becoming enslaved to
our urges, with reason, the rightful master, losing control. Now with his
remark, Hume turns the traditional imagery upside down. Against the
rationalists, he insists that the situation is not one of struggling between
following a passion and following reason. Reason is not the master of the
passion in the sense of the faculty that controls the passions. Nor does
it make sense to say, as a moralist might urge, that although the reality
of our weak psychology may often be different, reason by rights ought to
be the master of our passions. This conveys the wrong picture of agency.
According to Hume, reason has, from the very outset, only an auxiliary
role in determining the course of our action. Our passions determine the
direction of our action; reason’s role is simply to find the best way to get
there.
If reason, which only adjusts means to ends, has no substantial, or non-
instrumental, role in the process of setting the ends themselves, the agent’s
aims are a matter of extra-rational fact. Hume adds that the ends are con-
stituted by the agent’s passions or, as it is most often put today, by his
desires. Again we plausibly have to countenance derived as well as un-
derived desires, the latter serving as the ultimate anchoring point of the
former. But it seems clear that, in the final analysis, we can trace back
any intentional explanation of an action to the agent’s ultimate desires.
Hume explains:
[T]he ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case,
be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves en-
tirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without
any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man why
he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his
health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will
readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your
enquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is
impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and
is never referred to any other object.
Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he
⁶“Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the
combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are
only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates” (Hume 1978: 2.3.3, 413).
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may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his call-
ing. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will an-
swer, because he desires to get money. If you demand why? It
is the instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is
an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can
be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be
a reason why another is desired. Something must be desir-
able on its own account, and because of its immediate accord
or agreement with human sentiment and affection. (Hume
1975: Appendix I, 293)
According to Hume, an agent’s ultimate ends are set by his desires. When
we ask for a rational explanation for his aim, we may be referred to a
further superordinate goal. But an appeal to a further end can only occur
a finite number of times. At the end of such a chain of referrals, we find
an end that recommends itself “entirely to the sentiment and affections”
of the agent. This ultimate aim — perhaps to attain pleasure or to avoid
pain — is itself not the appropriate target of rational challenges because
its being an end is in no way attributable to the understanding but only
to the brute fact of its being desired. We cannot give any justification for
this. Nor is this fact to be lamented: for Hume it is an inevitable fact about
human agency. Thus it is “an absurdity”, when dealing with an ultimate
desire, to ask for a justification: these states of the agent are simply there
to be discovered.
We have now arrived at the sense in which, in the eyes of the Humean,
desires are the only source of reasons. The two ideas out of which the
Humean view is composed — the desire-based reason thesis and the in-
strumental conception of practical reason — naturally complement each
other.⁷
The question we will be concerned with in this chapter is the question
whether theHumean theory can bemaintained and, in particular, whether
⁷They do not, strictly speaking, entail each other. It may be possible to be an instrumen-
talist while holding that the source of reasons is not the agent’s set of desires but another
extra-rational source — perhaps our ends may be thought to be set by nature or through the
command to a divine being. Conversely, there may be ways to combine the desire-based
reason thesis with conceptions of rationality that countenance more (or less) than instru-
mental reasoning. Nonetheless, the two ideas clearly lend each other support. In particular,
the instrumentalist idea that ends are fixed by extra-rational items lends support to the idea
that we can name a source of practical reasons, and combined with the seemingly straight-
forward idea that desires or passions are extra-rational items, it is not a far leap from the
idea that practical reason is limited to instrumental operation to assuming that it is desires,
and only desires, that give us our reasons.
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it is true that desires give us reasons. My conclusion will be that — at least
on a construal of the concept of desire that fits naturally with the Humean
picture — the desire-based reasons thesis is false. But before proceed-
ing to a detailed examination of this thesis, it will be useful to refine the
sketch of Humeanism by extending the space of theoretical options. The
Humean theory can be contrasted with a more permissive theory which
rejects the Humean’s main claims. This more permissive theory, which I
will defend starting at the end of this chapter, holds that not all our rea-
sons are grounded in extra-rational desires; and it holds that the role of
reason in the practical sphere is more extensive than the instrumentalist
view allows. This theory portrays practical rationality as comparatively
rich. By contrast, the Humeanism we have considered is more skeptical
about practical reason and considerably limits its scope by rejecting all
non-instrumental use of reason as illusory. Although we cannot criticize
an agent for the ultimate ends he accepts, he can be incorrect, rationally
speaking, by failing to taking the necessary means to ends he already has.
Going further on the scale of practical skepticism, however, there is an-
other position which rejects even the idea that reason can be practical
in this limited sense. According to this more radical skepticism about
practical reason, there is not even instrumental rationality strictly speak-
ing. On this radical view, even the failure to take the required means to
accepted ends does not license rational criticism of the agent.
As I said, this view exceeds Humeanism in the radical nature of its skepti-
cism about practical reason because it constitutes a wholesale rejection of
practical rationality. Perhaps surprisingly, as a number of scholars have
argued, it is this radical skepticism of practical reason that Hume himself
actually defended in his Treatise.⁸ It follows somewhat paradoxically that
Hume does not count as a Humean.⁹ For Hume, a passion qua passion
cannot be evaluated as either reasonable or unreasonable. He supplies a
famously extreme example:
⁸Cf. Millgram (1995), Korsgaard (2008) and Hampton (1995).
⁹The term Humeanism, as I introduced it and as it is used widely, is not the view of
the historical Hume but a view held by contemporary philosophers of action that, although
inspired by Hume’s writings, is not identical to his view. One way to mark the distance be-
tween Hume’s doctrine and Humeanismwould be to call the latter view “Neo-Humeanism”,
as Hubin (1999) suggests, or to use the somewhat artificial lowercase variant “humean” (see
Brandom 2000: Introduction). Because the term “Humeanism” is so well established, how-
ever, with for the most part little regard to the question of whether it coincides with Hume’s
doctrine, I will continue to use the term to denote the theory committed to instrumentalism
and the desire-based reasons thesis. Contemporary Humeanism takes its inspiration from
the suggestive passages I have quoted, and even if it doesn’t coincide perfectly with Hume’s
point, it is fair to say that the view is, in many ways, a theory in Hume’s spirit.
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Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor
chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can
neither justify nor condemn it. ’Tis not contrary to reason to
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching
of my finger. (Hume 1978: 2.3.3, 416)
Here Hume countenances only two ways in which a passion may prop-
erly be called unreasonable. For example, an agent, mistakenly thinking
there is an apple in front of him, may consequently develop a desire to
get the apple. In such a case, the passion exists because the agent’s desire
was stimulated as the result of a factually mistaken belief. On the other
hand, an agent who intends to bring about X may do φ because he thinks
that φ’ing will promote X although in fact there is no causal relation be-
tween the two. In this second type of case, the passion is based on faulty
causal reasoning. In both of these ways, it is appropriate to criticize the
agent’s passion, but in each case the criticism is only directed at an ele-
ment of the desire in question which is attributable to theoretical reason.
The desire did not come about because of faulty practical reasoning.
Hume’s example of scratching my finger illustrates the point. If I have a
preference of doing φ over doing ψ, there is nothing that can be said, from
a standpoint of rationality, against my having this preference. Either I
have the preference, or not. Hume contends that it is wrong in principle
to describe an end as an end in itself as incorrect from the standpoint of
rationality. Summarizing his position, he writes “a passion must be ac-
company’d with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable;
and even then ’tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unrea-
sonable, but the judgment” (Hume 1978: 2.3.3, 416). So far the position
described is in line with Humeanism as we have introduced it. However,
Hume’s position is soon revealed as more radical. The instrumentalist
we have described may agree with Hume in principle that, other things
being equal, a brute preference of a trivial action over as undesirable an
outcome as the destruction of the world is legitimate. But the instrumen-
talist would want to add that, normally, other things are not equal. In
particular, an agent normally has a multitude of desires. What makes
Hume’s example so surprising is that the destruction of the world con-
flicts in themost blatant waywith a greatmany desires almost universally
shared. Thus surely a normal agent wants to preserve the lives of his close
relatives and wants to enjoy pleasures in the future — desires that would
certainly not be fulfilled if the destruction of the world were imminent.
Thus although in a preferential vacuum Hume’s claim is true, the situ-
ation is clearly underdescribed. A typical agent has goals whose attain-
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ment is precluded by the action preferred and he can be assumed to know
it. More fully described, then, contrary to Hume’s assertion, the agent is
open to charges of irrationality — or so the instrumentalist would argue.
The criticism would not be that the agent’s goals are irrational in them-
selves. Recall the instrumentalist thesis that an action or passion is ratio-
nal only to the extent that it (is known to) promote an end accepted by
the agent so that practical irrationality is always instrumental irrational-
ity. The instrumentalist criticism would be that the agent’s action cannot
be squared with his other, crucial goals. On any instrumentalist view,
the agent’s preference for scratching his finger would be instrumentally
irrational because the agent knows that choosing it is incompatible with
pursuing other ends.
Although Hume does not intend the “destruction” example in that way,
the conflict described in the passage makes a strong case for the intuitive
idea that an agent may be acting irrationally in pursuing one of his goals
if other, more important goals are incompatible with it. For this reason,
instrumentalists typically qualify their endorsement of the principle that
an end cannot itself be assessed: they accept that it can be criticized on
prudential or instrumental grounds. Hume, on the other hand, makes no
such concession. Just after the passage cited, and before the summary, he
writes:
’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to
prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly
unknown to me. ’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer
even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and
have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A
trivial goodmay, from certain circumstance, produce a desire
superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable
enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this,
than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hun-
dred by the advantage of its situation. (Hume 1978: 2.3.3,
416)
Here Hume clarifies his position. Given a choice between φ and ψ, there
is nothing rationally problematic about preferring φ even if I judge at the
same time that ψ is the greater good which promotes a value that is more
important to me. Contemporary instrumentalist concede that choosing
the “acknowledged lesser good” is an instance of practical irrationality
because it conflicts with what I know to be the right choice, but Hume
demurs. He does not even countenance blatantly failing to take themeans
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to an acknowledged end as a case that makes it appropriate to accuse the
agent of practically irrationality.
In other words, Hume is skeptical, not just about non-instrumental prac-
tical rationality, but also about instrumental varieties of rationality or
irrationality. Hume accepts that we very often do what promotes our
ends. But in his view this is a psychological principle rather than a prin-
ciple of rationality: it is a psychological regularity. This is shown by the
fact that, if we fail to do what is required to achieve our ends or even
do something that is incompatible with their achievement, we do not act
against the dictates of rationality. If this is so, the instrumental principle
is not in fact a principle of reason, and questions of rationality do no enter
the equation.
It follows that Hume does not espouse all claims of instrumentalism. Re-
call the three points in Hampton’s list. Hume certainly accepts the sec-
ond point, the idea that we reason instrumentally: we make the kinds
of inferences necessary to adjust means to ends. To do so, the ability to
calculate causal relations is required. Hume also agrees with the third
point that our underived ends are not fixed by reason operating in a
non-instrumental way. But, as we can see from the passage, Hume does
not accept the first point, the idea that our actions or passions are ratio-
nal or irrational to the extent that they promote the attainment of our
ends. While he emphasizes, with the contemporary instrumentalist, that
it is improper to call a passion or action irrational on non-instrumental
grounds, he disagrees about the positive point. He also thinks it improper
to call a passion or action irrational even on instrumental grounds. An
agent who fails to take themeans to an acknowledged end is just someone
who prefers to act on his present occurrent desires rather than to pursue
other ends he already accepts. To Hume, there is nothing irrational about
failing to follow one’s ends, although it may be a bit odd. The refusal to
conform to instrumental norms is just an expression of the agent’s pref-
erences at the time. Hume, then, is not an instrumentalist in our sense as
he doesn’t accept all the points in Hampton’s list. Accordingly, insofar
as Humeanism involves commitment to the instrumental conception of
practical reason, Hume’s own view does not qualify as Humean.
To summarize, we have considered three positions, listed in order of the
degree to which they countenance a specifically practical sort of ratio-
nality:
1. Anti-Humeanism holds that, in addition to the possibility that an
agent may be irrational by instrumental standards, there is a sub-
stantial sense in which an action or passion can be seen as irra-
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tional, a sense that does not require the acceptance of further ends
which are related to the action instrumentally. Actions can be crit-
icized, or recommended, without reference to any prior motiva-
tional states of the agent. As a concomitant, Anti-Humeanism as-
sumes that an agent may have reasons for action which are not
the direct or indirect consequence of the agent’s having underived
desires.
2. Humeanism rejects the notion of practical rationality in its sub-
stantial, non-instrumental sense but accepts the idea that reason
can be practical insofar as it directs the agent to take the means to
an avowed end. As a corollary, it holds that the source of our rea-
sons is our desires. Humeanism is skeptical about practical reason,
but its skepticism is limited; it salvages instrumental reason as a
genuine form of practical reason.
3. Radical practical skepticism is the view, endorsed byHume himself,
that, properly speaking, there is no practical rationality whatso-
ever. In particular, the instrumental principle does not have ratio-
nal force. There are means-end relations between states of affairs,
but it is not incorrect, from the standpoint of reason, for the agent
to ignore them and to remain unmoved. Human beings are so con-
stituted as to reason instrumentally, but they are not under any sort
of rational pressure to conform to the instrumental principle.
Does radical practical skepticism accept that our desires give us reasons?
This seems to depend on what we mean by this. It cannot mean that our
desires fix what it is rational for us to do; for that can hardly be true with-
out instrumental relations getting any grip. This question will be treated
in more detail later. Our main goal for now is to consider the plausibility
of Humeanism in the contemporary sense — in the sense, that is, in which
Hume is not a Humean. But it will be useful briefly to review the reasons
why practical philosophers today often prefer Humeanism, with its com-
mitment to instrumentalist rationality, over Hume’s own radical practical
skepticism. The issue is that radical skepticism denies instrumental con-
siderations any rational or normative force. It is intuitively plausible that
there is such a thing as means-end irrationality. An agent with a given
end who stubbornly refuses to take the required means seems to be mak-
ing some sort of mistake. It seems a genuine failing to violate the dictates
of instrumental rationality.¹⁰
¹⁰See §6.
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Of course, the existence of instrumental rationality is just what Hume,
as we interpret him, denies. But that such rationality has a claim on us
is built into our conception of agency. Someone who does not display a
certain degree of conformity to instrumental principles is a creature we
find it difficult to construe as an agent in the proper sense of the term.
An agent, as opposed to an automaton, is responsible, and can be made
accountable, for failing to be prudent. A creature that, as Hume envisages
it, exhibits a brute preference to an option with total disregard to means-
end considerations is unrecognizable as an agent.
The goal of the following discussion is to cast doubt on the tenability
of skepticism about practical reasoning. In this context, it seems clear
that of the two versions, the contemporary version is the more defensible
position of the two views. For these reasons, in what follows I will focus
on the modern, more defensible view.
2.2 Why think that reasons are based on desires?
There can be no doubt that Humeanism is widely held among practical
philosophers — one writer has called Humeanism the “default theory” in
the field.¹¹ Let us focus for now on the desire-based reason thesis. To
see what makes the view so compelling to many action theorists, we will
review a number of considerations that make the view that desires enjoy
the special privilege of providing us with reasons an attractive position.¹²
1. The belief-desire model: The belief-desire model is a widely shared
and plausible view of intentional action. It may be thought that the de-
pendence of reasons on desires directly follows from this model of ac-
tion, which posits that, whenever an agent does something intentionally,
we can distinguish two relevant elements in his mental state. On the
one hand, action involves a conative element, something that pushes the
agent to action. This element aims at changing the world. On the other
hand, the cognitive element, rather than purporting to change the world,
aims at representing the world as it is. Neither element is dispensable. In
order to act, it is not enough to have an opinion what the world should be
like because one also needs an opinion as to what would be a way of ef-
fecting this change. Conversely, an opinion about the way to effectively
¹¹Nozick writes that “instrumental rationality is the default theory, the theory that all
discussants of rationality can take for granted, whatever else they think. There is something
more, I think. The instrumental theory of rationality does not seem to stand in need of
justification, whereas every other theory does” (Nozick 1993: 133).
¹²Cf. Darwall (1985: ch. 2).
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bring about a goal alone does not dictate an action unless it is accompa-
nied by a desire-like state that fixes the goal.
The fact that intentional action is inevitably accompanied by an inten-
tional state of the conative sort may be thought to imply that only desires
have the power to give reason, but this is to overlook a distinction. Thus
Thomas Nagel, while admitting the possibility that some desire have the
reason-giving force claimed by Humeanism, argues that not all desires
aremotivating desires.¹³ On his view, a desire may itself be the upshot of
a process of deliberation. These motivated desires, as he calls them, are
themselves the result of a process of practical reasoning, which in turn
may or may not involve further desires. A motivated desire, then, is a
state that, for all that has been said, may be held as the result of having
a number of pure beliefs. With this distinction in mind, we can see that
the Humean claim that reasons are based on desires may be interpreted
in two ways. A merely causal interpretation of the claim implies that, if
a piece of behavior is to count as an intentional action, desires must be
among its efficient causes. This interpretation leaves open the possibility
that whatever desire is causally responsible for the conduct is merely a
motivated desire, a mere causal byproduct of the psychological process.
Thus it may be that the agent judges, on purely rational grounds, that
he ought to do φ, and that as a final step in the process, as a matter of
causal consequence, this judgments brings about the desire to do φ. In
such a scenario, it would still be true, nominally, that desires play a role
in the production of action. But this interpretation is so weak that it can
hardly be the intent of the Humean contention that desires provide us
with reasons.
Clearly the Humean wants his claim to amount to more than the modest
idea that a desire must be part of the psychological mechanism leading to
action. This modest idea is compatible with almost any theory of action,
to the point of being almost vacuous. Instead, Humeanism is committed
to assigning desires a constitutive role in acting for a reason, so that they
are in a substantive sense the source of our reasons. For the Humean, far
from being a mere causal antecedent of action, desires are what makes
it true that the agent has a reason to act. True, the Humean typically
accords desires an important causal role as well, but his view should go
beyond causal significance. We have seen that Humeans are committed
both to the idea that an action is rational insofar as it promotes the attain-
ment of one of the agent’s ends and to the idea that the agent’s ends are
constituted by desires. It follows that whether or not an action is reason-
able is a function of the agent’s desires. The Humean idea must be that
¹³Cf. Nagel (1970: 29). See also Wallace (2006a: 22ff).
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intentional action ultimately requires an unmotivated desire that “simply
comes to us” (Nagel 1970: 29) which is nonetheless endowedwith rational
or normative significance, in addition to causal significance.
The notion of motivated desires shows that themere acceptance in princi-
ple of the belief-desire model does not imply commitment to Humeanism.
There is something clearly true about the thought that it is impossible to
act for a reasonwithout having both a representation of what one’s action
will accomplish and a desideratum that one’s intervention in the world
is intended to accomplish. We can appreciate this thought without com-
mitting ourselves to the ambitious Humean idea that a desire, conceived
as an element of our natural psychology beyond the ken of our rational
faculties, is what makes it the case that we have a reason to act.¹⁴
2. Naturalism: As we have seen in the first chapter, there are naturalistic
worries about alleged reason-facts. In particular, the inherently action-
guiding nature of reasons is seen as puzzling on the assumption of a pre-
dominantly scientific world-view. The idea that reasons are grounded in
desires is often taken to be a way to solve this puzzle. Reasons, as one
writer puts it, can be reduced to desires.¹⁵ Unlike reason-facts, desires,
as psychological states, are deemed unobjectionable from the naturalistic
point of view. An analysis of reasons in terms of desires helps us find a
location of reasons in a naturalistic picture of the world.
This thought relies on the assumption that desires are elements in our
natural psychology, i.e. states that we can describe objectively. In the fi-
nal analysis, it is assumed, desires are states that are “just there” for us to
discover them. The thought is that we can build a superstructure of nor-
mative properties and relations on top of the bedrock of naturalistically
¹⁴Likewise there need be nothing problematic about insisting on a cognitive and a cona-
tive element of action so long as one does not take this idea of a dichotomy of cognitive and
conative states to have far-reaching implications. In my view, the truth behind the belief-
desire model lies in the distinction of two complementary directions of fit. However, it is
problematic to take it for granted that the element with mind-to-world direction of fit is not
cognitive in the sense that it is placed firmly outside the scope of reason. It is important to
see that these two ideas are separable, although they correspond to two common uses of
the word “cognitive”. On the one hand, the word applies to states that share the mind-to-
world direction of fit of belief. In this sense, it is clear that intentional action involves some
element that is not cognitive. But the word also refers to states that are not amenable to
rational explanations, explanations that ask for a justification. Here I dispute the assump-
tion that intentional action needs to involve, in a constitutive fashion, a non-cognitive or
conative element in this second sense. This, in fact, is what the Humean asserts and the
anti-Humean rejects. The point is simply that the seemingly straightforward plausibility of
belief-desire models of action in no way entails the desire-based reason thesis. The question
of how to accommodate the distinction of two directions of fit will be addressed in §3.3.
¹⁵Cf. Schroeder (2007: ch. 4).
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describable desires. In this way, the Humean hopes to construct norma-
tivity from the ground up without risking to make it appear mysterious.
Part of the appeal of Humeanism, then, lies in the fact that allegedly
objectionable normative entities can be reduced to mere psychological
states. Having already discussed this thought, we can leave it to one
side.¹⁶ However, another naturalistic consideration that is thought to
support Humeanism is that it is hoped to account for the biological con-
tinuity between human action and the behavior of non-human animals.
If we assume, as the Humean does, that reasons are provided by desires,
then as long as we have a conception of desire that is applicable to non-
rational animals, we are free to say that animals, too, act on reasons, albeit
in a less sophisticated way. Sub-rational creatures are attracted to, or re-
pelled from, objects in their environment, which raises the question why
we should not say that animals have reasons in a pre-reflective way. On
the Humean model, human agency and animal behavior may be under-
stood along similar lines.
As tempting as it is, I think we should resist this line of reasoning. In
what follows, we will develop a conception of acting for a reason that
implies that, at least so far as we know, only human beings, as the only
known concept-mongerers, are agents in the full sense of the term. It
may be objected that this response amounts to a form of chauvinism.
We will take up this objection later.¹⁷ Whatever else may be true, any
support that the two naturalistic considerations lend to Humeanism is
conditional on the acceptance of far-reaching naturalistic assumptions,
ontological, as in the idea that the normativity of reason may be reduced,
or methodological, as in the assumption that acting for a reason is acting
on a desire for humans beings and non-human animals alike.
3. Internalism: According to existence internalism, there is a very general
relation between desires and (judgments about) reasons. A reason is es-
sentially a consideration on which it is possible to act, and it is something
that we must be able to appeal to in an intentional explanation of the ac-
tion. Desire is an essentially motivational kind of state. Accordingly, a
necessary condition for ascribing a reason to an agent may be thought to
be that the agent has a desire of some sort or other appropriately related to
the action. This idea, however, is predicated on the unwarranted assump-
tion that only desires can motivate us. An anti-Humean may argue that
a purely cognitive state could by itself move an agent to action. Rather
than providing independent motivation for the Humean thesis, this idea
¹⁶See §1.4.
¹⁷See in particular §4.6.
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presupposes it. Here it may be objected that beliefs or belief-like states
like observations are by themselves unable to motivate us. Once again,
however, even if this is true, this doesn’t rule out the possibility that a be-
lief — say, an ought-judgment — is by itself able to bring about or justify a
motivated desire. In this sense, the desires would only be causally neces-
sary intermediaries; and the line of thought would not support the claim
that desires are the source of our reasons. The idea that Humeanism is the
superior explanation of the genuinely motivational character of reasons
is speculation. The true test of this argument is to see whether a compet-
ing, anti-Humean theory can explain the idea that reasons are essentially
things that motivate equally well. Showing this requires demonstrating
how an anti-Humean theory can account for our internalist intuitions.¹⁸
4. Raw preferential desires: A simple line of thought may lend plausi-
bility to the desire-based reasons thesis. Suppose two customers in an
ice-cream parlor are alike in all respects save for the fact that one agent,
A, has the desire to eat strawberry ice-cream, whereas the other, B, has
no such desire. It seems plausible to say, in this situation, that the one
agent, but not the other, has a reason to buy a cone of strawberry ice-
cream. But if the only difference between the two agents is that A but
not B has a preference or desire for this flavor, it may be held that is must
be the desire that engenders the reason. A only has the reason because
of his desire, and nothing else could explain the fact that A has a reason
where B doesn’t.¹⁹
Having pointed to examples of this type, the Humean may go on to argue
that desires in general give us reasons in this way. What holds in the
ice-cream parlor also holds elsewhere. When we ask for the most basic
explanation of the agent’s action — and thus of what his reason was — we
inevitably reach a point where the only thing we can point to is a state
of preference or desire. Furthermore, the Humean may point out that,
having found that a desire grounds a reason in a special case, our best
theoretic option is to assume that the same form of explanation holds in
the general case. Explanatory simplicity is a reason for us to think that
the general case is similar to the special case.
This argument, however, is not convincing. First, the idea that minimal
pairs of agents, only differing with respect to their raw wants, have dif-
ferent reasons relies on special features of the situation. Even if we grant
that desires may have this role in the ice-cream parlor, typical action does
not occur in a context of strawberry-or-chocolate choices. It is doubtful,
¹⁸The valid intuitions behind both existence-internalism and judgment-internalism are
discussed in chapter 5.
¹⁹Schroeder (2007: ch. 1) offers an argument of this type.
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to say the least, that we can transfer the conclusion in artificial brute
preference-based choice situations to the general case. Second, there are
alternative explanations of what it is that in such situations gives us a
reason. What relevantly distinguishes A from B may not be his desire to
choose a flavor but the fact that A, but not B, can expect to derive plea-
sure from tasting the strawberry flavor. If so, the agent’s reason does not
derive from his desire per se but from facts about the kinds of things that
tend to give him pleasure.²⁰ The reply to the argument would be that, if
the agent with the desire for F has a reason whereas the one without the
desire doesn’t, this is so because desires often track what would be plea-
surable for the agent. In fact, if the agent didn’t derive any pleasure from
the experience and if no other needs were fulfilled, the desire would no
longer provide any reason. Finally, even if no alternative account of A’s
and B’s reasons were in the offing, the argument would not by itself be
conclusive. True, other things being equal, a theory that explains the dif-
ference in multiple-choice situations would be preferable, but given the
artificiality of these situations, explanatory simplicity falls into the “nice
to have” category. Certainly we should not ground our entire theory of
reasons on differences in situations of this type.
2.3 The phenomenological conception of desire
Having seen that some common motivations for the desire-based reasons
thesis are not compelling, we can now turn to an assessment of the thesis
and put it to the test by drawing out its implications. Let us start by
noticing that the thesis implies the biconditional
You have a reason to do φ if, and only if, you desire to do φ.
Splitting this claim into its two components, we can see that Humeanism
is committed to two ideas: (i) wanting to φ is necessary for having a rea-
son to φ and (ii) wanting to φ is sufficient for having a reason to φ. Con-
sequently, we can criticize Humeanism either by raising difficulties about
the necessity of desires for reasons or by questioning the sufficiency of
desires for reasons. The latter strategy is pursued in the rest of this chap-
ter. However, before turning to this task, I will explain briefly why I will
ignore the former strategy. Many anti-Humean philosophers have taken
the route of arguing that it is possible for an agent to have a reason to do
φ without having a desire to do so. It is common to point to a situation
²⁰Cf. Scanlon (1998: ch. 1).
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where an agent has a reason to perform an action while at the same time
having no desire at all to do so. It is easy to imagine a situation where
the agent has a reason to do something although he finds it altogether
unpleasant or tedious to do so. Examples are amply provided by cases of
moral duty clashing with personal pleasure. In scenarios of this kind, it
is pointed out, the difficulty for the agent lies precisely in the fact that he
is morally obligated to do something even though the prospect is entirely
undesirable for him.
I do not want to say that this anti-Humean complaint is without merit.
However, any attempt to attack the Humean position by citing moral
counterexamples is laden with difficulties.²¹ In particular, any such at-
tack relies on a particular understanding of moral reasons as imposing
categorical demands on agents. The cogency of an argument against
Humeanism is conditional on the plausibility of the underlying theory
of moral reasons, and any such interpretation of morality is inevitably
controversial. The goal here, by contrast, is to understand reasons for
action without regard to what makes moral reasons special. The hope
is that skirting the contentious topic of morality makes the case against
Humeanism more compelling.
The following criticism of the desire-based reason thesis, then, will focus
on the sufficiency claim:
Sufficiency Having a desire to φ is sufficient for having a prima facie rea-
son to φ.
Three brief notes are in order. First, Sufficiency is clearly a simplifica-
tion. A relevant, simple distinction needs to be drawn between two ways
in which an action may result from a desire. (a) On the one hand, if I
want to dance in the rain, I can satisfy this desire simply and directly by
dancing in the rain, provided that it is raining. (b) On the other hand, if
I want to make my grandmother happy, I cannot do so directly. When
I make my grandmother happy by baking her a cake, I satisfy the desire
by performing another action which I think is likely to bring about the
desired state of affairs. Clearly many if not most of my desires — being
comfortably warm, having friends, and so on — are of the second type.
Strictly speaking, the sufficiency claim should take this into account. We
could modify the formulation:
²¹To name one such controversy, Foot (1972) is a classical defense of the claim that moral
reasons are only hypothetically valid. McDowell (1998a) takes the opposing view that the
force of moral reason is not conditional on the existence of desires that function as inde-
pendent components in the explanation.
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If S has a desire that p and the desire p can be satisfied by his
φ’ing, then he has a prima facie reason to φ.
On this formulation, my desire to make my grandmother happy gives
me a reason to bake her a cake. Moreover, my desire that I dance in the
rain gives me a reason to dance in the rain. While in the first case, I will
only perform the action if I also have the instrumental belief that baking
a cake will make my grandmother happy, no means-end belief is strictly
required in the second case. Nonetheless, there can be no harm in as-
suming that in dancing for the sake of dancing, I do so because of a trivial
means-end belief that I can dance by dancing. On the assumption that we
have such “null” means-end beliefs, the amended formulation covers (a)
directly actionable desires as well as (b) the more common indirect vari-
ety. Keeping this complication in mind, however, we can, for the sake of
simplicity, go back to the original formulation even if it doesn’t cover all
cases. Surely at least for desires that can be fulfilled directly, Sufficiency
must be valid if Humeanism is true. If we can find cases that disprove
Sufficiency in the simple form, this will cast doubt on the entire Humean
claim that desires provide us with reasons.
Second, we are not claiming that Humeanism is committed to the idea
that having a desire gives you a conclusive reason to satisfy it. Of course
it cannot be true generally that if you want to do φ, you ought to do
so. Even if I want to stay dry, when walking along the river I see a man
drowning, surely I ought to ignore my desire and dive in. Sufficiency is
not the implausible claim that you ought to follow each of your desires
all of the time. True, the desire to stay dry gives me a reason to keep
out of the river, but I have a much stronger reason to save the man’s life,
perhaps based on some other desire to help people in need. Desires do
not provide the agent with an all-in reason. Instead, desire-based reasons
are prima facie and typically defeasible by other considerations. Even for
Humeans, it is only when no competing or more powerful prima facie
reasons is present that your desire is what you ought to act on.
Third, it may not be obvious that Humeanism is committed even to this
modest prima facie sufficiency claim. Here we may simply ask how else
the Humean would want to see his idea interpreted if not as implying
that someone who has a desire thereby has a defeasible reason to act to
satisfy the desire. If claims about desires being a source of reasons are
to have any substance at all, it must be an essential part of the idea that
reasons flow from desires. Perhaps it will be said that wanting to φ is
only necessary for having a reason to do so but doesn’t by itself give
us a reason. This could mean that, although desires generally generate
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reasons, they only do so under certain circumstances, thus maintaining
the connection while introducing certain qualifications. Later on we will
consider candidates for such additional conditions.²² On the other hand,
if the Humeans rejects the sufficiency connection entirely, the result is
the idea that desires have only a secondary, causal significance, which
is to give up a central component of Humeanism. We can conclude that
Humeanism is committed to the claim that in the absence of special cir-
cumstances desires are intrinsically reason-giving.
At this point, however, the question before us —whether desires generate
prima facie reasons — has become difficult to answer without knowing
in greater detail what, according to the Humean, desires consist of. In
the abstract, it doesn’t seem unplausible that you should pursue what
you desire, but what this means exactly — and thus its truth — hinges
essentially on the way we interpret the talk of desire in Sufficiency. A
desire, to be sure, is a psychological state of the agent, but what is it
about desires, as opposed to other mental states, that endows them with
a power not only to explain but to rationalize our conduct?²³
Humeans have typically defended either of two conceptions of desires:
1. According to the phenomenological conception of desire, an agent
who wants to do something experiences a certain qualitative feel-
ing towards a certain object or state of affairs.
2. The dispositional conception of desire maintains that to desire p is
to have a disposition, or cluster of dispositions, concerning various
sorts of behavior toward p.
Beginningwith the phenomenological view, wewill now examinewhether
these conceptions of desire lend support to the Humean sufficiency claim.
A well-known version of a phenomenological conception of desires can
be found in Hume’s Treatise. The stated purpose of this work is to develop
what Hume calls a new science of man — a comprehensive theory of the
human mind. Among mental episodes or “perceptions”, he distinguishes
impressions and ideas, which he characterizes, respectively, as a kind of
feeling and thinking. Passions are a kind of impression of the mind, and,
more specifically, impressions of reflection which arise as a consequence
of original impressions or ideas. Passions and other impressions are dis-
tinguished by the ways they feel. In particular, Hume holds that ideas and
²²See §§5–6 below.
²³Following Davidson (2001a), I intend my use of the verb “rationalize” to carry no pejo-
rative overtones.
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impressions differ chiefly as to their “force and liveliness” (Hume 1978:
1.1.1, 1). The characteristic feature of passions, Hume assumes, is some-
thing we are intimately acquainted with. Hume sees little need to explain
the kind of phenomenal feel that defines passions.
Still, we should be skeptical about the existence of a single distinctive
quality that accompanies all of our passions and, hence, all of our inten-
tional actions. For Hume, desire and aversion are direct passion which
arise as a consequence of impressions of pleasure and pain.²⁴ For exam-
ple, an agent who experiences pain after holding his hand into a flamewill
develop a tendency to experience a feeling of aversion when faced with
the prospect of direct contact with fire. The hypothesis that the aversion
to fire is identified with a certain feeling has some plausibility, as it is not
hard to imagine the peculiar “force and liveliness” of the impressions.
Perhaps it will be said that what gives desires, or passions, the power of
giving us reasons consists just in the forcefulness of this peculiar experi-
ence. It should be clear that the various kinds of passion mentioned by
Hume such as fear, hope, pride and humility each have a very different
phenomenological profile. What do these experiences share that gives
them their extraordinary power? It seems that Hume has no easy an-
swer to this question. To make things worse, it seems that many desires
are almost entirely dispassionate. Mundane wants — to solve the cross-
word puzzle in the morning or to save money for one’s retirement — are
rarely accompanied by strong feeling, or any feeling at all. Pace Hume,
often we would be hard pressed to pinpoint which feeling accompanied
a given action or to ascertain that any such characteristic feeling exists.
Hume’s idea of a passion as what grounds reasons in general is modeled
on actions we perform in response to salient experiences, like the one of
having a sudden craving for chocolate. True, such passions have a strong
phenomenal component, but acting for a reason isn’t always, or even very
frequently, like this. This difficulty may be what prompts Hume to ad-
mit, somewhat paradoxically, calm passions, whose qualitative profile is
mild, in addition to violent passions, such as hunger or thirst.²⁵ The diffi-
culty remains, however, that Hume’s explanation of passions in terms of
force and liveliness does not explain what distinguishes them from other
mental episodes such as beliefs or sensory impressions. The existence
of less than poignant passions shows that the urging feel of physical de-
sire cannot be the defining characteristic of passions in general. In short,
Hume’s theory doesn’t explain what it is about passions that binds them
²⁴Hume (1978: 2.3.9).
²⁵Hume (1978: 2.3.3, 417).
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together and gives them the normative oomph required for them to have
normative significance.
Some recent writers have revived the idea of a distinctive phenomenol-
ogy of pro-attitudes.²⁶ Some writers base their account on our ability to
recognize what they call a “obligatoriness or”demand quality“” in objects
and actions (Firth 1952: 327). Sharon Street mentions our
knowledge of what it is like to have a certain unreflective ex-
perience — in particular, the experience of various things in
the world “counting in favor of” or “calling for” or “demand-
ing” certain responses on our part. (Street 2008: 240)
She goes on to explain:
I believe it is impossible adequately to characterize this expe-
rience except in such primitive evaluative terms, yet I think
we all know exactly the type of experience I am pointing to.
We need only think of how we feel when, for example, a
tractor trailer swerves toward us on the highway or we see a
stranger threatening our child; we all know what it is like to
experience (at an unreflective level that we surely share with
many other animals) evasive action or a protective response
as utterly “demanded” or “called for” by the circumstances.
[…] one must already be familiar with the conscious experi-
ence I am talking about (Street 2008: 240)
Accordingly, perhaps we should understand desires as attitudes charac-
terize by what could be called an experience of intrinsic normativity: a
general feeling that an action is called for. The idea, then, would be that
a normative experience that φ’ing is called for is sufficient for giving an
agent a prima facie reason to do φ.
Even in its updated version, the phenomenological conception seems un-
able to sustain the Humean claim. One problem with the proposal is that
its fundamental premise is doubtful. It is not at all clear that there is any
characteristic experience unifying all desires or desire-like states. In par-
ticular, when agents do tedious things out of obligations, they don’t seem
to have any salient normative feeling. In any event, if a calm passion or
weak normative experience is present, it is hard to detect. In particu-
lar, the idea that a particular intrinsic quality could be associated with
²⁶See also Galen Strawson’s arguments against neo-behaviorism in his Strawson (1994:
ch. 9).
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normativity is questionable. This is not to dispute that desires have a
normative aspect — on the contrary, this is precisely the thesis that will
be defended.²⁷ It may even be true that normative states sometimes are
accompanied with a certain phenomenological content. But it is doubtful,
to say the least, that normative states have this content essentially.
More to the point, we should ask whether making the “demand quality”
the identifying characteristic of a desire helps explain how desires, as
the Humean insists, are reason-giving. In this connection, it is useful to
consider an argument against the phenomenal conception put forward by
Michael Smith.²⁸ Although I do not agree entirely with Smith’s specific
conclusion, I think it puts us onto the right track. Smith’s argument is
based on the epistemology of desires and specifically on the idea that we
do not always know what we want. The phenomenological conception
assimilates desires to sensations as it defines the former, like the latter,
in terms of their distinctive phenomenal quality. Accordingly, it makes
it seem as if our knowledge of our own desires is similar to that of our
own sensations. Now our self-knowledge of pains and similar sensations
is all but infallible: typically, when you think that you have a headache
you really do. From the current suggestion, it seems to follow that we
typically know, in the same way, about our own desires. However, Smith
insists, this is a mistake because we can easily be deceived about our own
motivations. Sometimes an agent may have a desire and act on it and
yet not be prepared to admit to having the desire because, as it is seen as
shameful, it has become subconscious. Even after acting, he may remain
unaware that this desire was his motivation. On the other hand, an agent
may assume that he has a motivation to do something, perhaps because
it is expected of him, even though on closer inspection he does not really
exhibit the desire in question in his conduct. We may, then, be deceived
both about the desires we have and about those we don’t.
If a phenomenological conception applied to desires, we would expect it
to be easy to know what one wants. But while we have near-infallible
knowledge of our sensations, we are not in such a privileged positions
with respect to our desires. The phenomenological view fails to explain
that knowledge of what we want is sometimes hard work. By contrast,
Smith’s preferred view, the dispositional conception, explains how our
self-knowledge of desires can sometimes be imperfect. As that view iden-
tifies desires with complex dispositional states, knowing one’s desires re-
quires knowing what one would do, say or think in certain counterfactual
circumstances. Clearly, one may be mistaken about one’s own hypothet-
²⁷See chapter 3.
²⁸Smith (1994: ch. 4).
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ical behavior. For Smith, an adequate theory of desire needs plausibility
as a self-standing account of desires, which rules out the identification
of desires with their qualitative content because this view gets the epis-
temology of desires wrong. Smith concludes that we should reject the
phenomenological view in favor of dispositionalism.
What is responsible for the superior ability of this alternative view to ac-
count for conative self-deception, according to Smith, is the fact that it
emphasizes the propositional content, rather than the phenomenological
content of the states. The epistemology of the propositional content of a
desire is different from that of its phenomenological content. It is easy to
be wrong about one’s own propositional states. For Smith, then, dispo-
sitionalism is the key to giving an explanation of propositional content.
He writes that
[phenomenological conceptions] in no way contribute to our
understanding of what a desire as a state with propositional
content is, for they cannot explain how it is that desires have
propositional content. They therefore in no way explain the
epistemology of the propositional content of desire. (Smith
1994: 108)
Because the phenomenological conceptions don’t help explain the propo-
sitional aspect of desires, he adds:
they require supplementation by some independent and self-
standing account of what a desire is that explains how it is
that desires have propositional content and how it is that we
have fallible knowledge of what it is that we desire (Smith
1994: 108)
According to Smith there are two distinct aspects of desires to account
for: their phenomenological content and their propositional content. He
admits that a desire sometimes may have a qualitative feel attached to it.
But that is not always the case, and even when it is, it is the state’s propo-
sitional content that is primary. If the phenomenological view cannot
provide an explanation of latter — it models desires on sensations, which
do not per se have propositional content — it needs a supplementary ac-
count of the intentional aspect of desire. This further aspect is required
to make room for Freudian counter-examples, meaning that for explana-
tory purposes, the phenomenal content is secondary. Smith concludes
that desires cannot be adequately understood on the phenomenological
conception.
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Turning now to the evaluation of Smith’s argument, we can agree with
his conclusion — that the propositional content of desires is primary and
any possible qualitative content secondary, and that this is an advan-
tage of the dispositional theory over its rival — while remaining skep-
tical about his way of arriving at the conclusion. The problem with his
argument is twofold. First, as regards self-knowledge, the case for dis-
positionalism is not as clear-cut as Smith seems to see it. Smith argues
that to understand desires as a kind of feeling is problematic because it
implies, against our everyday experience, that we mostly know exactly
what we desire. Whether you actually have a disposition of this kind im-
plies knowledge about what you would do in various situations, and it
is easy to be deceived about such counterfactuals. But in the same point
also lies a weakness, for this account is in danger of making it too difficult
to know what you desire. If self-knowledge implies complex knowledge
of how you would react in hypothetical situations, it may be that you
hardly ever know for sure that you have a desire. If this is true, then the
dispositional account overshoots its target. To the extent that it explains
well how we are sometimes mistaken about our desires, it fails to explain
how we are still right in the majority of cases.
Second, Smith suggests a two-stage process. As a strategy to explain
the role of desires for the Humeans thesis, we ought to start by look-
ing for an explanation of the mental state of desire which is plausible
as a self-standing account. On this suggestion, we consider the connec-
tion between desires and reasons only after we have established an in-
dependently plausible account of desires. It sees the first step as inde-
pendent of the second insofar as we can discover the nature of a desire
in an isolated way, without taking into consideration the way in which
the reason-providing force may be essential to desires. However, desire
is essentially the type of intentional state that can figure in intentional
explanation of an action. On a Humean view, desire is the kind of state
that can rationalize behavior. But this casts doubt on the idea that we
could understand the notion of desire without regard to its role in practi-
cal reasoning and in intentional explanation. If a conception of desire is
to sustain the desire-based reason thesis, a two-stage process is unlikely
to succeed.
Now in order for something to be able to figure in intentional explana-
tions — the type of explanation that make sense of the agent’s behavior
by revealing the light in which the agent saw it — it must at least meet
the minimal requirement of possessing propositional structure. Even if
a desire may also have qualitative content, it is its propositional content
that determines what actions the desire counts in favor of, or which ac-
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tion it can appealed to in an intentional explanation. Counting in favor
is best understood as a matter of something’s being an element in a po-
tential piece of practical reasoning, and such elements must have a from
corresponding to that of judgeable, i.e. propositional contents. We can-
not divorce desires from its rational role, which is determined only by its
propositional content. Whatever phenomenal content these states may
have does not enter into the intentional explanations.
Although Smith’s appeal to self-knowledge is problematic, then, our ar-
gument leads us to a similar conclusion: desires should be thought of as
primarily having propositional content. This doesn’t need to imply that
desires are devoid of qualitative aspects. While a desire may or may not
have qualitative content, it is the propositional content that fixes its iden-
tity. Rather than attempting to understand desires in isolation from their
potential role in rational explanations, we see this role as partly fixing
their content. As it gives pride of place to an intentional state’s propo-
sitional content, a dispositional theory is clearly to be preferred over a
phenomenological theory.²⁹
2.4 The dispositional theory of desire
Although it is clear that the dispositional theory offers advantages over
the phenomenological conception of desire, to see if it gives support to
Humeanism, we need to askwhat kinds of dispositions it identifies desires
²⁹It might be said that the last paragraphs amount to an unfair criticism of Smith’s posi-
tion. Smith carefully distinguishes between theories of motivating reasons and theories of
normative reasons, and while he defends a Humean account of the former, he takes pains
to stress that he is defending an anti-Humean theory of the latter (Smith 1994: ch. 4–5).
His theory of normative reasons is that, roughly, an agent has a reason to do φ only if he
would desire φ if certain ideal circumstances were present. As a consequence, although
normative reasons might be said to be desire-dependent, they are dependent on hypothet-
ical rather than actual desires. Smith insists that this question is quite independent of the
actual preexisting set of motivations that the agent happens to have. The question we are
considering now — the sufficiency of desires for reasons for action — is a question about
normative reasons, so the criticism doesn’t seem to apply straightforwardly to Smith’s own
theory.
Smith, then, is not directly committed to the idea that desires furnish us with reasons
in just the way we have ascribed it to Humeans. Perhaps, then, Smith need not take into
account the essential involvement of desires in reasoning. He cannot make use of the idea
that normative reasons must be propositionally structured. To the extent that this is true, it
should be pointed out that the principal target is not Smith’s own, rather complicated theory
of normative reasons but the Humean theory of normative reasons. In doing so, we are
considering Smith’s insightful discussion as one of the various concepts of desire available
toHumeans, a discussion that is valuable regardless of whether Smith’s own theory qualifies
as Humean in our sense.
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with.³⁰ In his Analysis of Mind, Bertrand Russell proposes such a theory
according to which we should understand the mental state of wanting in
terms of a series of events he calls a behavior cycle, a “series of actions
continuing, unless interrupted, until some more or less definite state of
affairs is realized” (Russell 1921: 75). He explains:
The property of causing such a cycle of occurrences is called
“discomfort”; the property of themental occurrences inwhich
the cycle ends is called “pleasure”. […] The cycle ends in a
condition of quiescence, or of such action as tends only to
preserve the status quo. The state of affairs in which this
condition is achieved is called the “purpose” of the cycle, and
the initial mental occurrence involving discomfort is called a
“desire” for the state of affairs that brings quiescence. (Rus-
sell 1921: 75)
For instance, such a behavior-cycle may be the result of hunger. Describ-
ing a hungry agent, he writes:
[I]t seems clear that what, with us, sets a behaviour-cycle
in motion is some sensation of the sort which we call dis-
³⁰Surprisingly, like the phenomenological conception, the dispositional view of desires
can also be found, in an inchoate form, in Hume’s Treatise. When Hume discusses the
distinction between calm and violent passions, he notes that, unlike to latter, the former do
not necessarily have a salient phenomenology. If I refuse to eat another brownie despite my
strong urge to do so, we can ascribe this triumph to my long-term goal of maintaining my
weight. On Hume’s view, because the rewards of this desire are far off in the future, it does
not make itself felt in the same way as an occurrent appetite. He writes that calm desires
are more known by their effects than by their immediate sensation (Hume
1978: 2.3.3, 417)
and adds that, because of their tendency to “cause no disorder in the soul”, we can easily
confuse these passions with the operation of reason. In other words, we are justified in
ascribing passions or desires to agents even when they don’t report the appropriate feeling
if they show, in their behavior, a tendency that is best explained by the presence of the
desire. The fact that on the whole Hume clearly favors a phenomenological conception
over the dispositional account suggested by the passage cited is no doubt a consequence of
his general theory of mind or “science of man”. On this theory, ideas are copies of sensory
impressions; by virtue of their pictorial character, they represent the world. Passions, on
the other hand, are what Hume calls original existences; they do not have representational
character. For Hume, this theory, which he announces at the beginning of book I of the
Treatise as the basis of his new system of philosophy, raises the problem of explaining the
differences between various non-representational states. His official view on this topic is
that these differences are all explained by the various degrees of liveliness. Adding that some
types of mental states can also have their contents fixed by their dispositional connections
to behavior would imply a fairly important change of direction.
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agreeable. Take the case of hunger: we have first an uncom-
fortable feeling inside, producing a disinclination to sit still,
a sensitiveness to savoury smells, and an attraction towards
any food that there may be in our neighbourhood. At any
moment during the process we may become aware that we
are hungry, in the sense of saying to ourselves, “I am hun-
gry”; but we may have been acting with reference to food for
some time before the moment. (Russell 1921: 67)
The desire manifests itself in characteristic “searching” behavior, which
continues until the purpose of the activity is realized. However, the pur-
pose is not fixed by what the agent’s thinks but rather in terms of his
activity of trying to get the object. In other words, Russell offers a be-
havioristic analysis of the mental state of desire in terms of its typical
behavior. He writes that desire “must be a causal law of our actions, not
something actually existing in our minds” (Russell 1921: 60). The pur-
pose of a behavior cycle, and consequently the object of the desire, is,
not what the agent consciously intends, but the state of affairs that, if
realized, would bring the cycle to an end. Thus the agent’s wanting food
rather than some other object is constituted by the fact that his search-
ing behavior would come to an end if he found food. What desires one
has is a matter of what one would do or not do in certain counterfactual
conditions. To desire that p is the state which would go out of existence
if the state of affairs that p were realized.
Russell’s view offers two advantages. By defining a desire in terms of a
“causal law”, i.e. links to possible behavior, it highlights the propositional
aspect of desire rather than its qualitative aspect, which Russell still ad-
mits in the form of disagreeable sensations. To define the propositional
content of a desire for food, Russell could say that X has a desire to have
food just in case he is engaging in behavior which would stop if the state
of affairs “X has obtained food” is realized. Desires, on this account, meet
the requirement for being a candidate for a reason. Moreover, Russell
takes into account the possibility of imperfect self-knowledge by admit-
ting the possibility of unconscious desires as well as conscious desires. If
the object of my desire is determined by what would bring quiescence to
my searching behavior, I can easily be wrong about what I really want.³¹
³¹In fact, when he writes that “[c]onscious desire is made up partly of what is essential
to desire, partly of beliefs as to what we want”, Russell defines a conscious desire in terms
of unconscious desire, i.e. simply as being a part of the behavior-cycle (Russell 1921: p 67).
See (Kenny 1994: ch. 5) for an exposition and criticism of Russell’s theory.
92 CHAPTER 2. LOW-BROW DESIRES
The question before us now is whether Russell’s theory of desire makes
it plausible that if I have a desire, I ipso facto have a prima facie reason to
act accordingly. A negative answer is suggested by the following consid-
erations.
To begin with, we should note that a technical mechanism, as well as a liv-
ing organism, can exhibit behavior that it would not be inappropriate to
describe as a Russellean behavior-cycle. The function of a pressure-plate
systemmay be described as wanting to open the super-market door when
a customer walks toward the entrance. The cycle starts with the system
recognizing a certain weight. The opening of the doors brings quiescence
to the cycle, albeit only temporarily, as when the door is closed again, an-
other customer is likely to reactivate the mechanism. In short, the ability
that Russell identifies with desire — what Brandom calls a reliable differ-
ential response disposition — is not restricted to potential agents.³² How-
ever, a pressure-plate system can hardly be said to have reasons. This
casts doubt on any Humean claim that all it takes to have a reason is to
be in the kind of dispositional state Russell points to.
The defender of Humeanism, of course, has an easy comeback. The idea
that wanting may be as simple as a reliable disposition, combined with
the view that desires give us reasons, does not commit him to the absurd
idea that all systems with behavioral dispositions resembling a behavior-
cycle have reasons. On the other hand, we may suspect that there must
be an issue with any Humean proposal that links having reasons to an
ability shared by mere technical mechanisms. Surely the presuppositions
of having a reason are more extensive than Russell’s theory suggests.
Next, according to Sufficiency, to have a desire ipso facto is to have a
reason. We may now ask what it is about being in a Russellean cycle
that makes it the case that one has a reason. Suppose a smoker craves
a cigarette. On Russell’s analysis, this means that a state of discomfort
initiates a cycle of behavior on the part of the agent: he looks in his jacket
only to find an empty packet, he goes to the store and buys a new one,
he lights the cigarette, and so on. He has a desire for a cigarette be-
cause his restlessness, and thus his searching activity, would stop if he
smoked a cigarette. However, although the agent has a habit of seeking
out cigarettes, that does not seem to make it true that he has a reason to
do so. The description of the agent as looking for a smoke implies that he
is likely to smoke a cigarette in the future, but not that he ought to do so.
Surely the answer to the question — what aspect of being in a behavior
cycle rationalizes one’s action —must be that nothing does. Merely being
³²Brandom (1994: 7–8).
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in a habit to do φ in no way justifies the doing of φ. One may value
having a routine, of course. But if it is possible to appeal to one’s habit in
justifying one’s action, this is only so because one espouses a normative
principle to the effect that it is better to stick to one’s habits. We clearly
cannot presuppose a substantive normative judgment of conservatism in
explaining the purported connection between desires and reasons. That
I tend to smoke cigarettes does not make it sensible for me to do so.
Third, the complaint is not just that having a desire for a cigarette, in
Russell’s sense, does not give one a conclusive reason to do so. It is true
that health hazards may outweigh individual reasons one may have for
smoking. But merely being in a habit does not even give the smoker
a prima facie reason to smoke. The disposition does not rationalize the
action, even defeasibly.
This is true not just from the perspective of a third-person onlooker. This
possibility exists from the first-person deliberative standpoint as well as
from the external perspective. The agent may say, “It is true that I tend
to pursue X, but even admitting this, do I really have a reason to do so?”
It does not seem a sign of confusion to ask this. Instead, the possibility of
such a question indicates that even for someone in the grip of a disposi-
tion, it is not evident that the disposition engenders a justification. This is
what happens when one notices that one is in a rut. Such a person might
say, “I know I always do this; but I have no justification for doing it.”³³
The mere fact that one is in a rut doesn’t by itself constitute a reason to
continue the pattern at all, as all justification must result from additional
considerations.
Although it sometimes thought that the idea that desires-as-dispositions
give us reasons is intuitive, it is, to the contrary, not plausible at all that
everyone who has a Russellean desire to φ ipso facto has a reason to φ.
Hailing from 1921, of course, Russell’s theory is hardly up-to-date. Per-
haps it will be thought that the worries mentioned are peculiar to his
theory and that a more contemporary dispositional will fare better. As
we have seen, when Smith criticizes the phenomenological conception,
he proposes his own dispositional account in which he identifies desires
³³The problem brings to mind Moore’s OpenQuestion Argument (Moore 1959: ch. 1). In
that argument, Moore argues that naturalistic definition of goodness inevitably fail. Take
any natural property F that is proposed as an analysans for goodness. No matter what the
property, we can grant that a proposed action X has property F while at the same time
doubting, or denying, that X is also good. Crucially, we can doubt this without thereby
betraying a confusion or misunderstanding of the terms “F” or “good”. In other words,
granting that X is F, the question whether X is also good always seems to remain an open
question. ForMoore, any attempt to identify goodness with a natural property is an instance
of what he calls the Naturalistic Fallacy and should as such be rejected.
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as states occupying a certain functional role. Desire is a “complex dispo-
sitional state”:
[W]e should think of desiring to φ as having a certain set of
dispositions, the disposition to ψ in conditions C, the dispo-
sition to χ in conditions C0, and so on, where, in order for
conditions C and C0 to obtain, the subject must have, inter
alia, certain other desires, and also certain means-ends be-
liefs, beliefs concerning φ-ing by ψ-ing, φ-ing by χ-ing, and
so on. (Smith 1994: 113)
On Smith’s account, ascribing a desire for an end to an agent is to make a
counterfactual claim about the agent, a claim about what the agent would
do depending on his beliefs about what would be away to achieve his end.
He explains that, in this respect, desires differ fundamentally from beliefs:
a belief that p tends to go out of existence in the presence of a
perception with the content that not p, whereas a desire that
p tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to bring
it about that p. (Smith 1994: 115)
Smith improves upon Russell’s view because he explicitly takes into ac-
count the relevance of means-end reasoning for the way in which a desire
is realized behaviorally. What an agent who desires φ will do depends on
what he thinks is necessary in order to achieve φ. Relatedly, Smith ac-
knowledges the fact that the content of a mental states crucially depends
on relations to other mental states. The content or meaning of a desire to
φ depends on the belief that ψ’ing, or χ’ing, etc. is a way of φ’ing. What
a desire to φ disposes an agent to do depends, importantly, on the agent’s
beliefs about what actions would be ways of achieving the desired result.
A dispositional theory implies, correctly, that we cannot understand de-
sires apart from these essential connections.
A further difference to Russell is that Smith doesn’t think that desires are
just “causal laws” or mere behavioral dispositions. Smith’s proposal is
based on a functionalist picture of the mind that holds that the identity
of an intentional state is determined by its causal role, i.e. by the type
of event that tends to cause the state, the type of event that is typically
caused by the state and by the type of other mental states that both cause
and are cause by the state. Furthermore, he holds that having a desire in-
volves a disposition only inter alia, explicitly leaving open the possibility
that a desire may also incorporate a phenomenological content, although
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for Smith a state’s phenomenological feel remains secondary to its propo-
sitional content.
Despite these improvements, however, Smith’s functionalist view is in
fundamentally the same position as Russell’s behaviorist account with
respect to the question whether the conception of desire supports the
desire-based reasons claim. To see this, consider an example by Warren
Quinn.³⁴ Quinn asks us to imagine a person with a peculiar fascination
with car stereos — call him the Radio Man. This person, albeit normal
otherwise (let us suppose), has the habit of turning on every stereo in
every open parked car as he walks along the street. He just does it out of
habit and does not at each stop pause to wonder whether or not he ought
to turn on the radio at every instant. AsQuinn puts it, Radio Man is in a
“strange functional state”: he is disposed to react to the sight of a parked
car by turning its radio on.
As the case is described, the only salient aspect of Radio Man is his dispo-
sition to act. He doesn’t expect to derive pleasure from this activity and
he doesn’t get any. Nor is his activity useful to any other further purpose.
He does not turn on the radios in order to listen to music or to hear the
news, or to do anything else. So in judging whether he has a reason we
have only his functional state to go on. Quinn asks whether, given this
disposition, the Radio Man has any reason to turn on radios. The answer
he suggests is that strange functional states such as Radio Man’s do not
provide an agent any reason whatsoever to do anything. Such a disposi-
tion doesn’t really seem relevant to the question what reasons the agent
has.³⁵
If it is true that, in spite of his functional state, Radio Man doesn’t have
any reason to turn on stereos, the thesis that desires conceived as dispo-
sitional states rationalize cannot be true. It is one thing to conform to a
patter of behavior, but it is quite another thing for the pattern to make
sense of the behavior. If the intuition elicited byQuinn’s examples is that
it would be wrong to speak of Radio Man’s reasons, what features of the
³⁴Cf. Quinn (1995). G.E.M. Anscombe discusses a similar case: “But is not anything
wantable, or at least any perhaps attainable thing? It will be instructive to anyone who
thinks this to approach someone and say: ‘I want a saucer of mud’ or ‘I want a twig of
mountain ash’. It is likely that the other will then perceive that a philosophical example is
all that is in question, and will pursue the matter no further; but supposing that he did not
realise this, and yet did not dismiss our man as a dull babbling loon, would he not try to find
out in what aspect the object desired is desirable?” Her point is that, unless we can supply a
desirability characteristic, we cannot properly understand the agent as desiring that object,
despite his declaration (Anscombe 2000: §36, 70).
³⁵For a similar conclusion, see Heuer (2004).
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case explain this intuition? Radio Man’s salient feature is that his func-
tional state ultimately remains unintelligible or alien to us. It is rationally
isolated in away thatmakes it impossible to see the state as reason-giving.
It also strikes us as arbitrary. Perhaps it will be said that on Smith’s view,
if a desire, as a functional state, forms part of an intricate network of
connections between mental states, it is not arbitrary or isolated. How-
ever, although desires are functionally integrated, their integration is not
of the right kind to trigger our intuition that they count as rationalizing.
That someone has a desire is still a mere descriptive, psychological fact
about the agent. It is not clear at all why the agent should care about a
mere functional state as having normative force for him.
Smith’s functionalist conception of desire is in no better position than
Russell’s behaviorist view to explainwhy a desirematters rationally. What
the dispositionalist and phenomenological conception have in common is
a deflationary view of what it is to want something. They all hold that you
can desire p simply by showing certain dispositions, simple or complex,
or by having a certain phenomenological experience. But if a desire that
p is to justify, and provide reasons for, an action, it needs to be such as to
make the action intelligible. The important difference is this. What sep-
arates a normal agent from Radio Man is that the former does, whereas
the latter doesn’t, see the action in a positive light. We are unsure why
Radio Man should care about his dispositional attitude towards stereos
precisely because he doesn’t see anything good or desirable in the act of
turning on the radios. The action strikes us as arbitrary because, even
from the agent’s own perspective, there is nothing good to be found in it.
So we can explain our intuition that, although Radio Man is in a strange
functional state, he does not have any reason to conform to it by reference
to an important distinction between two general perspectives on action:
Low Brow Intentional action is acting on a desire. In order to desire an
object or state of affairs, it suffices to have a certain feeling or to be
disposed to pursue the object or state of affairs, and nothing more.
It need not entail any positive evaluative stance on the object or
state of affairs.
High Brow Whenever we act, we necessarily aim at something good. In-
tentional action requires regarding an object or state of affairs as
good or desirable. Intentional action requires positive evaluation
of its goal.³⁶
³⁶The distinction between High Brow and Low Brow originates in Railton (1997). Rail-
ton’s commentary on the difference will be discussed in §6.
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The Humean fails to establish that desires rationalize because he sees ac-
tion from a low-brow standpoint. To identify desires with dispositional
states, however complex they may be, is to adopt a low-brow stance on
agency. On a low-brow view, roughly, a state counts as a wanting of p
when it is constituted by a functional state which involves pursuing p. It
follows that Radio Man can follow his strange habit without seeing any-
thing desirable about what he does. The consequence is that while we
imagine the agent pursuing his strange functional state, that state cannot
rationalize the behavior.
But we don’t have to accept the consequence that the action remainsmys-
terious. We can imagine Radio Man only if we of conceive intentional
action in a Low Brow way which completely brackets its evaluative ele-
ment. If we presuppose High Brow, we get a different picture. According
to Hight Brow, an agent can be said to be intentionally doing φ as a re-
sponse to a reason to φ only if he also takes a positive stance towards
φ’ing, in a way that makes his action recognizable as aiming at some
good or other. On this view, the action no longer appears arbitrary be-
cause the agent’s evaluative judgment places it in a rational context. It
is no longer isolated, rationally speaking: taking something to be good
amounts to integrating it in a general view of the good. If the agent re-
gards something as good, he doesn’t have a choice but to care about it in
some way: he cannot rationally remain indifferent about it. Moreover,
the existence of a positive judgment on the agent’s part enables us to
provide an intentional explanation of the action which makes sense of it
by the agent’s own lights. Whereas a disposition only affords us with a
causal explanation, we can now offer a rational-agent explanation of the
behavior.
The consequence to draw from the Radio Man example is to drop Low
Brow as an inadequate picture of rational agency. Russell’s or Smith’s dis-
positional theories are superior to a phenomenological account because
they emphasize the propositional content of desires, but, like the latter,
they are low-brow accounts which fail to bring into relief the evaluative
nature of such states. As mere dispositions, functional states do not have
the power to rationalize behavior: they lack any relation to the good.
By conceiving action as incorporating an evaluative element, High Brow
provides the missing element which allows us to see high-brow desires
as rationally making sense of behavior.
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2.5 Two Low Brow defenses
Summarizing the argument so far, the question we have been trying to
answer is what truth there is to the Humean claim that if you desire φ you
also have a reason to φ. As this depends on what we mean by “desire”, we
have plugged in the two most promising conceptions of desires to see if
doing so makes the claim true. The shared explanation why either of the
conceptions fails as an interpretation of the claim is that both conceptions
take a low-brow view of intentional action. But if we think of wanting as
merely experiencing a certain feeling or as exhibiting a pure behavioral
disposition, we fail to account for the evaluative element of action. As
High Brow insists, all intentional action involves some form of positive
evaluation of the expected outcome on the agent’s part. If a desire is to
provide a reason, it must have an evaluative component.
The tentative conclusion is that low-brow views fail to validate theHumean
claim. The conclusion is only tentative, however, as we still have to con-
sider possible comebacks to the objection voiced in the previous section.
The present section addresses two broad ways of defending the view that
low-brow desires are reason-providing, and the next section a third one.
To begin, when the argument concluded that a desire need not have nor-
mative force even for the agent himself, it relied on the assumption that
a low-brow desire is something that an agent need not care about. Such
a desire need not be seen as part of the agent’s identity as a person. See-
ing this assumption as an opportunity, the Humean could invoke Harry
Frankfurt’s view on personal identity. Harry Frankfurt asks what it is for
an agent to act freely in the sense of acting as the expression of his own
personal identity. His answer is that in order to do so, it is not sufficient
merely to act out of a desire one has. The reason is that the agent may
disown his first-level desires. The example he gives is that of an unwilling
addict, who has frequent desires to inject drugs but prefers not to act on
these desires. So although he frequently acts on his urges, he does so, in
a sense, despite himself. He is not ready to stand behind his own choices.
The unwilling addict is, not an agent in the full sense of the word, but a
“wanton” whose actions flow from desires he does not identify with. By
contrast, an agent who identifies with his choice to φ not only desires
to φ but also has what Frankfurt calls a second-order volition, a kind of
desire to desire to φ. In effect the free agent wants to want to do φ and
to be motivated by his first-order desire. The agent’s freedom consists
in his ability to be reflective by forming second-order desires that back
up — or oppose — his base-level wants. With no second-order desires to
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support his choices, the wanton fails to act in expression of his identity
as a person.
A defense of low-brow Humeanism could posit that what is missing from
the dispositionalist account so far is precisely this element of identifica-
tion. On this proposal, only desire buttressed by a higher-order desire,
as an expression of the agent’s person, is capable of generating a reason.
By contrast, wanton desires would not be intelligible as reason-providers.
By deploying the idea of higher-order desires, the Humean could hope to
avoidQuinn’s counterexample.
We can agree that, if the strategy was sound, it would successfully rule
out RadioMan’s functional state aswanton. Unfortunately, the Frankfurt-
style strategy does not prove workable, as becomes apparent in Gary
Watson’s criticism of Frankfurt’s view.³⁷ For Frankfurt, an agent is wan-
ton if he doesn’t have any second-order volition to back up his first-order
inclinations, but, as Watson points out, it is equally possible to be wanton
with respect to one’s second-order volitions. If Frankfurt asks whether
this or that desire is what the agent really wants as an agent, we can
equally ask whether this or that second-order volition is a genuine ex-
pression of the agent. The natural response is to allow for desires of a
higher reflective level that back up the second-order desires in question.
On this proposal, the agent’s second-order desire is really the agent’s own
only if there is a further desire to back it up. However, this raises the obvi-
ous worry that such a theory generates an infinite regress. An agent iden-
tifies with his desire D₁ only if there is a further desire, D₂, which takes
as its object the first-order desire. But then the original desire doesn’t
really seem the agent’s own unless D₂ itself is not a wanton desire. Other
than arbitrarily cutting off the chain, the only way to secure this further
identification seems to be the postulation of a desire D₃ that shows that
the agent stands behind D₂; and so on. But the assumption of infinite hi-
erarchies of desires is a psychologically impossibility. Furthermore, the
agent never seems to reach a point where he genuinely endorses a course
of action. Aware of this type of worry, Frankfurt notes that
[it] is possible […] to terminate such a series of acts with-
out cutting it off arbitrarily. When a person identifies him-
self decisively with one of his first-order desires, the commit-
ment ‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of
higher orders […] The fact that his second-order volition to
be moved by this desire is a decisive one means that there is
³⁷Watson (1982).
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no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires
or volitions of higher orders. (Frankfurt 1982: 91)
So Frankfurt allows the possibility of taking a decision as to which of
one’s desires are to count as genuine expressions of the person’s identity.
To do so is to undertake a commitment or to identify decisively with one’s
base-level desire. Accepting such a possibility, of course, allows Frankfurt
to halt the regress: the act of identification brings further questions to a
halt. But as Watson points out, this amounts to an admission that the
notion of a higher-order desire cannot really perform the task Frankfurt
assigns it. For according to the passage cited, desires, even higher-order
desires, do not ultimately explain what it is for a person to identify with
an inclination: it is the act of committing oneself to the inclination in
question. Furthermore, once decisions of this kind are admitted, it is no
longer clear why we need to assume that identification and commitment
take place on some higher level of a putative hierarchy of desires at all.
An agent can decide to commit himself directly to a given course of action
as well as to a preexisting inclination. It follows that what an agent really
wants, as an expression of his agency, is not what we wants to want, but
the outcome of a different kind of attitude towards the state of affairs.
Contrary to Frankfurt’s suggestion, the idea of a higher-order desire can-
not in fact be what constitutes endorsement as an agent. Adding more
elements of the same kind — more desires, albeit of a higher order — only
adds further contenders with psychological force to the scene. Instead we
should conclude with Watson that this endorsement is, not a low-brow
attitude, but a sui generis attitude of valuing. But then we can simply
accept valuing as applicable on the ground level, which renders a hier-
archy of higher-order attitudes unnecessary. What is required for the
agent’s action to be really his own is not more desires of the low-brow
kind. Instead an action the agent identifies with must be the outcome of
a high-brow state such as Watson’s attitude of valuing.
This insight is relevant to the Humean idea that desires give us reasons.³⁸
The sufficiency claim is sound only if we understand desires as evaluative
attitudes. If instead we conceive them as, at base, nothing but mere incli-
nations, it is hardly clear why such states should be such that the agent
necessarily needs to care about them, given that he does not necessarily
consider them his own. But if even the agent himself, despite his own
inclinations to act according to the patterns, doesn’t in fact care about
³⁸Watson makes this point in a footnote: “it is not the case that, if a person desires to
do X, he therefore has (or even regards himself as having) a reason to do X” (Watson 1982:
100).
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them, they can hardly provide him with genuine reasons. Genuine rea-
sons can only flow from what the agent’s positive evaluations of states —
from what he holds, in some sense, to be good.
Reflections on Frankfurt’s doctrine have led us straight to a high-brow
conception of agency, but we may be declaring victory too quickly. Tak-
ing a different tack, the defender of a low-brow conception of desires may
argue that Radio Man does not constitute a genuine counter-example to
his thesis because, although desires normally generate reasons, there are
exceptions, which include his strange functional state. This defense is a
way for the Humean to retreat from the maximal position while keeping
the spirit of the desire-based reason thesis. This idea offers the Humean
the possibility to admit that the counter-examples are real; but he will
hasten to add that they are counter-examples only on an overly strict in-
terpretation of the sufficiency thesis. The Humean doesn’t want to claim
that any old desire suffices to generate a reason. On this proposal, not all
desires are the same, and some have features that disqualify these partic-
ular states from actually providing a reason.
The Humean’s task, then, is to identify a subset of the agent’s desires
which have the right features to generate reasons and to restrict the the-
sis accordingly. In effect, He proposes a filter acting on the class of the
agent’s functional states that removes objects that the agent doesn’t de-
sire in a narrower sense of the word, leaving only those that are desired in
a privileged way. The challenge lies in specifying the kinds of desires in a
non-arbitrary way. To give a simple example of an obviously inadequate
specification, one might propose that desires give us reasons unless they
resemble the case of Radio Man in some arbitrary way, say, in that the
person acts on the inclination only once. The conditions the filter puts on
what makes an object something the agent really wants must be general
principles rather than ad-hoc responses to counter-examples.
According to the present proposal, only rational desires give us reasons,
with the implication that Radio Man’s desire to turn on car-radios is in
some sense irrational, which would bar it from being able to give rise to
a reason. Keeping in mind that the desire-based reason thesis has as a
companion thesis the instrumentalist conception of practical reason, the
Humean holds that desires cannot be criticized as irrational per se but only
on some formal charge. What the Humean needs to do, then, is carefully
to specify purely formal criteria of rationality, in a limited sense of that
word, that pick out some desires as privileged or, alternatively, filter out
some desires as only apparent.³⁹ The Humean may appeal to three princi-
³⁹There are pitfalls associated with this approach. After all, the Humean intends to ex-
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ples: rational desires must be (i) based on correct factual information, (ii)
internally coherent or (iii) stable under reflection. Let us examine each
proposal individually.
1. Rational desires must not be based on faulty factual information: Some-
times we develop desires as a consequence of misinformation. Suppose I
want to fix myself a drink and believe that the clear liquid in the bottle
in front of me is gin, so that I develop the desire to pour myself a glass of
that liquid.⁴⁰ But I am mistaken about the bottle, which in fact contains
petrol. As a consequence, despite my desire it doesn’t seem true that I
have any reason — any objective reason at any rate — to pour me a glass
of the liquid.⁴¹ According to the present proposal, the desire does not
count as rational because it is based on faulty theoretical thinking. The
proposal holds that this irrationality is a matter of defective theoretical or
empirical reasoning. Because of this purported theoretical mistake, the
proposal excludes this desire from the class of reason-providing states.
To say that a desire can be called unreasonable on account of its being
derived from a mistaken empirical premises seems an unusual way of
using the word “irrational”.⁴² Take a theoretical example. Suppose that,
standing in the African savanna, I see a striped animal in front of me
plain the notion of having a reason by reference to the concept of a desire, so if we interpret
“rational” as meaning or implying “reason-giving”, the Humean account becomes obviously
circular. This claim, amounting to the idea that desires give us reasons unless they don’t,
would be devoid of content. The current proposal must therefore include a different, inde-
pendent definition of “rational”. Furthermore, such a definition must not be substantive:
saying that a desire is rational in the required sense should not embody particular norma-
tive advice about what is a good reason to do something. To do so would be to propose a
substantive normative theory about reasons for action. His point of departure, remember, is
that what we have reason to do derives not from any substantial normative theory — which
always embodies particular rationalistic assumptions — but instead is a function purely of
our contingent inclinations.
⁴⁰For the example see Williams (1981a).
⁴¹Although arguably one has a subjective reason. For the discussion of the distinction
between objective and subjective oughts, see chapter 6, particularly §5.
⁴²Hume already speaks of affections as unreasonable because of mistaken empirical or
causal judgments. In fact, these are the only ways in which he admits talk of irrational
passions at all:
’tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call’d unreasonable. First,
When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is
founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not
exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means
insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of
causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false supposition,
nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither
justify nor condemn it. (Hume 1978: 2.3.3, 416)
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and judge “This is a zebra”. In fact the animal looks like a zebra, but
unbeknown to me someone has painted stripes on a horse. My original
belief, based simply on my visual perception and plausible assumptions,
was wrong, but it wasn’t strictly speaking irrational. Similarly, a further
belief inferred from the first is likely to be false (though it could be true by
accident) but it would be unusual to call the derived belief irrational on
account of its provenance. But if a belief derived from a bad assumption
is not irrational, we should not assume that desires that have come about
in a similar way can be called irrational. A belief in a proposition may
be irrational if it has been derived from another proposition by means
of a bad rule of inference such as reverse modus ponens, the Fallacy of
Affirming the Consequent. But simple factual mistakes need not be the
result of bad reasoning. Similarly, for the question of whether a desire is
rational it seems irrelevant whether the causal history of a desire includes
untrue beliefs.
A desire deriving from a mistaken belief is such that the agent is likely
to drop the desire if he became aware of its origin in a factual mistake.⁴³
Perhaps we can say that the desire, because of this fault, is not what the
agent really desires. If we accept this, we can also admit that desires with
this property constitute an exception to the sufficiency claim. However,
clearly only derived desires can have this property. Desires that have not
been derived from a factual premise cannot be “irrational” in this sense.
Accordingly, the defense filters out only a small subset of desires, and in
particular it does not apply to RadioMan’s strange functional state, which
we have described as in no sense derivative. In fact, the way Quinn de-
scribes the example all but rules out this interpretation of the case. For
suppose that the agent has made a mistake about what turning on ra-
dios would accomplish — he thinks, perhaps, that doing so will bring him
pleasure. Then what he really wants is to enjoy the expected pleasures of
listening to the news or hearing music. Unlike many, Radio Man does not
desire to turn on a stereo in order to listen to music or the news. He sim-
ply has the disposition to do it, with no ulterior motives; that’s precisely
what is strange about him. The idea that desires only give reason inso-
far as they are factually blameless does not mark Radio Man’s functional
⁴³Hume writes, perhaps too optimistically: “The moment we perceive the falsehood of
any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without
any opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince
me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain actions as
means of obtaining any desir’d good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary,
and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos’d effect; as soon as
I discover the falshood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me” (Hume
1978: 2.3.3, 416–7).
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state as eligible.
2. Rational desires must not be incoherent: A natural way for a desire to
be rational is for it to exhibit some form of coherence. Plausibly, when
compiling a list of the things an agent really wants, we should omit the
things he wants incoherently. However, it is not clear how the notion of
incoherence, a property of a system of intentional states, applies to de-
sires. Humeanism admits the possibility of means-end incoherence, the
fault of an agent who fails to take the required means to an acknowledged
end. But it cannot appeal to instrumental irrationality to filter out way-
ward desires because our task is precisely to explain what makes desires
unfit to provide the starting point of means-end considerations.⁴⁴
According to David Gauthier, an agent’s wanting p can itself be incoher-
ent in a formal sense, explained in terms of the notion of agential prefer-
ence common in the social sciences and in economic theory.⁴⁵ Muchwork
in these fields is predicated on the assumption that we can understand an
agent’s preferences primarily in terms of his observable choices. Prefer-
ence, of course, is a cognate of desire, so that we can presuppose that it
is possible to translate talk about the former into talk about the latter, or
vice versa. The great advantage of preference-based theories is that they
make preference amenable to measurement: we can observe what a con-
sumer wants, for instance, by presenting himwith the choice of a number
of products. On a particularly strong version of this view, a person has
just those preferences he exhibits in choice, so that preferences that don’t
show up in conduct are not taken as real. A rational-choice conception
is often taken as a mere model of our behavior.⁴⁶ Versions of the view,
accordingly, which, like Gauthier’s, aim to represent our actual goals do
not restrict their assumptions to revealed preferences — the behavioral
component of preference — but also posit an attitudinal component of
preference, which is taken as persisting even in the absence of relevant
behavior.
The relation of preference holds between an agent and two options. It is
one of the assumptions of this account of preferences that they are tran-
sitive. For instance, a child who prefers bananas to apples and cherries
to bananas, when given a choice of cherries and apples, will be expected
to choose the former. Now, however, suppose we attribute to the child
also the preference of apples to cherries. If so, there seems something
⁴⁴This is not to say that the Humean may not in some other way invoke instrumental
rationality as the ingredient of low-brow conceptions of desires that allows desires to exert
normative influence. This possibility will be explored in §6.
⁴⁵Gauthier (1986: 40ff).
⁴⁶Cf. Gauthier (1986: 27).
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wrong with his set of values. His cyclic preferences make it impossible
for him to make a rational choice between different types of fruit. Cyclic
preferences are puzzling to formal theories of rational choice, which of-
ten assumed that we can, from a given number of two-place preferences,
form a preference ordering, starting from the preferred option and lead-
ing to the least preferred. Behavior resulting from cyclic preferences can
be described as inconsistent in itself. In the light of these formal difficul-
ties, we may grant that a desire fails the requirement of coherence if its
preferential equivalent is part of a group of preferences which share the
structure of the fruit example.
Once again, however, if the Humean argues that preferences that ratio-
nalize must be coherent in this sense, this filters out only a small fraction
of our desires. This particular kind of irrationality seems to be a rela-
tively rare occurrence. In particular, this defense doesn’t help to explain
away the counter-example we have been considering. If Radio Man has
a preference for turning on car-radios over doing something else, there
is no reason to suppose that it is part a series of cyclic preferences. Radio
Man’s irrationality, if he in fact is irrational, does not seem to consist in a
formal difficulty of this type at all. Even if the idea of cyclic preferences
allows the Humean to rule out certain pro-attitudes as irrational, unless
the Humean can extend the applicability of charges of incoherence, this
minimalist concept of rationality does not address the problem.
3. Rational desires must be stable under reflection: Whereas the two pre-
ceding principles fail to apply to Quinn’s counterexample, this further
idea is applicable. Perhaps Radio Man’s functional state seems arbitrary
or ad hoc because it strikes us as capricious. Thus the Humean may say
that in order for a desire to rationalize the behavior it produces it can-
not be a one-off urge or whim. Again the idea is proposed by Gauthier,
who writes that “[i]n the absence of full reflection on one’s preferences
choice tends to go astray” (Gauthier 1986: 31). On this proposal, a desire
which generates reasons must have persisted through a period of reflec-
tion. The idea seems to be taken from everyday situations: if I come to
want a motorcycle in the heat of the moment, this may not in fact reflect
what I really want, even if that is how it feels at the moment. To ascertain
my real or rational desires, I need to sit down in a quiet hour and reflect
on the desire. Perhaps if I give it some thought, use my imagination to
picture the possible implications and dangerous consequences, my rash
desire will evaporate. However, if the desire remains in existence even
after closer scrutiny, this shows that the desire is mature and stable. The
Humean may suppose that only in the latter case is it correct to say that
the desire gives me a reason or, as Gauthier puts it, reveals my values.
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In an example, he envisages a young woman who, pressed for a choice,
accepts a marriage proposal, only to regret it later:
The young lady’s acceptance of the proposal (or proposition)
is equally not a basis for determining her values. Shemay not
lack the experience to form a considered preference. But she
fails to reflect before accepting. When she does come to re-
flect she realizes that her firm preference is expressed by ‘No’.
Does she change her initial preference, or does she correct it?
Neither alternative is acceptable; the first would imply that
her successive preferences stand on an equal footing; the sec-
ond would imply that initially she misstates her preference.
A better account is that without due consideration, she forms
a tentative preference revealed in her acceptance, which she
then revises. Any choice reveals (behavioural) preference,
but not all preferences are equal in status, so that the rejec-
tion of a tentative preference is not to be equated with the
alteration of a firm or considered preference. Of course not
every rejection of a tentative preference need involve the for-
mation of a firm one. The young lady’s ‘No’ might have been
followed by yet another ‘Yes’. But we may suppose that in
this case further reflection only confirms her second prefer-
ence. And so we treat it as affording a basis for determining
the young lady’s values. (Gauthier 1986: 30)
In Gauthier’s view, although the initial acceptance of the proposal ex-
pressed a preference, it was only a tentative preference. Not all pref-
erence are on a par. A tentative preference is valid only if affirmed in
further contemplation. If thinking things over does not change the initial
decision, the agent develops a firm, considered preference; otherwise the
preference is dropped. To Gauthier, only firm and considered preferences
form a basis for determining the woman’s values and, as we may add, her
reasons, as behavioral or even attitudinal preferences only count as an
expression of what she really wants if they have been reflected upon.
Now it is certainly true that we sometimes form a desire or preference
hastily, without thinking about it enough, and that this can be a ground
for discounting its importance or relevance. On the other hand, it doesn’t
seem correct that everything we genuinely want is the outcome of long
reflection on the subject. Sometimes we act spontaneously and still for
genuine reasons, and there need be nothing wrong with such actions.
Often, in particular in cases like the above that involve planning one’s
future life, reflection will improve the overall coherence of our values;
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but in many cases, it seems superfluous. Therefore, even if it sometimes
improves matters, it doesn’t seem correct to call stability under reflec-
tion a general requirement for desires to count rationally. In particular,
it doesn’t seem true that the reason whyQuinn’s Radio Man doesn’t have
a reason to turn on car radios is the fact that he hasn’t reflected enough
on his behavioral pattern. Perhaps if he did reflect on it, his tentative
preference would even confirm itself.
Nonetheless the Humean may insist that Radio Man only persists in his
rather monotonous activity because he is insufficiently reflective. But
this is not a point that counts in favor of low-brow conceptions of de-
sire. To see this, we need to ask what explains the fact that reflection
brings him closer to what he really wants. It seems that reflection has
the function of making the agent abandon habitual behavioral patterns
in favor of active deliberation about what it is in life that he values. It
helps the young woman to think about the proposal in quiet because this
prompts her to think about what, for her, a good life consists in. Rather
than mechanically giving in to impulses, she frets over what she values.
If this is so, however, then the situation is no longer one in which an
agent has a desire conceived as a purely functional state. What may start
off as a mere behavioral tendency turns, through Gauthier-style reflec-
tion, into an endorsement or rejection of proposed action. In particular,
her reflection on her preference makes it more stable and reliable, but it
also adds an evaluative aspect to her attitude. This explains why reflec-
tion makes a preference a better basis for determining the agent’s values:
that the agents gives the question more thought is evidence that she is
actively making an evaluative judgment. It is also likely that a period of
reflection helps bring the preference more in line with other goals. In
the young woman’s case, the work done by thinking things over is to
weigh different value against each other and to find out whether or not
accepting the proposal would cohere with these values.
Similar things must be true of the Radio Man. If it is true that he doesn’t
reflect on his choices, this does indicate, as the Humean proposal says,
that he doesn’t have a reason to act as he does. However, it doesn’t indi-
cate this because of a principle that rules out unreflective functional states
as the source of reasons. Instead, what explains that the agent doesn’t
have a reason is that he doesn’t in any way see the actions he performs
as good or desirable. The fact that the Radio Man does not reflect on his
preference is only a symptom of the more important fact that he lacks a
high-brow view of the action. If he judged the actions to be good in some
way or other, this would be enough to support the idea that the attitude
gives the agent a reason. But if he fails to take an evaluative stance, his
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low-brow functional state is powerless to make sense of his action.
What prevents Radio Man’s strange functional state from generating rea-
sons, then, is not its spontaneous, unconsidered nature but the fact that
it is a low-brow state. We can conclude that the three proposals con-
sidered either do not achieve their goal of filtering out weird desires as
“irrational” or collapse into a high-brow conception of desire.⁴⁷
2.6 High and low
Humeans hold that low-brow states, in particular behavioral dispositional,
are capable of rationalizing our behavior.⁴⁸ The arguments rehearsed in
the last two sections suggest that the claim cannot be upheld. It may
be said, however, that we have not been interpreting the Humean claim
charitably enough. Along these lines, the Humean can mount a final de-
fense of his position. He agrees he is committed to the sufficiency of
desires-as-dispositions for reasons, but he insists that desires should be
seen in the context of a more complex theory of agency than the one we
have been considering. Specifically, he protests that we have neglected to
take into account the entire instrumental dimension of desires. Pleading
that the picture of the agent is too simplistic, he promises that once we
take into account a fuller portrayal of the agent in action, the idea that
our reasons are provided by low-brow states is no longer mysterious.
To see how such a defense could run in detail, consider again the two
broad views of agency we have been working with. One side of the con-
trast, High Brow, takes intentional action to involve regarding its object
under the guise of the good, which requires the agent to take an evalu-
ative stance on the action’s outcome. On the other side of the contrast,
Low Brow sees acting on a desire as the actualization of a behavioral dis-
position. At this point, the defender of Low Brow may protest that this
characterization of the Humean view makes the intentional action of an
agent seem too much like animal behavior caused by an appetitive incli-
nation. The fact that a Humean agent, like a fish, does not (necessarily)
regard his doings as good does not imply that he should be seen as simi-
lar to a fish as regards mental complexity.⁴⁹ Thus Railton appeals to our
⁴⁷For a penetrating discussion of Gauthier’s proposals, see Brandom (2001b).
⁴⁸From here on out, I will disregard the phenomenological conception to focus on dispo-
sitionalism as the Humean’s best option.
⁴⁹The term “Humean agent”, like the term “Humeanism”, is not intended to imply that
Hume endorsed a picture along these lines. “Humean agent” is a way to refer to the kind
of individual that does the things the Humean theory expects it to, thinks the thoughts the
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intuitive sense that there is
a great deal of psychic distance between a fish that swims to
the surface “because it is hungry” and a child who responds
to our question “Why did you come downstairs?” with the
answer “I’m hungry”. (Railton 1997: 306)
We shouldn’t assimilate the desire of a Humean agent such as a child,
which in Railton’s view doesn’t have the ability to make evaluative judg-
ments, to an animal’s mere functional state. We can reject the evaluative
component of agency without going so far as to identify desires with
states similar to animal appetites. The idea is that there is room for more
sophisticated low-brow conception.
According to Railton, the typical Humean agent occupies amiddle ground
between having a full-blown evaluatively loaded desire and having amere
functional state. It is not, however, immediately obvious how such a so-
phisticated version of the low-brow conception of agencywould look like.
In which sense are an agent’s desires more than mere functional states,
especially in terms of their power to rationalize action? If a sophisticated
version of the low-brow view is to work, there must be some way to en-
rich the low-brow conception to explain the psychic distance between
Humean agents and pre-rational creatures without full access to agency.
The idea is not to replace the dispositionalist conception of desires with
another view but to reconsider it in a different light.
According to defenders of the low-brow conception, the way Humean
agents interact with the world is significantly more complex than the pic-
ture of pre-rational agency suggests, which is reflected in the agent’s ca-
pacities. For Railton, Humean individuals “exemplify agency even though
they do not by their nature ‘aim at’ the good” (Railton 1997: 305). Railton
takes up this task by noting biographical details of a Humean agent:
Humean individuals engage in both theoretical and practi-
cal reasoning. They inquire into causes and effects; form be-
liefs about the conductiveness of means to ends; take into
account the relative strengths and independence of desires;
acquire habits; form intentions to act; and formulate and re-
spond to rules and sanctions. Their conduct therefore can, it
is claimed, be given fully fledged intentional, rational-agent
explanations. Why-questions about their conduct can often
Humean theory predicts, and so on, and it is a well-established term in the literature.
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be answered correctly by citing their reasons for behaving as
they do, and these will include: how they represented the sit-
uation, what their goals were, how they weighed their var-
ious ends, how they adjusted means and ends, and so on.
(Railton 1997: 305)
What makes a creature a Humean individual — and thus, if Low Brow
is correct, an agent — is his possession of a whole array of interrelated
practical capacities. He is able to cope with the fact that he may have
several desires that cannot be satisfied at the same time. In order to nav-
igate his way through the world, he employs beliefs about the world, and
in particular empirical beliefs about how to effect a change. To do so, he
assigns different desires different strengths. His means-end calculations
cause him to form intentions and to make decisions.
On Railton’s view, unlike a pre-rational creature, a Humean individual is
perfectly capable of acting on reasons in the full sense. To illustrate the
difference, he gives the example of a girl and her younger brother before
a weekend trip with their parents to the beach:
[The] two children have been begging all week to go to the
shore. Both, however, dislike long summer car rides. When
the weekend comes one child absolutely refuses to get into
the car. “But we’re going to the beach, which you love!” “I
don’t care. I don’t want to ride in this stuffy old car. I hate
it! I won’t do it.” He has to be carried bodily to the car and
buckled in, thrashing. Once in the car, he still refuses to be
jollied along. “It’s your fault I’m in this stuffy old car! I told
you I hate it.”The second child confines her thrashing to loud
complaints. “Not another car ride! Last time I felt sick the
whole time!” But when the time comes to leave she climbs
into her seat of her own accord, waiting sulkily to be buckled
in. On her face is a look that says “Okay, I’ll ride in the car,
but don’t expect me to like it.” (Railton 1997: 306)⁵⁰
In this scenario, the children both have a desire to go to the beach, al-
though their reactions are different. Let us accept with Railton that, de-
spite their desire, neither of the children can be said to judge that going to
the beach would be a good thing. Maybe they’re not yet capable of such
evaluations in the full sense. In any event, the attitude of either child
toward the prospect of going to the shore is a low-brow attitude. What
⁵⁰Railton attributes the example to Jean Hampton.
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is more, the children share a dislike for the required means to going to
the shore: they hate enduring a long ride in a car. What, then, is the dif-
ference between the two children? One child — let us say: the younger
brother — entirely refuses to enter the car at his own will, i.e. to take the
required means towards an end he desires. His two desires — going to the
beach and staying out of the car — are in conflict, and he lacks the capac-
ity to weigh his own desires. The more salient desire of avoiding the car
ride gets the upper hand, but seemingly without the involvement of the
agent. The child’s dislike of the back seat pushes it to throw a tantrum.
This is a sign that the younger child doesn’t fully exemplify agency. In
particular, he lacks the ability to control his own desires and to harmonize
them in the case of conflict. By contrast, the older sister is more mature
in this regard. Like her brother, she doesn’t like to enter the car, but she
grudgingly complies because she is able to see the car ride as a means to
the end she looks forward to. Crucially, she makes use of her ability to
adjust means to ends. She doesn’t let herself be controlled by what desire
happens to be felt the most strongly at any given time but instead exerts
active agential control over her own inclinations. She is able to weigh her
greater long-term interest against the prospect of a minor but imminent
displeasure. And she is able to adapt means to ends even if the means
happen to be unpleasant. For Railton, she has the qualities constitutive
of a Humean agent, qualities which her brother lacks.
Railton emphasizes that seeing the older child as in charge of her own
desires doesn’t force us to attribute to her positive evaluations of the
states of affairs she wants. As he describes the scenario, she does not
make any judgments, positive or otherwise, about the day at the beach.
Nonetheless, her abilities as a Humean agent allow her to treat going to
the beach as an end. For Railton, her case shows the difference between
mere desires, which can be attributed even to the brother, and what we
may call desires-as-ends. Like her brother, the older child is influenced
by her desires or inclinations. But in a Humean agent desires “function
as end-setting” (Railton 1997: 307). On Railton’s view, what separates
Humean agents from sub-Humeans behavers, then, is the ability to adopt
and pursue ends as such.
For Railton, the addition of means-end oversight makes a difference to
the rationalizing power of desires. While we have argued that the low-
brow conception of desires is no basis for the view that desires provide
us with reasons, Railton replies that this is true only for immature proto-
agents. With respect to the brother, he concedes, we cannot say that
his desires gives him a reason to go to the beach or to wait out the car
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ride, or any reason at all. Because of his lack of practical competence, his
desires do not set ends and therefore fail to rationalize his behavior. But
to Railton it is amistake to equate theHumean positionwith the view that
assimilates intentional agents to the brother. An enlightened low-brow
conception takes a view of Humean agents as closer to his sister, who has
the ability, among other things, to rank desires and adjust means to ends.
She does not just chase inclinations but pursues ends. For Railton, this
means that we can appeal to her desires in intentional or “rational agent”
explanations as things which rationalize her behavior. On this view, the
inclinations of Humean agents have reason-giving power.
Railton is right to point to the various abilities associated with practical
reasoning as prerequisites of responding to a consideration as a reason.
However, he also holds that these abilities do not require acting under the
guise of the good. Her further capacities notwithstanding, the girl in his
example is acting on desires which, conceived as functional states, do not
aim at the good. Mere dispositions, we have established, are insufficient
tomake an action reasonable. It seems that the addition of agential capac-
ities alone doesn’t change the fact that the girl’s inclinations do not have
to matter rationally to her. We may ask what about these abilities it is
that makes the difference between a pre-rational behaver and a Humean
agent. The answer must be that only a rational agent treats the things
she desires as ends. But it is hard to see that one can treat something as
one’s end without regarding it in some way as good.
What additional resources does graduating to a full Humean agent bring
to the table? The Humean may answer that what makes the difference is
the fact that the Humean individual engages in instrumental reasoning.
The Humean seems to rely on the idea that the fact that the instrumen-
tal principle holds gives the desire an additional significance. But that
amounts to the idea that participation in instrumental rationality some-
howmanages to elevate a mere functional state into something with nor-
mative significance. It is hard to see how the instrumental principle could
possibly achieve this feat all on its own. After all, means-end rationality
is often said to be merely capable of transferring normative significance
from the means to the end. But a transfer is not what we are envisaging
at present. On the present proposal, the role assigned to instrumental
thought is that of endowing a state which was previously normatively
innocent with a normative standing. It is deeply mysterious how this
could be instrumental rationality in operation.
Instrumental rationality requires you to take the means necessary to at-
tain you ends. The story the Humean story would need to tell is that,
as a Humean agent, by developing a desire-as-disposition, you become
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subject to hypothetical imperatives. So on this line of thinking desires
generate imperatives of the form:
If you want to φ and believe that ψ’ing is required for achiev-
ing φ, then you ought to ψ.
The idea, then, must be that by way of generating imperatives, i.e. re-
quirements, the desires become ends. However, this is unconvincing. In
order to have force for an agent, a hypothetical imperative itself presup-
poses that an agent is already committed to pursuing an end — it cannot
make it the case that the agent has the end. But surely the agent’s be-
ing committed to a project is founded on a positive evaluative attitude
towards the project. Practical imperatives matter rationally only to an
agent aiming at the good.
Finally, the instrumental principle canmake a difference to the agent only
if the agent is in fact being guided by the principle in his reasoning. Rail-
ton’s Humean individual engages in means-end arguments, true, but he
falls short of being guided by the principle that he ought to take themeans
to his acknowledged ends. On Smith’s dispositional theory, if he desires
to φ, he has the behavioral pattern to do ψ insofar as he believes that φ’ing
requires ψ’ing. Suppose he wants to φ and believes that ψ’ing is neces-
sary to do so. Then either he really does ψ, or he fails to do so. If the
latter, we are having difficulties describing the situation properly. The
fact that he does not take the means does not indicate that he is making a
mistake rationally. Instead it seems to suggest that the agent didn’t really
want to do φ in the first place. For if to desire φ is, inter alia, to take the
required means, then failing to do the latter casts doubt on the former.
The low-brow proposal does not allow for the true possibility of violating
the instrumental principle.
Conversely, if the agent does take the means, this is a consequence of his
behavioral disposition to do what coincides with the dictates of instru-
mental rationality. However this is what, given his disposition, he was
going to do anyway. With the dispositional interpretation of the instru-
mental principle, to do differently was not really an option. It follows that
in taking the means, he is not being guided rationally by a principle.⁵¹
⁵¹For an extended and difficult argument to this effect, see Korsgaard (2008: 32–46). Ac-
cording to Korsgaard, empiricist accounts of agency cannot account for the fact that the
instrumental principle not only motivates but functions “as a requirement or a guide” (Ko-
rsgaard 2008: 52). On Korsgaard’s view, if the Humean gives a dispositional account of
instrumental reason, it turns out to be strictly speaking impossible for the agent to refuse
to take the means M to the end E, for if the agent does not do M, it follows that he has not
really accepted E as an end.
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To conclude, Railton is right to call attention to instrumental reasoning as
a crucial component that allows us to see an agent as acting for reasons
rather than merely following inclinations. However, he neglects the way
in which the instrumental principle is itself a way of spelling out what
it means for an agent to see something as good or to treat it as his end.
If this much is true, Low Brow cannot help itself to the notion of the
instrumental principle in explaining why a low-brow agent’s inclinations
can justify his behavior because genuine instrumental rationality itself is
in reach only for agents aiming at the good. Railton’s contention that, in
an individual with purely low-brow resources, desires may nonetheless
act as end-setting cannot be upheld.⁵²
⁵²For an answer to the question how we should understand the instrumental principle,
see chapter 6.
Chapter 3
High-brow commitments
3.1 Kripke’s rule-following paradox
As the arguments of the last chapter have shown, any low-brow concep-
tion of agency faces serious difficulties. We have considered twoHumean
attempts to clear away the difficulties: demarcating a class of “irrational”
desires and appealing to the instrumental reasoning of a Humean indi-
vidual. Neither of the strategies has succeeded in defending the reason-
giving power of low-brow dispositional states, which led us to reject the
Humean account of action in general. Ultimately, however, the argu-
ments are persuasive only if an alternative, high-brow theory can be
shown to be viable. In order to do so, we first need a clearer idea of what
such a theory entails. High Brow holds that in acting for a reason, an
agent values the goal of his activity or regards it as, in some sense, good.
Relatedly, if we are to understand intentional action generally as imply-
ing a want, we need to take a high-brow view of the intentional state of
desire as well.¹ On a high-brow view, an agent who wants to perform an
¹This formulation is conditional: we need to understand desire in a High Brow way if
(as in Davidson’s belief-desire model) we tie action to wanting. On the classical view, de-
sire is the principal intentional state in the practical realm, and all intentional actions are
accompanied by a desire. However, I will reject the classical view below in favor of a Sell-
arsian alternative (§4). On my view, intention — not desire — is the quintessential practical
state. If we conceive intention rather than desire as the state that accompanies action, it is
not, strictly speaking, necessary to argue for a High Brow conception of desire, since what
is most important is a High Brow conception of intention. On the other hand, much of the
discussion has been conducted in terms of desires rather than intentions. Therefore, in order
to be able to engage with the literature, my argument in the following sections (§1–3) will
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action is someone who regards the action or its expected outcome in a
positive light. When we desire, we aim at the good.
The first question raised by this proposal is what it means for a state
to aim at the good. This chapter will be concerned primarily with this
question. Having been critical of the dispositional approach to desire,
we are particularly interested in the way in which a state that aims at
the good is anything more than a mere dispositional state. Investigat-
ing this question will first require some beating about the neighboring
bushes. Kripke’s discussion of the so-called rule-following paradox con-
tains an important critique of dispositionalism about meaning, which, as
we find, applies similarly to dispositional accounts of desire (§1). The
discussion leads to the general thesis that semantic and mental content
are normative (§2). It follows that desires, as contentful states, are rule-
governed states. Two common ways of distinguishing desires from be-
liefs — through the notions of constitutive aim and direction of fit — are
considered and interpreted in line with this conclusion (§3). “Practical
commitment” is introduced as a notion to replace that of desire, as it bet-
ter reflects the normative nature of the intentional state that accompanies
action (§4). Finally, we address the question where this notion leaves us
relative to the Humean doctrine (§5).
In order to move beyond and improve upon the dispositional theory of
desires criticized in the previous chapter, we should start by pinpointing
its difficulties. We will take our cue from Saul Kripke’s seminal criticism
of another dispositional theory, viz. the theory that what a person means
by his words is constituted by facts about his behavioral propensities. By
way of setting the stage, let us start by describing the paradox he lays
out at the beginning of his Wittgenstein on Rule and Private Language, a
reading and interpretation of what has become known as Wittgenstein’s
rule-following remarks.²
continue to target the classical question of how we should understand desires. The caveat
is that, ultimately, desires will be seen to be less important than the closely related states
of intention or practical commitment. We will drop the working assumption that desire is
the crucial practical state in §4.
²Rather than portraying it as an exact representation of Wittgenstein’s own negative
and positive views, Kripke offers his interpretation of the paradox as “Wittgenstein’s ar-
gument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him” (Kripke 1982: 5). Likewise,
here we will not delve into the numerous interesting, but difficult, questions of Wittgen-
stein hermeneutics. Instead, our focus will be on Kripke’s presentation of the important
rule-following difficulties which, everyone should agree, are genuinely Wittgensteinian at
least in their general direction, and in particular on Kripke’s ingenuous treatment of dispo-
sitionalism.
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Kripke asks us to imagine a competent speaker of the English language
who knows the use of the word “plus” or the symbol “+” but who, al-
though he has performed a large number of additions in the past, has
never made the particular calculation “68 + 57” before. Suppose that
all additions he has performed before operated on numbers smaller than
57. Now the person performs the calculation and, not surprisingly, ob-
tains the answer “125”. At this point, however, a skeptic intervenes and
questions the person’s confidence that he is giving the right answer. He
brings up an alternative possibility: “Perhaps given how you used the
term “plus’‘in the past, the answer you intended for this calculation is
“5’‘rather than “125’’.” What the skeptic suggests is that the speaker’s cer-
tainty about the calculation may not be justified. As the skeptic points
out, the subject never gave himself explicit instructions as to what the
answer to this particular arithmetical task should be, and, as we have
stipulated, he has never attempted the task before. So what the subject
must do is to apply the same rule which he previously meant by the ex-
pression “+” and which he has applied many times before. However, the
skeptic argues that the subject may have used the expression “+” to de-
note, not plus, but quus, a made-up function which yields the result of
addition for numbers smaller than 57, but 5 otherwise. If this skeptic is
right, the correct answer to the question would have been, not 125, but 5.
Although the skeptic’s hypothesis is wholly implausible, it turns out to
be hard to refute. The challenge raised by the skeptic is the following:
“What evidence can you adduce that shows that what you meant by “+’’
in the past was plus rather than quus?” If the skeptic’s hypothesis — that
the person always intended “+” to mean quus — is as absurd as it sounds,
there should be some facts about the person’s past usage of the word the
speaker can appeal to refute the claim. Kripke writes that “[o]rdinarily I
suppose that in computing ‘68 + 57’ as I do, I do not simply make an un-
justified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previously gave myself that
uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say ‘125’” (Kripke
1982: 10). We are usually certain about our usage, but in the light of the
skeptical question, the application of as straightforward a rule as addition
suddenly seems to be “an unjustified stab in the dark” (Kripke 1982: 17).
In order to show that the subject is justified in answering “125” we may
point to the fact that he grasps the rule of addition. But that only raises
the question what grasping the rule amounts to. What facts determine
that the rule the subject has in mind is addition rather than quaddition?
In the course of his discussion, Kripke considers a number of theories
about what the fact that the agent means plus rather than quus consists
in, theories that purport to show that the right answer to the question,
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as the subject intended it, is “125”. The first suggestion is to invoke facts
about the history of the agent’s usage of the word. In the past, he has
used addition many times. However, as we have stipulated, prior usage
never included the addition “68 + 57”. As a result, all previous instances of
addition are just as compatible with the hypothesis that what hemeant by
the word was “quus” as they are with the hypothesis that what he meant
was “plus”. If the directions the person gave himself are nothing more
than a finite number of previous applications, then for all we know, he
may have meant quaddition all along. The person’s psychological history
doesn’t seem to settle what he meant by the word.
Kripke spends much effort discussing a dispositionalist answer to issue
raised by the skeptic, which is also arguably the most promising natural-
ist reply available. Our interest in what follows is in Kripke’s criticism of
this approach.³ According to this answer, there are facts about the subject
which determinewhat hemeans by theword “+”: facts about the subject’s
dispositions. We can understand this as a way to escape the limitations
of the obviously inadequate idea that my previous additions settle what
answer I should give now. Because the history of my previous usage is
limited to a few thousand instances, we can easily find an application of
the rule that hasn’t been covered by it. On the other hand, dispositions
can manifest themselves in a greater number of ways, so the disposition-
alist answer holds the promise of explaining why I mean addition even
in novel applications.
According to a dispositionalist analysis, to mean addition by “+” is simply
to be disposed to reply with the sum of two numbers when asked “What
is x + y?” That the subject means addition, then, implies that the subject
is disposed to reply “125” to the question “68 + 57”, “200” to the question
“100 + 100”, and so on. On the other hand, if the subject meant quaddition
by the expression, he would tend to reply “5” to the same question. Even
if the actual answers given in the past do not allow us to tell whether the
subject meant addition or quaddition, it may still be true that the subject,
had he been asked the question, would have replied “125”.
Kripke’s riposte to the dispositionalist defense is to point out that the
skeptic challenged us to name a fact about the subject that we can appeal
³A discussion of the skeptical dimension of Kripke’s (andWittgenstein’s) paradox is out-
side the scope of this chapter. Kripke goes on to consider a number of defenses against the
skeptic, including a phenomenological account and a Platonist account of meaning, all of
which he finds incapable of meeting the skeptical challenge. After dismissing these sug-
gestions, Kripke proposes, in chapter 3 of his book, what he calls a skeptical solution to his
paradox. In the text I focus on the difficulties of a naturalistic or reductionist solution and
assume that we can live with the conclusion that no descriptive or naturalistically unobjec-
tionable facts can serve the role of meaning-facts.
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to as a justification of the answer to the mathematical question. What the
skeptic questioned was our confidence that it was really addition that the
subject meant all along. The answer seemed merely a “stab in the dark”.
But it does not make sense to react to such a challenge by pointing to a
disposition. If the dispositionalist says that “125” is what the subject tends
to reply and that earlier the subject would have given the same response
if he had been asked, this misses the point of the skeptical question:
How does any of this indicate that — now or in the past —
‘125’ was an answer justified in terms of instructions I gave
myself, rather than a mere jack-in-the-box unjustified and
arbitrary response? (Kripke 1982: 23)
As Kripke points out, the trouble with the dispositional view is this: it
doesn’t “tell me what I ought to do in each new instance” (Kripke 1982:
24). Instead, it simply seems to rubber-stamp the agent’s behavior, what-
ever it may be. This, however, cannot be what the meaning fact consists
in. In particular, the dispositionalist theory seems to entail that all our
behavior is automatically, and incredibly, correct according to the rule:
A candidate for what constitutes the state of mymeaning one
function, rather than another, by a given function sign, ought
to be such that, whatever in fact I (am disposed to) do, there
is a unique thing that I should do. Is not the dispositional
view simply an equation of performance and correctness?
Kripke points to Wittgenstein’s view that if, concerning a subject, “what-
ever is going to seem right to me is right,”, that indicates that something
is amiss. ForWittgenstein, “that only means that here we can’t talk about
right” (Wittgenstein 1958: §258). If a theory implies that, with respect to
some rule, any performance is, by definition, automatically right, then
nothing is. The difficulty becomes apparent once we notice the possibil-
ity of systematic mistakes. It is not unusual for a subject to have dispo-
sitions to make mistakes, even in areas of their competence. A student
may have the disposition, under certain circumstances, to give an answer
that deviates from the one found in the addition table. The normal thing
to say would be that, in giving deviating answers, the subject is making
mistakes. But according to the dispositionalist, we can read off the func-
tion that a person means from his dispositions. Thus the dispositionalist
seems to be committed to the absurd conclusion that, strictly speaking,
we cannot make systematic computational errors. The answer the agent
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would have given becomes identical to the answer the agent should have
given.
Here is Kripke’s summary of his discussion of the dispositionalist ac-
count:
Suppose I domean addition by ‘+‘. What is the relation of this
supposition to the question how Iwill respond to the problem
‘68 + 57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of
this relation: if ‘+‘meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’.
But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is
normative, not descriptive. (Kripke 1982: 37)
He goes on to explain the crucial contrast between normative and de-
scriptive accounts:
The point is not that, if I meant addition by ‘+‘, I will answer
‘125’, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of
‘+‘, I should answer ‘125’. Computational error, finiteness of
my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to
be disposed to respond as I should, but if so, I have not acted
in accordance with my intentions. The relation of meaning
and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive.
(Kripke 1982: 37)
The core difficulty of the dispositional view, then, is that it is a descrip-
tive rather than normative account of the relation between meaning and
future action. The problem calls for a different approach to the general
question of how we can use a term with understanding.
Kripke’s criticism of dispositionalism captures a profound truth. The im-
portant point, for our purposes, is that it has implications for a correct
theory of desire and thus for our theory of reasons. Kripke himself draws
attention to this relationship in an extensive footnote.⁴ There Kripke
notes that Russell’s dispositional theory of desires in terms of behavior-
cycles, which we have discussed earlier, was a target of Wittgenstein’s
criticism during the development of the views which were later published
in the Philosophical Investigations.⁵ Wittgenstein’s thought about mean-
ing took one of its early forms in his criticism of Russell’s behaviorist
conception of the relation of desire to its object. Drawing out the impli-
cations, Kripke writes:
⁴Kripke (1982: 25, n. 19).
⁵For the discussion of Russell’s view, see §2.4.
3.1. KRIPKE’S RULE-FOLLOWING PARADOX 121
Clearly the sceptic, by proposing his bizarre interpretation of
what I previously meant, can get bizarre results as to what (in
the present) does, or does not, satisfy my past desires or ex-
pectations, or what constitutes obedience to an order I gave.
(Kripke 1982: 25, n. 19)
and adds:
Russell’s theory parallels the dispositional theory ofmeaning
in the text by giving a causal dispositional account of desire.
Just as the dispositional theory holds that the value I meant
‘+‘to have for two particular arguments m and n is, by def-
inition, the answer I would give if queried about ‘m+n’, so
Russell characterizes the thing I desire as the thing which,
were I to get it, would quiet my ‘searching’ activity. (Kripke
1982: 25 n. 19)
Here Kripke suggests a basic problem for dispositionalist accounts of de-
sires. In Russell’s view, a desire is defined in terms of the thing which
tends to bring quiescence to my searching behavior. It follows that the
object of a desire is the thing which if obtained would cause the desire
to disappear. In a rare (almost) direct criticism of another philosopher’s
view, Wittgenstein points out the consequences of Russell’s account. He
writes in the Philosophical Investigations:
Saying “I should like an apple” does not mean: I believe an
apple will quell my feeling of nonsatisfaction. This propo-
sition is not an expression of a wish but of nonsatisfaction.
(Wittgenstein 1958: §440)
Again, in the Philosophical Remarks, he writes:
I believe Russell’s theory amounts to the following: if I give
someone an order and I am happy with what he then does,
then he has carried out my order.
and goes on, in parentheses:
If I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the
stomach, taking away my appetite, then it is this punch that
I originally wanted. (Wittgenstein 1975: §22)
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On the dispositionalist theory of desire, the object of a desire is deter-
mined, as it were, after the fact. If it turns out that a punch in my stomach
will bring an end to my desire, we must conclude that its object was not,
as I thought, the apple but the punch. Clearly this consequence is ab-
surd: the object is not determined in such a way as to make such a switch
possible. The problem is one of intentionality. As Wittgenstein points
out, Russell’s theory portrays the relation between desire and action as
an “external relation”, whereas what we need to do is to see the relation
as “internal”.⁶ The object of the desire —my taking a bite of the apple — is
already contained in the desire, conceptually, even if it doesn’t exist yet,
seeing as I don’t have the apple yet.
The following section argues more carefully for a non-descriptive theory
of desires and gives a sense to the idea that desire is related internally,
rather than externally, to the action done from it. For now, let us restate
the Kripke-Wittgenstein point about desires. There are correct and in-
correct ways of reacting to a desire. Correctness or incorrectness here is
always relative to the content of the state in question. We do not have a
reason to (try to) satisfy all our desires, and some of our desires are such
that we ought not to pursue them at all. But the desire imposes internal
standards of correctnesswith respect to its conditions of satisfaction. And
as long as the desire is in place, so are the standards. This suggests that
Kripke’s point with respect to the mental state of meaning something by
a term carries over to the state of desire. Wittgenstein’s polemic against
Russell can be translated into Kripke’s idiom: the relation between the
desire and the action which follows from it is normative, not descriptive.
3.2 The normativity of desires
If, as Kripke argues, a person’s meaning a concept by a linguistic ex-
pression is not reducible to dispositions, then, if the above suggestion is
correct, the same must be true of desires. To see this, we need to (i) state
and refine the general idea of the normativity of semantic content, (ii)
extend it to the content of intentional states and (iii) ascertain that the
idea applies to desires as well as to other intentional states.
i) The normativity of meaning: Kripke’s criticism of dispositionalism al-
lows us to draw a positive conclusion about what it is to use a linguistic
expression with understanding. As we saw, Kripke holds that the rela-
tion of meaning to future action is normative: The availability of alterna-
⁶Wittgenstein (1975: §21).
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tive skeptical hypotheses shows that facts about a speaker’s past usage
or his dispositions do not exhaustively determine the speaker’s meaning.
Therefore, the fact that a speaker means something by a certain expres-
sion cannot be reduced to the fact that the speaker has used the expres-
sion in a certain way in the past or facts about his hypothetical behavior.
What, then, is it for the speaker to mean something by the term? The
picture suggested by Kripke’s discussion is different from the reductive
theories he considers.⁷ On this picture, for a person to mean something
by an expression is for him to be guided by a linguistic rule which governs
the use of the expression. The picture is closely related to one proposed
in more explicit terms by Wilfrid Sellars. Here is Sellars’s statement of
the core thesis:
Language-rule thesis The linguistic meaning of a word is entirely consti-
tuted by the rules of its use.⁸
The high-brow theory of agency presented in this chapter and the next is
largely based on a Sellarsian understanding of linguistic meaning, mental
content and following. or being guided by, a rule. To make progress on
the main topic, then, it will be necessary to introduce some core elements
of Sellars’s doctrine, including the language-rule thesis. The immediate
consequence of this thesis is the Normativity of Content. If what a per-
son means by a word is a matter of rules, then statements about meaning
are, or imply, statements about how the person ought to behave in var-
ious circumstances. This implication has often been seen as worrying.
According to a long-standing doctrine, we cannot derive ought from is. It
follows that, if meaning statement imply oughts, we cannot derive what
⁷What does Kripke’s (or Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s) own solution consist of? In part 3 of
his book, Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein an agreement with the skeptic, viz. that “there is
no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus” (Kripke 1982: 71). There is no “straight solution”
to the skeptical paradox, then, but according to Kripke, there is a “skeptical solution” to the
problem. According to this solution, a speaker considered in isolation cannot be understood
as meaning anything by his words. But the situation is different once we understand the
person as a part of a linguistic community. If a person learns to add — if he adds reliably —,
he is admitted to the community, which shares a common practice of adding. The practice
involves mutual criticism and correction. Meaning something by a term is understood in
terms of the attitudes of other members of the community. This story shares many features
with the account in Sellars (2007e). For a discussion, see Brandom (1994: ch. 1). See also
§4.1 below.
⁸See Sellars (1980b). It is important to emphasize that Sellars identifies meaning with its
use in the sense of “functional role”, not with its “instrumental use”. The latter is taken to
be crucial by a rather different view, which has been called “agent semantics” (Rosenberg
1974: ch. 2). Sellars emphatically rejects the contention of agent semanticists such as Grice
or Austin that what a speaker means by a term is a matter of his communicative intentions,
i.e. of what he is trying to convey by using the word. See also O’Shea (2007: 199, n. 7).
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a person means from a purely descriptive picture of the world. However,
this is not the place to worry about problems deriving from a scientific
naturalism.⁹ Instead, we should proceed towards a better understand-
ing of Sellars’s thesis, which should help us draw the right lessons from
Kripke’s argument.¹⁰ Sellars writes programmatically:
(a) linguistic activity is, in a primary sense, conceptual be-
havior; (b) linguistic activity is through and through
rule-governed. (Sellars 2007c: 61)
Starting with the second programmatic claim, to say that language is es-
sentially rule-governed is to say that using language is something that
speakers do. That is, it is to lay stress on the pragmatic aspect of speaking.
Our use of languages consists of doings that are evaluable as appropriate
or inappropriate, correct or incorrect, with respect to a certain standard.
If the basic unit of thought is judgment, the paradigmatic use of language
is in basic indicative assertions.¹¹ Thus in asserting an indicative sentence,
a speaker does something that can be assessed as correct or incorrect. It is
certainly possible to know the meaning of a term and use it wrongly, yet
knowing the meaning entails grasping its role of usage at least to a cer-
tain extent. Take for instance a subject’s assertion: “This vase is white.”
The appropriateness of this assertion depends, among other things, on
the appropriateness of the use of the predicate “white” in this context.
Meaningful expressions have conditions of correct use.¹² Again, as the
⁹The epithet “scientific” matters here, because normative facts are only problematic from
the perspective of the view that what is natural is determined exclusively by the ontology
of physics or similarly austere natural sciences. Some writers, notably McDowell (1996),
have proposed a more liberal naturalism which makes room for ought as well as for is. See
§1.4.
¹⁰Sellars is not so much a direct contributor to the debate started by Kripke as a writer
that independently developed many of the same Wittgenstein-derived themes. Kripke’s
1982 book did more than any other piece in the literature to bring the central importance
of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to the forefront of philosophical conscious-
ness. The ensuing discussion, some of which is collected in Miller and Wright (2002), and
in particular the attempts to defend the dispositional approach to meaning, are insightful.
However, a number of important distinctions have been neglected in much of the literature.
Writing some three decades before Kripke’s participation in the debate, Sellars offered a
forceful defense of these distinctions (see in particular Sellars (1980b), Sellars (2007e), Sell-
ars (2007d) and Sellars (2007c)). In doing so, he anticipated many of the difficulties encoun-
tered later by Kripke and others. In the text, I will make use of the Sellarsian distinctions
between different types of rules, acts and actions, obeying rules and conforming to rules.
The hope is that these additional tools contribute to making the rule-governed nature of
meaning less mysterious. The most direct connection of Sellars’s writings on rules and the
Kripke-derived debate is found in Brandom’s perspicuous treatment of the normativity of
content thesis (Brandom 1994: ch. 1).
¹¹Cf. Brandom (1994).
¹²Cf. Boghossian (2002: 148).
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word “white” means white, we can suppose that it applies — i.e. correctly
applies — to all white things and to none that are not white. That is, it
is correct, or appropriate, to assert statements predicating whiteness of
these things. Meaning statements such as “X means y by z” entail a large
number of normative truths of this kind. As a consequence, by coming
to mean something by a word, we acquire both obligations and liberties.
For example, if I mean white by “white”, I am obligated not to use the
word to describe things I know are not white. By using the word, then,
I take on a responsibility, but I also acquire an authority. Meaning white
by the term “white” entitles me to claim “X is the color of pure snow” if
I already claim “X is white”.
For Kripke the relation betweenmeaning and future action is not descrip-
tive. When we are indicating what a person means to say by an expres-
sion, what we are specifying is not what linguistic behavior the person
will, most likely, exhibit: we are fixing what linguistic behavior is appro-
priate, whether or not the person will likely exhibit it or not. Whether
or not the agent conforms, or tends to conform, to the relevant linguistic
rules is not material to the question what he says by using the expres-
sion. What matters are the semantic rules that constitute correct use of
the expression.
ii) If semantic content is normative, then so is the content of intentional
states: The normativity of meaning infects the psychological realm. On
a plausible assumption, the idea that meaning is essentially normative
also means that mental content is essentially normative. Here’s Allan
Gibbard’s formulation of the Normativity of Content:
The thesis that “mental content is normative” is this: that
when I attribute mental content – when I say, for instance,
that Ebenezer is thinking that he has lost his keys – I’m some-
how speaking oughts. (Gibbard 2003: 85)
Just as ascriptions of meaning are characterized by normativity, so are as-
criptions of intentional states. According to the Normativity of Content,
for a state to have intentional content is for the owner of that state to
be governed by various rules. This means that when we say that some-
one has, for instance, a belief, we say that he has a license to do some
things and a responsibility to do others. However, at least one writer has
suggested that the arguments put forward against the dispositional the-
ory of meaning do not apply to mental content.¹³ There are two possible
grounds for doubt here. First, the extension of meaning skepticism to
¹³Thus Colin McGinn writes: “The issue of normativeness, the crucial issue for Kripke,
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mental content rests on the assumption that mental content is, to some
degree, analogous to meaning. However, it seems plausible that when
we think, our mental activity involves some type of expressions or sym-
bols that act as bearers of significance. This requires not a language of
thought, perhaps, but the existence of events or mental acts that are par-
allel to themeanings of our assertions and their component expressions.¹⁴
Second, one may accept that the analogy between talk and thought exists
but at the same time doubt the idea that mental meaning could be subject
to the same kind of skepticism as linguistic meaning. But if we admit that
mental doings analogous to linguistic acts are involved in thought, it is
natural to infer that these episodes are open to rivaling interpretations or
misunderstandings in the same way as their counterparts in public lin-
guistic assertions. If these episodes are to be taken as significant, they
must have meanings, and with respect to these meanings we can ask the
same questions we asked about the meaning of public utterances; in par-
ticular, they must possess conditions of correct use.
It is hard to see how one could consistently hold that the meanings of a
person’s words are, in Sellars’s phrase, fraught with ought while at the
same time denying that our intentional states are as well.¹⁵ To support
has no clear content in application to the language of thought: what does it mean to ask
whether my current employment of a word in my language of thought (i.e. the exercise of
a particular concept) is correct in the light of my earlier inner employment of that word?
What kind of linguistic mistake is envisaged here?” (McGinn 1984: 147).
¹⁴The idea need not be that when we think, we think in Mentalese in the sense of a
language with a syntactical and semantical structure resembling that of our own, or even
with any analogue to the syntax of natural languages. Cf. Boghossian (2002: 144–6).
¹⁵Writing before the discussion begun by Kripke, Sellars, though he does not use the
phrase “normativity of content”, clearly is an early champion of this thesis. Thus he likens
the attempt to reduce intentional states to purely natural occurrences or dispositions to
similar — in his view failed — attempts in ethics when he writes that
the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder — even “in
principle” — into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenological or behav-
ioral, public or private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunc-
tives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical mistake — a mistake of a piece
with the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics. (Sellars 1963a: §5, 131)
In another well-known passage, Sellars talks about attributions of knowledge:
[I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving
an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one
says. (Sellars 1963a: §36, 169)
Sellars writes about “epistemic facts” and attributions of knowledge, but as McDowell
(2009b: 6–8) has pointed out, we should not understand Sellars to be concerned only with
epistemology in a narrow sense. Rather, his topic is intentionality in general, the objective
purport of thoughts, beliefs and statements about the world. Hence “epistemic” facts should
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this intuition, we need to turn to Sellars’s first programmatic claim cited
above, the claim that “linguistic activity is, in a primary sense, concep-
tual behavior”. Sellars argues that we can understand contentful mental
episodes on the model of assertions. The analogy between thought and
talk finds expression in Sellars’s view in the form of the doctrine he calls
Verbal Behaviorism, or for short VB.¹⁶ The core idea behind VB may be
put as follows: although it may not be literally true that thinking is a
kind of speaking, it is literally true that sometimes speaking is a kind of
thinking. Thus consider the intentional states or episodes of believing.
For Sellars, one way for a speaker to believe that snow is white is for the
speaker to say aloud, in a public language, that snow is white. Not only
that, but Sellars insists that “believing p” has as its primary sense saying
aloud that p.
Sellars’s view starts by focusing on a very basic type of language use.
Sometimes we simply spontaneously utter a sentence, without giving the
matter a lot of thought. For instance, when Ebenezer, on his way to work,
suddenly says “I have lost my keys”, he doesn’t think beforehand what
he intends to achieve with his utterance. Perhaps, alone in his car, he
is speaking without an audience, so he doesn’t take an audience into ac-
count. Now, as Sellars points out, we can understand this utterance itself
as a kind of thinking. It is not just, as the classical Cartesian theory goes, a
linguistic act caused by a thought but literally itself a piece of “conceptual
behavior”. We usually associate conceptual behavior with inner, silent
goings-on, but we can easily understand Ebenezer’s blurting out that he
has lost his keys as a non-silent thinking. Thus for Sellars to “think out
loud” that p is “‘candidly and spontaneously uttering”p“ ‘where the per-
son […] who utters ‘p’ is doing so as one who knows the language to which
‘p’ belongs” (Sellars 2007c: 68).
According to Sellars, who also calls the thinkings-out-loud “languagings”,
such spontaneous pieces of minded linguistic behavior are real and, even
more strongly, they form the primary sense of what we mean by “think-
ing”. This idea is puzzling at first. Sometimes we do not express our opin-
ions openly or publicly and prefer to keep them to ourselves. To say this,
of course, is an understatement — if we always thought out loud what-
ever popped into our minds, our lives would be much too chatty, not to
be understood simply as concept-involving facts. Insofar as a description of an episode as
a “knowing” is to place it in the logical space of reason, so is describing an episode as one
of believing. Placing an episode in that logical space, of course, is to provide a normative
characterization of that state, rather than merely giving an “empirical description”.
¹⁶“Verbal Behaviorism” may not be the happiest name for the doctrine. Sellars is not
committed to a version of behaviorism in the traditional sense. For instance, he does not
propose an eliminative account of intentional states.
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mention the social difficulties deriving from openly expressing our can-
did opinion about our fellow speakers.¹⁷ In quantitative terms, we keep
our opinions to ourselves much more frequently than we voice our opin-
ions candidly. The out-loud type of thinking only occurs when we are, in
Sellars’s words, in a “thinking-out-loud frame of mind”, which of course
we only rarely are. In which sense, then, can languagings be properly
called the primary form of thinking? The answer is that they are primary
conceptually, in the order of philosophical explanation.¹⁸ Sellars asks us
to understand regular silent thinking on themodel of candid languagings.
Accordingly, in his view the concept of a belief depends on the concept
of a linguistic act. Roughly, VB conceives thinking as, primarily, think-
ing out loud that p and, secondarily, having the proximate disposition to
think out loud, though not actually thinking out loud, that p.¹⁹ Belief that
p, in turn, can be understood approximately as a settled disposition to
think that p.²⁰
VB is controversial and Sellars himself has reservations concerning the
view, calling it a “radically over-simplified”.²¹ Of course, the picture of
¹⁷Cf. also Ryle: “The trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly
nor without effort; and it is a necessary condition of our acquiring it that we should have
previously learned to talk intelligently aloud and have heard and understood other people
doing so” (Ryle 1963: 28).
¹⁸Though not necessarily in the order of causal explanation.
¹⁹As Sellars writes:
But if thinking-out-loud is the primary concept pertaining to conceptual episodes, not
every concept of a conceptual episode is the concept of a thinking-out-loud. There is, in
the second place, the concept of a proximate — a ‘tip of the tongue’ — propensity to think-
something-out-loud. Such propensities amount to subjunctive conditionals as “If Joneswere
in a thinking-out-loud frame of mind, he would think-out-loud: ‘the bus didn’t stop’” (Sel-
lars 1980a: 9).
²⁰Cf. Sellars (2007c: section IV). The qualifications “roughly” and “approximately” are
necessary because Sellars himself rarely gives definitions without quickly adding caveats
or even taking back what he has said by calling it, say, a mistake to take it as capturing the
meaning of the term defined (e.g. Sellars 2007c: 65).
²¹See Sellars (1975: lecture II, §9). In which sense does Sellars view VB as an oversimpli-
fied conception of thought? One sense in which VB deviates from the truth (though there
may be others) is in its behavioristic reduction of thoughts to mere dispositions to utter
sentences. Sellars often contrasts VB with the classical theory of mental activity, which
conceives thoughts as inner mental episodes (e.g. Sellars 1980a: 7). On the classical the-
ory, it is by virtue of being caused by these inner episodes that our linguistic performances
have meaning. As we have seen, Sellars agrees with the Verbal Behaviorist in rejecting
this view. However, he disagrees with the claim that, unless they are actualized in speech,
thoughts are entirely dispositional in nature. Ultimately, Sellars is happy to countenance
mental acts as occurrent inner conceptual episodes on the Cartesian model. Thoughts de-
pend on thinkings-out-loud in a different way, viz. in that the concept of a silent mental
act is a derivative concept that depends in the order of knowing on the notion of an overt
languaging. What is more, the intentionality of thoughts is thoroughly dependent on the
intentionality of linguistic performances (Sellars 2007c: p. 79). In these important respects,
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thinking drawn by the view is only an approximation, but a very helpful
one. It helps to answer the question, raised above, whether the norma-
tivity of semantical content extends to intentional content as well.
Assuming the truth of VB, we can answer this question in the affirmative
without hesitation. According to the language-rule thesis, thinkings-out-
loud, which amount to pieces of linguistic behavior, are regulated by rules
and imply standards of correctness and oughts. From the perspective of
VB, thinkings-out-lout are also genuinely mental occurrences, pieces of
conceptual behavior. For on the model we assume, silent thoughts are
languagings sans thinking-out-loud frame of mind. The salient point of
difference — that when we think without speaking aloud, we are keeping
our thoughts to ourselves — cannot be of consequence to theway the con-
tent of the state is fixed. But if the normativity of content thesis applied
to public thoughts though not to private episodes, we would be forced
to say that the contents of the two types of state differed fundamentally.
When I say candidly “This chair is red”, the content of this public thought
— what it means — is clearly a matter of the meaning of the component
words as I have learned them. Given Sellars’s conception of belief, the
same thing must be true for a belief of the same content, because beliefs
are explained as a tendency to think out loud. If languagings are fraught
with ought then silent thoughts and beliefs must be as well.
iii) Like beliefs, desires imply oughts: Ascribing a belief to a subject implies
numerous normative truths about the agent. Beliefs are the paradigmatic
intentional state, corresponding, as they do, to indicative assertions of
complete propositions. What is true for beliefs, it seems, must also be
true for desires, which, like beliefs, essentially have propositional con-
tent.²² Whenwe ascribe desires to an agent, we are “speaking in oughts”.²³
However, the idea that desires are analogous to beliefs in this way has
been rejected by some writers. Paul Boghossian doubts that there are
“oughts about desires in virtue of the mere fact that they are contentful
states” (Boghossian 2008: 102). He explains:
Suppose I say of Ebenezer that he wants that Howard Dean
be the next president. In making this attribution, am I in any
way speaking oughts? […] To be sure, Ebenezer’s desire has
VB is basically correct.
²²The grammatical object of desire may also be a thing rather than a proposition. Some-
one may want a flashy new car or a better job. However, we can understand this type of
desire in terms of propositional desire. “I want a Fiat” implies “I want to have a Fiat”, where
the state of affairs desired is my owning that car.
²³Cf. Akeel Bilgrami’s argument that desire as well as belief is an “internal oughts”, i.e. a
“fully normative state” (Bilgrami 2006: 212).
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conditions of satisfaction — it will be satisfied if and only if
Dean is the next president. But, in and of itself, this doesn’t
translate either into a correctness fact or into an ought of any
kind. Of course, Ebenezer may have this particular desire
because he believes it to be a way of securing satisfaction of
another of his desires, and so his desire may be said to be
correct to the extent that his belief is true. But that would be
entirely a matter of the correctness of the underlying belief;
it wouldn’t introduce a sense in which the desire itself may
be subject to normative evaluation. (Boghossian 2008: 103)
Boghossian draws a stark contrast between beliefs and desires. Attribut-
ing to Ebenezer the belief that he has lost his keys carries the implication
that by having the belief, Ebenezer makes himself subject to normative
assessments because, as Boghossian puts it, there is a correctness fact as-
sociatedwith the belief. For Boghossian, it seems, this fact amounts to the
supposition that Ebenezer’s state is correct in the sense of corresponding
to how things really are in the world. On this view, his belief is correct if,
and only if, it is in fact true that he has lost his keys. Boghossian identifies
the beliefs’s correctness conditions with its truth conditions. Correctness
conditions come with an associated norm, and the norm in question is to
believe what is true. On the other hand, Boghossian holds that there is
no analogous norm governing Ebenezer’s desire, as desires do not come
with conditions of truth, being incapable of being either true or false.²⁴
As a candidate for conditions of correctness of desires truth conditions
can be ruled out.
In the passage cited, Boghossian concedes that desires can be correct or
incorrect, but on his view they are so evaluable only in an improper sense.
He is appealing to the Humean idea, discussed earlier, that desires based
on mistaken instrumental beliefs can be called irrational, though not qua
desires: their incorrectness is inherited from the beliefs from which they
are derived.²⁵ The idea is that correctness or incorrectness must be a mat-
ter of a state corresponding to, or failing to correspond to, a state of af-
fairs. On such an understanding of correctness, it is no wonder that only
beliefs and the portion of a desire derived from means-end beliefs allow
assessment as to their correctness.
However, pace Boghossian, the fact that desires are not truth-apt does
not entail that correctness considerations are inapplicable to desires. The
²⁴Although of course it can be true, or false, that a person has a certain desire, that desire
itself cannot be true or false.
²⁵See §2.5.
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reason is that the sorts of normative evaluation of states we commonly
engage in are more diverse than he allows. Consider two ways in which
we can criticize someone’s intentional state:
• We can criticize a state for failing to conform to a vertical norm. In
the case of belief, the criticism can be founded on the claim that a
belief isn’t true. A vertical norm pertains to the relation between a
propositional attitude and the extramental reality.
• But intentional states are subject to horizontal norms as well. Hori-
zontal norms pertain to the “intralinguistic” (or content-to-content)
links, i.e. to links between propositional attitudes. To criticize a
state along the horizontal dimension is to question the extent to
which it is supported by reasons or to challenge its justifications.²⁶
The second type of criticism can be illustrated by examples:
1. You assume that she is rich just because he is a doctor. But that
doesn’t follow. You ought not to believe that — the medical profes-
sion doesn’t entail wealth.
2. Why don’t you believe that copper conducts electricity? As you
know, copper is a metal, so you ought to agree that it is an electrical
conductor.
3. If you think that Denmark has a king, then you ought not to believe
that it is a republic. A country cannot both be a republic and a
monarchy.
These are genuine cases of normative assessment of belief, none of which
amounts simply to pointing out that the belief in question is mistaken.
Insteadwhatwe do is to point out that the states are notwell supported by
evidence, are incompatible with other states or follow from other states.
In particular we criticize states based on their relations to other states.
If we only think of truth or falsity, we disregard a whole dimension of
our practices of evaluating belief as successful or unsuccessful, correct
or incorrect. Beliefs are not just evaluated in the vertical dimension but
in the horizontal direction as well. In praise or criticism, we regard a
belief in relation not just to the vertical norm of truth, but to the norms
of justification as well.
²⁶For the distinction between vertical and horizontal norms, see Zangwill (1998: 194).
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Broadly speaking, the horizontal norms that govern beliefs are inferential
norms, norms that govern transitions from one state to another. They are
rules that instruct the subject, who is in a given prior state S₁, to move
to another state S₂. Because they have conceptual content, beliefs are
subject to conceptual norms. The Sellarsian lesson we should draw from
Kripke’s observation that the relation between meaning and future ac-
tion is normative is a broadly inferentialist understanding of intentional
states: conceptual content is determined, essentially, through the rules by
which uses of states with that content are governed.²⁷ The normativity of
content is a reflection of the fact that conceptual content is inferentially
articulated.²⁸
When Boghossian doubts that there are correctness facts pertaining to
desire, he objects to the idea that desire is governed by vertical norms.
However, he does not take into account the existence of horizontal norms.
If what we have just said is right, these inferential rules are crucial for the
understanding of all contentful states. Just as belief is governed by rules
relating to the inferential transitions it ought to take part in, so is desire.
Desires are contentful states which imply, and are implied by, other con-
tentful states. Some conceptual transactions involving desires aremanda-
tory, whereas others are permitted or proscribed. Without their involve-
ment in horizontal rules, desires would not be meaningful.
In contrasting desires with belief, then, Boghossian overlooks the impor-
tant dimensions inwhich desires are subject to normative evaluation. The
horizontal dimension is more than sufficient to buttress the idea that the
normativity of content thesis is true for desires as well as for beliefs. We
may still ask whether the correctness of desire is also a matter of vertical
norms, a standard of correctness playing a role analogous to that of truth
²⁷Inferentialism understands a state’s conceptual content in terms of its inferential role.
It is useful to distinguish, with Brandom, between a narrow and wide sense of “inferential
articulation”. On the narrow understanding, the inferential role is defined as the entirety
of intralinguistic moves (where “linguistic” includes thinking as well as speaking) allowed,
and disallowed, by the conceptual content, i.e. with the proprieties of inference properly
speaking. The wide understanding also counts language-world transitions, i.e. moves that
are not strictly speaking inferences such as observational judgments and volitions, among
the moves whose appropriateness is determined by the conceptual content.
Armedwith this contrast, we can further distinguish betweenweak inferentialism, strong
inferentialism and hyperinferentialism (cf. Brandom 2000: 28). Weak inferentialism holds
that one factor that determines the conceptual content of a state is its inferential relations to
other states, although there may be other factors as well. Strong inferentialism holds that
the conceptual content of a state is determined purely by the state’s inferential relations
widely conceived, whereas hyperinferentialism identifies conceptual content with inferen-
tial relations narrowly conceived. With Brandom, I accept strong inferentialism (see also
Brandom 2007: 656–660).
²⁸See Brandom (2000: Introduction).
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for belief.²⁹ Yet we can already see that desire attributions imply numer-
ous oughts in a way which does not depend on an answer to this further
question.
3.3 The direction of fit of desires
The goal of this chapter is a better understanding of the intentional state
of desire, the quintessential practical state of mind. We are inching closer
and closer to such an understanding. The previous section introduced, as
a topic, the contrast between belief and desire. As a final step in com-
pleting a high-brow account of desire, we need to ask what it is that dis-
tinguishes these two types of state. The question is pressing if we want
to preserve a sense in which, even on a high-brow view, the belief-desire
model of intentional action has a kernel of truth.³⁰ Classically, there have
been two answers to this question:
a) The type of an intentional state is fixed by the state’s direction of
fit. Beliefs have a direction of fit such that the state must fit the
world, whereas desires have a direction of fit such that the world
must fit the state.
b) Whether a given intentional state is a desire or a belief is deter-
mined by the state’s constitutive aim. While beliefs aim at truth,
desires aim at the good.
As we have emphasized, High Brow is built on the idea (b) that to de-
sire is to regard something as good, but as we have seen in the previous
section, there are worries that desire may not have a constitutive goal or
norm in the same way as belief. Let us therefore, following suggestion
(a), start with Michael Smith’s invocation of the notion of direction of
fit in the service of an argument for Humeanism. The argument’s goal
is to buttress the Humean idea that agency requires both desire and be-
lief. Before canvassing the argument, we should note that Smith does not
take his argument to establish the truth of the claim that normative rea-
sons are composed of belief-desire pairs.³¹ Our focus is on the genuinely
Humean idea that only desires truly give us normative reasons. Nonethe-
less, Smith’s argument is interesting for our purposes because, so long as
²⁹See the following section.
³⁰See §2.2.
³¹Smith calls his theory of normative reasons an anti-Humean theory (1994: ch. 5).
134 CHAPTER 3. HIGH-BROW COMMITMENTS
normative reasons and motivating reasons are connected, our argument
also touches on the assumption that motivating reasons necessarily in-
volve desires. Furthermore, Smith’s well-known argument throws light
on the metaphor of direction of fit. His use of the metaphor will be our
primary focus.
Smith argues that for an agent to have a motivating reason just is for him
to have a desire. For him, this follows from three simple steps. Here is
Smith’s teleological argument:³²
What is it for someone to have a motivating reason? The
Humean replies as follows. We understand what it is for
someone to have a motivating reason at a time by thinking
of him as, inter alia, having a goal at that time; the ‘alia’ here
includes having a conception of the means to attain the goal.
But what kind of state is the having of a goal? It is a state
with which direction of fit? Clearly, the having of a goal is
a state with which the world must fit, rather than vice versa.
Thus having a goal is being in a state with the direction of
fit of a desire. But since all there is to being a desire is being
a state with the appropriate direction of fit, it follows that
having a goal just is desiring. (Smith 1987: 54)
A person who acts on a reason has a motivating reason. For Smith, as-
cribing a motivating reason to that person implies ascribing to him a goal.
Having a goal is being in an intentional state. There are two types of in-
tentional state, those having the mind-to-world direction of fit and those
having the world-to-mind direction of fit. Choosing between these two
options, having a goal must be for the agent to be in a state with world-to-
mind direction of fit, which according to Smith simply amounts to having
a desire. Hence, motivating reasons are desires.
Should we accept this miniature argument that motivating reasons must
be desires? The answer depends on what we mean by “desire”. If we
understand desire as a high-brow state, the argument is unobjection-
able. However, Smith himself defends a low-brow conception of desire.
With its reliance on the idea of a direction of fit, his teleological argu-
ment seems to support the low-brow view. Smith sets up the condition
of having a goal and then brings his antecedently developed dispositional
theory of desire to bear. Reversing the argument, we can understand his
remarks as establishing a job description for the state we identify as hav-
³²The expression is due to Wallace (2006a).
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ing a motivating reason. Whatever a motivating reason is, it should con-
sist in having a goal and thus be such that the world should fit the state,
rather than vice versa.
In supporting his identification of a complex disposition as the relevant
state, Smith relies heavily on the notion of a direction of fit. The ex-
pression “direction of fit”, of course, is only a metaphor.³³ To use it, we
must provide a paraphrase of the idea behind it. What is it for an inten-
tional state to have mind-to-world rather than world-to-mind direction
of fit, or vice versa? In general, the idea is that the distinction sorts lin-
guistic acts and intentional states into two categories. Let us start with
Elizabeth Anscombe’s characterization of the distinction in her book In-
tention, which served to introduce or revive the topic for contemporary
philosophy of action.³⁴ The basic question is how we can distinguish, in
the most basic terms, between beliefs (or belief-like states) and desires (or
desire-like states). In her Intention, Anscombe writes:
In some cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for not
being in accordance with the words, rather than vice versa.
This is sometimes when I change my mind; but another case
occurs when e.g. I write something other than I think I’m
writing: as Theophrastus says (Magna Moralia, 1189b 22),
the mistake here is one of performance, not of judgment.
(Anscombe 2000: §2, 4–5)
Here Anscombe is thinking of a person expressing the thought that he
will do something, perhaps by saying “I will write my name on this sheet
of paper”. That such a linguistic act may have two very different functions
can be seen from the case where the person does not afterward write his
name. On the one hand, the expressionmay be interpreted as a prediction
about future behavior. In this case, there has been a mistake: the person
misjudged his own behavior. Here it is appropriate to speak of a “mistake
of judgment”, the case where the words are “impugned for not being in
accordance with the facts”. On the other hand, the expression may be
an expression of intention, and the person may write a different word
on the paper than he intends, perhaps by writing “Kim” instead of “Jim”.
This, too, constitutes a mistake, but the mistake is of a different kind. The
person hasn’t made a false judgment of fact but has failed to realize an
intention. Anscombe calls this a “mistake of performance”. Here it is not
³³As Smith points out himself (Smith 1987: 51).
³⁴Anscombe did not herself use the term “direction of fit”. As L. Humberstone (1992)
points out, the term was introduced by Austin (1953). John Searle helped popularize the
expression; see in particular Searle (1983).
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thewords which are at fault; it is the facts that are impugned for not being
in accordance with the words.
Picking up the same theme again later in her book, Anscombe provides a
more illuminating example:
Imagine a man going round a town with a shopping list in
his hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the
things he actually buys is one and the same whether his wife
gave him the list or it is his own list; and that there is a differ-
ent relation when a list is made by a detective following him
about […] What then is the […] relation to what happens,
in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the
record? It is precisely this: if the list and the things the man
actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone consti-
tutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the
man’s performance […] whereas if the detective’s record and
what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is
in the record. (Anscombe 2000: §32, 52)
Here Anscombe illustrates the two complementary directions of fit by
two different roles a hand-written list can play depending on its interpre-
tation. In both cases, the object of the list is the man’s purchases. Perhaps
the list reads “Smith buys sugar, flour and potatoes.” However, the rela-
tion of the list to the items bought depends on the context of the creation
of the list. If the list is meant as a detective’s report of the items bought, it
represents a truth about the things bought, or it does so if successful. By
contrast if the list is intended as a shopping list, it does not represent but
mandate that certain things be bought; its object is something to be made
true. Again the difference becomes apparent when there is a mismatch
between the shopping cart and the list. In each case there is a mistake, but
the mistakes are of different types. Whereas in the first, mind-to-world
case, the mistake lies in the detective’s report or judgment, in the second,
world-to-mind case, the mistake lies in the man’s performance.
Anscombe’s immediate topic in these passages is a linguistic expression
such as an inscription on a piece of paper or a hand-written list. But
clearly the same contrast exists between types of intentional states. On
the one hand, desires, intentions, hopes or wishes all contain mandates
of what is to be done. They differ in the way they mandate this: while an
intention has immediate practical relevance, a wish may be far-fetched or
avowedly completely impractical and is not thought of as something in
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the power of the agent. Beliefs, assumptions, hypotheses and imaginings,
on the other hand, are representations of how the world in fact is.
Now compare Smith’s gloss of the direction-of-fit metaphor:
a dispositional conception of desires enables us to cash in
non-metaphorical terms, and therefore in turn finds support
from, themetaphorical characterization of beliefs and desires
in terms of their different directions of fit. For the difference
between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit can be
seen to amount to a difference in the functional roles of be-
lief and desire. Very roughly, and simplifying somewhat, it
amounts, inter alia, to a difference in the counterfactual de-
pendence of a belief that p and a desire that p on a perception
with the content that not p: a belief that p tends to go out of
existence in the presence of a perception with the content
that not p, whereas a desire that p tends to endure, dispos-
ing the subject in that state to bring it about that p. Thus,
we might say, attributions of beliefs and desires require that
different kinds of counterfactuals are true of the subject to
whom they are attributed. We might say that this is what a
difference in their direction of fit is. (Smith 1987: 115)
Smith explains the two complementary directions of fit in terms of a
counterfactual question: What would become of the state in question if
the subject perceived or otherwise realized that ¬p? Belief and desire dif-
fer in this respect. While in these hypothetical circumstances, the belief
that p would go out of existence, in the same circumstances the desire
that p would endure. The tendency to disappear when joined to the per-
ception that p is what makes belief a state with mind-to-world direction
of fit, while the tendency to endure despite the perception is what gives
desire the world-to-mind direction of fit. Here again we are reminded
of Russell’s theory of desire, according to which a desire is a state that
ceases to exist when the behavioral cycle comes to an end but endures
while the searching behavior is continuing.³⁵ As we have already noted,
Smith follows Russell in defending a dispositional theory of desire and
beliefs. It is no wonder, then, that he also employs dispositional terms in
cashing in the distinction of directions of fit.
In this respect Smith’s theory differs fundamentally from Anscombe’s.
Both Smith and Anscombe explain the notion by pointing to the case
³⁵See §2.4.
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of a mismatch between the state’s content (p) and (the perception of) a
contradicting reality (¬p). Anscombe emphasizes the normative aspect of
the mismatch. The vocabulary she uses is normatively loaded. The facts
or words are “impugned”, so that, we might imagine, either of the two is
blamed for themismatch, and there is amistake, either in the performance
or in the judgment. In Anscombe’s description, the shopping list and
the report differ in the way in which it is appropriate to react when a
mismatch is noticed — the former mandates going back to the grocery
store, the second might warrant hiring a better detective.
By contrast, Smith explains the directions of fit metaphor by describing in
neutral terms how the agent’s intentional states would change in a coun-
terfactual situation. His account is an attempt to purge the metaphor of
its normative aspect. But by doing so, the notion loses an essential ele-
ment. To see this, consider how Smith’s theory fares with two examples
based on his own suggestion of seeing the states relative to the perception
that p:
1. Belief : Joe has the firm belief that his pants are aquamarine. At
some point, he sees that they are the same color as something he
knows is turquoise, but he doesn’t let himself be influenced by the
observation. Despite his realization, he does not drop his belief that
his pants are aquamarine.
2. Desire: Jill desires to eat healthy. After a stressful day, she indulges
in a greasy burger with fries. As she realizes that what she is eating
is not healthy at all, she decides that she doesn’t in fact want to do
so anyway. Her observation causes her to drop her desire.³⁶
In each of the two examples, the subject reacts to the perception that p in
a way we would not expect her to under the assumption that she is ratio-
nal. Now on Smith’s view, a state has mind-to-world direction of fit just
in case it tends to disappear when conjoined with the realization that ¬p
and world-to-mind direction otherwise. However, because his belief that
his pants are aquamarine is so deeply entrenched, Joe’s belief endures de-
spite his realization that they have a different color. But then Smith must
conclude that the direction of Joe’s state is not, after all, mind-to-world
but rather its inverse. Again, Smith holds that a state has world-to-mind
direction if it tends to endure when conjoined with the realization that
¬p, whereas it has world-to-mind direction of fit if it tends to disappear
when conjoined with that realizations. Jill’s desire to eat healthy, how-
ever, happens to be so constituted that it goes away when she becomes
³⁶For further discussion of this kind of upstream reasoning, see chapter 6.
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aware that she is not eating something healthy. Smith is forced to say
that her state is not in fact desire-like but belief-like.
But the verdicts about Joe and Jill are both clearly inadequate. The mere
fact that the subject reacts against our expectations does not magically
change the orientation of the state towards the world. In his defense,
Smithmay point out that the directions of fit imply dispositions only with
the caveat of a ceteris paribus clause which allows for exceptions. On the
other hand, as we have previously seen, a subject may have a disposition
to make systematic mistakes.³⁷ The deviating reactions need not be one-
off exceptions: Joe may have a chronic mental hangup about his pants
and Jill about fast food. Another defense would modify the definition of
the direction to add a clause explicitly allowing for cases like Joe’s or Jill’s:
An agent’s state S with content p has mind-to-world direc-
tion of fit if it tends to go out of existence when S perceives
that ¬p unless the agent is irrational.
This changewould allow the view to accommodate the counter-examples.
But it would do so at the cost of reintroducing the normative element that
was banished in the dispositional formulation, for to say that someone
tends to do something unless he is irrational is merely a different way of
saying that he ought rationally to do so.³⁸ The direction of fit metaphor
is inherently normative: desires or intentions are states with which the
world should fit, whereas beliefs or predictions are states which should
fit the world.³⁹
We have seen that, if we are going to deploy the idea of a direction of
fit to distinguish desire from belief, we should understand the notion
in normative terms. Turning now to answer (b) distinguished above,
Bernard Williams has proposed that the characteristic feature of belief
is that it aims at the truth.⁴⁰ Correspondingly, we can understand desire
in terms of its constitutive aim. In David Velleman’s words, an “enter-
prise at which we can succeed or fail”, such as believing or desiring, is
³⁷See §2.
³⁸In other words, removing the normative aspect from the direction of fit metaphor is a
futile endeavor. To adapt a Sellarsian phrase, we can pitchfork normativity out of the door,
but it may well return by the window.
³⁹In a later article, Smith proposes amore sophisticated account of differences in direction
of fit. On this account, beliefs and desires differ with respect to their counterfactual betting
behavior (Smith 1998). However, the new account is still a dispositional account and thus
subject to the same objection as in the text.
⁴⁰Williams (1973).
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one that “must have an object against which success or failure can be
measured” (Velleman 2000b: 176). On the common conception cham-
pioned by Williams, belief constitutively aims at truth, whereas desire
constitutively aims at the good.
The proposal that desires aim at the good is sound. Intentional action —
having a motivating reason — requires aiming at the good, and if we are
to hold on to the idea that a motivating reason requires a desire-like state,
then desire must aim at the good as well. However, Velleman argues that
the proposal falls short since desire needs an object against which its
success can be measured and, in his view, goodness cannot be such an
object. Now if the aim of desire is the good, it doesn’t seem to be related
to it in the same way as belief is related to truth. Velleman distinguishes
between the formal object of an enterprise and its substantive object. As
he explains,
The formal object of an enterprise is a goal stated solely in
terms of, or in terms that depend on, the very concept of
being the object of that enterprise. […] Any enterprise that
has a formal object must have a substantive object as well —
that is, a goal that is not stated solely in terms that depend on
the concept of being the object of that enterprise. (Velleman
2000b: 176)
As an example, hementions the concept of a hunt. To say that a hunt con-
stitutively aims at a quarry is merely to specify its formal object. There
would be something essential missing from the concept if all we could
say about its object was that it was the quarry — if, that is, no specifica-
tion of the substantive object was forthcoming. According to Velleman,
there can be an enterprise of hunting only if there is a particular object
that transcends the activity in question.
Now for Velleman, to say that belief aims at truth is to specify its sub-
stantive standard of success, rather than merely a formal object.⁴¹ On his
view, to say that in believing we care about truth is more than to say
that in believing we care about whatever it is that we pursue in believ-
ing; it is to provide a particular standard against which to measure the
success of the endeavor. For Velleman, truth makes for an unproblematic
substantive standard of success for belief, but we cannot say the same
about the alleged standard of desire. If we can say that the constitutive
⁴¹Vellemanwrites: “The object of theoretical reasoning is to arrive at true belief; and since
true belief needn’t be defined in terms of success in theoretical reasoning, it constitutes a
substantive rather than formal standard of success” (Velleman 2000b: p. 180–1).
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aim of desire is the good, then, according to him, we still haven’t fixed
a particular object yet. According to Velleman, then, practical reason-
ing constitutively aims at the good, if it does, only in the formal sense in
which a hunt constitutively aims at the quarry. If, as it surely is, figuring
out what to desire is a non-vacuous activity, desire must have another,
substantive standard.
Velleman’s view involves a striking disanalogy between theoretical rea-
soning — forming beliefs — and practical reasoning — forming desires.⁴²
What makes a piece of theoretical reasoning, with the conclusion that
something is true, a good instance of doxastic deliberation is a concern
for what is true. In the case of practical reasoning, on the other hand, we
need to look elsewhere for a substantive goal. Goodness can itself only
be specified in terms of the activity of practical reasoning. If the good
is just the best thing to do, the specification of the good is simply what
results from a successful, appropriate process of practical reasoning. Al-
ternatively, we can give a particular characterization of the good. Doing
so requires making a particular normative judgment about what it is we
seek in seeking the good. But we were looking for a way of distinguish-
ing desires from beliefs on a conceptual basis, and surely a substantive,
tendentious conception of the good can hardly be part of the concept of
a desire.
In terms of the distinction introduced in the previous section, Velleman’s
criticism is that goodness does not function as a vertical norm of assess-
ment in the way truth does. However, the idea that truth is a substan-
tive norm is hardly uncontroversial. The idea that truth can function as
a yardstick for belief seems to presuppose an understanding of truth as
correspondence with reality. On such a view, ontologically speaking, be-
liefs are true in virtue of truthmakers, facts which we can appeal to as
furnishing an independent point of reference. However, on many other
conceptions of truth — such as deflationist or pragmatist views — such
an independent yardstick is not available.⁴³ As an example, deflationist
views see the concept of truth simply as a grammatical device that allows
disquotation and making certain sorts of generalization which would not
be possible without it. But if we take a disquotational view on the pred-
icate “is good” as well as on the predicate “is true”, the purported stark
contrast between practical and doxastic deliberation disappears. The de-
flationists holds that no substantive concept of truth is available, and that
none is needed, meaning that Velleman’s argument that goodness com-
⁴²Velleman later names the aim of being in conscious control of one’s behavior as what
is constitutive of practical reasoning (Velleman 2000b: 193).
⁴³Cf. Horwich (1998), James (1907).
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pares unfavorably to truth fails.
Here we need to remember that both belief and desire are governed es-
sentially by horizontal norms which exist in the form of inferential rules.
Velleman may be right that desire does not have a substantive goal, but
he is wrong to assume that it needs one. He is thinking of vertical norms
only, but the inferential norms governing desire give practical reasoning
a point. The inferential norms, of course, are norms of reasoning, so the
constitutive standards are defined in terms of the activity that is ruled
by the standards. But it simply is not true that this makes the activity
vacuous or pointless. On deflationist theories of truth the fact that we
cannot state the aim of doxastic deliberation in terms not involving the-
oretical reasoning or inferring does not entail that theoretical arguments
are empty. Similarly, in order to show that practical reasoning has con-
tent, we need not understand the aim of practical reasoning, as it were,
from outside the practice of deliberation. Since we know these practices
to be robust, we have little reason to suspect that the lack of an external
aim renders them purposeless. Therefore it need not be seen as a diffi-
culty that desire aims at the good only as a formal object.
The way desires are embedded in a network of inferential norms also
gives us a way to distinguish them from beliefs and to illuminate the
notion of direction of fit. What is characteristic of desire, or other states
with the same direction of fit, is not its various dispositional relations
but its normative relations — what the agent ought to say, think or do,
i.e. both what he is permitted to do and what he is prohibited from doing.
This leads us back to our gloss of the notion of directions of fit, which,
as we have stated, should be construed in a normative way. In Smith’s
view, a subject’s belief that p is a state that tends to go out of existence
when the subject perceives that ¬p. Instead we should say that there is
a horizontal inferential norm asking you to move from “I perceive that
¬p” to dropping the belief that p; but there is no such norm that asks you
to drop your desire that p in the same circumstances. This corresponds
to Smith’s idea that a subject’s desire that p should persist despite the
perception that ¬p. Additionally, there is a requirement that if you have
a desire that p, you should also develop the intention to φ, provided you
believe that φ’ing helps to bring about p.⁴⁴
⁴⁴We should retain Anscombe’s normative understanding of the direction of fit metaphor.
Smith defends a functionalist theory of desires that explains them in terms of their causal
role in a system of propositional attitudes. On this view, it is constitutive of desire that
it plays a certain causal role in such a system. The upshot of the present section is that
although we can retain the idea of an account of desire in terms of its functional role, we
should prefer normative functionalism to the more common dispositional or causal func-
tionalism (cf. Zangwill 1998). According to normative functionalism, the essential charac-
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The distinction between belief and desire, then, is built on the entirely dif-
ferent inferential profiles of these states. In deviating from the rules, Joe
and Jill are being irrational, but their intentional states are not switching
their orientation to the world. The rules that govern these states — in-
ferential in the wide or narrow sense — are rational rules. To desire is to
evaluate an object or state of affairs as good in some way. The standard
of success is internal to our rational practices, but the inferential rules
are robust, so there is no need to worry that the enterprise of practical
reasoning or intending would be vacuous.
3.4 Practical commitments
After making the case against Humeanism in the last chapter, this chap-
ter has been devoted to developing a positive high-brow conception of
agency. Progress has been slow and laborious, but in the process we have
collected a number of threads that now allow us to formulate what it is
for intentional action to aim at the good. It is time to pull these threads
together.
As a result of the preceding discussion, we have understood the claim
that the constitutive aim of desire is the good in terms of its involvement
in a network of inferential norms. It may be said that this terminology is
misleading. Calling a state as we have described it a desire means recon-
struing a term that has been understood as low-brow in the philosophy
of action as a high-brow state. As a result, the word “desire” carries dis-
tinctly Humean associations that may impede comprehension. Rather
than breaking established usage, we could react to this difficulty by sim-
ply stopping to talk about desires entirely. Citing the inadequacy of low-
brow states to rationalize behavior, wemay conclude that there is nothing
to the Humean claim that desires provide us with reasons or that desire
is crucially involved in intentional agency.
However, as we have emphasized, the belief-desire model of action, the
idea that there is at least a representing and mandating component of
teristic of desire — and of belief — lies in its conceptual content, a content which consists
of proprieties of inference.
Causal functionalism emerged in the 1970s with the work of Armstrong, Putnam and
Lewis. However, it may be argued that Sellars is one of the forefathers of functionalism. In
essays such as Sellars (1963a) or Sellars (2007d), he advocates a conception of mental states
where the identity of a state depends on its role in a system of relations. Sellars developed
his view, which arguably can count as a normative functionalism, before the introduction
of causal functionalism and may have influenced early writers on the topic. Lewis (2002)
explicitly cites Sellars (1963a) as an influence.
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action, has some merit. Doing away with the concept of desire entirely
would leave a theoretic void in the practical realm. Although we have
seen that mere functional states or qualitative feels do not play the role
Humeans take them to play, there is room for a more adequate notion of
a state to replace the notion of desire as the occupant of that role. A good
word for this quintessential practical state is “practical commitment”.⁴⁵
In what follows, I will conceive intentionally doing φ as constitutively
involving a practical commitment, either to φ’ing itself or to some goal ψ
whose attainment is (believed) to be advanced by φ’ing.⁴⁶
In the course of the present chapter, we have already been implicitly cre-
ating a profile of the notion of a practical commitment. The notion must
fulfill four desiderata:
1. Practical commitments are high-brow in the sense of aiming at the
good. Being practically committed to p implies looking favorably
on actions that have p as likely consequence.
2. The fact that practical commitments aim at the good is a matter
of their subject being constrained by a profile of inferential norms
characteristic of the world-to-mind direction of fit.
3. Owing to the way their contents are fixed by inferential norms,
practical commitments are normative states, i.e. states with essen-
tially normative content. As contentful states, they are, as Kripke’s
remarks have shown, fraught with ought. As a consequence, they
cannot be reduced to mere dispositions.
4. As on the traditional belief-desiremodel, intentional action involves
a pair of intentional states with complementary directions of fit,
i.e. both a practical commitment and a doxastic commitment.
The notion of a doxastic commitment is the counterpart to a practical
⁴⁵Bilgrami reaches a similar conclusion when he writes that “[d]esires too are commit-
ments. If I desire something, say, that I should help the poor, then I am committed to doing
various things, such as, say, giving money to charity or joining the communist party” (Bil-
grami 2006: 215). See also Bilgrami (2004: 128).
⁴⁶Often replacing a philosophical term is possible only partially. When engaging with a
philosophical tradition, it is necessary to use the language of that tradition. For this reason,
I will continue to use the word “desire” when delineating the position of a philosopher
from the Humean tradition, and often understand it in a high-brow way. Likewise, unless
the context makes it clear that the topic is low-brow states, talk of desires in the preceding
sections should be interpreted as referring to practical commitments.
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commitment, just as traditionally belief is the counterpart of desire.⁴⁷
Whereas practical commitments are commitments to a certain project,
ultimately to acting in a particular way, a doxastic commitment is the
commitment to a claim being true. The elementary, most straightfor-
ward way to undertake the doxastic commitment that p is to assert “p”.
A paradigmatic way to undertake a doxastic commitment is in response
to a perceptual situation, in which you take some propositional content
to be true, thereby committing yourself to its truth. Similarly, the ele-
mentary way to undertake the practical commitment to φ is to assert “I
shall φ”. A paradigmatic way to react to the undertaking of such a com-
mitment is to respond by acting in such a way as to make it true that one
φ’s, by doing φ.⁴⁸
That practical commitments are essentially normative states is part of
what the word “commitment” is intended to signal clearly. When you
adopt a normative state, you bind yourself to a project or claim. In this
regard, practical commitments are similar to promises. It is helpful to
understand commitments in contractual terms, but the analogy may be
thought not to be apt. Making a commitment is unlike promising in some
respects. In making a promise, the promisor is binding himself at some
point in the future to render a certain service to a promisee. Necessar-
ily, making a promise requires a predetermined audience to which one
becomes accountable when the promise is broken. When the presiden-
tial candidate gives a speech promising to lower the taxes, the promise
is made to his audience, the electorate. If, as President, she later fails to
make good of the promise, the voters will hold her responsible for her in-
action. The discursive commitments we are envisaging, by contrast, are
not directed at a particular audience. There is no defined group of people
to whom the person undertaking the commitment owes an explanation
if things don’t go as planned.
It would be closer to the truth to say that undertaking a commitment is
making a promise to oneself. However, it isn’t exactly clear what mak-
ing a promise to oneself entails. Promises come with sanctions, but if
one has only promised oneself, then one can easily evade the sanctions
by absolving oneself of the promise. What negative consequences could
there be to breaking a promise to oneself? Such a vow seems conceptu-
⁴⁷Practical and doxastic commitments are the species of discursive commitment at the
center of Brandom’s scorekeeping model. For the introduction of this pair of notions, see
Brandom (1994: 233). Interestingly, Brandom accords the notion of a doxastic commitment
explanatory priority insofar as both practical and doxastic commitments are states forwhich
reasons can be given and giving reasons for discursive commitments requires the ability to
make assertions, i.e. expressing doxastic commitments.
⁴⁸Cf. Brandom (1994: 8).
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ally to require a split personality where promiser and promisee are kept
separated, and it is not easy to see how such a separation would function
for something so basic as a practical commitment.⁴⁹ Unlike breaking a
promise, failing to meet one’s practical commitment does not necessarily
impact another speaker. Nor are there necessarily sanctions associated
with it. Nonetheless, we clearly have an idea of what being committed to
a certain claim amounts to in the case of doxastic commitments.
Committing oneself to making a propositional content true is to bind one-
self by rules. The rules in question are conceptual rules. The idea is easily
illustrated for doxastic commitments. For instance, if I believe, i.e. if I am
committed to the claim, that dogs are mammals, then I bind myself by an
inferential rule that mandates that if I believe that Fido is a dog, then I
ought also to believe that Fido is a mammal, or that if I believe that Pluto
is a dog, then I ought also to believe that Pluto is a mammal. Making an
inference from a sentence of the first sort to the second is something I am
obligated to do, given my commitment to the genus-species relationship
between mammals and dogs.
The idea carries over to the practical case. Suppose I intend to marry the
richest woman in town. If I discover that of all the unmarried women
in town Mary is the richest — and otherwise eligible — then I ought to
intend to marry her. By undertaking the original long-standing practical
commitment about my future spouse, I have committed myself to mak-
ing various inferences of this kind. As long as a belief remains in force, it
exerts its normative influence, giving permissions to, and imposing obli-
gations on, the speaker, and the same is true for practical commitments.
Similarly a practical commitment remains in force while it exists. It is
true that it is possible to withdraw a practical commitment without nec-
essarily opening oneself to sanctions from others, but that doesn’t imply
that having a commitment, so long as one does not withdraw it, is nor-
matively ineffective. We can change our minds about what to do but
unless we do, the conceptual pressure a practical commitment exerts is
genuine.⁵⁰
⁴⁹Cf. Davidson (2001b: 90). For a discussion of the disanalogies between promise and
commitment, see Brandom (1994: 262–6).
⁵⁰Korsgaard comes to a similar conclusion when she explains her Kantian conception of
the instrumental principle. According to her, the central notion is that of “willing an end”.
To will an end is not the same as pursuing the end or as being disposed to act on the end.
Willing the end is committing yourself to “take the means to this end”. She writes:
Committing to taking the means is what makes a difference between willing
an end and merely wishing for it or wanting it or thinking that it would be
nice if it were realized. (Korsgaard 2008: 65)
On Korsgaard’s view, willing an end is an “essentially first-personal and normative act”
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Finally, although we have introduced practical commitment as a substi-
tute for desire, it is more accurate to say that it corresponds to the notion
of intention in the traditional topology of mental states. Committing one-
self to doing φ is to form the intention to do so. While everyone agrees
that belief is the crucial state in the theoretical sphere, writers in the lit-
erature are split in two groups over the question whether desire or inten-
tion is the principal state in the practical realm. Philosophers in the first
group identify desire as the crucial practical ingredient of intentional ac-
tion.⁵¹ Some writers have argued that we can entirely dispense with the
notion of intention in favor of talking about desires, holding that talk
about intentions can be reduced to talk about desires.⁵² The second, mi-
nority view, on the other hand, takes intention to be the more important
notion, or the more basic in the order of explanation. For adherents of
this view, any person who acts necessarily has an intention that accom-
panies it, and the intention is causally or non-causally responsible for the
action.⁵³ On this view, while talk about desires has its place, it is not the
crucial ingredient in action. This view holds that intention, not desire, is
the counterpart of belief.
As we are identifying practical commitments with intentions rather than
desires, we are situated firmly in the latter, minority camp. On my view,
the difference between desire and intention is roughly this. To have a
desire that p is to take a positive view on the state of affairs p. To have
such an attitude also entails looking favorably on actions that have p as a
likely consequence but it doesn’t necessarily entail preparedness to take
those actions, even if one knows that they are likely to promote the action
one desires. Someone who wants to have a vacation in Capri and knows
that working a second job will help him realize this wish may nonethe-
less not be willing to take the job. Having a desire does not yet entail
treating something as a goal, and not pursuing the goal is not irrational.
(Korsgaard 2008: 57). In describing the act, she employs Kantian terminology relating to
laws and autonomy. The act of willing is to be conceived as the act of giving oneself a law,
or as governing oneself. Willings, as opposed to mere dispositional desires, are constitu-
tive of having a will and thus of agency. As she writes, willing an action requires one to
“consciously pick up the reins” (Korsgaard 2008: 59).
⁵¹This large group notably includes defenders of the belief-desire model of action, includ-
ing Davidson (2001a).
⁵²In earlier writings, Davidson holds such a view. See Davidson (2001a: 8) for his view
that “intention” is a syncategorematic word. Later in his career, Davidson changed his
mind on this issue and came to hold that intentions — in particular future intentions — are
indispensable, even if in his framework the notion of desire remains primary. Cf. Davidson
(2001b).
⁵³Important defenders of the priority of intention include Anscombe (2000), Sellars (1966)
and Brandom (1994: ch. 4).
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By contrast, an intention does entail such a preparedness.⁵⁴ If I intend to
make it the case that p and I know that φ’ing would cause p to be true,
then I thereby intend φ’ing — or, at least, I ought to have this intention.
Desires, but not intentions, are optional in the sense that I can remain in-
different to my own desires without incurring irrationality, but I cannot
in the same way remain rationally unmoved by my intentions.⁵⁵
3.5 Psychologism and Humeanism reconsidered
To summarize our results, acting for a reason needs to be understood as
aiming at the good, i.e. as the expression of a practical commitment which
itself is subject to rational norms. What does this mean for our overarch-
ing inquiry into the nature of reasons for action? Let us begin with the
question raised, in chapter 1, whether reasons are psychological states.
We saw earlier that an adequate theory of reasons needs to show an ac-
ceptable relation between normative and motivating reasons.⁵⁶ Noticing
the distinction betweenmental acts and their contents, we concluded that
an adequate theory identifies motivating reasons with contents rather
than mental acts. When you act for a reason, you act because of what
you believe in the sense of the thing believed rather than the attitude of
believing. The believing itself comes into view as a reason only when it
is also a believed, as in what we called opaque cases.
On the present theory, a motivating reason is a practical or doxastic com-
mitment. Like the word “belief”, the word “commitment” admits an -ing/-
ed disambiguation, although unlike the former, it doesn’t wear this fea-
ture on its sleeve. Thus when we speak of someone’s commitment, this
may refer to the action or propositional content he is committed to, as
⁵⁴Brandom suggests that different conative states may be more or less overtly commit-
tive. He writes that “desires and intentions are essentially, and not just accidentally, things
appropriately assessed as to their success, in the sense of their fulfillment” and adds that
“[e]ven less overtly committive intentional states such as conjectures, hopes, and wishes are
contentful only insofar as they settle how things ought, according to them, to be” (Brandom
2001a: 588).
⁵⁵Another way to distinguish desire from intention would be to say that desire, but not
necessarily intention, implies that achieving the result desired is (potentially) mixed with
an element of pleasure or enjoyment. Sellars, who takes intentions as the primary practi-
cal state, defines desires derivatively as “roughly, relatively long term dispositions to have
thoughts of the form: “(Other things being equal) I shall do A (or bring it about that-p)‘’
where it is presupposed that doing A or contemplating the truth of ‘p’ is something one
would enjoy” (Sellars 1973: 206). For a more long-winded discussion, see in particular Sell-
ars (1966).
⁵⁶See §1.4.
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when we say that two people are committed to the same project. On
the other hand, using the same word we may also refer to the person’s
act of undertaking a commitment, i.e. of endorsing a project or proposi-
tional content. If what we said earlier was right, to say that a persons’s
motivating reason is his commitment, this must mean that the reason
is the content the person is committed to as something to which he is
committed. In other words, the theory proposed involves a version of
content-psychologism.
We can briefly illustrate the contrast with the help of the distinction, due
to Brandom, between normative attitude and normative status.⁵⁷ Adopt-
ing a normative attitude towards a speaker in Brandom’s sense is to take
another speaker to have a certain normative status. Taking normative at-
titude is to assess the other speaker as to what he is committed or entitled
to. A normative status, by contrast, is essentially something that is as-
signed by another speaker. Whereas normative statuses are the playing
chips in what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons,
acts of adopting normative attitudes constitute the moves in the game.
Along this dimension, reasons for action are normative statuses rather
than attitudes: it is something we essentially take other agents, as well
as ourselves, to have. The distinction adds a social element to content-
psychologism: having a reason is having a normative status which can
be assigned by other speakers.
Turning to the main topic of this chapter, we have seen that Humeanism
consists of two claims:
1. Desire-based reasons: Desires, and only desires, provide us with
reasons.
2. Instrumentalism: The only way in which reason can be practical is
in the form of means-end reasoning.
As we have pointed out, the truth of the first thesis depends on what
exactly one understands by the term “desire”. Humeans understand it
along low-brow lines, chiefly as dispositions, leading to:
Sufficiency Having a desire to φ is sufficient for having a prima facie nor-
mative reason to φ.
On a low-brow conception, however, we have seen that it is not true that
desires are the source of our reasons. The search has led us to a more
⁵⁷Cf. Brandom (1994: 165–6).
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adequate conception of the fundamental notion of the practical realm:
practical commitments. On a low-brow conception Sufficiency turns out
to be false, but what if, in the place of desires, we substitute the High
Brow notion of practical commitments?
Sufficiency C Being practically committed to φ’ing is sufficient for having
a prima facie normative reason to φ.
Our chief reason for denying the original sufficiency claimwas that a per-
son with a weird functional state would turn out, according to Sufficiency,
to have a reason. We rejected this as absurd because Radio Man had only
a weird disposition, which does not by itself justify his conduct. Based
on the new formulation, we cannot derive this conclusion. According to
Sufficiency C, having a practical commitment is sufficient for having a
reason. But, as we portrayed him, Radio Man precisely is not committed
to his actions or identified with them as an agent. We rejected the idea
that he has a reason to turn on radios as absurd because he only had a
weird functional state to show for it.
We argued that Radio Man’s pure functional state is arbitrary and seem-
ingly ad hoc; that it was not sufficiently integrated rationally; and that
the action is virtually unintelligible because his desire is a mere element
of his natural psychology. Things are different with a person who has
formed a bona fide intention to turn on radios. Let us describe the situ-
ation in more detail. In the scenario envisaged, the person, when he is
approaching a new stereo, is not just following the raw mindless goal of
turning on the radio, he is evaluating this goal positively. How exactly
should we understand this evaluation? Generally speaking, he must be
regarding the activity as good in some sense or other, but the specifics
depend on how we describe the case further. There is something the per-
son takes to be a reason for operating the radios. Here are a number of
possibilities:
1. The man derives enjoyment from turning on radios. In his experi-
ence, doing this has proved pleasant to him. Perhaps we find the
fact that he enjoys the activity inexplicable, and perhaps he himself
has no idea what about the action he likes. However, human na-
ture being as it is, our predilections are often of the hard-to-explain
type. There need not be a deep reason for his action. Similarly, it
may be that for whatever inscrutable psychological reasons he is
uneasy when not turning on radios on a regular basis. The goal of
avoiding an unpleasant feeling is as good a motive as any.
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2. The man is curious or values activities “outside the mainstream”.
We actually often act on similar reasons, as when we say: “I’ll have
the garlic flavor because I’ve never had garlic-flavored ice-cream
before.” or “Let’s take the other route to the supermarket today,
just because we can.”
3. Theman is simply used to doing it and he values following a routine
or habit (Wittgenstein, when asked what he would like for dinner,
reportedly said he did not care what he was served for dinner so
long as it was the same thing every day). We may not agree that
this is a good reason. However, whatever may be objected against
such a justification doesn’t stop people from reasoning in this way:
“This is what I’ve always done; why change now?” Although this
may not in fact be a good reason, the agent may regard it as such,
and that is enough to make the action intelligible.⁵⁸
Although diverse, these possibilities have something in common: they
point out a way to justify or rationalize the action. Such a justification
need not be particularly convincing. What is more, the degree to which
these considerations ostensibly justify the action may be small. But it
does portray the action in some way as making sense, in however mini-
mal a sense. If we are to understand the Radio Man’s action as an expres-
sion of his agency, permitting the use of intentional, i.e. rational-agent,
explanation, there must be a shred of justification which shows some-
thing about the action that, in the eyes of the agent, makes sense. Of
course it may be hard, or impossible, to discover this aspect from the out-
side. The agent may conceal his reasons. It is not part of this position
that all reasons are open to public scrutiny. Even the agent himself may
find it difficult accurately to assess his own reasoning after the fact or, in
a psychologically complicated case involving inner obstacles, even at the
time of his action. However, that does not mean that no such desirability
characteristic exists. Unless such an aspect can, at least in principle, be
found, the behavior is not amenable to intentional explanation.⁵⁹
Any of the three possibilities suffice to support the idea that, when he is
⁵⁸Here is how Thomas Scanlon describes the action of getting a cool drink when he is
thirsty: “First, there is the unpleasant sensation of dryness in my mouth and throat. Also,
there is the thought that a cool drink would relieve this sensation and, in general, feel good.
I take this consideration, that drinking would feel good, to count in favor of drinking, and
I am on the lookup for some cool drink.” Scanlon concludes that “[i]t is this future good —
the pleasure to be obtained by drinking — that makes it worth my while to look for water
[…] The motivational work seems to be done by my taking this future pleasure to count in
favor of drinking” (Scanlon 1998: 38).
⁵⁹See §4.2 for Milton’s Satan as a particularly difficult example.
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operating stereos, the person is, in our sense, aiming at the good. On the
proposed view, this is to say that his intention to turn on radios commits
him practically to doing so. Although such an intention may be a long-
term commitment, it need not be. While some practical commitments
are held for a prolonged period, others may result from a spontaneous
decision. Nor is it part of the view that a commitment must be the result
of careful reflection, as suggested by Gauthier’s conception of considered
preferences.⁶⁰ While a practical commitment can be the outcome of a well
thought-out argument, it can equally be arrived at in a haphazard way,
as when one happens upon a good idea. Or even a bad idea — there is
much room for irrational commitments, commitments that one would do
better, from a rational standpoint, not to have.
Though practical commitments are sometimes — often, even — irrational,
they are rational states in another sense. As contentful, rule-governed
states, they are integrated in a system of inferential relationships. As
Nick Zangwill puts it, “a propositional attitude is a node in a complex,
crisscross network of rational relations” (Zangwill 1998: 197), and in-
tentions or practical commitments aren’t any different. Because of their
rational integration, practical commitments do not strike us as arbitrary
or ad hoc in the way the original Radio Man’s weird functional state does.
Practical commitments are by nature something the agent stands behind,
as the agent has made up his mind that performing the action constitutes
a good for him. The commitments are, in this sense, part of his identity
as a person. As an expression of his will, they have normative author-
ity. Thus whereas a mere functional state is insufficient to make sense
of an action, a practical commitment has a stronger claim to succeed in
rationalizing an action.
This is not to say that we must necessarily agree with an agent that the
actions to which he has committed himself are worthwhile or the things
he ought to be doing.⁶¹ This would lead to the absurd conclusion that
judging that one has a reason to do something automatically makes it true
that one has such a reason. Like all judgments, an evaluative judgment
can be mistaken.
It remains doubtful, in any case, that Sufficiency C is true as it stands.
Counter-examples are not far to seek. For one thing, does an agent have
a normative reason to φ if the path by which he reached the decision to φ
started from a mistaken factual premise? Here, at least, it seems far from
clear that it would correct to attribute to the agent a normative reason
⁶⁰See §2.5.
⁶¹See the discussion of the bootstrapping problem in §6.1.
3.5. PSYCHOLOGISM AND HUMEANISM RECONSIDERED 153
rather than a merely supposed reason.⁶² Furthermore, we should also be
wary of attributing a normative reasons — even a prima facie normative
reason — to someone who acts out a morally vicious intention. Although
the agent clearly has a motivating reason, he acts although he doesn’t
have a good reason to do so — or so we would be tempted to speak.
Question about specifically moral reasons cannot be settled here. The
point is merely that our practice of attributing normative reasons is com-
picated. Even in its adjusted formulation, then, the Humean claim that
having a conative state suffices for having a normative reason is open to
formidable challenges.⁶³
Even if Sufficiency C should turn out to be true, however, that should not
be seen as giving aid and comfort to defenders of Humeanism. In its ad-
justed form, it is not a particularly informative thesis since it does not
impose any substantive constraints on reasons. Having a practical com-
mitment is defined, through its rational links, in terms of its role in reason-
ing, so it is part of the meaning of the term “practical commitment” that
practical commitments rationalize behavior. The result is a high-brow
position that is no longer recognizable as a form of Humeanism. Practi-
cal commitments are the source of reasons only in the weakest possible
sense. Practical commitments, as we have introduced them, are defined in
terms of the inference licenses they involve. These licenses include inter
alia the permission to transition from having the commitment to do φ to
actually doing φ, or to doing something else which promotes the attain-
ment of φ. Here, then, we can confer to the idea of having a reason to do φ
the sense of having the license to form the intention to do φ and to realize
this intention. Having a practical commitment is directly related to hav-
ing a motivating reason. But someone’s being practically committed does
not explain having a reason any more than having a reason explains be-
ing practically committed; the two concepts are interdependent. Instead,
what has been said supports the suggestion, mentioned earlier, that hav-
⁶²For a discussion of this question see chapter 5. The view proposed there is not a version
of Bernard Williams’s existence internalism in any recognizable form. For a critique of
existence internalism, which takes reasons to depend on motivational states in another
sense, see §§5.2–3. As I argue in these sections, we can ascribe intentions and reasons
consequentially, which decouples reasons from our avowed intentions.
⁶³While Humeans hold that unmotivated desires are beyond the reach of rational crit-
icism, High Brow makes no such assumption about intentions, so even if one has an in-
tention, it may still itself be irrational. A prima facie reason generated from an irrational
intention is unsound. What is more, the idea that aberrant intentions may produce further
reasons through instrumental reasoning may be worrying. But the reasons generated by
an aim are only as good as the aim they are derived from, which in the case of aberrant
intentions is not very good. For further discussion of the bootstrapping problem, see §6.1
and §6.5.
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ing a reason for action is an irreducible notion.⁶⁴ This result should be
encouragement to defenders of the view that the notion of a reason for
action is the elementary, fundamental notion in the philosophy of ac-
tion.⁶⁵ On the present view, practical commitments cannot be separated
from reasons for action, or vice versa. The concept of a reason for action
is undefinable except in terms which presuppose the same notion.
⁶⁴See §1.1.
⁶⁵See e.g. Scanlon (1998: 17–8), Raz (1975).
Chapter 4
Defending High Brow
4.1 Is High Brow incoherent?
In the previous chapter, we have seen the contours of a high-brow con-
ception of intentional agency. According to this theory, practical com-
mitments aim at the good, and intentional action involves a practical com-
mitment and thus an evaluative element. We have spelled out the notion
of a practical commitment in terms of rational, inferential rules. Clearly,
in order to count as being subject to rational, inferential rules, one needs
to possess conceptual capacities. High Brow implies, then, that the capac-
ity to act for a reason requires the possession of a faculty of rationality
and that actualizing the capacity for intentional action involves the de-
ployment of concepts.
Some philosophers find such a picture of agency appealing, whereas oth-
ers are wary of High Brow conceptions of acting for a reason. On the one
hand, we can find versions of a high-brow conception of agency through-
out the history of philosophy, in writers ranging from Plato to Kant.¹ The
idea is summed up in the Thomist thesis: “Quidquid appetitur, appetitur
sub specie boni.” We desire objects under the guise of the good. The long
history of the view indicates there is a presumption in favor of its cor-
rectness. As Railton puts it,
¹See Plato’sMeno (77a–78a). Kant notes with approval an “old formular of the schools”:
“nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur, nisi sub ratione mali” (2003: AA
59). See also Tenenbaum (2003).
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High Brow is a view with excellent pedigree, tracing its an-
cestry back to ancient Greece. According to High Brow, just
as belief necessarily “aims at” the True, action necessarily
“aims at” the Good. (Railton 1997: 302)²
A few paragraphs after delivering this praise, however, he cautions,
High Brow is, however, highbrow. Many philosophers, in my
experience, are not. (Railton 1997: 304)
According to a number of philosophers, there are difficulties with the idea
that intentional action requires the involvement of conceptual capacities.
They argue that as a theory of acting intentionally in general High Brow
is too demanding. This chapter addresses two broad issues of this type:
1. Is High Brow incoherent? If you act intentionally, you have a prac-
tical commitment, and having a practical commitment means be-
ing subject to, and having one’s conduct regulated by, conceptual
rules. However, this thesis faces a fundamental objection. If act-
ing in accordance with a rule is itself something that must be done
intentionally, then acting on a practical commitment seems to in-
volve another action which again requires a practical commitment.
But then a vicious regress looms. According to the objection, it fol-
lows either that intentional action cannot occur sub specie boni or
that our account of acting under the guise of the good in terms of
conceptual rules must be faulty.
2. Is High Brow too demanding? According to High Brow, acting in-
tentionally requires you to conceive of what you’re doing as some-
thing good or worthwhile. But some creatures who are in princi-
ple incapable of making evaluative judgments still are often said to
act on desires. Moreover, even mature rational agents sometimes
act spontaneously or thoughtlessly, and when they do, they do not
seem to engage in evaluative judgments. Accordingly, the objec-
tion runs, it cannot be true in general that intentional action must
occur sub specie boni.
I begin the chapter by discussing the first set of worries about the viabil-
ity of High Brow (§1); the remainder of the chapter is devoted to variants
²See §3.3 for the important caveat that the good is only a formal object. See also §6
below.
4.1. IS HIGH BROW INCOHERENT? 157
of the second worry. The next section considers counter-examples due to
Michael Stocker against the principle that the good, and only the good,
attracts us (§2). Next I turn to the problem that not all intentional ac-
tions are conceptually reflective (§3). After some general remarks about
the structure of practical reasoning (§4), I make an attempt at solving
the problem of unreflective agency while nonetheless maintaining High
Brow (§5). Finally, I address the perennial question whether non-rational
creatures, too, are capable of acting for reasons (§6).
Acting for a reason has been explained as aiming at the good, which in
turn was explicated in terms of being subject to conceptual rules. This
creates a puzzle for High Brow which may be described as follows. Start
with the intuitive difference between obeying a rule in a strict sense and
merely acting in conformity with the rule. Take McDowell’s concise ex-
ample of “someone following a marked trail, who at a crossing of paths
goes to the right in response to a signpost pointing that way.” (McDow-
ell 2009a: 129) We can think of a signpost as a kind of rule, since, like a
rule, it gives us instructions about what to do. The signpost’s shape and
inscription directs the agent the right. If, as McDowell describes him, the
agent’s taking the path on the right is a response to this rule, surely in his
action he is obeying a rule. By contrast, the agent may walk to the right
without understanding the sign or even completely at random. In that
case, although the action would conform to the rule, the agent would not
be obeying the rule. Genuinely obeying a rule involves more than mere
conformity to a regularity.
Applying this distinction to our topic, we have explicated acting for a
reason as a performance governed by at least one inferential rule.³ One
may reason as follows. Suppose I am intentionally φ’ing as a way of
acting on my intention I to φ, and this performance is enjoined by the
rule of inference R. My φ’ing, then, must be in “reaction”, in McDowell’s
phrase, to this rule. Further, it clearly is not enough that my performance
should merely conform to R. The performance must occur because of the
rule, so more than merely coinciding with what R prescribes, it seems
that my doing φ must be an instance of obeying R. The puzzle becomes
evident when we add that, apparently, obeying the rule R is something
one needs to do intentionally. In other words, it seems that in order to
count as obeying R, I must have another intention I₂ to follow R. Now
according to the proposal, I₂ must be rule-governed. It follows that the
act, my obeying I, must be a reaction to a further rule R₂. Once again,
³I will simplfy things by supposing that only one inferential rule is involved. In reality,
intentional states are governed by a mutidue of rules.
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rather than merely doing what R₂ enjoins by accident, I must be obeying
R₂ intentionally. But at this point it is clear that we are embarking on an
infinite regress. For if doing what R₂ instructs me to do is an intentional
action, I must have another intention I₃ to follow the rule, and so on.
According to the puzzle, our high-brow account, combined with a seem-
ingly plausible account of what a reaction to a rule amounts to, implies
that doing φ for a reason entails having an infinite number of intentions
and following an infinite number of rules. But this is an absurd conse-
quence. The objection concludes that High Brow must be fundamentally
incoherent or that at least our way of spelling out the theory must be
faulty.
As prerequisites to solving this puzzle, we need to put in place a number
of Sellarsian distinctions. So we first need to consider a related problem
raised by our presentation of Sellars’s philosophy of language.⁴ Recall
that for Sellars, the linguisticmeaning of aword is constituted by the rules
of its use.⁵ To use a word, say, the adjective “red” in the assertion “This is
red”, is to produce a performance that is subject to various meaning rules.
In an early essay, not long after introducing his conception of meaning,
Sellars quickly notices that it faces an objector who asks:
Are you not confronted by a dilemma? For surely the rules
for a linguistic system are themselves linguistic phenomena.
Therefore either you must hold that they, in turn, are rule-
governed, or else admit that at least one linguistic structure
exists which is not “rule-governed” in your sense. You can
scarcely be prepared to adopt the latter course. If you take
the former, you are committed, surely, to an infinity of rules,
meta-rules, meta-meta-rules, etc. (Sellars 1980b: 142, n. 5)
In this essay, Sellars hasn’t worked out a satisfactory answer to this ob-
jector yet, but we can find an answer in his later seminal essay Some
Reflections on Language Games. There, Sellars presents a restatement of
the problem. He writes that if, as the language-rule thesis holds, know-
ing the meaning of a term is to know the rules of use that govern that
term, then learning a new language must amount to learning the rules
that govern the expressions of that language. Now suppose that a person
learns the meaning of “red”, i.e. acquires the concept of red. The thesis
entails the existence of a rule of the form
⁴In §3.2.
⁵Sellars (1980b: 142).
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If you are in circumstances C, you ought to do A.
The natural form of a rule is a conditional sentence. Now if learning the
use of “red” requires learning the rule, it seems that learning that requires
learning the truth expressed by the statement. What sentences would
that be in the specific case of “red”? Plausibly, among those sentences
should be the rule:
You ought to utter the words “This is red” only if the object
you are pointing at is red.
This rule is arguably partly constitutive of the meaning of the word “red”.
But in order to understand the rule in question, you need to understand
the meaning of its constituent words. It follows that to learn the rule,
you already need to know what “red” means: you must already possess
the concept of red. But learning the concept is what we were trying to
explain in the first place. If acquiring a concept requires learning a rule,
learning the rule cannot itself require already familiarity with the concept
in question. More generally, in order to learn a language one already
needs to know a metalanguage in which the rules for that language are
formulated. But unless we want to assume that the knowledge of such
a metalanguage could be innate, this starts a vicious regress: learning a
language requires knowledge of a metalanguage, which in turn requires
knowledge of a meta-metalanguage, and so on.
Sellars locates the problem in the way our assumption is formulated. We
assumed that learning the concept red is coming to obey the rules of the
term “red”. For him, the first step in the right direction is to take note,
as we have, of the two ways in which a person may relate to a rule. An
agent who has the habit of doing A in C — in the example, saying “this
is red” only when the object he points at really is red — conforms to the
rule. All that is needed to conform to a rule is to do A in the required
circumstances with some regularity. By contrast, obeying a rule is more
demanding. As Sellars writes,
whereas obeying rules involves using the language in which
the rules are formulated, conforming to rules does not, so that
whereas the thesis put in terms of obeying rules leads to a
vicious regress, it ceases to do so once the above substitution
is made. (Sellars 2007e: 29)
The suggestion is that for mastering the concept red, obeying the corre-
sponding rule is not required, conformance to the rule being sufficient.
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Only if the agent is obeying the rule does he need to have a rule-expression
in his mind. The suggestion is initially appealing. Following Wittgen-
stein, Sellars likens speaking a language, with its assertions and other
performances, to playing a game such as chess, with a number of avail-
able moves. Chess is governed by rules which must be learned in order to
play it, but as Sellars points out, being a competent player of chess does
not entail the ability to explicitly formulate the rules of the game. Thus
Sellars develops the proposal:
playing these games is a matter of doing A when the circum-
stances are C, doing A0 when the circumstances are C0, etc.,
and […] the ability to formulate and obey the rule, although
it may be a necessary condition of playing “in a critical and
self-conscious manner” cannot be essential to playing tout
court. (Sellars 2007e: 29)
Although seeing playing a game as mere conformance to its rules is at-
tractive and contains an element of truth, the idea is ultimately unwork-
able. The problem is that this conception of playing a game portrays the
rules of the game as “externally related” to the game. Sellars notes, but
does not fully endorse, the following objection-cum-suggestion:
surely one is not making a move in a game (however un-
critically and unselfconsciously) unless one is making it as a
move in the game, and does this not involve that the game
be somehow “present to mind” in each move? (Sellars 2007e:
30)
In Sellars’s view, the first half of this suggestion is true whereas the sec-
ond half, the rhetorical question, misleads. The key to his understanding
of rules lies in seeing how the first can be accepted without the second.
Sellars explains the first and true part further when he notes with ap-
proval the idea that:
learning a game involves learning to do what one does be-
cause doing these things is making moves in the game (Sellars
2007e: 32)
The trouble with a person whomerely conforms to a rule is that although
he goes through all the right moves, he doesn’t make the moves because
of the rules of the game, i.e. because they are the right rules. In relation to
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the rules, his moves are accidental. But this runs counter to our intuition
that the rule should be present in the activity, in a sense that makes it
true to say that the agent acts because of the rules.
The rhetorical question in the second part of the quote offers a natural-
sounding interpretation of the relation between the rules and the moves.
On this proposal, the only way for one to make moves in the game be-
cause of the rules of the game is “in virtue of the fact that one made one’s
moves in the light of these demands and permissions, reasoned one’s
moves in terms of their place in the game as a whole” (Sellars 2007e: 32).
But if this is not a viable option because it leads to the regress of meta-
languages, the assumption that the agent must have the rules in mind
in order for them to be present in the moves in order for them to be
relevantly explanatory of the moves must be false. Thus for Sellars it
is possible for the behavior of the subject to be governed by rules even
though they are not explicitly present in the subject’s mind. The fact that
the agent does not, in doing what he does, explicitly intend to follow the
rule-formulations does not entail that the behavior is accidental with re-
spect to the rules:
there can surely be an unintended relation of an act to a sys-
tem of acts, which is nevertheless a necessary relation — a
relation of such a kind that it is appropriate to say that the
act occurred because of the place of that kind of act in the
system. (Sellars 2007e: 32)
For Sellars, the distinction between the complex phenomenon of obey-
ing a rule — implying an explicit intention — and the undemanding phe-
nomenon of merely conforming to the rule — implying a lack of necessity
— is a false dichotomy: there is a middle ground between mere confor-
mity and obedience to a rule. For Sellars, what we need is the notion of
pattern-governed behavior: behavior that happens because of the rule, in
the appropriate sense, without the involvement of an explicit intention
to follow the rule.⁶
Even if we can see pattern-governed behavior as a middle ground be-
tween mere regularity and explicit rule-following, for Sellars it is crucial
for our understanding of language. The key to solving the problem of
a subject’s learning a language, then, is understanding pattern-governed
behavior, which according to Sellars is
⁶Sellars (2007e: 34).
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the concept of behavior which exhibits a pattern, not because
it is brought about with the intention that it exhibit this pat-
tern, but because the propensity to emit behavior of the pat-
tern has been selectively reinforced, and the propensity to
emit behavior which does not conform to the pattern selec-
tively extinguished. (Sellars 2007d: 87)
An agent’s pattern-governed behavior, whose pattern is shaped by a sys-
tem of linguistic rules, is in accordance with the rules of the system. In
other words, like a creature that merely conforms to a set of rules, the
agent is disposed to do what the rules mandate without thereby deploy-
ing an intention to do so. The difference from mere conformity is not in
what the agent does but in how he has acquired the relevant propensities.
Here the contrast to rule-obeying behavior is useful. A teacher may teach
a chess novice the rules of chess by giving explicit instructions: “You
ought to move the rook in a straight line, you are not allowed to castle
after having moved the king, and so on”. Other than giving instructions,
however, it is also possible to bring about the relevant behavior through
selective reinforcement. The chess teacher may let his students play and
encourage the moves that comply with the rules while criticizing moves
that don’t. As Ryle points out, in order for a player to know chess, what
is important is what he does on the board.⁷ If the lessons succeed, the
student’s behavior not just conforms to the rules of chess but actually
becomes a piece of pattern-governed behavior.
In practice, learning chess involves a mixture of explicitly memorizing
rules and simply acquiring habits through reinforcement and extinction
that is not in propositionally explicit form. Of course, in chess train-
ing, selective reinforcement usually is verbal; and chess is a game that
students learn after having learned a language. If we take Wittgenstein’s
metaphor of a language game seriously, then to learn one’s first language
is to learn a special sort of game, one can play without already being
able to play any language-like games. Of course, a school-level child ac-
quires its linguistic abilities partly through explicit instruction, e.g. in the
form of grammatical prescriptions. But on Sellars’s view, at its most basic
level, the acquisition of a first language involves only learning through
(friendly) drill or conditioning. The methods employed by the teachers,
vastly different from their equivalents in chess, can be summed up in the
expression “Mommies and daddies, frowns and smiles”: if the child says
things — makes moves in the language game — that are correct according
to the rules governing the expressions, it is encouraged, while it receives
⁷Cf. Ryle’s lucid description of learning chess in his Ryle (1963: ch. 1, 40–44).
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a negative reaction when its moves are incorrect. Using a variety of tech-
niques, the teachers get the children to exhibit good uniformities in their
behavior. At the end of the process, the child’s verbal behavior is pattern-
governed in Sellars’s sense. No child pauses to think of linguistic rules,
let alone grammatical rules, in deciding what to say. Nonetheless, its be-
havior is, in a perfectly intelligible sense of the word, governed by those
rules.
Two related objections to this conception arise naturally. First, how can
you “follow” a rule — and be guided by the rule —without explicitly using
that rule as a premise in your reasoning? Second, even if this is possible,
in which way is the rule really present in the activity if it involves no
explicit grasping of a proposition? The first problem can be put in the
followingway. It is often assumed that the concept of a rule is the concept
of something that prescribes a certain course of action in a specified set
of circumstances. A rule is, or is expressed by, a general ought-statement
of the form:
Ought-to-do If you are in conditions C, you ought to do A.
What constitutes compliance with a rule? A subject that is subject to the
rule conforms to it when he does A when he is actually in conditions C.
On a popular conception, this means that the subject needs to become
aware that he is in these circumstances and, as a consequence of this be-
lief, decide to do A. This obviously requires the subject following the rule
to have considerable conceptual capacities. He needs to be able to rec-
ognize that he is in the relevant conditions mentioned in the antecedent
and he needs to know what constitutes compliance with the response
mandated in the consequent. It is, to say the least, unlikely that we can
presuppose these kinds of capacities in an agent when we are trying to
explain what it is for the agent to be able to speak the language — when
we are giving an account of what his conceptual capacities amount to in
the first place. What is more, if we take one of the relevant rules to be
the aforementioned:
You ought to utter the words “This is red” only if the object
you are pointing at is red.
then understanding the consequent requires that the agent already be
in possession of the concept of redness, the concept whose mastery we
are hoping to explain. If we must interpret rules along these lines, they
cannot play the role Sellars gives them — the role of supplying a basic
explanation of our ability to speak meaningfully.
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As Sellars points out, however, this line of thought relies on an unwar-
ranted assumption about rules. It assumes that semantic rules need to be,
as Sellars calls them, rules of action. If a rule of action is involved,
for the rule itself to play a role in bringing about the confor-
mity of ‘is’ to ‘ought’, the agents in questionmust conceive of
[action] A as what ought to be done in circumstances C. This
requires that they have the concept of what it is for an action
to be called for by a certain circumstance. (Sellars 2007c: 59)⁸
A rule of this type cannot form the basis of our mastery of language,
so if there were only rules of action, the language-rule thesis would be
unworkable. Fortunately, there is a second type of rules which has the
following form:
Ought-to-be Xs ought to be in state F whenever such and such is the
case.⁹
Prescriptions of this type, which Sellars calls rules of criticism, specify
not what the agent ought to do but in what state something — in our
case a subject — ought to be.¹⁰ For this reason, rules of criticism are also
known as ought-to-be’s, to contrast with rules of action or ought-to-do’s.
There are three differences between the two types of rules:
1. Whereas ought-to-do’s, which require conceptually structured recog-
nitional capacities on the part of its subject, ought-to-be’s can, in
principle, apply to inanimate objects as well as to persons. Here is
an example:
Clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour.¹¹
Although the verb used (“strike”) has the form of an action verb,
this rule is an ought-to-be since it specifies what should be the case
⁸I have corrected a misprint in the Brandom-Scharp volume.
⁹Sellars (2007c: 59). The distinction between ought-to-be’s and ought-to-do’s is simi-
lar to LLoyd Humberstone’s distinction between situational oughts and agent-implicating
oughts (I. L. Humberstone 1971).
¹⁰Sellars’s talk of “being in a state” should be understood in a wide sense that includes
a creature’s behavior as well as its psychological states. Bear in mind that Sellars’s topic is
learning and teaching of conceptual behavior. A creature’s doings — raising an arm, say, or
producing language-like sounds — are subject to ought-to-be’s. The relevant contrast is be-
tween mere trained behavior, which is in principle available to non-agents, and intentional
action, which involves more stringent cognitive requirements.
¹¹I take this example and the following from Sellars (2007c: 59–61).
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— the clock’s striking — rather than what someone should inten-
tionally do. Not being a person, of course, the clock cannot do
anything intentionally. A fortiori, it does not have any conceptual
capacities to recognize situations and adjust its behavior.
2. Ought-to-be’s are more interesting for our purposes when applied
to living creatures rather than things. However, even when apply-
ing to persons, an ought-to-be need to involve an awareness of the
conditions of application. Thus the rule
One ought to feel sympathy for bereaved people.
is a rule of criticism that only applies to persons, but here, too, the
predicate “feel sympathy” does not refer to an action. Like a clock’s
striking, it is not something that one can do intentionally or for a
reason.¹² In Sellars’s terminology, feeling sympathy is an act rather
than an action. Actions are actualities which “appropriately can be
spoken of as deliberate or impulsive, carefully or careless” (Sellars
1980a: 8). They done intentionally and for a reason. A feeling such
as sympathy is the actualization of a potentiality, but it is “non-
action”, and although there may be reasons for performing an act,
a subject does not perform an act with a reason in mind. Even
when the subject of an ought-to-be is a person, the rule refers to
acts rather than actions.
The difference between action and acts is important in particular in
the context of conceptual or linguistic activity, which for Sellars to
a surprising extent consists of acts rather than actions. There are
of course linguistic actions, including baptizing a ship, proclaim-
ing victory or making a birthday call. In doing these things, we are
hoping to achieve a certain effect. On the other hand, not all pieces
of verbal behavior are properly classified as linguistic actions. Sell-
ars emphasizes that what he calls “languagings” or “thinkings-out-
loud” are not actions that we decide to perform as a result of practi-
cal reasoning.¹³ Similarly, undertaking a commitment is a linguis-
tic act, a doing, but not an intentional action. Importantly, while
ought-to-do’s pertain to actions, ought-to-be’s can refer to mere
acts, including linguistic acts, as well. As we are envisaging things,
¹²Feeling an emotion is not something one can do at will, though perhaps one could
do something that helps bring it about that one feels sympathy. This would, however,
not amount to intentionally feeling sympathy but changing one’s own habit through self-
criticism.
¹³See §3.2.
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saying “this is red” in response to a red object should be thought of
as a languaging and hence as an act rather than an action. There-
fore the subject can produce the performance in response to a rule
without forming an intention to do so.
3. In order to conform to the sympathy rule, the subject arguably
needs to have the concept of someone bereaved. Yet it is important
to note that having a concept of the circumstances is not necessary
for ought-to-be’s in general. Applied to animal training, we can
imagine a rule
These rats ought to be in state F whenever C.
Through conditioning, we could bring it about that an animal con-
forms to this ought-to-be rule. In order for such training to succeed,
it would not be necessary for the animal to have a concept of cir-
cumstances C. Instead it would be sufficient if the animal had the
ability to “respond differentially to cues emanating from C” (Sellars
2007c: 60). As a result of the training, the rat’s behavior conforms
to the rule in question. Similarly, there is nothing mysterious in as-
suming that a person could have his behavior governed by a rule of
this sort without presupposing sophisticated conceptual capacities
on his part.
Ought-to-be’s are different from ought-to-do’s in that they involve acts
rather than intentional actions and that reliable differential responsive
dispositions¹⁴ suffice for having one’s behavior governed by them. For
Sellars, however, there is an important link between the two: ought-to-
be’s “point beyond themselves” (Sellars 2007c: 59). In particular, every
rule of criticism points to a related rule of action. Thus,
These rats ought to be in state F whenever C
points to
One ought to bring it about that rats in state C are in state F,
and
S ought to utter the words “This is red” only if the object he
points at is red
¹⁴Brandom (1994) ch. 4.
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points to
One ought to bring it about that S utters the words “This is
red” only if the object he points at is red.
Bringing it about that someone exhibits behavior in accordance with an
ought-to-be is something one does intentionally, and to attain such a goal,
one needs to engage in practical reasoning, determining the best means
for realizing the pedagogic end. But crucially, these rules of actions are
directed, not at the subject of the behavior in question — the person learn-
ing themeaning of “red” — but to the one attempting tomake his behavior
conform to the ought-to-be rule — to the language trainer.
We are now in a position to answer the objections. An ought-to-be is
less demanding than an ought-to-do because unlike the latter, it requires
no explicit process of reasoning taking account of a rule statement. The
solution to the puzzle is to conceive of the indispensable ground-floor
rules that govern our use of language as ought-to-be’s rather than ought-
to-do’s.¹⁵ As to the sense in which these rules are present in the rule-
governed activity, the difference between pattern-governed behavior and
mere rule-conformity lies in the history of the acquisition of the patterns
in question. We understand linguistic behavior as rule-governed in the
sense of being pattern-governed because the pattern was instilled in the
subject by its trainers when it learned the language. We can now ex-
plain this in greater detail. In learning a first language, a child comes
to conform to ought-to-be rules. It acquires the uniformities of behavior
it acquires because its trainers selectively reinforce correct behavior and
extinguish incorrect behavior. The child itself does not mentally come
into contact with expressions of the rules in question, but the trainers
do. In performing their task, the trainers consciously think of the rules
of criticism they wish to bring their students to conform to. When they
perform the educational tasks they do, i.e. when they selectively smile
and frown, they do so because these encouragements are ways of follow-
ing the pedagogic rules of action (“one ought to bring it about…”), the
rules which the ground-level rules of criticism point to.
The two distinctions, between act and action and between trainer and
trainee, enable us to see what is true and what is misleading about the
idea that if moves in a game are made “as moves in the game”, they must
¹⁵I use the word “ground-floor rules” because, as Sellars points out, some language rules
are ought-to-do rules (Sellars 2007c: 61). The important point is that, for the reasons out-
lined in the text, all linguistic rules could not possibly be ought-to-do’s.
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involve explicit awareness of a rule-statement. It is true that the state-
ment of the ought-to-be has a function in the explanation of the rule-
governed behavior, but that function does not amount to the subject’s
explicitly gasping a proposition while producing his performance. In-
stead, it is the language-teacher who while teaching that rule explicitly
has the statement in mind, reasoning practically on its basis. When a
competent subject says “This is red”, his move is not accidental: he makes
a move because of the ought-to-be rule that governs the expression. But
the significance of this “because” is not that the rule occurs in his reason-
ing in any way. It means, more indirectly, that the performance is part of
a system of behavior shaped by a pattern which was acquired through the
actions of a trainer who, at last, explicitly envisaged the rule-statement.
Returning to the original question, the same set of distinctions shows that
High Brow does not involve itself in an infinite regress. When a person
intentionally raises his arm in order to φ, he is thereby expressing his in-
tention or practical commitment, for example to hail a cab. It is true that
his raising his arm counts as expressing the commitment only if in doing
so he is being guided by the rules governing the intention. But the objec-
tion incorrectly assumes that the only way his activity could be guided by
rules is for him to envisage the rules explicitly. It overlooks the possibil-
ity that his expression of his commitment is a piece of pattern-governed
behavior. It is appropriate to say that he is doing what he does because
of the rules, not because he is explicit thinking of any rule-expressions —
he isn’t —, but because he has acquired the behavior-pattern correspond-
ing to the rule through the conditioning of a teacher who did explicitly
envisage the rules.
Relatedly, the agent’s forming his intention should not be thought of as
another intentional action, which would give rise to a series of further
intentions. Instead it is a mental act which is not preceded by any further
intention.¹⁶ Again, the agent’s letting himself be guided by a concep-
tual role is not itself an action that should send us looking for a further
intention. Acknowledging a practical commitment does not amount to
consciously following any instructions. While the rules shape the sub-
ject’s behavior, as rules of criticism they stay in the background. Yet it
is perfectly legitimate to say that practical commitments are through and
through rule-governed. The agent is not “following a rule”, an ought-to-
do, in the sense of having a corresponding intention, but his conceptual
¹⁶Of course, if the act of forming an intention, or undertaking a commitment, is an act
rather than an action, something that can only be the subject of ought-to-be’s, what is
envisaged in the intention is an action rather than an act, something that is called for by
ought-to-do’s.
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behavior is nonetheless guided by the rule, an ought-to-be. Undertak-
ing a commitment is making a move in the game as a move in the game,
with its demands and permissions, because those demands and permis-
sions played an active role while the behavior was acquired. According
to the high-brow thesis, that intentions or practical commitments aim at
the good is constituted by their being subject to a network of ought-to-be
rules. Therefore, performing an intentional action does not generate an
infinite series of intentions or rules, and we have no reason to suspect
that High Brow is incoherent.
4.2 Must we act under the guise of the good?
Some philosophers think that High Brow is too high-brow or overly intel-
lectual. The worry that the view makes unrealistic demands on the agent
encompasses two separable objections:
1. Someone may object that in stipulating that intentional agents nec-
essarily act under the guise of the good, we exclude non-rational
animals and human infants from membership in the class of inten-
tional agents. According to the objection, we regularly ascribe in-
tentional actions to those creatures and High Brow cannot account
for these ascriptions.
2. Granting that only mature rational beings are capable of inten-
tional agency, High Brow may still be thought dubious even with
respect to creatureswho can be assumed to have rational capacities.
On this second objection, it is true that our actions are sometimes
expressions of, or the upshot of, evaluative judgments, but in these
cases we act reflectively and with a high degree of self-awareness.
However, not all our actions are accompanied by an assessment of
the action as something good or desirable. In particular when an
agent acts without deliberating in advance or reflecting on the mer-
its of the action, it is inappropriate to ascribe to him a deployment
of the concept of goodness.
Deferring discussion of the first, more radical complaint until §6, I will be-
gin addressing the second by considering an argument against the Guise
of the Good by Michael Stocker. On the high-brow view, the Guise of the
Good is a conceptual truth, but Stocker disagrees. He holds not only that
the claim that “the good attracts” cannot be conceptually true but also that
there are counter-examples that show the generalization to be mistaken.
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According to Stocker, the view that we act sub specie boni exemplifies an
overly optimistic view of human psychology. Of course it is no part of
any High Brow position that everything every agent does is good. It is
only that committing themselves to an action, an agent takes its outcome
to be in some way desirable, and it is of course always possible that he
may be wrong.
Nonetheless, the argument runs, the Guise of the Goodmakes the unwar-
ranted assumption of a straightforward relationship between evaluation
and motivation.¹⁷ Thus Stocker argues that it is entirely possible to re-
main unattracted by a perceived good. He describes a man who used to
be active in politics because he cared about the suffering of the mem-
bers of his community. After years of public service he has grown disen-
chanted with the nature of politics. Although he still remembers his past
devotion to the needs of his community he is now bitter and has stopped
caring altogether about the well-being of these people. He still sees what
is good for them but his bitterness has made him indifferent to their good.
Because the man has become disaffected, a psychic state Stocker calls a
“malady of the spirit”, he is no longer motivated by his judgments about
what would be good for the persons he used to care for. In such a spirit,
“one sees all the good to be won or saved and one lacks the will, interest,
¹⁷Hursthouse (1991) argues against the Guise of the Good by providing a “recalcitrant set
of counterexamples”. For instance, she points out that an action may be “explained by a way
of love, affection, or tenderness — kissing or lightly touching in passing, seizing and tossing
up in the air, rumpling the hair of, or generally messing up the person or animal one loves;
talking to her photograph as one passes, kissing it” (Hursthouse 1991: 58). This action, she
argues, is in no way rationalized by a belief-desire pair in the classical sense. In particular,
although the action is an expression of an emotion, the agent is not purposefully expressing
an emotion. Hursthouse calls actions of this type “arational” rather than “irrational”: they
are done actions for which no reasons can be found.
It is clear that, if the examples are real, they cannot count as the agent acting sub specie
boni. As I see it, however, Hursthouse’s cases, though interesting, do not constitute a fun-
damental objection to the Guise of the Good thesis. According to the Guise of the God,
intentional action aims at the good. We have identified intentional action with acting for
a reason. The fact that an act done out of pure affection is done for no reason at all, then,
does not show (as Stocker urges) that intentional action may occur without an evaluative
element. Rather, what the examples suggest — and what is surely true — is that we need to
make room for the fact that not everything we do is an expression of intentional agency.
Hursthouse objects that the “significant class of actions” she points to are intentional
actions because they are not unintentional (Hursthouse 1991: 64). But unlike her, I do not
think it is implausible to say that there is a class of human doings that are neither inten-
tional nor unintentional, given that calling an action unintentional usually implies that it is
intentional under another description. What is more, although her cases are certainly sig-
nificant, it is also true that they are at the periphery of purposeful human behavior. Rather
than building a theory of the behavior of rational beings on a “lowest common denomi-
nator” which is present in arational doings as well as in intentional doings in the narrow
sense, we should focus our attention on paradigmatic cases. See also §6 below.
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desire or strength” (Stocker 1979: 744).
For Stocker, the examples shows that “something can be good and one can
believe it to be good without being in a mood or having an interest or en-
ergy structure which inclines one to seek or even desire it” (Stocker 1979:
745). Stocker emphasizes that a mood of this kind can intervene between
an evaluative judgment and attraction, leading to a more complex rela-
tion between evaluation and motivation. This phenomenon, commonly
called accidie, impedes our ability to be moved by normative judgments.
Stocker is right to underline the possibility of accidie. It is a big leap,
however, from this observation to the claim that this reveals believing in
the Guise of the Good to be optimistic or “unjustifiable” (Stocker 1979:
749). It is true that the Guise of the Good posits a close relation between
regarding an action as good and acting accordingly. But it does not entail
that all our judgments about the good necessarily become effective in ac-
tion. Because this would be an implausibly strong judgment-internalism
about action, we should instead defend a weaker, more defensible ver-
sion of judgment-internalism according to which we are motivated by
our evaluative judgment only on condition of being rational.¹⁸
According to the Guise of the Good, cases of accidie should be understood
as instances of irrationality. Does this mean that examples like the bitter
politician pose a problem for high-brow conceptions of agency? It would
certainly pose such a problem if High Brow had no way of coping with
the phenomenon of weak-willed agents. However, there is little reason to
think that this is so. As Stocker rightly says, the influence of the interme-
diary psychic states on our motivation is complex. Weakness of the will
is a murky topic with many subtleties which a complete account would
have to address in detail. As such a detailed account is clearly outside
the scope of our current topic, however, an outline of how a high-brow
conception can explain motivational inefficiencies in agents will have to
suffice. Thus note that the politician is unusual in that, although he sees
that a state of affairs — helping the members of his community — is good,
this positive evaluation does not influence his actions. In which sense
is that outcome good? Clearly fulfilling the needs of the community is
good for those people, but if that was all that could be said, there would
be nothing unsurprising about the man’s indifference. There is nothing
surprising about a person being unattracted to what is good relative to a
certain group — perhaps good for the Bulgarian Association of Pharma-
cists. If the case is to present an instance of accidie, we need to assume
that the politician not only regards the actions in question as good for the
community but also, for that very reason, considers the actions good tout
¹⁸See §1.5.
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court. If he makes an all-out judgment that helping the needy of his city
is good, not relative to this or that group or interest, but simpliciter, then
we would expect him to let himself be influenced by this thought.
What the psychic state of disillusion gets in the middle of, then, is the
politician’s ability to respond appropriately to some of his all-out eval-
uative judgments. His appropriate response would be to move from the
judgment about the needy to forming an intention. In which way is such
a response appropriate? The view we propose conceives all-out evalu-
ative judgments as practical commitments. Commitments, as we have
insisted, are normative rather than purely dispositional states. The com-
mitment to help the inhabitants of the town is explained, not in terms of
the reactions the state usually produces but in terms of the reaction the
state calls for — in terms of oughts. In this instance, one of the norma-
tive consequences of the commitment is to form the relevant intention.
Doing so is what, given his commitments, it would be correct, rationally
speaking, for the person to do.¹⁹
How do we explain the fact that, although the evaluative judgment re-
quires producing an intention, this doesn’t happen in the politician’s
case? Here it is useful to consider two different ways of relating to a
practical commitment.²⁰ On the one hand, we can attribute, from a third-
person perspective, commitments to another speaker. We do this with
doxastic commitments, as when I attribute to someone the commitment
that X melts at 1084℃ based on my attribution to the same person of
the commitment that X is made out of copper. In attributing the further
commitment, we rely on the word “should” or “ought”. Thus we may say,
“If you think that the pipe is made out of copper, you should also believe
that it melts at 1084℃.” Similar relations exist with respect to practical
reasoning. I may attribute to an agent the commitment to use a wet blan-
ket based on his commitment to kill the fire: “If you intend to kill the
fire, you should also intend to throw a wet blanket on the flames.” When
we make attributions based on what an agent should do according to his
own commitments, we make use of practical reasoning but take up the
detached attitude of an observer. On the other hand, a different way to
deal with commitments is to take them up in first-person deliberation.
Here, too, we engage in practical reasoning, but we do so with a view
¹⁹Brandom, who understands akrasia as the undertaking of incompatible commitments,
notes that it is “one of the cardinal strengths of the deontic scorekeeping approach to in-
tentional states in terms of normative statuses that there is nothing conceptually myste-
rious about the possibility of such incompatible commitments. Difficulties in coherently
understanding akratic action and endorsement of incompatible beliefs arise from exclusive
emphasis on a causal-functional model of intentional states” (Brandom 1994: 270).
²⁰Here I am following (Brandom 1994: 269–271) closely.
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to determining which course of action to take. Whereas in third-person
attributions of commitments, we derive the conclusion that the agent we
are talking about should do φ, first-person practical reasoning results in
a conclusion of the form “I shall do φ”, thereby constituting an acknowl-
edgment of the commitment rather than a mere attribution.
The striking contrast of attributing and acknowledging commitments de-
pends on a distinction between two social roles. Whereas attributions of
commitments to another result, at best, in advice for the agent, acknowl-
edgment of practically relevant commitments typically result in the per-
formance of the action in question. Thuswhen from the social perspective
of an assessor we conclude “X should φ”, on the basis of attributions of
prior commitments, our mode of thought, although it deals with practical
matters, is distinctly detached or theoretical. A practical conclusion from
the deliberative point of view, on the other hand, is practical not just in
terms of its subject matter but also in its issue. We have a reliable dispo-
sition to respond to acknowledging a hic-et-nunc practical commitment
by producing the performance in question.²¹
Notice that we can attribute commitments in a third-person fashion not
just to others but also to ourselves. If we conclude a line of reasoning in
this way, the “should” that appears in the conclusion can also apply to
oneself. If I treat my own beliefs in a detached way, I can conclude that,
given my beliefs and collateral commitments, I should believe that the
pipe melts at 1084℃. Similarly if I treat my own practical commitments in
a detached way, I can conclude that I should, all things considered, throw
a wet blanket on the fire. The important thing is that doing so does not
automatically entail forming the practically efficacious intention to do so.
The upshot of my reasoning about the pipe is my attribution to myself of
a doxastic commitment, but this need not mean that I acknowledge the
commitment. Similarly the upshot of my reasoning about the fire is my
attribution to myself of a practical commitment, but I need not thereby
draw all the required conclusions. In particular, I need not acknowledge
the commitment behaviorally by responding to it by performing the ap-
propriate action — throwing a wet blanket on the fire.
Cases of accidie seem puzzling because they involve a peculiar non-re-
sponsiveness to positive evaluation. On the model presented, this is be-
cause “should” conclusions do not always reliably give rise to “shall” con-
clusions. The non-responsiveness is a matter of self-attributions of prac-
tical commitments coming out of sync with acknowledgments of those
²¹Brandomwrites that “intentions are causes, for in the properly trained agent, acknowl-
edgments of practical commitments reliably causally elicit performances” (Brandom 1994:
261).
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commitments. Reasoning about one’s own commitments only in a de-
tached third-person manner robs the commitments of their direct rela-
tion to motivation. In particular, “I should” differs from “I shall” in terms
of its noninferential significance, i.e. in the way it does not license or call
for a nonlinguistic response.²² But it is clear that if an agent judges all-out
that he should do φ that he is thereby committed to doing φ, whether he
likes it or not. Although it is psychologically understandable how there
may not be a practical realization of the “should” evaluation, it reveals a
rational fault in the agent: he fails to draw out the consequences of the
commitments he has. Self-attribution of a practical commitment does not
in every case trigger the reliable differential disposition to act, but that
does not mean that there is no rational requirement to do so. The appeal
to Stocker’s maladies of the spirit explains the failure to form an intention
psychologically but doesn’t justify it.
These are only the contours of an account of accidie. But they allow us to
see in principle that an account that understands evaluative judgments
in terms of practical commitments is at least in as good a position as a
rival dispositional account to account for cases where an agent is not
attracted by what he himself regards as good. So Stocker’s example that
the good need not attract does not pose a difficulty for the Guise of the
Good. However, Stocker’s argument against high-brow conceptions has a
second part, which is more challenging to our thesis. He argues not only
that the good may fail to attract but also that not only the good attracts.
In particular, he attempts to show that, in our darker hours, we may have
an appetite for the bad as well as for the good. He gives the example of a
person consciously making bad decisions as to his nutrition:
Given certain moods, interest structures, energy levels, and
the like — e.g. my having ceased caring about my well-being
— what I want is this food, even though, perhaps even be-
cause, I realize it is the wrong amount, the wrong sort, … i.e.,
bad for me. (Stocker 1979: 747)
Now it should not come as a surprise that we choose to do things even
though they have some negative aspect or other and even though we
know that they have it. Many if not all the things we do have not only
desirable features but downsides as well. Driving to work is convenient
but damages the environment; sleeping in is pleasurable but could cost
you your job; eating organic meat is healthy but expensive — we are used
²²Cf. Brandom (1994: 270).
4.2. MUST WE ACT UNDER THE GUISE OF THE GOOD? 175
to weighing pros and cons. What is more challenging is the radical claim
that we can find something attractive, not despite its downsides, but pre-
cisely because it is bad, or at least seen as bad. According to Stocker, given
certain adverse conditions, we can be attracted by the bad qua bad; and he
concludes that, at least as a general thesis, the claim that we necessarily
act sub specie boni must be mistaken.
Suppose an agent acts on a desire to eat a large amount of unhealthy food.
It is certainly true that he may do so despite his realization that doing so
is bad for him. But is it really the bad qua bad that attracts him? The
structure of Stocker’s example is that the agent acts on the desire to φ
and the fact that φ’ing is bad is the purported object of the agent’s desire.
Now Stocker holds that such cases leave the defender of the Guise of the
Good with two equally unattractive options:²³
1. The agent judges that φ’ing qua doing harm is itself good.
2. The agent does φ only in order to attain some other goal ψ, which
itself is desirable.
Stocker thinks that the first option is “too implausible” (Stocker 1979:
748). On the other hand, the second option does not cover all cases of
“desiring the bad”. While Stocker concedes that in some cases, doing
harm can be a means to attaining a further goal, he insists that some-
times, when we are affected by a particularly bad mood, there need be
nothing further that justifies the harm done. Perhaps this is true in cer-
tain modes of self-directed disgust. In such cases, the proper object of
the desire just is the damage, so that he is doing something bad precisely
because it is bad.
Of the two strategies Stocker suggests, the second is not particularly
promising. There are certainly many cases where we do harm, to oth-
ers or to ourselves, in order to achieve a further goal. But I agree with
Stocker that we have no reason to assume that harming others or our-
selves can never itself be our purpose. As he rightly points out, when we
help another person, we often do so without ulterior motives. If I help my
friend, the goal is not necessarily to deepen the friendship but may sim-
ply be to do what I can to help him in the spirit of friendship. Similarly,
if in a mood of disgust or spite I do damage to someone, there need be
no further motive involved — my desire may simply be for the other per-
son’s ruin. Yet if this is possible with respect to another person, a mood
²³Cf. Stocker (1979: 748).
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of self-hatred may equally prompt a desire to harm myself, without any
expectation of further pleasure or relief.
Stocker is right, then, to reject the second defense, but I think he doesn’t
take the first defense seriously enough when he dismisses as implausible
the idea that in the relevant cases the bad is a believed good. In my view,
when someone genuinely desires an action as one of harming someone,
he thereby regards doing harm as a good thing. Stocker find this ab-
surd, presumably because he regards such a desire as in itself inconsis-
tent. Thus it may be thought that evaluating positively a bad action such
as causing damage is self-defeating. However, it is easy to see that the
ascription
Jim treats hurtingX as good* precisely because it is not good**.
need not be a self-contradiction. In the sentence, “good” is used in two
different ways. In its second occurrence, “good**” refers to a substantive
conception of the good. Such a substantive conception incorporates par-
ticular values. Although it is certainly true that doing physical damage
to a person is bad, this assessment constitutes a substantive value judg-
ment. In its first occurrence, however, the word refers to a purely formal
notion.²⁴ Regarding something as good* is to take it as worth pursuing
or desirable, as something that provides structures to the action by fixing
its end. In particular, this notion of the good informs our processes of
practical reasoning. But regarding something as good* need not entail its
goodness** in any substantial sense of the word.
There are many substantial conceptions of the good to choose from. Such
a good**may bewhatever is morally required, the egoistical notion of sat-
isfaction of the agent’s own needs or the famililist idea of promoting the
well-being of one’s close family or clan. From this variety, it is clear that
the claim that agents act under the guise of the good cannot be intended to
posit a necessary connection between intentional action and the good**
in any substantial sense. To think this would be to assume, absurdly, that
particular non-trivial normative judgments are part of the very concept
of intentional action. So an agent may treat harming someone else, an
action he himself deems bad**, as good*. Nor is this thought restricted to
harming others. We have little reason to assume that one could not treat
harming oneself has positive or desirable, even if this is not part of any
good system of values. Thus when someone desires eating an unhealthy
amount of food precisely because it is harmful, this attitude towards the
²⁴Compare the discussion of the formal notion of “good” in §3.3.
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action as bad** in a substantive interpretation does not preclude him from
also regarding it as good* in the formal sense. It is possible that the agent
is committed to overeating and he takes the means necessary for achiev-
ing this goal, however misguided.²⁵
If agents who are influenced by their psychic structure to intentionally
aim at doing something substantially bad do not count against the Guise
of the Good, then neither do more far-reaching instances of perverse de-
sire. We can even concede the possibility in principle of an agent with
radically inverted priorities. A particularly vivid illustration is due to
Anscombe, who alludes to the case of Satan from Milton’s epic poem
Paradise Lost.²⁶ In the poem, Satan declares:
So farewell hope, and with hope farewell fear,
Farewell remorse: all good to me is lost;
Evil, be thou my good (Milton 2005: IV, 108–110)
Disappointed with God and divine goodness and troubled with self-doubt
and despair, Satan decides that from this point on, the bad will be his
good. But when he does so, what he rejects is not the entire project of
pursuing a formally good thing, the project of pursuing ends — to do
so would be to renounce agency altogether. Instead he turns away in
disgust from the conventional divine or human conceptions of the good—
a substantial conception which includes what is morally right rather than
“evil”. His announcement says as much. Can we genuinely understand
such a decision? Perhaps we can if, with Anscombe, we speculate about
Satan’s reasons for renouncing the traditional conception of the good: he
may be doing so as a way of freeing himself from the slavery of God’s
laws or simply out of curiosity about how it is like to act unencumbered
by moral codes.²⁷ Whether we can truly be said to know the reasons
that move Milton’s Satan will depend to some extent on the availability
of such auxiliary accounts. Nonetheless, even if we are left with the bare
observation that he is taking the fact that something is on all conventional
accounts good as a reason to despise it, we have enough to go on to see
at least in principle how even he, perversely, is acting sub specie boni.
²⁵A similar response to Stocker’s objection is suggested briefly in Tenenbaum (2003).
²⁶Anscombe (2000: §39, 75). Velleman (2000a) cites the case of Satan as a counterexample
to the Guise of the Good.
²⁷Anscombe (2000: §39, 75).
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4.3 Unreflective agency
High Brow need not be troubled by Stocker’s alleged counter-examples.
However, there is a different argument, due to David Velleman, that pur-
ports to threaten the idea that we always act under the guise of the good.
Like Stocker, Velleman thinks that the Guise of the Good is too demand-
ing, but unlike him, he doesn’t think that the view is overly optimistic.
He thinks it is overly reflective.²⁸ Velleman holds that, although High
Brow may apply to some agents, some of the time, it doesn’t portray the
intentional agent in its full generality:
The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let’s
face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he
regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that
he acts intentionally onlywhen he act out of a desire for some
anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must
regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions
are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni:
under the guise of the good. (Velleman 2000a: 99)
Velleman takes issue with this assumption:
Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so nar-
row a cast of mind. Our moral psychology has characterized,
not the generic agent, but a particular species of agent, and a
particularly bland species of agent, at that. (Velleman 2000a:
99)
So what exactly is wrong with the Guise of the Good? On the high-
brow view, wanting something amounts to making an evaluative judg-
ment about it, but for Velleman it is not plausible that the capacity to
desire requires the capacity to perform evaluative judgments. On behalf
of the high-brow view, he invokes a “qualified formulation”, proposed by
Davidson, that “the natural expression” of desire is “evaluative in form”
(Davidson 2001b: 86). Thus my desire to stay dry is an attitude that is
naturally expressed by statements such as “It is desirable to stay dry” or
“I ought to stay dry”. This affords the high-brow theorist a way of say-
ing that intentional action requires evaluative judgments without being
committed to the idea that every action is accompanied by an exercise of
²⁸For a similar argument against the Guise of the Good, see Setiya (2007: 59–68).
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evaluative capacities involving concepts such as “ought” or “good”. On
Velleman’s suggestion, these concepts are a natural way to express the
attitude, but they do not necessarily form part of the judgments them-
selves. On this view, one can be motivated by a desire without mentally
grasping the corresponding evaluative proposition. But this raises a dif-
ferent problem. For Velleman the view that intentional action involves
evaluative judgment adheres to what he calls the story of rational guid-
ance, which says that “acting for a reason entails being influenced by the
force of a mentally grasped justification of one’s action” (Velleman 2000a:
104). The problem is this:
According to Davidson’s qualified formulation, however, a
proposition that’s essential to the justification of the action
— namely, the proposition that the action’s expected conse-
quences are desirable — is merely a proposition that would
naturally be used to express the agent’s desire. And the agent
can be moved by his desire without being able to express it
or grasping the proposition with which it would naturally
be expressed. He can therefore satisfy Davidson’s story of
motivation without having mentally accessed anything that
justifies his action. (Velleman 2000a: 104–5)
In other words, this suggestion allows for the possibility of agents acting
on a desire without being in the right way in contact with the proposition
which in fact carries the justificatory force. The evaluative proposition of
the form “… is good” only exists, as it were, in the background. But for
Velleman, the agent acted in the light of this evaluation only if, at the
time of acting, he grasped the proposition.
Thus with respect to the relation between intentional φ’ing and the eval-
uative judgment that φ’ing would be good, Velleman sees the High Brow
theorist impaled on the horns of a dilemma:
1. The defender ofHigh Brow can argue that φ’ing intentionally doesn’t
require mental contact with the evaluative proposition (that φ’ing
is good). The action is caused by an inclination, but it is rationalized
by the evaluative proposition. However, Velleman argues, then it is
hard to see how the action counts as an expression of the proposi-
tion that justifies it. For how can the agent be guided by the propo-
sition if he doesn’t have it before his mind? According to the objec-
tion, the justifying proposition cannot play the crucial role it does
unless the agent has access to it.
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2. On the other hand, the High Brow theorist can argue instead that
in φ’ing intentionally, you are necessarily entering in a mental rap-
port with an evaluative proposition. Because the proposition that
justifies your conduct is mentally present, we can see how the eval-
uation is also what guides your action. However, this implies that
every intentional action must be accompanied by an exercise of
advanced conceptual capacities. That is not a realistic psychologi-
cal picture. Making judgment about the goodness of things is on a
higher conceptual level than object-level judgments. If you make
such a normative judgment, you are reflective about what you do.
But surely some actions are entirely unreflective.
How can the defender of the Guise of the Good extricate himself from
this dilemma? First off, we should accept that Velleman’s criticism of the
second horn is warranted. To say that every intentional action is accom-
panied by the mental grasping of an evaluative proposition is to overstate
the role of the intellect in the typical intentional agent. The second horn
implies that in order for the agent to engage in something as unsophisti-
cated as a simple intentional action, he must deploy high-level concepts.
Velleman’s official argument is that if we identify desires with evaluative
judgments, we imply that only agents who have the conceptual where-
withal to make evaluative judgments can have desires.²⁹ The concept of
the desirable or good belongs to a higher stratum of concepts operating
on the level of reflection rather than the object level. Although small
children competently use concepts on the object level — the concept of
a fork, horse, etc. — they have yet to learn the use of the more sophis-
ticated machinery of abstract discourse. As the current suggestion links
intentional action to having the concept of what is desirable, a concept
that small children arguably don’t have, the suggestion entails, against
expectations, that small children do not genuinely have desires.
The objection that creatures to whom we usually attribute agency lack
the concept of goodness deserves to be taken seriously.³⁰ For themoment,
however, note that this objection against the second horn assumes that if
one kind of creature does not possess concept X even though he is capa-
ble of acting then X cannot be a presupposition of intentional action in a
different kind of creature, either. Rather than explicitly arguing against
this assumption, I will only note here that this assumption is not trivial
before looking for another motive for the assumption. Fortunately, such
a motive, which explains why even if we restrict our attention to mature
²⁹Velleman (2000a: 104).
³⁰I address this objection in §6.
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rational agents we could think that acting on a desire cannot entail posi-
tive evaluation, is not far to seek. On the present suggestion, the outright
identification of desiring with evaluative judgments means that acting
on a desire is a matter of explicitly deploying an evaluative concept. This
picture has us mentally token the concept of goodness or “ought” each
time we act for a reason. No doubt sometimes this may happen, but on
this high-brow suggestion every intentional action needs to conform to
this model.
The trouble is that, with the concept of goodness belonging to a higher
stratum of reflective concepts, the current suggestion seems to entail that
every intentional action is conceptually reflective. The implication is that
an intentional agent explicitly grasps a proposition or thought of the form
“… is good”. But this seems false simply as a claim about what is involved
psychologically in acting for reasons. We do not seem to pause mentally
on an evaluative step. Mere intentional action does not seem to mentally
consult explicit maxims of action. These are sophisticated employments
of our rational capacities, of the intellect, that need not be actively em-
ployed in action.
Velleman correctly suggests that accepting the second horn of the dilemma
has implausible implications. However, his criticism of the first horn is
faulty. By appealing to the story of rational guidance, he relies on a prin-
ciple:
Guidance Principle If an agent acts on the consideration p, then he must
be guided rationally by the positive evaluation of p.
Although the principle is sound, the way Velleman interprets it is prob-
lematic. As he understands it, the principle says that being rationally
guided by p requires that you are explicitly aware of the proposition that
p. If his interpretation is correct, then the only way to be guided by p
is by being in a “mental rapport” with the proposition. On this inter-
pretation, the first option — saying that doing φ intentionally without
making an explicit evaluative judgment — is instantly ruled out. How-
ever, Velleman’s interpretation of the Guidance Principle is not without
alternatives. To see this, we need to reconsider what happens when we
engage in practical reasoning.
In describing the high-brow view, Velleman refers to Davidson’s view of
intentional action. On Davidson’s view, intentional action can be treated
as if it were the conclusion of a practical argument.³¹ The description
³¹See Davidson’s description of seasoning a stew (Davidson 2001b: 85–85).
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aptly captures the high-brow view. It is useful to understand the inten-
tional explanation of an action as the exhibiting of a sample piece of prac-
tical reasoning which has as its conclusion the decision to perform the
action. In our terminology, a practical commitment can be the result of
a practical syllogism. When I open my umbrella on the street, a classical
explanation in terms of belief and desire has this shape:
Desire: I want to stay dry.
Belief : I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella.
It is easy to see, however, that these propositions do not permit us to
construct a valid practical inference because they are attributions on the
mental states rather than their expressions. From the fact that I have a
certain mental state, nothing interesting about what I should do follows.
This naturally leads to the sequence:
Premise: Staying dry is good.
Premise: I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella.
Conclusion: Thus, I shall open my umbrella.
The two premises of this argument correspond to the components of the
belief-desire explanation. The second premise is a matter of empirical,
causal fact, whereas the first premise expresses the pro-attitude or in-
tention towards the goal. The attempt to construct a valid practical ar-
gument requires the introduction of normative vocabulary — in this case,
“is good”. We can understand someone coming to undertake the commit-
ment to open his umbrella — and to acknowledge the commitment by do-
ing so — as the result of a practical inference taking these starting points.
The point now — and this is what I take to be a crucial motivation behind
the anti-high-brow argument — is that it doesn’t seem psychologically re-
alistic to assume that, whenwe open an umbrella, we necessarily perform
this argument or something like it. On the picture proposed, we pause
mentally on the evaluative step. As we have pointed out, this premise in-
corporates normative vocabulary which is at home at a higher reflective
level. The picture requires us to acknowledge mentally the goodness of
what is being pursued in action. But as far as I can tell, we do not always
make such an explicit acknowledgment, or even very often. We hesitate
to say that an explicit employment of normative concepts is a necessary
part of acting for a reason.
Note that there seems to be no analogous problem with the empirical
premise. It is not surprising that an agent who opens his umbrella is
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explicitly aware of the fact that he has to open his to umbrella unless
he is prepared to get wet. Nor does it surprise us that the action is ra-
tionally guided by the empirical proposition in the form of an explicit
premise. By contrast, we hesitate to accept that the agent is explicitly
grasping the premise of the form “… is good” unless he is opening his
umbrella with extraordinary reflectiveness. We aren’t always thorough
in this way. To echo Velleman, this model captures a specific, intellectual
but rather bland agent who keeps explicit track of his commitments, but
the model isn’t wide enough to cover the generic agent, who is sometimes
thoughtless or hasty, unreflective or rash.
But this doesn’t mean that we have to give up the Guise of the Good.
In my view, if we see things the right way, we can accept a version of
what I called the first horn of the dilemma. To see this, we first need to
re-examine the Guidance Principle. It is true that in order for an agent to
truly act on the thought that p is good, she needs to be rationally guided
by that thought. OnVelleman’s view, the onlyway to be rationally guided
by an assessment is to have a proposition with normative content present
to one’s mind. However, there are ways of satisfying the guidance con-
dition other than entertaining a proposition.
In fact, Velleman’s argument is based on a widespread assumption that
Ryle calls the intellectualist legend. This philosophical picture sees the
primary exercise of minds in specifically intellectual operations of theo-
rizing. To be rational, on this view, is to be able to recognize truths. Ryle
argues against “the general assertion that all intelligent performance re-
quires to be prefaced by the consideration of appropriate propositions”
(Ryle 1963: 30). For Ryle, it is wrong to assume that every intelligent
operation needs to be the work of the intellect, a further mental act of
theorizing about a truth that accompanies the operation. But an opera-
tion can be properly called intelligent or rational without assuming the
existence of any such further “internal process of avowing to [oneself]
certain propositions about what is to be done” (Ryle 1963: 30). It is not
true that contact to the proposition is required in order for the agent to
“execute his performance in conformance with those dictates”, as one
might think, mistakenly, that a chef needs to recite his recipe inwardly
so that he prepare his meal skillfully. But the cook’s skill doesn’t lie in
his knowledge of intellectual truths but in rules or criteria that govern
his performance but that he may nonetheless not be able to formulate.
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4.4 Achilles and the tortoise
Let us now see if we can replace the intellectualist legend castigated by
Ryle with a more adequate picture of rational guidance. This requires a
deviation from the course of the argument to make a general point on
the basic form of practical reasoning. I will continue the defense of the
Guise of the Good in the following section. In his short paper “What
the Tortoise said to Achilles”, Lewis Carroll makes an important point
about the nature of arguments by presenting a philosophical conundrum
in the spirit of Zeno’s paradoxes.³² Caroll tells a tale of the levelheaded
hero Achilles, who is challenged by the skeptical tortoise to perform a
seemingly easy task: not, as in Zeno’s original, to win a race but to prove
that a simple syllogism,modus ponens, is good. In a first step, the tortoise
asks the hero to write in his notebook the propositions:
(A) p → q
(B) p
(Z) q
Now the tortoise points out that someone who isn’t convinced that A is
true or that B is true might yet accept the sequence of propositions — the
inference — as valid. This person might express his view by saying that
he rejects both A and B but accepts the hypothetical proposition that if A
and B, then Z. Having made this observation, the tortoise further notes
that the converse case is equally conceivable. A different person might
accept A and B but reject the hypothetical proposition. The tortoise turns
out to be a skeptic of this second sort.
According to the tortoise, the fact that the conditional can be rejected
shows that he is not bound by logical necessity to accept the conclusion Z.
Insisting on his skeptical view of the conclusion, he challenges Achilles to
force him to accept the conclusion. The tortoise invites Achilles to write
down the hypothetical as an additional premise:
(C) If A and B are true, then Z must be true.
After Achilles has added (C) to his notebook, the tortoise agrees to accept
the proposition. But just when Achilles triumphantly declares that his
task is over, the tortoise demurs: he still refuses to accept the conclusion.
Achilles replies, “But if you accept A, B and C, then you must accept Z!”
³²Carroll (1895).
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The tortoise quickly points out that Achilles has just presented him with
another conditional proposition. Repeating his earlier move, he says that
he is willing to accept this proposition if Achilles agrees to add it to his
list as:
(D) If A, B and C are true, then Z must be true.
Naive as he is, Achilles hopes that now the tortoise doesn’t have a choice
but to accept Z. Unsurprisingly, the hero’s delight doesn’t last long, for
once the statement D is added to the sequence, the tortoise again refuses
to concede that he is compelled to accept Z. As in Zeno’s original, this
starts an infinite regress. As Achilles’s notebook is quickly filling up,
it becomes apparent that convincing his skeptical interlocutor requires
adding an infinitude of conditional propositions C, D, E and so forth, each
one longer than its predecessor — an impossible task.
Although the tortoise appears to be cooperative, he keeps refusing to ac-
cept inferences as valid, so Achilles never reaches the point where he can
get the tortoise to agree that the intended consequence follows from the
premises. What conclusion should we draw from this observation? We
might be tempted to begin to have doubts about the validity of reasoning
in general. Achilles’s heroic efforts fail to defend even the simplestmodus
ponens against the skeptical insistence. That the tortoise can achieve a
stalemate, if not a victory, is a paradoxical outcome.
But the tortoise’s success relies on a faulty picture of logical arguments.
If Achilles accepts the terms of the game as laid down by the tortoise, he
is bound to lose. The tortoise’s claim of being cooperative is based on
the fact that he is willing to grant the principles that Achilles appeals to
as valid. For instance, he accepts that A and B together imply Z, subse-
quently he accepts that A, B and C together imply Z, and so forth. He
does not, however, do this by conceding that the conclusion follows in
practice. Instead he only agrees to add the principle to the list of valid
propositions in the notebook. Written down as a proposition, the princi-
ple is added as an additional premise and takes the form of a conditional
— “If A and B, then Z”, “If A, B and C, then Z”, etc. The assumption here
is that adding a further proposition comes down to the same thing as
accepting an inference as valid.
These two do not really amount to the same thing, however, and the tor-
toise exploits this fact in the paradox. Although he accepts the condi-
tional proposition, he relies on the fact that moving from this conditional,
along with the antecedent conditions, to the consequent is a further step
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that can itself be challenged. It is true that this is a further contentious
step. But this means that accepting a conditional and regarding the cor-
responding inference as valid is not exactly the same thing. The faulty
intellectualist picture that makes Carroll’s tale seem paradoxical takes it
for granted that the only thing that matters in logic are propositions of
the kind the tortoise accepts. The apparent paradox indicates that we
should reject this picture.
A better picture sees a logical argument as a sequence of propositions,
premises and conclusion. When we reason, when we make an infer-
ence, we transition from acknowledged commitment to the premises to
acknowledged commitment to the conclusion. In making an inference,
we regard the transition as a valid one. For example, if we reason:
A: Argos is a dog.
B: If Argos is a dog, then Argos is a mammal.
Z: Thus Argos is a mammal.
we assume that the premises together imply the conclusion. Relying
on this implication is related but not equivalent to adding as a further
premise the conditional proposition (C) “If Argos is a dog and if Argos
is a dog, then Argos is a mammal, then Argos is a mammal”. Instead it
amounts to being committed to treating the inference as good.
The difference is between, on the one hand, explicitly holding a proposi-
tion to be true and, on the other, treating an inference as valid in practice.
For an inference to go through, both explicit truths and a valid inferen-
tial principle have to be present. It is not enough to accept the premises;
we must also accept that the premises entail the conclusion. To do this,
we necessarily rely on the kind of cooperation the tortoise stubbornly re-
fuses: the willingness to appeal to a common practice of accepting certain
inferences as good. Unless a propriety of inference implicit in practice is
acknowledged, Achilles will not succeed, no matter how many explicit
premises he adds. Every step of the way, the tortoise concedes another
conditional proposition. This adds to the explicitness of the argument,
but it never reaches a point where, per impossibile, all implicit aspects of
an underlying practice has been removed. The assumption that removing
all implicit treating-as-good is possible and even required to show that an
argument goes through is part of the faulty intellectualist picture that we
need to give up.
Any skeptical conclusion, then, that arguments never properly speaking
go through or that it is futile to justify a piece of reasoning, is unwar-
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ranted. Rather than agreeing to the tortoise’s terms, Achilles should ap-
peal to a shared rational practice of accepting certain inferential steps as
primitively good. The tortoise did not blunder in challenging the hero’s
inferences. It is perfectly permissible to ask for further confirmation or
support of an inferential relation. And it is possible appropriately to re-
spond to such a query. Achilles’s patient answers are a way of doing that.
In responding to each of the challenges, Achilles makes more and more
of his argument explicit. The problem is with the idea that codifying all
steps in the form of premises is possible or that it is even desirable. After
all, the argument consisting of A, B, C, D and Z is hardly more interesting
or illuminating than the one he started out with.
The picture suggested by Carroll’s story raises a number of points which
will be important in what follows. First, what is the function of condi-
tionals such as proposition B or C above in this picture? It should, of
course, be pointed out that the logic of conditionals is intricate. It will
not be possible to explain their role comprehensively here. However, as
an approximation it is helpful to follow Ryle in thinking of conditionals
as “inference-tickets”.³³ The idea is that accepting the conditional is akin
to having in one’s pocket a train ticket that allows you to go from one
place, where you already are, to another, where you are going. To spell
out the analogy, the conditional is a license that permits the transition
from the antecedent to consequent. Suppose you have the commitment
that p in your commitment-box (or pocket). Accepting the conditional
“p→q” then amounts to being entitled to put into your box the commit-
ment that q.
Nonetheless, as before, we need to keep in mind that there is a difference
between accepting the conditional proposition, which explicitly says that
you are allowed to make the transition, and being actually prepared in
practice to regard the transition as good. There still is a possible gap
between the two. Achilles in the story adds another conditional, which
makes explicit what was already (or should have been for an interlocutor
willing to cooperate) implicit in practice before. The conditional, then, is
a device for making explicit an implicit inference license.
Second, we noted that making an inference is to regard the transition from
premises to conclusion as valid. But of course not all the transitions we
treat as good really are good. Sometimes our mistake is just an over-
sight, sometime the defect runs deeper. Speakers do not always agree
as to which inferences are good. Spotting faulty inferences is one of the
ways in which we work out our disagreements with another speaker. If
³³See Ryle (1971) and Ryle (1963: ch. 5). See also (Sellars 2007b).
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there is disagreement, we can criticize the other by pointing out that a
given inference is incompatible with another commitment or that it is
unfounded. By doing so, the speaker can challenge the correctness of the
inference. This is what the tortoise in effect is doing. There are different
ways to respond to such a challenge, but one of the main ways is to make
the propriety of the inference explicit in the form of a claim. We often
defend an inference by formulating a conditional, and this is also what
Achilles does.
Sometimes, as with the tortoise’s nerve-racking questions, such a chal-
lenge can seem pointless. The tortoise’s suspicious attitude towards the
inference in question is unwarranted. But in other circumstances, a chal-
lenge of this type is perfectly legitimate. In these cases it is a way to effect
conceptual change. A typical response is to appeal to a conditional which
licenses the inference in question. Making the goodness of the inference
explicit exposes it to public scrutiny. The challenger can continue the
challenge by targeting the conditional. This can be done, for instance, by
supplying counter-examples. Challenges of this kind help articulate the
concepts in question better, which again is helpful in detecting interper-
sonal difference concerning the meaning of words. When we subject our
commitments to challenges of this kind, we engage in what Sellars calls
the Socratic method.³⁴
Third, it might be found unusual that no appeal has yet been made to
the notion of logical validity. The reason why this may seem unusual
is a tendency to treat as valid only inferences which are logically valid.
According to a long tradition, logical inferences are inferences that are
valid in virtue of the form of the propositions only. An example of such
an inference modus ponens: “p. p→q. Thus, q.” It is characteristic of ar-
guments of this type that we can easily tell that they are valid without
knowing anything about the specific conceptual content lying behind the
propositional constants. Thus we need not know what “p” and “q” stand
for to recognize the argument as valid.
Arguments withmodus ponens structure, then, are formally valid, but not
all valid arguments are formally valid. Take as an example the argument
(1) Philadelphia is East of Pittsburgh.
(2) Thus, Pittsburgh is West of Philadelphia.
Clearly this inference is valid andwe do not hesitate to treat it as such, but
to know that it is one needs to know specifics about the concepts “East
³⁴Sellars (1980b).
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of” and “West of”. Thus the validity is not just a feature of the form of
the proposition. In the past, many have treated formally valid inferences
as the only valid type of inference. According to these philosophers, we
should understand material inferences like (1)-(2) as essentially ellipti-
cal.³⁵ If they are right, we need to complete the argument by supplying
a further conditional premise that establishes a connection between (1)
and (2). Thus the allegedly enthymematic (1)-(2) would require supple-
mentation by
(3) If place X is East of place Y, then place Y is West of place X.
Adding this as a premise turns the earlier inference into a formally valid
argument and the conjunction of the premises and the conclusion into a
logical tautology. The tradition takes it that, unless we supply such a con-
ditional premise, inferences of the (1)-(2) type are essentially incomplete.
As a consequence, material inferences are treated as derivative compared
to formal inferences.
Brandom calls this position the formalist approach to logic, which con-
trasts with his preferred materialist approach to logic.³⁶ The materialist
view here has no connection to the doctrine of the same name which is
a version of metaphysical monism. Nor are “material” inferences related,
other than by name, to the “material” conditional.] The difference is one
of explanatory priority. The materialist starts with proprieties of infer-
ence that are implicit in practice and goes on to explain formal validity in
terms of material validity. The formalist, on the other hand, starts with
taking as primitive what speakers explicitly say and believe, in the form
of propositions, and proceeds to explain material inferences in terms of
the truth of propositions. As was said, this works by expanding material
inferences by adding explicit conditional propositions. Brandom follows
Sellars in holding the formalist approach to be a dogma which we ought
to reject.³⁷ In what follows, I will adopt the materialist approach. Com-
paring the conceptions is outside the scope of this chapter. Three points
should be mentioned that favor the materialist view:
1. The story of Achilles and the tortoise shows that no matter how
many premises we add to an argument, we still need to rely on
an underlying implicit practice of regarding certain inferences as
proper. Crucially, this is true also for formally valid inferences: we
³⁵The expression “materially valid inference” is due to Sellars (see Sellars 2007b: 3ff).
³⁶Brandom (1994: 97–107).
³⁷Cf. Sellars (2007b).
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need to admit certain inferences as primitively good in a shared
practice. But if we admit primitive goodness on this level, it seems
natural to extend this to inferences that have material validity, but
not formal validity. Why deny that we regard the goodness of in-
ferences of the form (1)-(2) as primitive goodness when we accept
primitive goodness for formal inferences?
2. An important motivation for materialism that cannot be fully ex-
plored here is that formalism cannot support an inferentialist con-
ception of conceptual content. The conceptual content of an inten-
tional state is what the agent is committed towhen he is in the state.
This, in turn, is determined by, on the one hand, what would be a
reason for having that commitment and, on the other, what having
that commitment would be a reason for. The conceptual content of
a state then is a function of the valid inferences that permit under-
taking the commitment and the valid inferences that undertaking
the commitment would permit. Now if the inferences in question
were restricted to formally valid inferences, the conceptual content
would be too narrow to support inferentialism. If we allow mate-
rially valid inferences to add to the conceptual content, however,
the inferential relations become much richer. The notion of a non-
enthymematic material inferences is essential if we do not want to
preclude an inferentialist semantics.
3. Finally, we simply do, in everyday reasoning, treat material infer-
ences as good without supposing that there are hidden premises
lurking in the background. Thus it seems natural to go from (1) to
(2) without a detour to (3).
This last point leads to a natural extension of the idea. The Pittsburgh-
Philadelphia argument does not follow the model of the classical syllo-
gism, in which the conclusion is inferred from exactly two premises. But
at least since the advent of modern logic it has been clear that arguments
are more varied than the ancient format of the syllogism allows. To name
just one example, “¬(p and q). Thus ¬p or ¬q” is clearly a valid argument,
yet it has only one premise. The fact that not all inferences are of the
two-premise format was noticed already by Hume:
As we can thus form a proposition, which contains only one
idea, so we may exert our reason without employing more
than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to
serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause imme-
diately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true
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species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others, and more
convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect
the two extremes. (Hume 1978: 1.3.8, 97 n. 1)
Hume’s topic in this passage is the inference from cause to effect, which
to him is the only means of achieving knowledge of the empirical world.
According to Hume, an inference is just a type of habitual association of
mental episodes: a habit of the mind to move from one set of perceptions
to another. When the mind is presented with the cause, it immediately
transitions, by an easy and natural movement, to the effect. We do not
need the idea of a connection which mediates between the cause and
the effect; we do not need knowledge of a law. This is reflected by the
structure of causal reasoning. Hume points out that an inference which
lacks an intermediate step— a statement of the law— is still a genuine sort
of reasoning. The role assigned by a formalist approach to a conditional
law statement is played in Hume’s view by the habit produced by the
constant conjunction of past instances in themind. We can recognize this
idea as a version of the view, which is the present topic, that in single-
premise inferences, the connection between premise and conclusion is
implicit in practice, rather than explicit in propositional form.³⁸
Hume uses the word “inference” chiefly in the context of casual reason-
ing: reasoning about the effect of a cause. In our usage, the word has
much broader application, which includes but is not restricted to the
context of empirical or causal thought. Thus we can apply the idea of
a single-premise inference to simple non-causal theoretical reasoning:
(4) Argos is a dog.
(5) Thus, Argos is a mammal.
We can accept that there is a materially valid transition moving from (4)
to (5) which doesn’t pass through a conditional such as “If x is a dog,
then x is a mammal”. The inference is not logically valid, but it is treated
as materially valid by competent users of the concepts dog and mammal.
The fact that all dogs are mammals doesn’t figure in the premises of the
argument. In other words, it remains implicit in the practice in which the
speaker and his audience participate.
³⁸It must be mentioned that in another regard, Hume does not have the right view of
inferences. Thus he credits the imagination, an essentially arational faculty, with the habit
of moving from cause to effect, and he argues that these inferences cannot in any way be
proved valid in a rational way. Thus to him causal reasoning has very little to do with
rationality. In my view, there is nothing wrong with saying that making inferences of this
type are the doings of our reason.
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It may be objected that despite what we said the short argument is still
incomplete. But in the light of the preceding observations, we can see
that this is either misleading or wrong. The inference is incomplete in
the sense that the argument is seen to be correct only in combination
with a further rule, viz. a rule according to which inter alia the transition
from (4) to (5) is permissible. Still the objection is misleading, for all ar-
guments are incomplete in this way. As the tortoise’s insistence shows,
we always need a rule of inference to supplement the premises; the va-
lidity of an argument never is purely a matter of the premises. Thus it
is wrong that the single-premise argument is lacking in a way that reg-
ular syllogism-style arguments are not. The argument does not require
the addition of a further conditional to be made valid, and adding the
conditional does not make the inference fool-proof or independent of the
underlying inferential practice.
Finally, it is important to note that just as in the theoretical domain, we
can find valid single-premise arguments in the practical sphere. Here are
two examples:
It is 5 p.m..
Thus, I shall have the 5 o’clock tea now.
and
I shall clean up the kitchen Thus, I shall bring out the trash
It is natural to accept the transition as materially good without bringing
in an explicit conditional premise, even if the inference doesn’t possess
logical validity. The rule that allows this transition remains implicit in
the inferential practice. We can be entitled to moves of this kind without
having in mind an explicitly conditional proposition.
4.5 The Guise of the Good defended
Returning to the objection raised by Velleman against the Guise of the
Good, these reflections on the nature of reasoning help us guard against
the intellectualist legend. Velleman’s criticism of the Guise of the Good
was that an intentional action must be guided by an evaluation if we are
to see it as rationalized by it and that this in turn requires grasping a
proposition involving “good” or “ought”. But the argument assumes that
4.5. THE GUISE OF THE GOOD DEFENDED 193
if an intentional action is guided by an evaluative proposition, the agent’s
reasoning must contain that proposition as an explicit premise. We can
now see how the Guidance Principle can be satisfied without such an
explicit “mental rapport”. The reasoning can be guided by the evaluation
even if the agent does not pause, even for a moment, to inwardly consider
an evaluative premise.
To see this, return to the piece of rainy-day reasoning introduced above:
Argument 1:
P1: I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella.
C: Thus I shall open my umbrella.
A logical formalist might object to this argument as incomplete and pro-
pose an expansion:
Argument 2:
P1: I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella.
P2: Staying dry is good.
C: Thus I shall open my umbrella.
Whatwe have seen is that even now the tortoisemight object and demand
supplementation by a further premise:
Argument 3:
P1: I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella.
P2: Staying dry is good.
P3: If I will stay dry only if I open my umbrella and it is good
to stay dry, then I should open my umbrella.
C: Thus I shall open my umbrella.
We could possibly go on, but as a result of the previous section we no
longer have the patience to humor the skeptical reptile. Despite the tor-
toise’s protestations to the contrary, the practice of making inference
does not involve the ability of making all relevant rules of inference ex-
plicit in the form of premises. In fact we have no such ability. A de-
termined skeptic can always refuse consent to making the inferences re-
quired to connect the premises to the conclusion. We always rely on the
readiness to accept certain inferences as valid. But we have also seen that
there is no need to make all our inferential steps explicit. We implicitly
accept the principle of inferences on which the moves rely as valid: they
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are part of our inferential practice. Far from being reducible to a set of
explicit premises, a shared practice of treating inferences as valid forms
the necessary condition of using explicit premises in the first place.
It follows that Argument 2 is not in fact incomplete and does not require
supplementation by a further premise P3. It is certainly possible to add
this premise. But the fact that we have this possibility does not suggest
that Argument 2 was in any way deficient. True, the propriety of the in-
ference is not immune to doubt. If someone, like the tortoise, questions
the validity of the inference, one good way to react is to supply P3 as
a further explicit premise. We can then move to the more explicit Ar-
gument 3. But in normal cases, the additional premise is little more than
additional weight serving little purpose. It is perfectly legitimate to move
from P1 and P2 to C without paying these complications any mind — and
we do so most of the time.
Next, Argument 1 stands to Argument 2 in a similar relation as Argument
2 to Argument 3. By the same line of reasoning that shows Argument 2
to be perfectly acceptable without supplementation, we can see that Ar-
gument 1 need not be seen as an enthymeme. It is natural for the agent to
move from P1 to C without adducing any intermediary steps. Again, such
an argument, though short, need not be seen as incomplete. It is even
more obvious than before that it does not follow from this that the argu-
ment is immune to challenges. Quite the opposite — short arguments are
apt to be questioned. A skeptical inquiry by another, or critical reflection
by the speaker himself, evokes the response of moving to a more articu-
late practical inference by the introduction of an intermediary premise.
Crucially, moving to Argument 2 by adding premise P2 can be seen as a
response to such a challenge.
This is not to say that there should never be explicit normative premises
such as P2 in practical arguments, nor that they are superfluous. The
point is rather the limited one that these propositions can be seen as dis-
pensable as explicit premises in the argument. The function of P2 in Ar-
gument 2 is to make explicit the propriety of the inference, in Argument
1, from P1 to C. If there is nothing in Argument 1 as explicitly stated to
play the same function, that is because the same function is played by
an ought-to-be rule governing the inference in the reasoning. The rule
of inference allows going straight from the realization that only open-
ing the umbrella will keep me dry to the decision to open the umbrella.
Adding the evaluative thought that staying dry would be good is a way
to make explicit what we implicitly rely on when we treat short practical
inferences like Argument 1 as valid.
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With regard to Argument 2, when the agent draws the conclusion from
P1 and P2 to C, he implicitly takes that inference to be good. As we have
seen, it is possible to articulate the inference further by codifying it in the
form of P3. What is made explicit by formulating this premise, however,
is already implicitly present as a rule of inference in Argument 2. P3
has the function of codifying an inferential practice. The important point
now is that adding the evaluative premise P2 serves a similar purpose.
This has a consequence for the status of the assessment. It is true that
the positive assessment of staying dry is not present in the form of an
explicit premise in the shorter argument. However, the assessment is
still clearly relevant to the way the decision comes about. Though not
operative as an explicit thought, it is what provides rational guidance to
the agent in drawing the practical conclusion by being the inferential rule
that governs the argument. By going through the short Argument 1, the
agent implicitly commits himself to the goodness of the inference. The
agent’s regarding staying dry as good plays a vital part in his drawing
the conclusion to open his umbrella. The evaluation is present, not in
the form of a proposition explicitly grasped, but as an implicit inferential
pattern.
Velleman’s criticism of the Guise of the Good relies on the thought that
the only way to be rationally guided by a judgment is through direct
mental contact with the relevant evaluative proposition. Leaving the in-
tellectual legend behind allows us to see that in some practical inferences,
the argument leading to the decision is guided rationally by an evaluative
attitude even though the agent’s action is not preceded by an intellectual
act of grasping the evaluative aspect. When our agent opens his umbrella
after going through a short practical argument, we can say that he values
staying dry and that he acts because of this evaluation. Rational guidance
need not be intellectual: the rule of inference that governs the practical
commitment is itself rational insofar as it is subject to criticism, including
self-criticism by the agent himself.
Although we sometimes make our reasoning explicit, we are not always
so thorough or careful. In Velleman’s view a high-brow conception of
agency necessarily portrays the agent as conceptually meticulous — and
thus as bland. The above discussion explains how action guided by an
assessment can be sometimes careful, sometimes unreflective. When we
are acting as a matter of routine, our evaluative attitudes stay in the back-
ground and guide our conduct in the form of inferential principles. This
need not signal a deficiency. Explicitly paying attention to our norma-
tive principles in a Socratic manner is occasionally a worthwhile goal
but must surely remain something of a philosopher’s dream as a gen-
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eral maxim. What is more, some situations in life call for quick reactions
rather than deep reflection. In thosemoments where we do strive for con-
ceptual clarity, however, we have the option of turning implicit inferen-
tial patterns, governed by an ought-to-be rule, into explicit premises that
we can use in a practical argument. In doing so we bring our practical
commitments out into the light. Acknowledging a practical commitment
opens it up to public examination and criticism, but it can also lead to our
endorsing the principle in a more clear-headed way, a process that may
give us greater confidence. Specifically it allows us to see the commit-
ment in relation to whatever else we are committed to bringing about. A
degree of conceptual clarity is a prerequisite of harmonizing the various
goals and values that we care about and that contribute to our sense of
self as a unified person.
If this account is true, Velleman’s argument against the Guise of the Good
has no bite. Out of the two options presented as a purported dilemma,
we can accept the first. If we act on the evaluation that p is good, this
need not imply that the thought that p is good is an explicit premise in
an argument, because the evaluation can be present, in the background,
as an ought-to-be inference rule. When an agent acts intentionally, he
does so sub specie boni because the action is the expression of a practical
commitment amounting to a value judgment, but he need not make this
judgment explicitly. Finally, we have seen how the Guidance Principle
can be maintained even without supposing that the agent grasps explicit
propositions. We can conclude that no real dilemma exists.
4.6 Agency without rationality?
Although the arguments we considered so far take issue with the High
Brow thesis that all our actions involve an evaluative stance, as we have
interpreted them they grant the assumption that intentional agency is
exemplified only by mature rational beings. However, this claim, about
the demarcation of agency, is also controversial. To conclude this chapter,
we will explore the sense in which agency, as a competence, requires
capacities that are available only to concept-users.
Roughly, High Brow holds that doing φ intentionally requires being prac-
tically committed to φ’ing, which is a way of regarding φ’ing as good. It
follows that having the ability to deploy normative concepts is a prereq-
uisite for intentional agency. Even more, the point affects other terms as
well. Call “agency-concepts” the handful of concepts only apt to describe
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intentional agents. Intentional agents do things intentionally, for a rea-
son, they are sometimes wrong, sometimes right instrumentally, i.e. about
how to do what they have reason to do, they choose what to do and re-
alize their intentions. Strictly speaking, according to High Brow, agency-
concepts only apply to creatures whose conceptual repertoire contains
normative concepts. Creatures without the concept of the good fall out-
side the proper range of application of agency-concepts.
However, it strikes many as natural to use some or all of these concepts
in descriptions of the behavior of creatures that are not plausibly credited
with anything so much as sophisticated normative concepts. In particu-
lar, the idea is that agency is not the reserve of mature human language-
users but also with the reach of higher non-human mammals or pre-
linguistic human infants. This observation can be turned into an argu-
ment against High Brow. We have no qualms to describe, say, 13-month
old children as doing something for a reason. But if the proposed theory
of agency is correct, such an attribution constitutes an improper employ-
ment of the use “reason”. However, such a classification may seem coun-
terintuitive. Here is Velleman taking issue with the High Brow theorist
or, in his nomenclature, the cognitivist:
If the cognitivist means to characterize desire as an attitude
toward an evaluative proposition, then he implies that the
capacity to desire requires the possession of evaluative con-
cepts. Yet a young child can want things long before it has
acquired the concept of their being worth wanting, or de-
sirable. Surely, the concept of desirability — of something’s
being a correct or fitting object of desire — is a concept that
children need to be taught. And how would one teach this
concept to a child if not by disciplining its antecedently ex-
isting desires? (Velleman 2000a: 104)
In particular, possession of normative concepts such as desirability or
goodness is often regarded as a dubious prerequisite for agency. The rea-
son is that we cannot ascribe the evaluation that φ is good to a creature
unless it can also say of φ that it is good. Non-rational creatures lack
the ability to deploy normative concepts in the emphatic sense in which
language training is indispensable for concept-use. But then no creature
could regard something as good and, as a consequence, act intentionally
without having first learned a number of concepts. According to the ob-
jection, High Brow is committed to denying the dimension captured by
agency-concepts to infants or higher animals, which are, after all, crea-
tures with minds.
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It is worth emphasizing that with respect to human children, the bar is
not as high as it may seem. It may be thought that the Guise of the Good
mandates, as qualification for eligibility in the class of agents, mastery of
decidedly high-brow expressions such as “you ought to”, “worthwhile” or
“desirable”, to say nothing of “goodness”. Pre-school children do not typi-
cally express their approval by calling things “desirable” or “worthwhile”.
But we should not conclude that they steer clear of evaluative language.
In particular, they often use richly descriptive terms such as “fun”, “un-
fair” or “mean” to assess actions or people as good or bad. These thick
normative concepts, which imply normative judgments, are in heavy use
long before dry, academic-sounding normative vocabulary catches on.³⁹
Clearly, the ability to deploy normative concepts must not be exercised by
using purely normative vocabulary but can take the form of using thick
concepts as well. Interpreting High Brow accordingly will perhaps re-
duce the urgency of Velleman’s argument that young children lack the
concept of desirability.
Still many philosophers maintain that creatures entirely devoid of ratio-
nality are nonetheless capable of instantiating agency, citing common us-
age. There is a temptation to react to arguments of this type by conceding
some of the ground to Low Brow. The proposal would be to accommo-
date the semantic intuition favoring non-rational agency by relaxing the
criteria for ascribing normative concepts. Such a proponent would be
convinced by the arguments of the preceding chapters that intentional
action necessarily involve regarding φ or its outcome as good in some
way. On this view, what introduced the trouble is the thesis that ties re-
garding φ as good to having acquired linguistic abilities. Sure, one can
hardly be practically committed to a project without in principle being
able to express practical commitments verbally. As states governed by
language-like rules, practical commitments are part of a package one ac-
quires when one learns a language. But although the proponent wants
to remain faithful to High Brow, he is unhappy with the implication that
pre-linguistic creatures are not agents. So although he accepts that act-
ing for a reason is conceptually structured, and indeed requires normative
concepts, he proposes to allow for different kinds of concept-use. On this
proposal, although the highly developed concepts used by mature human
agents are tied to their linguistic abilities, there are lower-grade concepts
as well that are not necessarily derived from the abilities of language-
users. From this perspective, mere animals or infants can be seen as pos-
sessing concepts, albeit unsophisticated ones.
³⁹Bernard Williams describes as “thick concepts” concepts that combine an evaluative
judgment with a significant descriptive content. Cf. Williams (1993: 155–6).
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Though I think we should resist this temptation, the proposal does recog-
nize the fact that pre-rational animals or infants resemble human beings
in that they have minds. To see the proposal in comparison to the view
we have been defending, notice that there are two aspects of minded-
ness that a philosophical theory may focus on. Sapience is the aspect of
mind accessible only to creatures who partake in language and discursive
thought. Many creatures who are not sapient are nonetheless undeni-
ably sentient creatures that experience pain or pleasure, rely on sensory
impressions and physical inclinations and react through purposeful con-
duct. The strategy pursued by the conciliatory proposal is to put sentience
first in an account of what is distinctive of beings with minds. Sentient
beings are perceptually aware of their surroundings and capable of pur-
posefully effecting changes in their environments. On this strategy, we
can ascribe to mere animals or infants a species of concepts whose place
is exclusively in this domain. While the ability to use sophisticated con-
cepts only comes with the acquisition of language, sentient beings deploy
rudimentary concepts. Taking this path would permit subsuming mere
animals under agency-concepts, albeit in a less sophisticated way.
This first strategy focuses on the ways in which pre-rational animals re-
semble rational animals. But we can also choose to emphasize the discon-
tinuity between the rational and non-rational parts of the animal king-
dom. On this second explanatory strategy, to attribute to something a
conceptual structure is to speak of a phenomenon with a high degree of
complexity. The level of complexity involved in concept-use is unattain-
able except by creatures well-versed in linguistic abilities. The strategy
gives pride of place to sapience, rather than sentience, in our account of
the mental. It follows that conceptual capacities are dependent on ra-
tionality and exclusive to users of language in a strong sense.⁴⁰ What is
more, as aiming at the good requires making use of concepts, intentional
agency is, as far as we know, the preserve of mature human beings.
To make sense of this duality of strategies, we should note that each ap-
proach has its place. While some philosophical difficulties call for an
explanation in terms emphasizing sentience, others are better treated
while paying attention to the discontinuities between discursive and non-
discursive animals. The answer which strategy is to be preferred, then,
depends on the philosophical purposeswe are hoping to accomplish. That
said, the purposes of understanding human agency dictate choosing the
⁴⁰Although it is common to speak of the language of bees or whales, their type of com-
munication is (as far as we know) not linguistic properly speaking. To count as a language,
a practice must at least be learned and taught, have a certain grammatical structure and
include ways of making temporal, modal and normative distinctions.
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sapience-first approach. In other words, High Brow should not concede
too much ground by relaxing the criteria for attributing concepts to sub-
rational creatures. The reasons are threefold.
First, our topic, in the philosophy of action, is not the behavior of liv-
ing organisms in general but specifically acting for reasons. If we are to
understand the concept of a reason, we must take into account its inex-
orable connections to the concept of practical reasoning. On our view,
practical reasoning itself is a matter of making inferences from premises
to conclusions. But the ability to make inferences rests firmly on linguis-
tic abilities. A speaker does not count as inferring q from p unless he is
in principle able to couch in a public language the argument “p, thus q.”
Moreover, although our nature, like that of our relatives in the animal
kingdom, contains inclinations, the way we agents with a rational back-
ground act on these aspects of our nature is fundamentally different from
the way animal behavior is prompted by inclinations. In a mature ratio-
nal agent, an inclinations comes into view as a reason only insofar as the
agent endorses it and endows it with normative force. This requires the
ability to step back from one’s predispositions in a way that depends on
the ability to ask oneself whether or not it would be good to realize the
inclination. In particular, in order to act on an inclination as a reason one
needs the ability to frame propositions involving normative concepts. We
have seen that the agent need not in each case mentally entertain such
propositions. Yet even if the agent does not exercise the ability to reflect
on his inclination, to count as seeing the consideration that prompts the
inclination as a reason he must be presupposed to possess the relevant
linguistic competences.
Finally, our purpose is to understand what it is for rational beings like us
to act intentionally. If we choose an explanation of action in sentience-
derived terms, we cannot take into account all the features that come
into view only for a rational agent. Rationality is a package that involves
many abilities besides the ability to act for reasons. A rational subject
is also a moral subject. Rationality involves a sensitivity to reasons for
belief aswell as to reasons for action. Ultimately, the practical reasons of a
rational being cannot be made sense of without taking into account these
further aspects of rationality, aspects which we do not find in subrational
forms of life. These dramatic differences are obscured if we try to put our
theory into the Procrustean bed of a theory of agency that preserves the
continuity with mere animals.
These are compelling reasons to bite the bullet and to live with the fact
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that a strictly High Brow conception entails that mere animals and infants
fall outside the extension of intentional agency. Some may still find this
classification mysterious. Two considerations may help dispel this air.
First, we should bear in mind that denying concept use and intentional
agency to non-rational beings is at least partly a terminological decision.⁴¹
It is matter of a choice to use “concept” to mean an inferentially articu-
lated capacity with extensive connections to rationality and to language.
As I have argued, this decision is well-founded. Yet this doesn’t entail that
we should ban the use of the word in another sense which is more in line
with the continuity strategy delineated above. There is of course noth-
ing wrong with a use of the word “concept” that classifies non-rational
animals or infants as rudimentary concept-users. The point now is sim-
ply that a use of the word with this more generous meaning would not
be helpful to gain understanding of what it is to act intentionally. That
here a more exclusive sense of “deploying a concept” is preferred does
not mean that philosophers who have included animals among bearers
of conceptual capacities have been wrong — they may also be engaging
in a different discussion.
Second, although our topic is what is special about the conduct of ratio-
nal beings, we can choose to treat rational agency as a species of a genus
that includes as another species, say, the agency of sentient non-rational
mammals. Grappling with this problem, John McDowell, in hisMind and
World, takes the line of defending the idea that, although we share a sen-
tient nature with mere animals, only creatures endowed with conceptual
capacities, the inhabitants of the logical space of reasons, are capable of
responsiveness to reasons.⁴² In more recent writings, McDowell might
seem to have changed his mind about crediting mere animals with the
ability to respond to reasons.⁴³ The change, however, is only termino-
logical. It allows us hew closer to common usage by countenancing, for
example, that when a mere animal flees from a predator, we say that its
reason is the danger it is in. We can see the action as a response to “some-
thing that is in an obvious sense a reason for it” and we can “represent the
behavior as intelligible in the light of a reason for it” (McDowell 2009a:
128).
Despite the appearances, McDowell is not changing the substance of his
position. He insists that, although animals can respond to reason, they
cannot respond to reasons as reasons. This requires the ability, which an-
imals lack, of stepping back from one’s inclinations to ask whether the
⁴¹Cf. Sellars (1980a: 12).
⁴²See McDowell (1996), in particular lecture VI.
⁴³Cf. McDowell (2009a: 128ff).
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consideration that inclines one to do something really is a good reason
for doing so. McDowell’s distinction allows us to see animal behavior
and the intentional action of rational beings as two specific forms that
responsiveness to reasons can take. In this way, we can acknowledge the
superficial similarity between agency in the full sense of the term and
what we might call animal agency while at the same time insisting that,
when applied to rational beings, intentional action has presuppositions
that are inevitably out of reach for non-discursive creatures. In this way,
we can accept that animal agency does not involve sophisticated con-
ceptual capacities, while insisting that in our case, the case that we are
interested in, regarding an object or state of affairs as good, with all the
presuppositions this implies, is part of the idea of acting for a reason.
If there is still a residual mystery about how the action of rational beings
differs from mere animals in such a way that only the former, but not
the latter, are inhabitants of the logical space of reasons, this is unsur-
prising, as it is a hard problem. However, one step towards dispelling
the mystery would be an account of what a mere animal needs to learn
in order to become attuned to that logical space. As we have seen, to
give such an account is partly to explain the acquisition of linguistic abil-
ities, i.e. how the subject’s behavior comes to be patterned by the various
ought-to-be rules that structure language.⁴⁴ As a final note, an account
of this type may also be what Velleman is overlooking in his complaint
about young children in the passage cited at the beginning of this sec-
tion. There, Velleman suggests that, on a High Brow view, a child could
not possibly acquire the conceptual capacities required to have desires
conceived as evaluative judgments because, at the beginning of the pro-
cess, it would lack any desires the teacher could leverage in his training
program. But clearly the young child already has inclinations and is al-
ready responding to reasons, although it doesn’t yet count as being prac-
tically committed or as being responsive to reasons as such. If the child
comes to conform to the various ought-to-be’s constitutive of its language
and eventually learns to playing the game self-critically, that is precisely
what must happen in order for his responsiveness to reason to transform,
eventually, into a full-blown responsiveness to reasons as such.
⁴⁴See §1. The more specific question of how a mere behaver becomes an agent, i.e. a
bearer of practical commitments, is addressed below (§5.1).
Chapter 5
Internalism
5.1 Judgment internalism
The previous three chapters have been concerned with the motivation,
development and defense of the High Brow conception of agency. Along
the way, we have introduced the notion of a practical commitment and a
few other concepts and ideas that help explain intentional action. In the
remaining chapters, we will apply these tools to a number of philosophi-
cal problems that have been discussed extensively in the literature of the
philosophy of action of the past decades. The hope is that the tools de-
veloped in our defense of High Brow will help us make progress on these
fronts.
This chapter begins this task by tackling two entirely different views that
have both been called “internalism”: judgment internalism, on the one
hand, and, on the other, existence internalism (i.e. Bernard Williams’s in-
ternal reasons conception).¹ The internalist idea is that there is a neces-
sary connection between reasons and motivation, but this idea has been
developed quite differently by various writers. On the one hand, exis-
tence internalists hold that one cannot have a moral reason without be-
ing in a state of motivation that is related to the reason in a certain way.²
Having a reason, on this Humean view, implies a desire-like state. This
¹The word “internalism” is frequently used in other disciplines such as epistemology
and the philosophy of language. Neither knowledge internalism nor semantic internalism
have a significant relation to the class of views now considered, which belong to the field
of “moral psychology” or action theory.
²See Darwall (1997).
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first view functions as a constraint on reasons: it restricts the range of
reasons we can assign to an agent. Existence externalists deny that such
a condition exists: whether or not an agent has a reason does not, or at
least not always, depend on his motivational state. On the other hand,
as we have seen earlier, judgment internalism is the view that an agent’s
judgments about reasons are related to his or her motivation. This is not
a view about what reasons an agent has but about how he typically reacts
to judgments concerning those reasons. On this second view, one cannot
candidly assert, or believe, that one ought to perform an action without
being in fact motivated to do so.³
I begin this chapter by showing how High Brow can accommodate judg-
ment internalism. We have already seen that judgment internalism amounts
to an intuitive truth.⁴ We have not yet seen, however, how High Brow
canmake sense of this intuition. So the first task is to provide an explana-
tion of the internal connection between normative judgment and motiva-
tion (§1). Turning to existence internalism, I explain Bernard Williams’s
view that there are only internal reasons and briefly review his argument
against externalism (§2). As other writers have noticed, this argument
is defective since it presupposes much of what it is intended to show.
But Williams’s discussion also identifies two important features of rea-
son statements. I explain how the High Brow conceptions developed in
the previous chapters can accommodate these two features (§3).
An important desideratum for a theory of reasons is that it must be able to
make sense of the intuitive truth that normative judgments are internally
related to motivation.⁵ Recall the intuitive truth we noted earlier:
Weak Judgment Internalism If X judges that he has a conclusive reason
to φ (or that he ought to φ), then, ceteris paribus, he is motivated to
do φ.⁶
High Brow needs to explain Weak Judgment Internalism. Moreover, as
we have seen, it is not just per accidens that ought-judgments motivate.
³These two views are independent at least insofar as they do not strictly entail each
other. Judgment internalism does not imply existence internalism as it is possible to hold
that S cannot believe that she has a reason to φ without being motivated to do so while at
the same time holding that a person may have a reason that is “external” in the sense of not
being related to any preexisting motivation the agent may have. The converse implication
does not hold, either. To say that reasons are, in some way or other, a function of the
existing motivation does not entail that an agent who believes he ought to φ is necessarily
so motivated.
⁴See §1.5.
⁵See §1.6.
⁶See §1.5.
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According to internalism, the relation between the thought that one ought
and the corresponding performance is a necessary connection. On the
other hand, this does not mean that these thoughts move us with perfect
reliability. As the “ceteris paribus” clause indicates, there are exceptions
to this rule. The necessity of weak internalism, then, is not of the ordinary
type. Although it is necessary that the agent acts on his ought judgments
for the most part, a variety of conditions may nonetheless, in any given
case, prevent the agent from realizing his thought about what he ought
to do.⁷
On the theory proposed, the agent’s judgment that he ought to φ is best
seen as the undertaking of a practical commitment to φ. We may say that
undertaking the commitment regularly causes the action. This is right as
far as it goes. However, if we appeal to psychological regularity, inter-
nalism poses a twofold puzzle for the High Brow account:
1. How can the connection be necessary? Perhaps we can understand
that reasons are related to motivation by reference to the fact that,
through behavioral regularities, agents most of the time, though
not always, react to their normative judgments with motivation-
ally efficacious decisions. But how could an appeal to disposition
vindicate the idea that the relation between reason-judgment and
motivation is necessary or essential? It seems that behavioral reg-
ularities are just empirical generalizations incapable of supporting
claims of necessity.
2. Does High Brow collapse into a dispositional theory? Above it was ar-
gued extensively that a dispositional account of desires fails. Now,
however, it seems as if, in order to account for judgment internal-
ism, the notion of a disposition or regularity has returned through
the window. Doesn’t the strategy pursued here collapse into a
purely dispositional account? We may worry that the idea that
intentional action requires practical commitments in a strong nor-
mative sense precludes us from helping ourselves to the idea of be-
havioral regularities in explaining the relation between normative
judgment and motivation.
To solve the puzzle, let us start with the question of how the mental pro-
cess behind normative motivation works. The answer will be roughly
Sellarsian.⁸ The process begins when the agent makes a normative judg-
⁷For a basic account of akratic behavior, see §4.2.
⁸Sellars expounds his view on the logic of intentions in a number of articles. See Sellars
(1966), Sellars (1963b), Sellars (1980c), Sellars (1968: ch. 7) and, in particular, Sellars (1973).
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ment, for instance the judgment that he ought to call a cab. As we have
been insisting, the key to understanding practical thought is to under-
stand the intentional state of practical commitment or intention. Thus
we should also understand making an ought-judgment in terms of form-
ing an intention. On this view, a normative judgment is a general kind of
intention.⁹ Naturally, not all ought-judgments are immediately realized.
Even if I judge that I ought to call a cab, there may be other, more impor-
tant things that claim my attention. What is more, I may not believe that
I could in fact call a taxi if I tried, perhaps because it is physically impos-
sible to do so at the moment. But let us suppose that the ought-judgment
is both a conclusive and a practical, actionable judgment. The next ob-
stacle is that I need to have an opinion about how to go about calling a
cab. In other words, I need to engage in practical reasoning to determine
a possible means. If successful, a practical argument yields the intention
to, say, raise my arm.
On our Sellarsian view, the intention to raise my arm produces its practi-
cal effect, the bodily behavior, by turning into a volition, which is simply
a type of intention with immediate relevance to action. Specifically, a
volition is an intention to do something here and now. We can express
intentions as thoughts involving the word or operator “shall”. If the agent
has the intention
I shall raise my hand in 30 seconds.
soon the thought will gradually “mature”:
I shall raise my hand in 10 seconds.
…
I shall raise my hand in 1 second.
I shall raise my hand here and now.
⁹Thus Sellars proposes that ought “is a special case of shallw” (Sellars 1963b: 204). In
other words, we should understand ought-judgments as the expressions of intentions, al-
beit in a special way. What is the difference between an “ought” judgment and a regular
expression of intention? The main difference, according to Sellars, is that when we use a
sentence containing the moral “ought”, we are expressing a community-intention or we-
intention. In the quote “shallw” refers to a variant of “shall” used to express a community
intention. Sellars distinguishes between intentions in the first person singular and in the
first person plural. The latter are intentions formed as the member of a group. On Sellars’s
Kantian account, the group extends — at least in the moral case — to the community of all
rational beings. Sellars’s most worked-out version of his ethical view is Sellars (1968: ch. 7).
For a slightly different explication of the moral ought, see Sellars (1980c: §100, 92). Note
that in the text, we are not necessarily talking about the moral “ought” but rather about
the general “ought” of rationality. Nonetheless, it is plausible that even this “ought” can be
understood in terms of intentions (perhaps in terms of we-intentions).
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The result, the volition, is the final piece in the chain of mental occur-
rences leading to the action. Agents have a reliable disposition to react
to a volition to φ by performing the bodily behavior referred to by φ. If
all goes well, then, my normative judgment to call a cab leads me to form
a volition which causes my raising my arm.
It should be clear that, even in such a simple case, the mental process
leading to intentional action is complicated. Consequently, the logic of
intention is also complex. Though we cannot explain the logic of “shall”
comprehensively here, note that the word “intends” can take as its com-
plement either a that-clause or an action-verb and that, conversely, the
shall operator can operate on both propositions and action-verbs. The
latter form is the one more directly connected with action, i.e. when the
verb is a bodily action that can be performed directly, such as “I shall raise
my arm” or “I shall walk one step to the right”. Intentions of the propo-
sitional variety do not necessary involve any reference to the speaker,
as in the intention expressed by the sentences “It shall be the case that
income disparity is reduced.” However, if these attitudes are intentions
rather than mere wishes, they are linked to action-intentions. As they
have consequences for the agent himself, we can understand them as “I
shall bring it about that income disparity is reduced”, which in turn, de-
pending on further circumstances, may imply a more specific intention
such as “I shall vote for Mr. X” and, ultimately, “I shall move my hand
such as to write an X on the ballot.” Moreover, intentions entail other in-
tentions. As seen above, they do so when they stand to one another in
means-end relationships. For example, depending on the circumstances,
“I shall open the window” may imply “I shall move my arm in such and
such a way”. More general intentions, including those expressed by nor-
mative judgments, imply more specific ones — the ones leading directly
to action. But there are also purely logical relationships. Thus, “I shall
quit my job and become a saxophonist” implies “I shall quit my job”.
These interrelated features, togetherwith quite a few others, form awhole
framework of intention. We have seen in earlier chapters that we can
illuminate mental states by understanding them on the model of sponta-
neous linguistic acts.¹⁰ Thus we can understand doxastic commitments,
or beliefs, on the basis of our sound understanding of overt thinkings-out-
loud. Similarly, we can understand practical commitments, or intentions,
on the basis of languagings involving the word “shall”, or intendings-out-
loud.¹¹ The final element in the chain, the volition, may also be done
¹⁰See §3.2.
¹¹As in the theoretical case, these pieces of linguistic behavior are acts in the sense of ac-
tualizations, rather than intentional linguistic actions that can be voluntary or involuntary.
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aloud, in which case the performance is caused by a willing-out-loud. As
a consequence, in order to count as proficient in the framework of in-
tentions, a person must know the inferential relationships between the
various types of sentences containing “shall”. Becoming an agent implies
learning successfully to navigate “shall” talk.
Returning to our description of normative motivation, we can note that
the causal process leading fromX ’s judgment “I ought to φ” to his actually
φ’ing can be broken into two majors parts: first the normative judgment
causes a volition through a number of intermediate steps; then the voli-
tion brings about the bodily performance. Our question is what accounts
for the necessary quality of internalism. Focusing on the second half of
this two-part process, what ensures that agents who will-out-loud that
they φ in fact actually do so? Note that there is a close causal relationship
between a volition and actually being moved to performing the action in
question. When an agent thinks out loud something to the extent of “I
shall φ”, we can reasonably expect his behavior to follow suit. In some
cases, of course, the agent fails to realize his volition. The agent may be
prevented externally from performing the action or he may be the victim
of sudden paralysis or forgetfulness. Thus it is not strictly speaking true
that whenever an agent intends to do something right now, he will do so.
In keeping with weak internalism, we have to allow for exceptions.
The idea is not just that agents typically realize their intentions. An
agent’s intention to raise his arm implies, other things being equal, his
raising his arm.¹² What does it mean in this context that the agent’s
thought implies his action? Clearly implication is more than mere uni-
formity of behavior. To see what the difference consists in, consider the
sequence consisting of two events. One moment, the agent says “I shall
raise my arm”, a moment later he actually raises his arm. The agent re-
sponds to a mental occurrence by performing an action that affects the
world through his bodilymovement. Howdowe explain the second event
in the sequence? The fact that he moves from the first episode, the voli-
tion, to the second, i.e. the performance of the action, is due to the fact
that making this type of transition is obligatory according to the ought-
to-be rules governing “shall” talk. To have one’s behavior shaped by the
obligatory character of the transition is to be aware, albeit in a practical,
non-propositional way, of an entailment between the thought and the
performance. That intentions entail, ceteris paribus, their realization is
part of the logic of intention and is honored by anyone who knows the
meaning of the word “shall” and its cognates.
See §4.1.
¹²Cf. Sellars (1980c).
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Of course, a speaker sees the entailments between shall-involving sen-
tences only if he has previously learned the framework of intentions. Our
question, then, is what it takes for a fledgling speaker to learn the cor-
rect use of the word “shall” and its cognates. We can best approach this
question by going through a sample learning process, though this, too,
no doubt involves a great deal of idealization. Suppose a child, Ben, is for
the first time learning the portion of its first language concerned with in-
tention and has not yet mastered the correct use of the expression “shall”.
Through imitation induced by his parents, he starts making the noises we
make when we say “I shall raise my arm”. But because Ben doesn’t yet
understand the meaning of the term, it is not in fact correct to call Ben’s
performance a saying of “I shall raise my arm”. Here it does not mat-
ter whether we characterize the utterance as reported speech, using the
word “shall”, or whether we quote it as direct speech using quotes. That
Ben says “X” implies that he is using these words with understanding,
which of course he still lacks at this point of our story. Thus saying that
someone says something relies on certain assumptions about the speaker.
Crucially, to characterize his sound as a saying presupposes linguistic
competences on his part. Sellars writes:
when we characterize a person’s utterance by using a quo-
tation, we are implying that the utterance is an instance of
certain specific ways of functioning. For example, it would
be absurd to say:
Tom said (as contrasted with uttered the noises)
‘It is not raining’ but has no propensity to avoid
saying ‘it is raining and it is not raining.’
Thus to characterize a person’s utterances by quoting sen-
tences containing logical words is to imply that the corre-
sponding sounds function properly in the verbal behavior
in question and to imply that the uniformities characteris-
tic of these ways of functioning are present in his sayings
and proximate dispositions to say. (Sellars 1973: 198)
What Sellars says about “not” is true not only about “logical words” but
words in general. The reason why it is not appropriate to credit Ben’s
utterances with meaning is similar to the reason why we do not so credit,
say, a bird capable of speech imitation. Ben hasn’t yet risen above the
level of mere parroting because the way he employs the term does not
conform to the rules associated with the term. Recall that, on the view
proposed here, to use a word with meaning is to exhibit a certain pattern
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in one’s linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. To give an example, we
may ask what the correct use of the word “red” implies. We can see this
if we consider, conversely, what would cast doubt on the assumption that
someone employing the noise or string of letters “red” is using it to mean
what wemean by that expression. Here are pieces of evidence that would
make us wary about attributing mastery of the concept:
• Standing in front of a blue surface, the speaker, whose perceptual
capacities are assumed to be in good shape, tends to utter sincerely
“This surface is red.”
• The speaker says “This surface is uniformly red” but immediately
afterwards adds “This surface is uniformly green” without indicat-
ing that he has had a change of mind.
• In many different situations in which he is prepared to say “This is
red”, the speaker is not prepared to say “This is colored.”
Any of these incidents would make us question the assumption that the
speaker’s linguistic behavior is governed by the rules that are part of the
concept of redness. Roughly, the rules that correspond to these examples
are:
• You ought not to say of a clearly visible non-red surface that it is
red.
• If you say that an object is uniformly red, then you ought not to
say of the same object, at the same time, that it is uniformly blue.
• If you say that an object is red, you ought to assent to the assertion
that the object is colored.
These rules, and many more, are constitutive of the meaning of red. If an
agent doesn’t show, at least to a certain extent, that he conforms to these
rules, we eventually stop counting his linguistic performances as sayings
of “This is red”, even if he is still using the same sounds. As rules that
govern linguistic behavior at its most basic level, these rules are ought-
to-be rules that, though they aren’t followed explicitly by the speaker, still
guide his conceptual activity. As we have seen, we can understand these
rules as governing moves in a language game.¹³ A speaker starts in a cer-
tain position, say, the position which includes saying “This is red”, and
¹³See §4.1
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transitions to another position, which includes saying or explicit com-
mitment to “This is colored”. For our purposes, it is important that the
moves prescribed (or prohibited) by the relevant ought-to-be rules can be
classified according to their relation to extralinguistic reality:
1. Language-world transitions: In moves of this type, either the home
position or the destination position is an extralinguistic state of af-
fairs in the world. Onemove of this type is a language-entry transi-
tion, which moves from a non-linguistic perceptual situation to the
taking up of a linguistic position. This happens with spontaneous
observation judgments. Conversely, there are language-exit transi-
tions that lead from a linguistic event to a (normally) non-linguistic
piece of bodily behavior. Here the agent reacts to a volition by a
piece of bodily behavior.¹⁴
2. Language-language transitions: In moves of this second type, both
home position and destination position lie within language. The
second and third rule above are examples of rules governing moves
of this type. Intralinguistic transitions are inferences from one as-
sertion or position inside the language game to another assertion
or game position.
Themeaning of words like “red” is collectively fixed by intralinguistic and
language-world ought-to-be’s. These rules are alsowhatwe expect to find
active in a speaker’s behavior when we characterize an utterance of his
as a saying that incorporates the word “red”. Like “red” talk, “shall” talk
is governed by both inferential rules and language-world rules. Because
“shall” figures prominently in the content of volitions, language-world
transitions play a major role in fixing its meaning. A meaningful utter-
ance involving “shall” enjoins a corresponding language-exit move. Thus
a speaker who says “I shall φ here and now” ought to respond by produc-
ing the performance designated by “φ”. The fact that this type of response
is required is part of the concept “shall”. Beyond language-exit transi-
tions, however, the meaning also includes the propriety of intralinguistic
moves. As we have pointed out, one can, and often must, infer “Shall[φ]”
from “Shall[φ and ψ]”. Moreover, there are various inferences that derive
from means-end reasoning. In keeping with the remarks about proposi-
tional and action-verb intentions above, the logic of intention requires us
to move from
¹⁴There are also linguistic actions or speech acts, where the result of the willing, though
extralinguistic in our sense, has to do with language in another sense.
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Shall[p]
If I φ, then p.
to
Shall[φ].
On the Sellarsian view, this intralinguistic inference is as much part of the
meaning of the word “shall” as the language-exit transitions. Together,
these rules make up the functional role of the word.
We can now see what ensures that agents do φ after they will-out-loud
to φ. To master the framework of intentions is to have one’s tokenings of
“shall” governed by, among other rules, a language-exit ought-to-be. This
creates a regularity: people who have learned the language of intention
have the disposition to go from willing to action. However, appealing to
a disposition may cause the worry that this idea throws us back into a
dispositionalist conception of intention. Yet the worry is unfounded. It
is true that in learning the use of practical vocabulary, associations are
formed in an agent’s mind. However, the regular connection between
volition and action is not a mere association. By contrast to mere associ-
ations, we can explain the transition by reference to a relation of entail-
ment between the two episodes. The relation is more than a mere reflex
of the mind, as the agent proceeds to raise his arm after willing to raise
his arm because he sees that the intention necessitates or entails acting
accordingly. The language-exit move is governed by an ought-to-be rule
that says that you ought to do as you intend to. The agent’s move from
volition to action, then, is not merely a matter of disposition, although
a disposition is obviously involved. In making the move, the agent is
guided by the relevant entailment and thus by an ought-to-be rule.
It is important to emphasize that the rules in question are rules of criti-
cism, or ought-to-be’s, rather than rules of actions, or ought-to-do’s. As
we have seen, this means that it doesn’t follow from the fact that a per-
son’s linguistic move is guided by a rule that he is explicitly envisaging
the rule or that he is aware of it in a propositional form. The rule, as an
expression, fulfills its guiding role in the background. Only the language
teacher, while he is instilling the relevant propensities in the fledgling
speaker, is explicitly following the rule-statement or, to be more exact,
the pedagogic rule of action that is derived from it.¹⁵ The speaker’s rule-
governed behavior is guided by a pattern purposefully inculcated in him
¹⁵§4.1.
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by his trainer. The speaker makes the move because of the relations of
entailment, since owing to the history of the acquisition of the terms in
question, the rule is part of the complete account of the move.
The behavioral uniformities that are acquired alongside linguistic com-
petence are not brute dispositions. Instead, the regularities are what we
may call rational dispositions because the speaker comes to exhibit the
pattern-governed behavior in question in the process of being introduced
into the social practices that are constitutive of participation in rational-
ity. For this reason, there is no danger that the position described could
collapse into a version of causal functionalism. The idea that practical
commitments are accompanied by dispositions is perfectly compatible
with the claim that what determine their content are their rational or
normative links. Another significant respect in which the dispositions
that ground concept-use are rational is that they are part of an ongoing
collective enterprise and always remain potential objects of rational crit-
icism. A move in a language game can be regarded as inappropriate or
challenged. Importantly, such criticism can target not just the linguistic
behavior of another speaker but one’s own behavior as well. Noticing
a pattern in his inferences or extra-linguistic move, the agent may step
back from this disposition to ask whether the transition is in fact appro-
priate. According to Sellars, the ability to be self-critical in this way is
the mark of a mature speaker or agent.¹⁶ In McDowell’s view, this ability
is part of what transforms us into active thinkers.¹⁷ By engaging in crit-
ical reflection about one’s own conceptual rules, an agent emancipates
himself from the kind of brute dispositions we find in trained animals.¹⁸
With this picture of “shall” talk at hand, we can return to solving the
puzzle raised by internalism. As we have seen, Ben’s transition from
mere behaver to intentional agent is effected by his acquisition of the
framework of intention. When he has learned to make the “shall” noises,
we can give the following description of his behavior:
If Benmakes the noise “I shall raise my arm now”, he is ceteris
paribus going to raise his arm.
At this point in the story, the description is a mere causal generalization.
His teachers have trained him to react to a parroting in a certain way. But
because he doesn’t honor the full range of rules yet, he does not yet count
¹⁶Sellars (2007d: 86).
¹⁷McDowell (1996: 47).
¹⁸See also Sellars’s distinction between tied and free symbols, between “tied symbol be-
havior” and free or “rule-regulated symbol activity” (Sellars 1980b: 301).
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as saying “shall” yet. The connection between the linguistic performance
and the doingmay have causal or nomological necessity, but it is logically
contingent. Fast-forward a few training sessions, Ben has now learned
the uniformities enjoined by the inferential and language-world ought-
to-be’s to an appropriate degree. We can now redescribe his linguistic
performance:
If Ben says “I shall raise my arm now”, he is ceteris paribus
going to raise his arm.
Under the new description, the statement has a new modal status. What
used to be a conceptually contingent generalization has become a concep-
tual truth.¹⁹ The reason is that by ascribing to Ben a saying of shall, rather
than a mere parroting, we implicitly presuppose that the agent has the
relevant linguistic propensities. It follows that the principle that, absent
any preventing factors, an agent’s volition to raise his arm is followed by
his actually raising his arm, is no longer logically contingent because in
ascribing the intentional state and, hence, the accompanying linguistic
competence to the agent, we presuppose that, other things being equal,
he is going to act on his volition.
Our original puzzlementwas about the relation between ought-judgments
and motivation. Above we divided this question into two parts: the link
between ought-judgments and volitions, and the link between volition
and actual motivation. So far we have been concerned with the latter
half but, fortunately, the reflections relating to the internalism of “shall”
bear directly on the internalism of “ought” as well. As we have noted,
judgments about one’s own reasons are tied inferentially to intentions.
Roughly, judging that one ought to do φ is a general form of committing
oneself practically to φ’ing, which in turn entail other commitments. As
a result, if the circumstances are right, the judgment that I ought to raise
my hand entails the intention of doing so. Again, this inferential relation
forms part of the logic of “shall” talk and “ought” talk: it is part of what we
learn when we learn to use these words. It follows that the propensity to
make the appropriate moves is something we can take for granted when
we attribute to an agent that he makes a normative judgment, i.e. uses
the word “ought”. Willing and willed performance are related by a more-
than-accidental connection. The same goes for the connection between
ought-judgment and volition. Because they are inferentially related, we
presuppose, when describing the agent’s utterance as a saying of “shall”,
that the speaker is prepared to honor these entailments.
¹⁹Cf. Sellars (1973: 204).
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If this is true, we have, at least in outline, an account of intentions that ex-
plains how the internalist principle is true, and non-accidentally so: the
systematic relationship between reason-judgment and motivation, which
can be explained in terms of the agent’s history of language acquisition,
is ultimately a matter of conceptual necessity. We can also see how this
necessity does not in anyway require that the systematic relation is strict.
Mastering the concept behind the word “shall” requires having a disposi-
tion to respond to volitions by actual motivation to produce the required
performance. However, it does not require that the link is perfect. This is
expressed by the ceteris paribus clause: it is only other things being equal
that the agent performs the action after forming the volition.²⁰ Rational
links of this type can, and do, break down, a situation which occurs in
cases of weakness of the will. In such cases, although the agent should,
according to the rules that govern his concepts, show an extralinguis-
tic response, he doesn’t actually do it. But far from being surprising or
incompatible with the view that these dispositions are a matter of the
meaning of the word “shall”, the possibility of failures is to be expected.
The dispositions are rational dispositions that impose requirements on
the agents, and they would not be requirements in this emphatic sense
if it was not possible for the agent to flout them by failing to make the
move enjoined by the ought-to-be. True, a speaker who consistently vio-
lated the constitutive conceptual norms would eventually stop counting
as using the word “shall” in the standard way. A global lack of confor-
mity with the conceptual norms is in fact hard to imagine, but this does
not touch the possibility of a local breach of the norm. A volition that
doesn’t motivate is a mark not of having forgotten the meaning of the
word “shall” but of a local instance of irrationality.
5.2 Williams on internal and external reasons
Let us now leave judgment internalism behind and turn to existence in-
ternalism. The view is formulated and defended forcefully by Bernard
Williams in a number of papers.²¹ Williams is concerned with the prac-
tice of attributing reasons. He holds that there are significant constraints
on the normative reasons we can attribute to an agent. Take a normative
reason statement:
(NR) X has a reason to do φ.
²⁰See §1.5.
²¹Williams (1981a), Williams (1995), Williams (2001).
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What does NR mean? According to Williams, there are two ways we can
read this statement. On the first interpretation, NR implies the existence
of an element in what Williams calls the agent’s motivational set S. The
agent’s motivational set comprises various conative psychological states,
notably desires.²² On the internal interpretation, NR entails that X ’s mo-
tivational set includes such a “motive” which would be promoted by the
agent’s φ’ing. Conversely, on this interpretation NR is “falsified by the
absence of an appropriate motive” (Williams 1981a: 101). By contrast, on
the external interpretation, NR does not carry the implication that there
is an element in S that is appropriately related to φ’ing. On this reading,
NR may be true even if there is no “sound deliberative route” from X ’s S
to the decision to do φ (Williams 1981b: 120).
The two interpretations are mutually exclusive, which leads to two op-
posing views. According to externalism, the second interpretation is
true. There are “external reasons” as well as “internal reasons”: a reason-
statement may be true of an agent despite the absence of an appropriate
element of S. Williams’s preferred view, internalism, denies this. If the
internal interpretation of NR is true, all external reason statements are
false. If internalism is true, all reasons for action are internal; there are
no external reasons.
If true, internalism imposes significant constraints on normative reason
statements as it renders some reason statements false. As an illustra-
tion, Williams provides an example taken from Britten’s opera “Owen
Wingrave”. Against the wishes of his father, Owen refuses to join the
army. He doesn’t seek honor, nor is he especially keen to defend his
country. In order to sway him, his father (we may imagine) tells him that
he has a reason to join the military, viz. the fact that the men in his family
have always done so. By contrast, Owen doesn’t find this argument com-
pelling at all. He could not care less about his family tradition: there is no
desire to honor the family tradition in his subjective motivational set S.
It follows that the father’s statement is an external reason claim. But ac-
cording to internalism, such statements are never true. The father doesn’t
necessarily care whether or not the son has an existing motivation — he
²²According to Williams, the subjective motivational set S can contain desires but also
“such things as dispositions of evaluations, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loy-
alties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of
the agent” (Williams 1981a: 105). Clearly, however, desires are the paradigmatic members
of the set, as can be seen from the sentence that follows: “Above all, there is of course no
supposition that the desires or projects of an agent have to be egoistic; he will, one hopes,
have non-egoistic projects of various kinds, and these equally can provide internal reasons
for action” (Williams 1981a: 105). Williams later uses the letter “D” to refer to elements of
the set.
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doesn’t take his claim to imply anything to this effect. According to the
father, no matter what the son’s present motivational state consists of, he
has a reason to enlist. If we can make sense of the statement as intended
by the father, we have a vindication of external reasons. But Williams
takes this to be impossible. We can’t make sense of the statement as an
external reasons claim.
Williams’s internalism ties normative reasons tightly to the agent’s mo-
tives in the narrow sense which does not include beliefs or doxastic com-
mitments. On this picture, there are no reasons unless they are anchored
in the agent’s motivational set and desires and other members of S must
be the source of our reasons. Though we will review Williams’s argu-
ment against externalism below, the primary focus of this chapter will
not be on a criticism of Williams’s internalism.²³ Rather we will try to
bring into focus howWilliams’s nuanced positive position diverges from
a simplistic Humean model. Williams pays particular attention to a num-
ber of cases and special features of reason-attributions that may be used
in arguments against internalism. In responding to these worries by ad-
justing his position, Williams supplies cues for a conception of normative
reasons that is quite different from the expectations his initial character-
ization of the view may create.
Let us see how Williams applies spit and polish to his view. He writes
that “any model for the internal interpretation must display a relativity of
the reason statement to the agent’s subjective motivational set” (Williams
1981a: 102). However, although internal reasons are relative to S, that
does not mean that reasons are identical to elements of S. According to
Williams, we cannot simply read off the agent’s reasons from his motives.
We can see this if we remember that, while we are usually well aware of
the contents of our motivational set, we do not necessarily know our
internal reasons with perfect accuracy. Williams concedes that thinking
that one has a reason to φ is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
of actually having a reason to φ. To begin with the latter, Williams’s
famous gin-and-tonic example is intended to illustrate the fact that an
agent may believe that he has a reason to φ while in fact having no reason
at all to do so. The agent in the examplewould like a glass of gin and tonic.
This leads him to mix tonic water with the liquid in the glass in front of
him, which he takes to be gin. As it turns out, he is mistaken; the liquid is
actually petrol. Mixing the drink, he takes himself to have a reason to do
this. But does he really have a reason? Williams denies this. The natural
²³See the discussion of some positive reasons for Humeanism in ch. 2. A number of
commentators have already correctly pointed out difficulties with Williams’s argument.
See Cohon (1986), McDowell (1998c) and Millgram (1996).
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thing to say is that the agent did not in fact have any reason to mix the
liquids or to drink the result, although he thought he did.
But Williams contemplates seriously opting for the contrary answer that
the gin lover does have a reason to combine the liquids. Here he is pulled
in two opposite directions. On the one hand, it makes sense to say that the
agent has a reason, given that he in fact mixes the awful drink. The action
requires explanation, as the agent certainly does not act for no reason at
all. The ascription of a reason helps account for the agent’s behavior.
This aspect of reasons, which Williams calls its explanatory dimension,
counts in favor of a positive answer to the question that the gin lover
has a reason to mix the liquids.²⁴ As Williams emphasizes, our practice
of assigning reasons to agents relies on the assumption that sometimes
people act for these reason. But there is also a tendency that pulls in
the opposite direction. Williams appeals to our linguistic intuition that
it is “very odd” to describe the gin-and-tonic case as one in which the
agent has a reason (Williams 1981a: 102). On the strength of the intuition
behind this verdict, Williams ends by choosing not to assign the agent a
reason. According to him, to consider this aspect of reason claims is to
consider the agent as a rational being. As Williams puts it, “the internal
reason conception is concerned with the agent’s rationality” (Williams
1981a: 103). He says it is a mistake made by opponents of his view to
think that the conception is concerned exclusively with explanation.
We can already notice two features of Williams’s account. The fact that
Williams is willing to say that the gin lover has no reason to mix the drink
shows that, in fixing the agent’s reasons, he is prepared to abstract away
from mistaken beliefs on the part of the agent. On his view, an answer to
the question what an agent has reason to do depends to some degree on
seeing the agent as he should be rather than as he in fact is. Williams’s
theory of internal reasons, then, involves idealization. Second, from the
fact thatWilliams contemplates both a positive and a negative answer, we
can see that in edge cases, the determination of an agent’s reasons may be
a matter of dispute which has no clear-cut answer. His conception makes
room for variability of reason-ascriptions.
Turning now to the second way in which there may be a gap between the
agent’s view of his reasons and the reality, thinking that one has a reason
is not necessary for having a reason, either. Williams concedes that it is
possible to have a reason without knowing it. As an example, suppose a
motorist who prefers to stay safe on the road uses summer tires on a mid-
winter trip through the Alps because he doesn’t know that the weather
²⁴Williams (1981a: 102).
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conditions require snow tires. Here we say — and Williams presumably
will agree — that despite his factual ignorance the driver has a reason to
drive on winter tires. Again, our decision whether or not the agent has
a reason depends to a certain extent on our seeing the agent as a ratio-
nal subject. Determining the agent’s reasons involves not only removing
faulty empirical views but also adding true beliefs. Again, what we are
seeing in the example is the effect of the rationality aspect of reasons.
Williams’s policy for finding true reason statements involves approxi-
mating the agent to a certain ideal of rationality.
In the Alpine tourist example, the driver can appropriately be said to have
a reason because he is, as Williams puts it, “ignorant of some fact such
that if he did know it he would, in virtue of some element in S, be disposed
to φ” (Williams 1981a: 103). However, although Williams countenances
idealization in this way, he is not willing to permit it across the board.
Thus he writes:
For it to be the case that he actually has such a reason [with-
out knowing it], it seems that the relevance of the unknown
fact to his action has to be fairly close and immediate; other-
wise on merely says that [the agent] A would have a reason
to φ if he knew the fact.
We may say that the driver’s driving on summer tires is explained by his
ignorance of the danger this brings. Clearly, however, Williams thinks
that sometimes one can lack a reason to φ even though there is some piece
of factual information p such that one would be moved to φ if one knew
that p. It is less clear what kind of example would count as one where the
unknown fact is not, in his sense, closely and immediately relevant to the
action.²⁵ Perhaps the following example will do. Suppose a land owner is
interested in material wealth. Suppose further that, unbeknown to him,
there is an oil source in his back yard. We could express Williams’s point
by saying that the land owner only has a hypothetical reason. If the man
knew about the oil, surely he would have a reason to make preparations
for drilling. But given that he doesn’t have knowledge of that fact, we
say that he in fact doesn’t have a reason.
This second way in which a gap between having a reason and knowing it
can appear shows the element of idealization in reason ascriptions. But
²⁵Williams writes cryptically that the conditions “must be closely connected with the
question of when the ignorance forms part of the explanation of what A actually does”
(Williams 1981a: 103). This does not seem to help us understand what he means.
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the oil-drilling example also again highlights the variability of such as-
criptions. The question of which reasons an agent has is not as straight-
forward as we may have expected. On Williams’s view, whether an as-
cription is appropriate depends on a judgment as to how closely the un-
known fact p is to the φ’ing. Williams does not seem to think it is a prob-
lem that the set of reasons an agent has is less determinate than we may
ordinarily think.²⁶ A similar variability is at display in his conception of
what constitutes the “sound deliberative route” from the subjective moti-
vational set to the proposed action. Simple means-end reasoning counts
as correct practical reasoning, of course, but according to Williams, we
need a more inclusive conception of correct deliberation. Thus he ar-
gues that “finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would
make for an entertaining evening, granted that onewants entertainment”,
though not a species of instrumental reasoning, is still a sound deliber-
ative route (Williams 1981a: 104). What is more, the imagination may
play an important role in the process. He concludes:
We should not […] think of S as statically given. The pro-
cesses of deliberation can have all sorts of effect on S, and
this is a fact which a theory of internal reasons should be
very happy to accommodate. (Williams 1981a: 105)
There are, then, no clear limits on what processes of deliberation count
as rational transitions or on the contents of the agent’s motivational set.
This suggests that verdicts about reasons are variable in this sense, too. In
borderline cases, assessors may disagree as to whether an internal reason
statement is appropriate.
To summarize, fromWilliams’s point of view, in order to arrive at correct
reason judgments, we need to idealize the agent’s attitudes by making
different sorts of corrections. What is more, the assessments may vary
considerably and depend on factors other than the agent’s own attitudes,
such as pragmatic considerations. Although this point is not explicitly
stated, we can see Williams as proposing as tasks for adequate theories
of reasons to account for both the idealization and the variability aspect of
normative reasons. In the next section, we will explore the ramifications
of these points. For now, however, we have to take a look at Williams’s
argument against externalism. The argument has two parts, which we
can see as corresponding to the two dimensions of reasons mentioned
above. The (a) explanatory dimension is this: “If there are reasons for
²⁶Cf. Cohon (1986: 555).
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action, it must be that people sometimes act for those reasons, and if they
do, their reasons must figure in some correct explanation of their action”
(Williams 1981a: 102). The (b) rational dimension is this: If something is a
reason for action, then it must show that the agent is behaving rationally.
The agent must be able to acknowledge that he has the reason as a result
of rational deliberation.²⁷
The first part ofWilliams’s argument exploits the explanatory dimension.
Picking up the example of Owen Wingrave, he writes:
Now no external reason statement could by itself offer an
explanation of anyone’s action. Even if it were true (what-
ever that might turn out to mean) that there was a reason
for Owen to join the army, that fact by itself would never ex-
plain anything that Owen did, not even his joining the army.
For if it was true at all, it was true when Owen was not mo-
tivated to join the army. The whole point of external rea-
son statements is that they can be true independently of the
agent’s motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s (in-
tentional) action except something that motivates him so to
act. (Williams 1981a: 107)
Williams points out that if Owen has an external reason, then this should
be able to explain his action, and on his view, something can only explain
an intentional action if it motivates the action. For Williams, Owen’s
external reason R cannot possibly be “something that motivates him to
act” because externalism implies that external reasons are independent
of Owen’s motivational set. His reasoning is this: R is not a member of
S so it cannot be something that motivates the agent to act. Hence, we
must interpret Williams’s principle that “nothing can explain [his] action
except something that motivates him so to act” as “nothing can explain
[his] action except an element in his motivational set”. However, this is
a controversial principle, to say the least.²⁸ In fact, assuming that only
members of the agent’s motivational set can explain the action seems to
assume the very point Williams is trying to argue for: the idea that there
are only internal reasons.
Williams seems to assume from the outset that only internal reasons can
make sense of the explanatory dimension of reasons. If so, Williams is
²⁷The distinction of the two general features of reasons is taken with minor modifications
from Cohon (1986: 545–6).
²⁸As Cohon (1986: 547–9) makes clear. I follow Cohon’s presentation of the issue closely.
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begging the question against the externalist. However, Williams’s argu-
ment also has a second part, which is based on the rational dimension of
reasons. This part has the form of a reductio: Suppose that Owen actu-
ally has an external reason to join the army. Although he has a reason,
then, he lacks the relevant element in his S. It follows that there must be
some “psychological link” that explains how he comes to be moved to do
so. This link must be that, prompted by his father, Owen comes to believe
that his family tradition is a reason for him to enlist. Williams grants that,
once the agent has developed this belief, he is moved to act accordingly.
However, he asks how it comes about that the agent comes to have the
belief that he has a reason to act. He writes:
The basic point lies in recognizing that the external reasons
theorist must conceive in a special way the connexion be-
tween acquiring a motivation and coming to believe the rea-
son statement. For of course there are various means by
which the agent could come to have the motivation and also
to believe the reason statement, but which are the wrong
kind of means to interest the external reasons theorist. Owen
might be so persuaded by his father’s moving rhetoric that
he acquired both the motivation and the belief. But this ex-
cludes an element which the external reason theorist essen-
tially wants, that the agent should acquire the motivation be-
cause he comes to believe the reason statement, and that he
should do the latter, moreover, because, in some way, he is
considering the matter aright. (Williams 1981a: 108–9)
What Williams is working with here is a contrast between two ways in
which an agent may come to believe the external reason statement ad-
vanced by his father (that p). On the one hand, the agent may acquire the
belief that p by brute rhetorical force, or perhaps through a blow to his
head. If he does, he does not acquire the belief through rational means.
But as the rationality condition (b) above highlights, it is one function of
reasons for action to reveal the rationality of agents.²⁹ If the agent comes
to believe p in a brute fashion, this important condition is violated. This
way of becoming motivated does not validate that, before Owen devel-
oped the motivation, he had an external reason to join the army. The
externalist cannot base his claim that p is a reason on this non-rational
way of becoming motivated.
On the other hand, of course, there are rational ways of coming to be-
lieve reason statements and thus of becoming motivated. Williams ex-
²⁹Cf. Cohon (1986: 547).
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plains that the only way for the acquisition to be appropriate is for it to
occur under the conditions of correct deliberation.³⁰ For Williams that
means that the original external reason statement must entail that “if the
agent deliberated correctly, then, whatever motivation he originally had,
he would come to be motivated to φ” (Williams 1981a: 109). However,
Williams argues that the agent could not possibly acquire the motiva-
tion simply through correct rational deliberation. For we have assumed
that the agent does not have a relevant element in his motivational set
to deliberate from. For Williams, Owen could not acquire the motiva-
tion to join the army because he cannot reach that motivation by “seeing
things aright”, which he regards as necessarily involving practical rea-
soning which takes his existing motivation as its point of departure. For
Williams, the externalist faces the impossible task of showing how the
new motivation was arrived at rationally, yet
at the same time it must not bear to the earlier motivation
the kind of rational relation which we considered in the ear-
lier discussion of deliberation — for in that case an inter-
nal reason statement would have been true in the first place.
(Williams 1981a: 109)
Williams concludes that these conditions cannot be met simultaneously.
Now he is certainly correct that the defender of the claim that Owen has
an external reason to φ must show that the agent can reach the deci-
sion to φ in some way that is not blatantly irrational, i.e. in a way other
than using a blow to the head. That is, he must show that there is a
ground for attributing the reason to the agent.³¹ Owen’s father cannot
simply invent reasons for the agent — as we might say, they must be in
some way “anchored” in the agent. On the other hand, Williams takes it
for granted that the agent could rationally be moved to φ’ing only if he
engages in the kind of instrumental deliberation he recognizes as valid
practical reasoning.³² The idea is that no rational process could generate
a new motivation, given that no prior motivation exists from which it
could be derived.
³⁰Cf. Cohon (1986: 547).
³¹Cf. Cohon (1986: 554).
³²As noted above, Williams accepts other reasonings than simple means-end reason-
ing as valid practical reasoning, including finding what is constitutive of a given aim. But
like means-end reasoning, constitutive reasoning is also dependent on a preexisting end or
motivation. In this respect, Williams’s slightly extended conception of deliberation is no
different from the classical instrumentalist view.
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5.3 Ideal and variable reasons-ascriptions
We are now in a position to see that Williams’s argument relies on a con-
troversial understanding of what counts as a rational transition to a new
motivation. Williams holds that the only way reason can produce a new
element in S is by deriving it from another preexisting member of S. Jay
Wallace has usefully called this interpretation of practical reasoning the
desire-out-desire-in principle: no new element can come about unless it
build on an earlier one.³³ Williams demands, correctly, that a theory of
reasons must take into account the rationality aspect of reasons. It must
be possible to react to an external reason by acquiring the correspond-
ing motivation rationally. But we need not accept Williams’s restrictive
conception of what constitutes an exercise of rationality.
We have already extensively criticized the Humean conception of ratio-
nality.³⁴ The alternative, High Brow conception we have developed does
not restrict rational deliberation in the way envisaged by Williams. Ac-
cording to High Brow, to have a normative reason is to have a practical
commitment to φ. Practical arguments are inferential moves from one
practical commitment to another. What transitions are rational is deter-
mined by the judgments of the assessors of our inferential practice. We
have seen that practical commitments are not immune to criticism. In a
similar vein, we should not rule out the possibility that the agent may
acquire a practical commitment without deriving it from a prior practical
commitment.³⁵ There is much to learn about the ways such inferential
practices work. However, the point now is simply that Williams leaves
his assumption about the appropriate shape of rational deliberation un-
supported by argument. The desire-out-desire-in principle seems to be
little more than a reflection of his initial conviction that internal reasons
do not exist. Williams’s situation, then, is similar to the one he finds
himself in with respect to the first part of his argument. To assume that
(broadly) instrumental reasoning is the only way to come to have moti-
vations is to assume a large part of what he is trying to prove.
Let us return to the positive payoff we extracted from Williams’s treat-
ment of our practice of attributing practical reasons. We noted above
³³Wallace (2006a: 30).
³⁴See ch. 3–4.
³⁵In §4.4, we have already noted an example of a valid inference from a theoretical starting
point to a practical conclusion: “It is 5 p.m. Thus, I shall have the 5 o’clock tea now.”. The
existence of examples of this type seems to contradict Williams’s idea that new rational
motivation needs to be derived from some element in the agent’s subjective motivational
set.
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that, despite his Humean roots, Williams countenances a certain degree
of idealization in reason-ascriptions and that he appears receptive to the
idea that such ascriptions are not entirely determinate, i.e. that they dis-
play variability. Now, as we said, High Brow sees having a normative
reason to φ as being practically committed to φ’ing. This may give rise
to the worry that High Brow leaves idealization and variability out of the
picture: either you are committed to φ or not. To put it differently, given
that practical commitments were equated with intention, either you in-
tend to φ or you don’t. Does this picture leave room for the two features
we found in Williams’s article?
When we attribute an external reason or when we attribute an internal
reason that the agent is not aware of, we are essentially criticizing the
agent’s present assessment as to what he ought to do. We have already
noted that practical commitments are amenable to rational criticism, but
we can now describe in more detail how such criticism works.³⁶ To begin
with the problem of how the attribution of intentions can be subject to
the sort of idealization Williams admits, we should note that crediting a
speaker with an intentional state is not as straightforward as it may seem
first sight. Thus according to Daniel Dennett, attributing belief is what
we do when we start seeing the behavior of a creature as understandable
through rational explanation involving intentional states.³⁷ For Dennett,
in order to be properly regarded as an intentional system, an organism
needs to fulfill a number of criteria. On Dennett’s view intentional sys-
tems often have the ability to communicate verbally, but he does not re-
gard speaking a language as a requirement for counting as an intentional
system.
Obviously these creatures cannot tell us what they are thinking, yet we
can still explain what they do by positing beliefs and intentions. We
cannot read their minds, so for these creatures at least the sole basis we
have for attributing intentional states is their observable behavior.³⁸ Thus
when see a creature standing under the tree rather than in the rain, we
can attribute to it the intention not to get wet. However, it is immediately
clear that this explanatory strategy is hardly foolproof. For our evidence
that the creature has the intention we attribute to it is its staying under
the tree. But the creature’s intention to stay dry is relevant to the account
only on the further assumption that it also believes that the tree gives it
shelter. What would be evidence that the creature believe that the tree
³⁶See §3.5.
³⁷Cf. Dennett (1981: 16–22).
³⁸In fact, according to Dennett, even direct neurophysiological access to their brains
would be of no use. Cf. Dennett (1981: 21).
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shelters it from the rain? We can certainly attribute this belief to it if it
stays under the tree when it is raining. However, the belief explains its
conduct only on the assumption that it also intends to stay dry.
In other words, attribution of intentional states on a behavioral basis oc-
curs under delicate conditions: they are caught up in a circle of impli-
cations between intentional concepts.³⁹ We cannot single out one inten-
tional state and explain it individually in non-intentional terms. Instead,
intentional states hang together in such a way that they resist a safe and
entirely reliable procedure of identification: we can only attribute the be-
lief that p conditionally, on the assumption that the creature also has the
intention to φ; and we can attribute the intention to φ only conditionally,
on the assumption that the creature also has the belief that q; and so on.
Now of course, the creatures we are interested in — and the ones Den-
nett is most interested in — have a greater variety of giving expression to
their intentional states. Persons not only exhibit their beliefs and inten-
tions behaviorally but also produce linguistic performances that reveal
what they think. Thus it may be thought that the intentional circle does
not apply to speaking creatures: when in doubt about their beliefs and
intentions, we simply ask them. However, this turns out to be an illusion.
It is true that the speaker’s utterance “The tree gives me shelter” is good
evidence that he in fact believes that it does. However, the evidence is
conditional on the assumption that the agent’s utterance is candid, that
the agent does not want to deceive us, and so on. Furthermore, we need
to assume that we know what the speaker means by his utterance, which
again presupposes a number of further assumptions. If anything, inter-
preting the mind of a speaker is more challenging than explaining that of
a silent creature.
We need to make the best of our situation as interpreters of the minds
of others. On the other hand, it is true that we could hardly ask for a
better source of evidence for attributions of beliefs and desires than the
person’s words. For Dennett, avowals — i.e., in the Sellarsian terms in-
troduced above, intendings-out-loud and thinkings-out-loud — are also
what allow us to break into the intentional circle. There are, on his view,
two preconditions of a speaker’s being a rational system: (1) “normally,
more often than not, if x believes that p, p is true” and (2) “normally,
more often than not, if x avows that p, then he believes that p” (Dennett
1981: 18). Unless these prerequisites are met, the creature we are dealing
with cannot count as a rational believer (or intender). The agent’s beliefs
about his environment are, by and large, true; and what he says is, by and
large, what he thinks. We can make use of this assumption to establish
³⁹Dennett (1981: 19).
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a basic interpretation of the agent’s mind. We can in general say that
the agent’s assertions reveal his beliefs unconditionally. Most of the time,
the agent’s actions indicate what he intends. As Dennett writes, “we get
around the “privacy” of beliefs and desires by recognizing that in general
anyone’s beliefs and desires must be those that he “ought to have”, given
the circumstances” (Dennett 1981: 19). It should be clear, however, that
while this is true as a general rule or globally, it need not be true locally.
An adequate theory of interpretation must allow that, in any particular
case, an agent’s belief may deviate from the truth, his desires from what
is obvious.
In other words, even if we can assume, as Dennett urges, that the agent’s
beliefs are largely correct, we still need to carry out the task of identifying
attributing beliefs manually in any particular case. As we said, we can
draw on two sources of evidence: behavioral and verbal. Regarding the
first, when we attribute a belief to an agent because of something he does,
we very often have to attribute to him a true belief. In doing so, we are
guided by what Dennett calls the rationality norm. According to this
norm, we ought to favor attributing to the agent true beliefs and also
rational beliefs, i.e. beliefs that are not incoherent. Roughly: When in
doubt, do not assume the agent is mistaken or contradicts himself! On
the other hand, when we base our attributions on the agent’s utterances,
we are guided by what he calls the accuracy-of-avowal norm. Roughly:
When in doubt, avoid an interpretation according to which the agent says
something he doesn’t sincerely believe!
As Dennett writes, these norms often work in a complementary way, but
this need not always be the case. On occasion an agent produces an ut-
terance that gives rise to a conflict between the two norms.⁴⁰ Suppose
what a speaker says is clearly contradicted by the empirical evidence,
perhaps evidence that the agent himself is aware of. We have two ways
of dealing with such a situation. On the one hand, we may, as Dennett
puts it, “lean on the myth that a man is perfectly rational” (Dennett 1981:
20). In other words, we may assume that the agent does not in fact mean
what he is saying. That is, we may choose not to attribute the belief the
utterance is evidence for on the grounds that it would be incompatible
with other beliefs he has already expressed. However, to do so, we must
concede that the norm noted above — that most of the time assertoric
utterances are genuine avowals — fails in this particular instance. On the
other hand, we may “lean on the [the agent’s] right as a speaker to have
his word accepted” (Dennett 1981: 20). In doing so, we cling to the norm
⁴⁰Dennett (1981: 19).
228 CHAPTER 5. INTERNALISM
that utterances are genuine avowals, but we have to flout the norm not to
attribute to the speaker incoherent combinations of intentional attitudes.
ForDennett, we often cannot achieve complete conformance to both norms
— we either have to opt not to take the speaker by his words or assume
that his beliefs are at least partially irrational. As Dennett writes, neither
position “provides a stable resting place” (Dennett 1981: 20). In particular,
an ascription of irrationality can be problematic since, as we have seen,
the coherence of his attitudes is a condition of the possibility to make
sense of the agent. If the agent crosses a certain threshold of irrational-
ity, we would be forced to stop treating the creature as an intentional
system altogether. But we can tolerate a certain amount of incoherence
without shedding the intentional stance.
Thuswhenwe say of a person that he has a belief, we potentially confront
conflicts of this type. In this connection, Robert Brandom has noted that
theword “belief” is ambiguous.⁴¹ In the first sense of theword, attributing
a belief implies that the target of the ascription avows the belief or is
prepared to do so when prompted and the situation is appropriate. A
belief in this sense is obvious to the subject that has the belief. But in
another sense, it may well come as a surprise to the subject that he has
the belief attributed to him. In this sense, even though the subject believes
that p, he may not know that he does. Beliefs in this sense are not sub-
conscious beliefs but rather inferential extensions of avowed beliefs held
by the speaker. Whether the subject is consciously aware of the belief
or not, it can be ascribed to him on the basis of other commitments he
acknowledges.
Suppose a person concedes both that ¬q and that if p, then q. This person,
in a way, has also admitted that ¬p. Think of the remark, often heard in
debates, that “you have just admitted that …” In this case, ¬p is the logical
consequence of beliefs the subject has expressed. Still he may not have
noticed that the result follows logically from propositions he holds true.
Or he may not be prepared to admit the consequence due to a psycholog-
ical hang-up. In the avowed sense he can be said not to admit or believe
the proposition in question. But this should not be confused with the idea
that in another sense he does believe or admit the proposition. In other
words, it is possible for the subject to believe ¬p in the latter, rational or
ideal sense, and nonetheless fail to believe ¬p in the first, conscious sense
which implies preparedness to avow.
According to Brandom, it is an advantage of his normative scorekeeping
account that the ambiguous notion of belief can be replaced by the univo-
⁴¹Brandom (1994: 193–6).
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cal concept of a doxastic commitment.⁴² On his view, undertaking a dox-
astic commitment (forming a belief) is to be understood as a genus com-
prising two different positions in the game of giving and asking for rea-
sons. It may be understood as the agent taking up the normative attitude
of attributing the commitment that p to himself. Undertaking the com-
mitment directly in this way implies a preparedness to avow the claim.
But for Brandom, undertaking a commitment is not a species of attribut-
ing the commitment to oneself; in fact, the converse is true. Thus one
way to undertake the doxastic commitment that p is indirectly, by under-
taking another commitment whose inferential consequences include the
claim that p. An agent may be correctly taken as really committed to p
even though he lacks the disposition to acknowledge it in the appropriate
circumstances.
Dennett speaks primarily about attributions of beliefs, but the tension he
has identified exists equally for intentions. Similarly the ambiguity noted
by Brandom with respect to doxastic commitments is echoed in the re-
lated concept of a practical commitment.⁴³ A person may undertake a
practical commitment in either of two ways. He can directly undertake
the commitment by asserting “I shall …” or (more commonly) by just do-
ing what he intends, which is also a way of acknowledging the commit-
ment. But he may also undertake the commitment consequentially, by
virtue of its being entailed by another commitment he is prepared to ac-
knowledge. A restaurant diner’s practical commitment to have the nutria
entails the practical commitment to have rodent meat for dinner, whether
one is aware of the entailment or not. What one is committed to prac-
tically is not exhausted by one’s acknowledged plans but also includes
plans one is undertaking commitment to indirectly, claims commitment
to which is attributed to one by other speakers.
We can now return to the subject of our High Brow conception of the
practices of ascribing reasons. The view we have taken from Dennett and
Brandom helps us understand reasons for action as well. Let us see how
High Brow accounts for the two features we found in Williams’s view
above, idealization and variability.
a) idealization: As noted, making the normative reasons statement “X
has a reason to φ” is attributing to X a practical commitment to φ’ing.
When we attribute a consequential practical commitment to an agent, we
are choosing to see him as a rational being. We are taking an idealizing
⁴²Brandom (1994: 196).
⁴³Cf. Brandom (1994: 259–71).
230 CHAPTER 5. INTERNALISM
view on his commitments. Nobody actively attributes to himself all the
consequences that follow from his avowed commitments — that would
be an impossible task. Taking the idealizing view, we see the agent’s
commitments as they ought to be, rather than as the agent happens to
be prepared to acknowledge them. It follows that attributing a practical
commitment to an agent has a significant idealizing component.
According to Williams, reasons have an explanatory dimension. By see-
ing normative reasons as commitments, we can accommodate this dimen-
sion. When we provide an intentional explanation of an agent’s behavior,
we do so by seeing it in relation to possible practical commitments that
would make sense of the action. Doing φ intentionally is the expression
of the practical commitment to φ. On the view we have developed, ac-
knowledging the commitment to φ here and now — willing to do so — is
the causal antecedent of the performance. Rational agents are trained to
react to acknowledgments of commitment of this type by exhibiting the
behavior in question. Through the volition, an intention or commitment
is related causally and conceptually to the action intended. As practical
commitments, reasons for action have an important explanatory role.
As we noted, however, Williams also says that his conception is “con-
cerned with the agent’s rationality” (Williams 1981a: 103). In addition
to their explanatory role, reasons for action have a rationalizing aspect.
Indeed, intentional explanations can be successful only to the extent that
the agent is seen as rational. High Brow can accommodate this point as
well. In saying that X has a normative reason to φ, we say that he is com-
mitted to φ’ing, but this may also mean that he has undertaken the com-
mitment unwittingly, not by acknowledging the commitment directly ei-
ther verbally or behaviorally, but by undertaking another commitment
whose consequences include the commitment to φ’ing. Normative rea-
sons can be consequential commitment as well as acknowledged commit-
ments. In other words, as assessors of another’s reasons, by ascribing a
consequential commitment we gain the ability to take an idealizing stance
on what he has reason to do.
b) variability: We saw above that, besides idealization, Williams also al-
lows for a certain amount of variability in reason-ascriptions. We can see
the truth in this if we follow Brandom in paying attention to the social
dimension of discursive commitments.⁴⁴ As Brandom urges, in allowing
consequential commitments as well as acknowledged ones, we bring into
the picture the essential perspective of the attributor. For Brandom, there
are two socially distinct perspectives: the one of the subject ascribing
⁴⁴Brandom (1994: 197).
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commitments to himself by acknowledging them, and the one of other
speakers ascribing commitments to the subject. From the perspective of
the subject himself, there is no difference between the commitments he
acknowledges and the ones he is really committed to. But the attributor
assessing a subject can distinguish between the claims the subject ac-
knowledges and the one he has really undertaken. What emerges is, in
Brandom’s words, the distinction between the actual deontic status and
the deontic attitudes of the subject.
Suppose a person who knows the melting point of different metals ac-
knowledges commitment to the claim that this pipe is made of copper.
He still may not acknowledge the claim C that this pipe melts at 1084℃.
An assessor, on the other hand, may nonetheless take the subject to be
committed to C, albeit only consequentially. By attributing to the sub-
ject the commitment to C, the assessor is assigning the subject a deontic
status. Or again, suppose a person who knows (perhaps in theory) that
nutria is a rodent announces her intention to have nutria for dinner. Still
she may not acknowledge commitment to the plan P to have a rodent
for dinner. However, an assessor may nonetheless take the subject to
be committed to P, albeit only consequentially. The assessor is not at-
tributing to her any deontic attitude but the deontic status of really being
committed to P.
It follows that consequential commitments, doxastic or practical, display
a fundamental relativity to the social perspective of an attributor. What
is more, what a person is committed to consequentially depends cru-
cially on further collateral hypotheses that are assumed in drawing out
the consequences of an acknowledged commitment. That the pipe melts
at 1084℃ follows from the avowed claim that it is made of copper only
on condition of the auxiliary claim that copper melts at that temperature;
the volition “I shall eat a rodent” follows from the intention to have nu-
tria for dinner only on condition of the auxiliary claim that nutria is a
rodent. As a result, there are two ways in which attributions of conse-
quential commitments are relative. First, as attributors, we may choose
either to base our attributions on the collateral hypotheses of the subject
himself or to draw the collateral hypotheses from our own set of sub-
stantive commitments. If we choose the latter course, we use our own
beliefs and intentions to significantly expand the person’s commitments.
Even if the person does not know the melting point of copper, we can still
attribute to him commitment to the claim that the pipe melts at 1084℃
because there really is a relation of implication between “X is made out
of copper” and “X melts at 1084℃”, whether the subject is aware of it or
not. Second, insofar as different scorekeepers may bring different sets of
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collateral hypotheses to bear on the subject, what claims a speaker un-
dertakes consequentially varies depending on which scorekeeper is per-
forming the assessment.
We find the same relativity of consequential commitments in normative
reasons sentences. Take Williams’s gin-and-tonic case. Williams poses
the question whether the gin lover has a reason to mix the liquid in front
of him with tonic water. We can now see why Williams hesitates as to
whether a negative answer is appropriate. On the one hand, we may say
that, given his own doxastic commitments, the agent is practically com-
mitted to mixing the liquids. If we base our attribution on the subject’s
own view — which includes the belief that the liquid in the bottle is gin
— we can infer that the agent is consequentially committed to mixing the
drink. On the other hand, an attributor who knows the real contents of
the bottle may choose to draw on his own beliefs to determine the gin-
lover’s reasons. If he does, the assumption that the bottle contains gin
is not available as a collateral hypothesis that would license the infer-
ence from “I shall have a glass of gin-and-tonic” to “I shall mix this liquid
with tonic water”. From this perspective, the agent is not consequentially
committed — or even entitled — to the plan of mixing the liquids. Even
if he acknowledges the commitment by actually mixing the liquids, as
attributors we may still evaluate this performance as incorrect.
The attitude of taking someone to be committed to a claim or plan encodes
these different ways of correcting for false beliefs on the part of the sub-
ject. Conversely, the Alpine tourist we mentioned above lacks the belief
that a winter trip to the mountains requires snow tires. When Williams
says that someone in such a position has an internal reason, he suggests
that we should correct for the lack of a relevant belief as well. In Bran-
dom’s scorekeeping terms, the tourist does not acknowledge commitment
to the plan of using snow tires, but as assessors we may nonetheless take
him to be committed to doing so consequentially. When we say that the
tourist has a reason to use snow tires, we attribute a commitment based
on collateral hypotheses drawn from our own set of doxastic commit-
ments. Depending on the scorekeeper performing the attribution, what
deontic status — what reason — the agent is taken to have may vary, in-
sofar as collateral hypotheses are also liable to variations. This explains
why Williams sometimes does and some does not attribute a reason de-
spite the agent’s own view to the contrary. Attributions of reasons are
not a clear-cut practice because they depend on what material inferences
a scorekeeper regards as good.
In cases of conflict, we can see the effects of the tension Dennett has
identified as inherent in the attribution of intentional states. Suppose an
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Alpine tourist is dimly aware, in theory, of the danger of accidents in the
mountains due to inadequate tires. Our subject of attributing normative
reasons is governed by both the accuracy-of-avowal norm and the ratio-
nality norm. On the one hand, we may ascribe to the Alpine tourist the
intention of crossing the Alps on summer tires. To do so is to lean on the
accuracy-of-avowal norm: he reveals his intention practically by taking
the trip despite the danger, and we may judge his mind by his actions.
This requires us to ascribe to him a blatant inconsistency in the set of in-
tentions we ascribe to him. On the other hand, we may opt to say that the
agent does have a reason to put winter tires on his car. This allows us to
follow the norm of interpreting the agent as rational. But this means that
we cannot take him “by his word” or judge him by his actions. We have
to conclude that he does not understand his trip as a dangerous crossing
of the Alps, perhaps because he thinks the trip is short or that it may not
be snowing. In either way, we have to make a concession with respect to
one of the norms.
Thus we can capture the reason statements Williams wants to mark as
true on a High Brow conception of normative reasons as practical com-
mitments. In fact, Brandom’s distinctions between acknowledged and
consequential commitments, and between different perspectives on con-
sequential commitments, allow us to disambiguate the talk of reasons to
some extent. As we have seen, Williams condones idealization of nor-
mative reasons, and High Brow can explain the different ways of ideal-
ization from the perspective of a scorekeeper. However, Williams is only
willing to idealize in one dimension, as he only countenances correcting
for mistaken empirical beliefs. In our terminology, an agent who fails to
acknowledge the practical commitment to φ because he lacks, as a collat-
eral hypothesis, the doxastic commitment pmay still be taken by a score-
keeper to be committed consequentially to φ’ing if the scorekeeper can
supply the claim that p from his own commitments. But in a Williamsian
view, the same is not true for practical commitments. For Williams, if the
agent fails to acknowledge being committed to φ’ing because he lacks, as
a collateral hypothesis the practical commitment of ψ’ing, a scorekeeper
is not allowed to supply that practical commitment from his own set of
commitments. ForWilliams, unless the agent has a relevant “motivation”,
he cannot have a normative reason.
This is a pronounced asymmetry inWilliams’s treatment of doxastic com-
mitments, on the one hand, and practical commitments, on the other.
For Williams, practical commitment cannot be corrected for or idealized
by a scorekeeper because they ultimately have to come from the agent’s
personal, subjective motivational profile. In this judgment, his Humean
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conception of reasons and reasoning becomes evident. The last chapters,
however, have revealed a number of ways in which the Humean concep-
tion falls short. In particular, practical commitments are states that aim
at the good and are subject to rational norms that help determine their
content. We should not assume that practical commitments are immune
to rational criticism. We cannot decide the issue here. Perhaps some
practical commitments are inherently personal and subjective so that it
is “up to” the agent to decide whether to undertake them or not. But it
should not be assumed that all practical commitments are subjective in
this way. If there are intersubjective practical commitments as well as
personal ones, we cannot rule out the possibility that a scorekeeper may
assess another agent as having a practical commitment based on his own
view of what he should be practically committed to. Pace Williams, such
a practice would be intelligible. To ascribe a reason in this way, indepen-
dent of a preexisting motivation, would be to idealize and correct for, not
mistaken empirical beliefs, but wrong-headed, foolish or conspicuously
absent practical commitments.
Chapter 6
Rational Requirements
6.1 Rational requirements
Our reasons for belief and our reasons for action are plentiful. That the
street is wet is a reason for me to believe that it has been raining. An
open window will let in fresh air — that’s a good reason to open the win-
dow. The bird’s red color is a reason for me to believe that the animal
is a robin. That the man in the train needs assistance is a reason for me
to help him. Reasons such as these are substantive: they are grounded
in something that actually counts in favor of so believing or of so act-
ing. However, we sometimes attribute reasons that are not in this way
substantive. If you believe that Argos is a dog, then you ought to believe
that Argos is a mammal. The former belief, we say, gives you a reason
to have the latter belief, but although it is a reason, it is not necessarily a
substantive reason. After all, if it is not true that Argos is a dog, it may
be that from an objective standpoint you have no reason at all to think
that Argos is a mammal. Again, if you intend to become a doctor, you
ought to go to medical school. The former intention gives you a reason
to intend the latter, but again the consideration need not be a substantive
reason. Suppose that you are squeamish when you see blood and dislike
interacting with patients. Since you’re unsuited for the medical profes-
sion, you ought not to become a doctor in the first place. But then surely
neither do you have any good reason to intend to go to medical school.
Even if Argos is in fact not a dog but a lizard, it would nonetheless be
irrational for you not to believe that Argos is a mammal given that you
236 CHAPTER 6. RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
think he is a dog. Rationality requires you to have that belief. Once again,
it may well be true that it is a bad idea for you to become a doctor. Yet,
the foolishness of the plan notwithstanding, given your prior intention
it would be irrational for you not to intend to go to medical school. Ra-
tionality requires you to have that intention. We have to do here with a
particular type of reason. Whenwe give a substantive reason, we point to,
as Niko Kolodny puts it, “some feature of the actual situation” (Kolodny
2005: 509). But in special cases like the two we described, there may not
be any relevant feature of the situation to ground the reason. Instead
the reason arises from the agent’s combination of existing commitments.
There are, then, reasons of rationality as well as substantive reasons.
The existence of reasons of rationality gives rise to two puzzles that have
been discussed extensively in the literature. As we will see, reasons of
rationality are connected with a set of principles which are often called
“rational requirements”. A discussion of reasons of rationality is a dis-
cussion of rational requirements. The first puzzle concerns the logical
form of these requirements. The literature is divided as to whether the
principles involved take wide scope or narrow scope. The second puz-
zle asks what the relation between reasons of rationality and substantive
reasons might be. This chapter aims to make progress towards solving
the puzzles. I start by introducing the notion of a rational requirement
(§1). Next I move to the discussion of the first puzzle and consider a
well-known argument against the wide-scope view (§2). In the following
sections I successively develop a positive conception of rational require-
ments as inferential principles (§§3–4). The positive conception makes
use of the technical vocabulary and conceptual tools developed in earlier
chapters. Any contribution the High Brow framework makes to the solu-
tion of the puzzles discussed lends additional support to the framework
itself. Returning to the first puzzle, I apply the positive conception of
rational requirements to the dispute between wide-scopers and narrow-
scopers (§5). Finally, I close the chapter by addressing the second puzzle
(§6).
We can state the relations that generate our reasons of rationality in the
form of general principles. Consider again the two examples given above.
In the first example, we assume that the subject believes some proposi-
tion, p, and believes that p implies another proposition q. The conclusion
— that the subject ought to believe that q — relies on a principle I will call
MP, for modus ponens. MP is naturally expressed using a conditional:
(MP) If you believe that p and believe that p→q, then you
ought to believe that q.
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In the second example, we assume that the person intends an action, φ,
and believes that φ’ing requires performing another action, ψ. The con-
clusion — that the agent ought to intend to ψ — relies on the principle IP,
short for instrumental principle:
(IP) If you intend to φ and believe that doing φ requires doing
ψ, then you ought to intend to ψ.
To decide whether an agent violates MP or IP, we need to turn our atten-
tion to his intentional states considered as such. After abstracting away
from features of the actual situation, we are left with a view of the agent’s
attitudes and how they are related to one another. For this reason, MP
has also been called the principle of belief coherence while IP has been
called the principle of means-end coherence. There are some differences
among philosophers as to the correct formulation of the principles. As
to IP, John Broome contends that we must add to the conditional’s an-
tecedent a clause to the effect that you believe you will not ψ unless you
intend to ψ. According to Broome, an agent is only making himself vul-
nerable to accusations of irrationality if he doesn’t end up doing φ any-
way. And he also thinks that MP should have a clause to the effect that
it matters to you whether q because “rationality does not require you to
clutter your mind with pointless beliefs” (Broome 2005: 322–3). Whether
these clauses are required is a matter of some dispute. In any case, as
the modifications don’t change the situation in a material way, we can
safely ignore them for the present purposes and assume that an adequate
formulation of the principles can be found.¹
Two questions have dominated recent discussion of the two rational re-
quirements:
1. Do rational requirements have wide scope or narrow scope?
2. Do reasons of rationality give us substantive reasons? Or, equiva-
lently, are rational requirements normative?²
¹Opinions have varied, not just about the definition of the individual requirements, but
about the exact content of the catalog of requirements as well. Thus Broome proposes, as
a requirement, the principle not to believe p and to believe ¬p at the same time (Broome
2005: 322). Kolodny proposes as a principle that you ought to believe p if you believe you
have conclusive evidence that it is true that p (Kolodny 2005: 521). Kolodny’s principle will
be discussed below.
²Note, however, that the claim that reasons are normative allows different interpreta-
tions. See §6 below.
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Each question has generated a puzzle. Before explaining the questions
further, it will be useful to set out the puzzles associated with them. The
first puzzle starts from the observation that using only rational require-
ments and straightforward premises about the psychology of an agent,
we can derive apparently objectionable oughts. Given the premise that
a person believes that p and that p→q, we can construct the following
argument:
X believes that p.
X believes that p→q.
If X believes that p and X believes that p→q, then X ought
to believe that q.
Thus, X ought to believe that q.
From seemingly innocent premises, we can derive the conclusion that X
ought to believe that q. But suppose it is not the case that q; then it is
not the case that he ought to believe that q, for there can hardly be a
requirement to believe false propositions. A similar problem arises from
the instrumental principle. Given as a premise that a person intends to φ
and that he believes that φ only if ψ, we can argue:
X intends to φ.
X believes that doing φ requires doing ψ.
If X intends to φ and X believes that doing φ requires doing
ψ, then X ought to intend to ψ.
Thus, X ought to intend to ψ.
Assuming the premises allows us to conclude that X ought to intend to
ψ. But this is problematic: it may in fact be the case that X ought not to
ψ at all because it is immoral or crazy or imprudent. And it can hardly be
both the case that X ought to ψ and that he ought not to ψ. Here it may
be held that the conflict is only apparent because the oughts in question
are only prima facie oughts. In an election, perhaps, you ought to vote
for candidate C because he promises to improve the schools, but at the
same time you ought not to vote for C because he will cut funding for
the arts. These two statements do not contradict each other because the
oughts in question are not all-things-considered but prima facie oughts.
But that isn’t necessarily so in the present case. The ought in the argu-
ment’s conclusion does not seem defeasible in any way. What is more, if
there are moral reasons, it may be true categorically and indefeasibly that
X ought not to do ψ. Finally, prima facie oughts can be weighed against
each other, but we do not compare, or assign a score to, doing what is
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rational, on the one hand, and doing what is substantively correct, on the
other.
The problem is this: we can conclude that X unconditionally ought to ψ
or, as it is sometimes put, we can detach the conclusion from the con-
ditional principle IP (or MP). Accordingly the problem has been called
the “Detaching Problem”.³ In his important paper “Normative Require-
ments”, John Broome explicitly proposes a way out of the difficulty by
introducing a distinction concerning the logical structure of principles
such as IP and MP.⁴ The principle’s surface grammar suggests that we
should understand the “ought” in the formula IP as taking narrow scope.
We can use parentheses to mark the distinction:
(IP-NS) If you intend to φ and believe that doing φ requires
doing ψ then you ought to (intend to ψ).
But as Broome points out, another reading of the principle is possible:
(IP-WS) You ought to (intend to ψ if you intend to φ and
believe that doing φ requires doing ψ).
In this second interpretation, the conditional is entirely within the scope
of the deontic operator — hence the name “wide scope”. The difference
between wide and narrow scope readings has important consequences
for the logical behavior of the statement. In particular, while it is pos-
sible to detach the conclusion of the conditional from the narrow-scope
principle, this is not possible with the wide-scope principle. From IP-WS
and the psychological premises noted above, nothing interesting follows.
In particular, it does not follow that the agent ought to do or intend to ψ.⁵
Similarly, according to Broome, MP should not be interpreted as
³Cf. Way (2010).
⁴Broome (1999).
⁵Relatedly, philosophers have struggled with what has come to be called the Bootstrap-
ping Problem. According to the principle I+, you ought to intend to φ if you believe that
you have conclusive reason to φ. Now suppose that I think that I have conclusive reason
to φ. Given this assumption and the principle, we can infer that I ought to intend to φ. But
surely if it is the case that I ought to intend to φ, I have a reason to φ. Thus if we assume
a narrow-scope enkratic principle, just from the fact that I believe that I have a reason to
do something it follows that I really do have a reason to φ. Yet even when it comes to rea-
sons, just thinking that something is the case cannot ipso facto make it the case. We cannot
bootstrap reasons into existence like that. Cf. Broome (1999: 404). For a detailed treatment
of the problem with a different moral, see Kolodny (2005: section 1). Broome’s reaction to
this problem is to reject the narrow-scope version of I+ in favor of a wide-scope version.
The Bootstrapping Problem is, however, just a special case of the Detaching Problem, al-
beit one that makes the problem particularly vivid. The problem lies in the fact that we can
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(MP-NS) If you believe that p and believe that p→q then you
ought to (believe that q).
but rather as
(MP-WS) You ought to (believe that q if you believe that p
and believe that p→q).
Not all writers have accepted this conclusion. Philosophers have differ-
ent views concerning the question whether rational requirements such
as IP and MP actually have wide or narrow scope. For Broome, the solu-
tion to the Detaching Problem is to interpret all rational requirements as
wide-scope principles whose logic disallows detachment.⁶ Against this
argument, some philosophers have insisted that at their core rational re-
quirements must have narrow scope.⁷
The second puzzle is about the distinction we started with, between sub-
stantive reasons and reasons of rationality, and about the questionwhether
there is a connection between the two. In his initial treatment of the topic,
Broome assumes without explicit argument that there is a strong connec-
tion, viz. that rational requirements provide us with reasons:
Reasons Claim If one is rationally required to φ then one has conclusive
reason to φ.⁸
In later writings, Broome is more skeptical of, though still sympathetic
to, the Reasons Claim and regards it as an open question whether, as
he puts it, rationality is normative.⁹ Why ought we to be rational? Other
writers have explicitly argued that no substantive answer to this question
is possible.¹⁰ In particular, the Reasons Claim faces a challenge: if rational
requirements give us substantive reasons, what type of reasons do they
give us? For Broome, themost likely candidates are instrumental reasons,
detach oughts which seem objectionable. Because it relies on beliefs about conclusive rea-
sons, it only occurs with the rational requirement I+ and related principles. This restriction
makes the difficulty less general than the Detaching Problem, which is why in §5 I discuss
only the latter. The discussion in that section will be applicable also to the Bootstrapping
Problem.
⁶Other defenses of the wide-scope approach include Broome (2005), Broome (2007),
Brunero (2010), Way (2011).
⁷Schroeder (2004), Kolodny (2005).
⁸This definition is taken from Kolodny (2005: 539). Note that Kolodny’s main aim in his
paper is to argue against the Reasons Claim.
⁹Broome (2007), Broome (2005).
¹⁰Kolodny (2005).
6.2. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE WIDE-SCOPE VIEW 241
but some writers have pointed out problems with this approach.¹¹ On the
other hand, it has been said that, the problems notwithstanding, the idea
that rational requirements are normative has intuitive plausibility.¹²
6.2 Arguments against the wide-scope view
For now let us put the purported normativity of rationality to one side
and focus on the first puzzle. As a first step toward deciding the dis-
pute between wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretations of rational
requirements, we should examine what is distinctive of wide-scope prin-
ciples. Consider the wide-scope reading of the instrumental principle:
(IP-WS) You ought to (if you intend to do φ and you believe
that doing φ implies doing ψ, then you intend to do ψ).
The two antecedent conditions and the consequent of this conditional
refer to attitudes of the agent. As the parentheses indicate, the ought
covers the whole conditional. The “if… then” connective in IP should be
interpreted as a simple material conditional, the logical connective which
is true just in case its antecedent is false or the consequent is true.¹³ As a
material conditional is defined purely in terms of its truth conditions, the
principle can be read equivalently as a tripartite disjunction:
(IP-WS0) You ought to (not intend to do φ or not believe that
doing φ implies doing ψ or intend to do ψ).
As an example, suppose that Sarah intends to clean up the kitchen and be-
lieves that cleaning up the kitchen requires taking out the trash. Suppose
further that she fails to intend to take out the trash. What IP says about
her is that something is amiss with her rationally: she is in a combination
of states that she ought not to be in. Call this a conflict-state.
The fact that Sarah is in a conflict-state is indicated by the fact that all
three of the statement’s disjuncts are false. Conversely, for the require-
ment to be satisfied it is sufficient that one of the three disjuncts is made
¹¹Cf. Kolodny (2005).
¹²Cf. Broome (2005: 321).
¹³This is assumed in most of the contributions to the debate, including Broome’s later
papers. In his early paper “Normative Requirements”, however, Broome says that the rela-
tion is, not an ought simpliciter, but an ought “with determination added, from left to right”
(Broome 1999: 402). Broome does not appear to pursue this interesting idea further and
does not explain what the “determination” consists in. Also cf. Hussain (n.d.: 42–3).
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true. This has consequences for the revision of her attitudes: she ought,
on the one hand, to avoid getting into such a conflict and, on the other, to
remove the tension if she finds herself in a conflicted state. With regard
to the latter, three changes could occur which would resolve the conflict-
state by making her conform to the wide-scope principle:
a) Sarah comes to intend to take out the trash. This is the most natural
way to resolve the conflict. Perhaps Sarah just realized that the
kitchen needs to be cleaned up. Knowing that this involves taking
out the trash, she forms, by a logical train of thought, the intention
of doing so.
b) Sarah ceases to intend to clean up the kitchen. Doing so allows her
to retain her means-end belief and still not to intend to take out the
trash, while at the same time escaping the conflict. On the plausible
assumption that taking out the trash is an onerous task, this reac-
tion is not hard to understand. To be sure, our thoughts frequently
run along similar lines. Nonetheless, the rationality of such a reac-
tion seems dubious.
c) Sarah ceases to believe that to clean up the kitchen she needs to take
out the trash. This way of escaping the conflict seems even more
questionable than the preceding one. Still as far as the wide-scope
principle is concerned, this is a valid way of getting out of a state
that she ought not to be in.
The wide-scope instrumental principle tells the agent that there is some-
thing wrong about her combination of commitments, but it doesn’t single
out a specific commitment-state to revise, i.e. either undertaking a com-
mitment not held before or dropping a commitment presently held. As far
as IP-WS is concerned, all ways out of the conflict are on a par. Now ac-
cording to both Mark Schroeder and Nico Kolodny, this leads to problems
for the wide-scope view.¹⁴ To begin with the first criticism, Schroeder ar-
gues that the three options (a)…(c) are not equally appropriate. In fact,
he regards only the first option as the right thing to do. It is rational to
respond to a conflict between intending to φ and failing to intend to ψ
by coming to intend to ψ. Dropping the intention to φ, as we might say,
is a cop-out. Although it is a human and perhaps excusable reaction to
give up a plan when confronted with its unpleasant implications, it is not
what the instrumental principle recommends. The instrumental principle
cannot condone taking option (c), which is not just a surprising move but
¹⁴Schroeder (2004), Kolodny (2005).
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has the shape of a deeply irrational reaction: surely dropping an instru-
mental belief in response to the conflict is incorrect from the standpoint
of reason.
Schroeder points out that the wide-scope principle implies that the result
of choosing option (b) or (c) is that the agent is no longer irrational. After
all, as one disjunct out of three, (a) is in no way privileged. As such, the
principle appears to have a laissez-faire aspect about it: it condones what-
ever way to resolve the conflict, instead of insisting on the proper way.
The formulation of the principle does nothing to mark what we would
describe as the regular way to exit the conflict. For Schroeder, any wide-
scope principle “posits a symmetry between different ways in which it
might be fulfilled” (Schroeder 2004: 346). Given that the principle has
been labeled a rational requirement, it ought to tell us how to respond ra-
tionally to the conflict; and from the standpoint of rationality, the options
available hardly seem all on a par. For this reason, Schroeder maintains
that “the symmetry predicted by the Wide-Scope account […] is not sus-
tained” (Schroeder 2004: 339). As a consequence, he rejects IP-WS and
MP-WS in favor of a narrow-scope reading of rational requirements.
The second argument, given by Kolodny, starts by proposing a way of
determining whether a given principle has wide scope. To Kolodny, it is
a necessary condition of any wide-scope principle that it passes what he
calls the Rational-Response Test:
Suppose it is claimed that the process-requirement govern-
ing the conflict between A and B is wide scope: i.e., one is
rationally required (either not to have A, or not to have B).
For this claim to be true, it must be the case that (i) one can ra-
tionally resolve the conflict of having A and B by dropping B
and (ii) one can rationally resolve it by dropping A. (Kolodny
2005: 519–20)¹⁵
Building on this foundation, Kolodny goes on to ask what constitutes the
rational resolution of a conflict. His answer is that a way to exit the con-
flict is rational only if it can be explained by the subject’s “awareness of
what is amiss in the state (A, B)” (Kolodny 2005: 520). Such an explana-
tion is possible when the agent reasons from the content of one attitude to
revising the other. This is reflected by what he describes as a restatement
of the first test, the Reasoning Test:
¹⁵Note what Kolodny is chiefly interested in here is conflicts between pairs of attitudes
represented by “A” and “B”, whereas IP and MP involve two premises and one conclusion.
The reason is that Kolodny prefers a different set of rational requirements which have this
format. See the discussion of enkratic principles below.
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The process-requirement governing the conflict between A
and B is wide scope — that is, one is rationally required (ei-
ther not to have A, or not to have B) — only if, from a state
in which one has conflicting attitudes A and B, (i) one can
reason from the content of A to dropping B and (ii) one can
reason from the content of B to dropping A. (Kolodny 2005:
520–1)
According to Kolodny, we can use the Reasoning Test to determinewhether
a given principle really has wide-scope. For him, rational requirements
do not pass the test and thus cannot have wide scope.¹⁶ To see if this is
so, we can apply the Reasoning Test to the instrumental principle. Note
that A and B can represent multiple attitudes, and that they can represent
the lack of an attitude as well as the existence of an attitude. On this way
of seeing things, a conflict of attitudes is being in attitude-state A and
attitude-state B at once.¹⁷ In Sarah’s case, A consists of the intention to φ
(i.e. to clean the kitchen) and the belief that φ requires ψ (i.e. that doing
so requires taking out the trash); B consists of the lack of the intention
to ψ (to take out the trash). Sarah’s conflict lies in the fact that she is in
both attitude-state A and attitude-state B, so she has the choice between
giving up A, by ceasing either to intend to φ or to believe that φ only if ψ,
on the one hand, and, on the other, giving up B, by forming the intention
to ψ. As to the first condition of the Reasoning Test, it is plainly possible
to reason from the content of A to the dropping of B. The content of the
compound state A allows the reasoning:
Shall[φ]
φ only if ψ
Thus, Shall[ψ]
As the conclusion of this reasoning is to form the intention to ψ and its
result is the removal of state B, the first condition is met. Is it equally
possible to start from the content of B and to proceed to dropping A? As
Kolodny rightly says, this is impossible. To be sure, Sarah might notice
that she doesn’t intend to ψ and move from there to the conclusion that
either she ought not to intend to ψ or that φ’ing does not imply ψ’ing.
Such transitions are not uncommon, in particular if ψ’ing is an unpleasant
task, but they do not count as reasoning in a proper sense of the word.
Sarah cannot rationally move from B to A by a rational argument starting
¹⁶Or at least many such requirements do not pass the test.
¹⁷As I use it, the word “attitude-state” means having or lacking one or several attitudes.
For example, an attitude-state may be “does not believe p or q” or “intends φ”.
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from the lack of the intention to take out the trash and leading to giving
up the intention to clean the kitchen. Such a transition would be, not
reasoning, but a form of self-deception.
Moving from A to B follows the current of proper reasoning, but going in
the reverse direction — “going upstream” — does not. For Kolodny, there
is no such thing as upstream reasoning; there are only upstream irrational
transitions. As Kolodny writes, “[r]ationality requires one, in forming,
retaining, or revising one’s attitudes, to follow the downstream current”
(Kolodny 2005: 529). Rational requirements are a stream with a built-in
direction. According to the Reasoning Test, a principle has wide scope
only if it allows both downstream and upstream transitions. The instru-
mental principle does not satisfy the second condition of the Reasoning
Test, so according to Kolodny it cannot be a wide-scope principle.¹⁸
Although I agree with Kolodny that rational requirements do not satisfy
the second condition, I do not think that this warrants the conclusion
that rational requirements cannot have wide scope. In other words the
Reasoning Test is not a good indicator of whether or not a principle has
wide scope. Kolodny portrays the Reasoning Test as a natural extension
of the Rational Response test. But though the Rational Response test, in
my view, correctly captures the nature of a wide-scope principles, the
Reasoning Test does not. Thus it is true that, with any wide-scope prin-
ciple, there isn’t one unique rational way to exit a given conflict-state,
because depending on the circumstances, it may sometimes be correct to
drop A, sometimes to drop B. But this doesn’t entail that, in any given
instance, it is possible to reason one’s way, following a direct path, from
B to dropping A as well as from A to dropping B. In Sarah’s case the
Rational Response test says that it is sometimes correct to develop the
intention to take out the trash, but that at other times it is correct for her
to drop the intention to clean the kitchen. But this doesn’t entail that
there is a correct reasoning path leading from her reluctance to take out
the trash to dropping the intention to clean the kitchen. The rational re-
sponse doesn’t have to consist in a piece of reasoning from A to B or a
piece of reasoning from B to A.
¹⁸I am simplifying Kolodny’s argument a little here. Kolodny actually proposes two ar-
guments. The first argument holds that in order for reasoning from B to A to be possible,
B must have a content associated with it. If B consists in the lack of an attitude, there is
no content to reason from, so no reasoning is possible. The second arguments holds that
reasoning from B to Amust always be downstream. I take the second argument to be more
general than the first because it also applies to cases that the first does not cover. Focusing
on the upstream reasoning part does not, I think, weaken Kolodny’s argument.
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That there can be multiple rational exits from a rational requirement is
shown by two examples. Suppose that Karl believes that p and believes
that p→q (A) but fails to draw the conclusion that q (B). He is in vio-
lation of modus ponens. As in Sarah’s example above, when we convert
the conditional of MP into a disjunction, he has a total of three options,
namely
a) forming the belief that q,
b) dropping the belief that p and
c) dropping the belief that p→q.
In many cases, no doubt, forming the belief that q is appropriate. Perhaps
having recently learned that it is true that p and having good evidence
for the conditional, it is most natural for Karl to go on to conclude that
q. But it isn’t obvious that this choice is invariably the best. For one
thing, suppose that Karl has good independent evidence that makes it
likely that, in fact, it is not the case that q; and suppose further that he
has little evidence for the claim that p. In this scenario, it seems that it
would be preferable for Karl to respond to the conflict by giving up his
belief that p. To decide whether option (a) or (b) is more rational, then, we
need to consult the wider context of the beliefs. The choice between (a)
and (b) is familiar from philosophical arguments: As it is sometimes said,
one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens. Next, suppose
that Karl has good evidence that p and also that ¬q, but that his belief
that p→q is merely a wild conjecture. In these circumstances, it would
be entirely appropriate to give up the conditional belief while holding on
to the belief that p. Thus without taking the wider context into account,
we cannot decide whether the rational result would be dropping state A,
by picking option (b) or (c), or dropping state B, by picking option (a).
A similar point applies to practical reasoning. Going back to Sarah’s case,
her situation is that she has to choose between taking the means (ψ), giv-
ing up the end (φ) and stopping to believe that the end requires the means
(φ only if ψ). Now it is certainly often appropriate to react to the conflict
by taking the means, but in some cases a different reaction is warranted.
For instance, as before it may be that the evidence for the empirical judg-
ment that φ only if ψ is weak, in which case the perceived conflict would
prompt the agent to reconsider the unfounded empirical assumption. Fur-
thermore, it may be that Sarah is deeply committed to another project
which in effect precludes ψ’ing. In this case, it is appropriate for her to
backtrack and to reevaluate her unconditional commitment to achieving
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the end, ψ. The result of this reexamination may well involve giving up
the intention to ψ. In both of these cases, the rational requirement would
be satisfied by dropping state A rather than by dropping state B.
The wide-scope readings of IP and MP, then, leave open alternative ways
of removing the conflict. Sometimes it is better to prefer one of the alter-
native paths to the default option, and whether this is so depends on the
further context, which includes the evidence for the belief-premises and
the strength of commitment to the intention-premises. The wide-scope
principles cannot give specific advice about which way out of the con-
flict is best because they do not, and cannot, take these further factors
into account. Notice that, in the examples given, the alternative ways
of resolving the conflict really are rational resolutions. If so, wide-scope
principles pass the Rational Resolution test: one can rationally resolve
the conflict by having A and dropping B (the default path) and one can
rationally resolve the conflict by having B and droppingA (the alternative
path).
Still it would be wrong to describe the revisions involved, with the Rea-
soning Test, as “reasoning from the content of A to dropping B” and “rea-
soning from the content of B to dropping A”. In the theoretical example,
what Karl realizes, as a consequence of noticing the conflict, is that his ev-
idence for the belief that p is weak. He engages in reasoning which leads
him to dropping the belief that p, but it is not a case of reasoning which
starts from the fact that he doesn’t believe that q. Instead it is an argu-
ment that starts from independent premises related to the evidence for
the claim that p. The resolution of the conflict is rational in virtue of the
fact that it is the result of reasoning, but not of upstream reasoning. The
relevant reasoning is a different, independent line of downstream rea-
soning leading to the revision of the premises. In the practical example,
Sarah becomes aware that the end to which she has committed herself is
questionable. But she does not perform an upside-down argument, start-
ing from the fact that she isn’t committed to the means and leading to
dropping the commitment to the end; that would be “upstream reason-
ing”, which is to say not reasoning at all. Instead she engages in a separate
piece of reasoning from independent premises, which causes her to drop
the commitment to the end. The resolution of the conflict counts as ra-
tional because it is the upshot of a line of downstream reasoning leading
to the revision of the premise.
As the examples show, the principles pass the Rational Response Test but
do not pass the Reasoning Test. This gap shows that the latter is not a
more elaborate version of the former. Instead of taking the observation
that IP and MP do not allow both reasoning from A to dropping B and
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from B to dropping A to show that the principles are not wide scope, we
should reject the Reasoning Test as insufficient.
Before concluding this section, we need to consider a complication. The
argument developed by Kolodny requires us to pay attention to the differ-
ence between his catalog of requirements and ours. In his paper, Kolodny
is not primarily concerned with IP and MP but with a different set of ra-
tional requirements.¹⁹ The two corresponding principles are:
(B+) Rationality requires one to believe that p, if one believes
that there is conclusive evidence that p.
(I+) Rationality requires one to intend to X, if one believes
that there is conclusive reason to X. (Kolodny 2005: 521)²⁰
To distinguish these principles from IP and MP, I will call B+ and I+
enkratic principles.²¹ Supposing that these principles also count as ratio-
nal requirements, there should be wide-scope versions of these. Do they
resemble MP and IP in allowing multiple ways to exit a conflict? If there
is a unique rational revision of attitudes when conflicts of this type oc-
cur, B+ and I+ do not conform to the Rational Response Test. This would
undermine the idea that a correct wide-scope reading of all principles is
available.
Suppose that the Inspector believes that he has conclusive evidence that
Smith killed Jones (A), but he does not go on to form the belief that Smith
killed Jones (B). The belief about the evidence is a meta-belief. According
to the Rational Response Test, he can react to the conflict in either of two
ways: by coming to believe that the victim was killed by Smith — drop-
ping A — or by giving up the belief that he has conclusive evidence that
¹⁹Kolodny briefly considers modus ponens in Kolodny (2005: 541–2). He conjectures,
however, that all rational requirements, including IP and MP, can be reduced to enkratic
principles.
²⁰Kolodny also admits two negative principles, B- and I-. According to B-, rationality
requires you not to believe that p if you believe that there is not sufficient evidence that
p. According to I-, rationality requires you not to intend to X if you believe that you lack
sufficient reason to X. I will ignore these further principles mainly to simplify things. But it
is worth pointing out that the principles are more controversial than their positive counter-
parts. After all, I believe many facts without remembering what evidence I drew on when I
learned them in the first place, and I intend many things without having the explicit belief
that there is, in fact, conclusive reason to intend them. That does not make these beliefs and
intentions irrational. For a defense of the negative principles, see Kolodny (2005: 527).
²¹The term “enkrasia” or “krasia” (or “enkrateia”) is used for principles similar to B+ by
a number of writers, including Broome (2007) and Way (2010). In this usage, an agent is
“enkratic” if he is not akratic.
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Smith killed Jones — dropping B. More than in the case of MP, it seems
intuitive that the only rational option is to do the former; giving up the
belief about evidence would be irrational or “upstream reasoning”. But it
is not hard to imagine a situation in which revising the belief about evi-
dence would be entirely rational. For believing that you have conclusive
evidence for the belief that p entails having one or more particular beliefs
that make it probable that p. Thus suppose the Inspector believes:
E1: Smith was seen hurriedly leaving the crime scene.
E2: Smith is in debt and in dire need of money, which he
could rob from the victim.
E3: Smith owns a gun.
Together these pieces of evidence make it probable that Smith committed
the murder, so the Inspector is correct to believe that he has conclusive
evidence for the claim. If we have no further information about the In-
spector’s commitments, the most rational procedure would be to drop A.
But suppose, further, that the Inspector is aware that the witness who
reports Smith’s whereabouts is unreliable; that Smith is about to inherit
money to pay off his debts; and that the caliber of Smith’s gun doesn’t
match that of the murder weapon. If so, it would be rational to react to
the conflict described by B+ by giving up the assumption that E1…E3 sup-
port the hypothesis that Smith is the killer. By giving up his reliance on
the particular pieces of evidence, the Inspector also stops believing that
he has conclusive evidence that Smith committed the murder. In doing
so, he resolves the conflict between A and B by dropping A. The revision
is rational because it consists in reasoning, but he doesn’t reason from his
lack of belief that Smith was the killer (A) to giving up his belief about
the evidence (B): he gives up the belief after reasoning from facts about
E1…E3 being insufficient evidence for his hypothesis.
Despite the initial appearances, then, it is not true that B+ can be resolved
in only oneway. Which of his commitment-states needs revision depends
on the context of the Inspector’s further commitments. In this, B+ is no
different from modus ponens and the instrumental principle: sometimes
it is rational to drop A, sometimes it is rational to drop B. The belief about
evidence, which plays a crucial role in B+, is only a placeholder for the
substantive considerations that form the evidence. The real evidential
support for the conclusion that Smith killed Jones lies in the Inspector’s
substantive beliefs about the homicide, and there is nothing irrational
about giving up these beliefs in the case of a conflict if they are them-
selves badly supported and if there is an independent line of thought that
supports the claim that Smith is innocent. A similar point applies to I+.
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As with B+, the real work in supporting the conclusion is done by the
individual reasons — considerations which may themselves be built on
shaky grounds. If so, there is nothing irrational about reconsidering the
original particular reasons in the light of an incompatibility. Then the
situation is the same as with the instrumental principle and we have lit-
tle reason to think that the enkratic principles are special in this regard.
Kolodny’s argument fails to show that there are no wide-scope versions
of these principles.²²
To summarize, Kolodny’s argument against wide-scope interpretation
does not succeed. Although the Reasoning Test is not accurate, he is
right that all wide-scope principles must pass the Rational Response Test.
Against Kolodny, however, we have concluded that the rational require-
ments we have considered pass the latter test, and this is true for his
favored enkratic principles as well. This move allows us to respond to
Schroeder’s criticism as well. Schroeder says that wide-scope principles
posit a symmetry between different ways in which theymight be fulfilled,
an asymmetry between revising the requirement’s antecedent conditions,
on the one hand, and, on the other, revising the consequent attitude. Now
as we have seen, it is indeed true that, depending on the wider context,
it may be correct either to revise the antecedent or the consequent.²³ But
this does not amount to positing a symmetry or to saying that a wide-
scope principle authorizes all possible revisions. Rather than represent-
ing a laissez-faire policy, the principle simply remains silent on the ques-
tion of how to respond to the conflict. The principle only tells you that
you are in a conflict and that you ought to revise your attitudes so as to
remove the conflict, but it doesn’t specify how you ought to revise your
attitudes.
Schroeder’s grounds for rejecting the wide-scope interpretation of re-
quirements is that they predict a symmetry between different outcomes
that, on closer scrutiny, is not sustained. But defenders of the wide-scope
view are not committed to the claim that requirements predict a symme-
try. The job of the principles is not to prescribe specific attitudes but to
²²There is a reason, however, to focus on the principles we have been working with, IP
and MP, rather than the enkratic principles. As the latter principles start from premises
that concern what reasons (or evidence) we have for a given proposition, they are more
reflective, higher-order principles than the former: they involve judgments about reasons
and their relative weights. While enkratic principles operate on a meta-level, IP and MP
are first-order principles. If so, they require less cognitive sophistication and are thus more
basic: we do not, in everyday reasoning, reflect on our own reasons but rather directly act
upon them.
²³As Way puts it, “Wide-Scope requirements do not discriminate between the different
ways in which you might avoid irrationality” (Way 2011: 229).
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inform the agent of the presence of a conflict. Consequently, Schroeder’s
argument does not give us reasons to reject wide-scope rational require-
ments as incorrect. Interestingly, Schroeder at one point explains that
“[w]ide-scope principles are good at predicting what is wrong with an
agent at a time. But they are not good at predicting the rational ways
for an agent to change her situation” (Schroeder 2004: 346). According to
him, because the wide-scope readings do not capture this important as-
pect of the instrumental principle, and of other requirements, they ought
to be rejected. But the diachronic character of the rational requirements
should not lead us to reject the wide-scope principles. Instead we should
accept that they exist and are valid, while remembering that they only
have the limited role of informing us of a conflict.²⁴
Does this mean that rational requirements must have wide scope? To
draw this conclusionwould be rash. Although Kolodny’s and Schroeder’s
arguments have failed to show that rational requirements cannot have
wide scope, Schroeder’s point that there must be diachronic principles
which account for revisions of attitudes is important.²⁵ As wide-scope
principles cannot satisfy this condition, they are not by themselves suffi-
cient. Our attitudes cannot be governed by wide-scope principles alone,
so we need to supplement them with additional rational principles. The
nature of these additional principles will be explored in the following sec-
tions, and this exploration will lead us back to the question whether these
additional principles have wide or narrow scope. Although the present
section has been chiefly critical of Kolodny’s and Schroeder’s arguments,
both authors, as we will see, are right to insist that the most important
rational principles have narrow scope. What all this doesn’t show is that
there is no place at all for wide-scope principles. It is really true that ra-
²⁴In a similar vein, Kolodny distinguishes between state-requirements, which “simply
ban states in which one has conflicting attitudes”, and process-requirements, which “say
how, going forward, one is to form, retain, or revise one’s attitudes so as to avoid or escape
such conflict-states” (Kolodny 2005: 517). His arguments against wide-scope views of ra-
tional requirements assume that at least some requirements are process-requirements. He
goes on to discount the importance of state-requirements, if they exist at all. In the text it
was claimed that his argument that there are no wide-scope rational requirements is not
convincing. However if what Kolodnywants to say is just that rational requirements, if they
have wide scope, cannot also be process-requirements, then I agree with him. There is a
place for narrow-scope process-requirements, and in fact inmy view they play an important
role, as will be apparent in what follows. I only take issue here with Kolodny’s argument
that rational conflicts cannot be resolved in more than one way and that we should, for this
reason, reject wide-scope requirements.
²⁵Officially, Kolodny’s argument purports to show only that some rational requirements
have narrow scope, while other principles may have wide scope (Kolodny 2005: 515). But
he clearly thinks that ultimately all rational requirements can be reduced to narrow scope
principles. By contrast, it is claimed here that although there are wide-scope principles,
there must be narrow-scope versions of the same principles as well.
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tionality requires us to (either not believe that p or not believe that p→q
or believe that q) and Broome is right to defend the existence of IP-WS
and MP-WS.
6.3 The function of rational requirements
The preceding argument suggests that rational requirements consist of
more than the wide-scope versions of the principles MP and IP. Let us
take a closer look at the requirements to pinpoint their principal form.
We will also try to substantiate the suspicion that this form will have
narrow scope. Starting with some preliminary work, what is the func-
tion of rational requirements? What do principles likemodus ponens and
the instrumental principle accomplish? A first answer might be this: The
principles describe the way our minds work on a basic level, and their
topic is a particular type of regularity of our psychological states in re-
lation to one another. On this view, modus ponens says that people who
think that p and that p→q tend to think in appropriate circumstances
also that q; the instrumental principle says that people who intend to
φ and believe that φ’ing requires ψ’ing tend in the appropriate circum-
stances also to intend to ψ. Our mental machinery is designed in such
a way that attitudes of one type tend to occur together with attitudes of
another type.²⁶
This is true as far as it goes. It is true that rational requirements correctly
describe how our minds work. Although we violate the requirements
with some frequency, we do follow them in the vast majority of cases.
But as our criticism of dispositionalism leads us to expect, the view does
not fully capture the principles.²⁷ According tomodus ponenswe ought to
believe that q if we believe that p and that p→q. The dispositional view
reads the “ought” in this principle as the ought of prediction, as in the
remark that the train ought to arrive shortly. But this is clearly not what
the word should mean in this context. It means a genuine requirement:
the principles express norms properly speaking, not in the attenuated
sense of a feature that it is statistically normal for human reasoners to
have. When an agent fails to conform to modus ponens, she has broken a
rule, not just gone against a regularity.
This observation suggests a second view. When an agent makes a mistake
of this kind, we can take her to task for this violation of the requirement.
²⁶This is the view proposed in Pettit (2002).
²⁷See §§2.4–5.
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It may be a consideration like this that has inspired the view that the re-
quirements are normative, albeit in a less-than-complete sense. The idea
is that principles likemodus ponens are standards whose use is limited to
evaluation, coupled with the thought that standards of evaluation need
not necessarily be norms. Thus we can use the rational principles as a
yardstick to assess the performance of an agent as rational or irrational
and, as the case may be, criticize her. Yet according to this view, rational
requirements fall short of real normativity: they are not in force for us in
the way that prudential or, perhaps, moral demands are.²⁸
It is true that the principles, in the form in which they have been pre-
sented, are well suited for the assessment of the performance of other
agents. The reason is that, in giving direction about what is to be done,
the formulations embody a third person (or second-person) stance. Their
point is to reveal relations between attitudes attributed to an agent, and
this is just what an onlooker, as opposed to a deliberating subject, does.
And it is true that we often use the requirements in this way to assess or
criticize another subject; this interpersonal aspect of the requirement is
crucial. Again this is correct as far as it goes. But the proposal goes be-
yond merely stating that this is an important aspect of the principles. It
states that their use is purely evaluative. This does not seem true since it
hides the fact that rational requirements have an important first-person
aspect in addition to a third-person use. The principles have a part to play
in rational deliberation as well as in evaluation.
As we may put it, the requirements guide our rational conduct. Kolodny
also take note of this first-personal character.²⁹ Kolodny rightly observes
that the pure evaluative view fails to notice another normative dimen-
sion. But he adds that this dimension is the “experience of being bound
by a rational requirement to believe or intend” a proposition (Kolodny
2005: 554). Or again we “feel that we ought to respond as [the require-
ments] require” (Kolodny 2005: 555). This suggests a phenomenological
or experiential aspect of normative force that, as we have pointed out, is
questionable.³⁰ The important thing is not that there is something it is
like to be aware of a rational requirement. Rather it is that we are con-
scious of these requirements and that these requirements are operative
in our choices.
In the light of these circumstances, we can conclude that the function of
rational requirements is to be operative in an agent from the first per-
son standpoint rather than to play the role of a mere regularity or of an
²⁸For this idea, see Scanlon (2007) and Kolodny (2005: 551–6).
²⁹See also Scanlon (2007: 87).
³⁰Cf. §2.3.
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evaluative standard. The function is that of a guide of our theoretical
or practical reasoning. To be sure, the role of MP and IP in reasoning
is important, and it will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
However, while establishing this point we need to avoid two pitfalls. The
first is the assumption that to play their role in reasoning, the principles
must be premises; the second is the assumption that the pieces of reason-
ing we are concerned with are directed at attitudes. Let us take these two
sources of difficulties in turn.
Startingwith the first issue, we can askwhat role principles such asmodus
ponens play in our actual reasoning processes. One may assume that they
appear in the shape of premises to the arguments which constitute the
reasoning.³¹ Take as an example Ron, who believes that Argos is a dog
and that dogs are mammals. If rational, Ron also believes that Argos is a
mammal. Let us assume that, having discovered Argos’s canine nature,
Ron concludes that Argos is amammal. Clearly, in this reasoning he is be-
ing guided bymodus ponens, but in which way exactly does the principle
provide guidance the reasoning? On the assumption being considered,
the rational principle is a further, unstated premise to the argument. The
argument, the line of thought might run, has roughly this form:
(1) I believe that Argos is a dog.
(2) I believe that if Argos is a dog, then Argos is a mammal.
(3) Thus, I believe that Argos is a mammal.
As a hidden premise, we would have to assume the rational requirement:
(4) If I believe that p and that p→q, then I ought to believe
as well that q.
Adding this additional proposition arguably adds to the perspicuity of the
inference. On a possible view, rational requirements exert their guiding
function by being present as a further, essential premise, which can be
omitted for the sake of abbreviation. But this view cannot be correct.
First, we should note that when we actually rehearse an argument men-
tally, rational requirements do not usually figure as premises. Nor does
it seem that they merely slip from our minds. More importantly, the se-
quence (1),(2),(3),(4) is not a typical or simple theoretical argument. When
we go through the steps of a theoretical argument, we do not prefix each
step with “I believe that” or a similar clause. Instead, our reasoning is
more likely to have a simpler structure:
³¹Cf. §4.4.
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(5) Argos is a dog.
(6) If Argos is a dog, Argos is a mammal.
(7) Thus, Argos is a mammal.
Clearly this is the elementary form of reasoning. But now consider the
result of adding the requirement, in the guise of premise (4) above, to the
argument (5), (6), (7). Adding this further premise in no way improves the
perspicuity of the argument simply because it does not help the argument
go through. The premise fails to make contact with the premises (5) or
(6) because the antecedent of (4) has as its subject matter Ron’s beliefs,
whereas the former premises aren’t concerned with anyone’s beliefs. In
a similar way, the premise fails to make contact with the conclusion, (7),
because (4)’s consequent is concerned with beliefs, whereas there is no
mention of beliefs in (7). The statement ofmodus ponens cannot be simply
incorporated into the argument in the form of a premise. The same point
applies to the instrumental principle. Suppose that Sarah intends to clean
up the kitchen and believes that cleaning up the kitchen requires taking
out the trash. If so, then according to the principle, she ought to intend
to take out the trash. But what moves her to the intention would be a
practical syllogism:
Shall[I clean up the kitchen]
Cleaning up the kitchen requires taking out the trash.
Thus, Shall[I take out the trash]
As in the theoretical case, the individual steps do not refer to psycholog-
ical states. But then adding the premise
If I intend to φ and I believe that φ’ing requires ψ’ing, then I
ought to intend to ψ.
does not fit with the premises or the conclusion of the syllogism, whose
subject matter is not psychological at all. The requirement cannot assume
the form of a regular premise. If the instrumental principle cannot be
an explicit premise in an argument, it cannot be a hidden or suppressed
premise, either.
Consider now the second pitfall mentioned above. The point, which was
already implicit in the first pitfall, is that our reasoning proceeds on the
level of content, rather than attitudes. Just abovewe observed that regular
theoretical syllogisms do not aim at the conclusion that I believe that …
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and that regular practical syllogisms do not aim at the conclusion that
I intend to … Now consider a distinction offered by Scanlon. He asks
how we should interpret the antecedent of a rational requirement, the
part marking its circumstances of application. One way to conceive it
is as “a judgment about the adequacy of reasons for holding the attitude
in question”.³² As an example, Scanlon explains that “it might be that
an agent who judges there to be conclusive reason to believe that p must,
insofar as he or she is not irrational, believe that p.” But as Scanlon rightly
points out, these types of judgments, inwhichwe are explicitly concerned
with reasons for an attitude, are artificial. By contrast, our judgments are
usually content-directed. In Scanlon’s words,
In deciding whether to believe that p, we “direct our atten-
tion to the world” and ask whether p is true, and a judgment
leading to an intention to do A at t is likely to be a judgment
about the merits of doing A. (Scanlon 2007: 91)
Ifmost if not all reasoning is content-directed rather than attitude-directed,
then this must be reflected by the rational requirements. For this reason,
the principles should be interpreted as content-directed. Thus in the ex-
ample of a theoretical syllogism above, we can imagine Ron reasoning
out loud:
Argos is a dog. A dog is a mammal. So Argos is a mammal.
The propositions do not contain reference to psychological states. The
reasoning process comprises a series of expressed contents. The content
of the premises consists in what Ron believes, not in his believing it, and
the content of the conclusion is what he ought to believe, not his act of
doing so.³³
We can make the same point using the tools introduced in earlier chap-
ters. The elements of a piece of reasoning are propositions, or contents,
which represent commitments, pragmatic or doxastic. But there is a dif-
ference between attributing a commitment to a person and expressing
the commitment. The two differ in subject matter. Attributing a com-
mitment, e.g. by saying “John believes that snow is white”, is a way of
talking about an agent’s psychology. By contrast, expressing a commit-
ment, e.g. by saying “Snow is white”, does not normally concern the psy-
chology of an agent. It is true that by attributing a commitment one also
³²Scanlon (2007: 90).
³³Cf. §1.4.
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undertakes and expresses a commitment, namely one about someone’s
psychology. But the difference ought to be sufficiently clear. It is easy to
attribute to someone the commitment that p without oneself undertak-
ing the commitment that p — without thereby endorsing the truth of p
oneself.³⁴
Thus the actual reasoning process consists of a series of commitments ex-
pressed. Accordingly, the requirements of rationality should be content-
directed in this sense: they concern the contents of the commitments ex-
pressed, not the attitudes attributed. In following the requirements, we
“direct our attention to the world”. The function of the rational princi-
ples, then, is to guide our reasoning in a content-directed way. We do not
comply with the requirements because they figure as premises in our rea-
soning. Instead, the requirements appear transparent. This is related to a
point made by Scanlon. While discussing the way in which the rational
requirements constitute norms, he writes:
The behavior of a rational agent will exhibit (at least to a sig-
nificant degree) the regularities described by requirements of
rationality. But this is not because the agent sees this way of
behaving as required by principles that she must be guided
by. A rational agent who believes that p does not accept ar-
guments relying on p as a premise because she sees this as
required by some principle of rationality to which she must
conform. Nor does she generally do it “in order not to be ir-
rational”. Rather, she will be willing to rely on p as a premise
simply because she believes that p. (Scanlon 2007: 85–6)³⁵
³⁴One source of confusion is the fact that it is possible forme to attribute a commitment to
myself autobiographically. In doing this publicly, I talk about my own psychology. Thus just
as I can attribute to John the belief that snow is white, I can say “I believe that snow is white”,
and just as I can attribute to John the intention to close the window, I can say “I intend to
close thewindow.” Still self-attributing a commitment is not the same as expressing it. To see
that the two are different it suffices to see that it follows logically from “Snow is white”, but
not from “I believe that snow is white”, that snow is not black; and that it follows logically
from “I intend to close the window”, but not from “I shall close the window”, that I presently
have an intention. Now it is true that in everyday speech, we do not always observe this
distinction clearly. Often we use the expression “I intend to φ” to mark the expression of
the intention without purporting to comment on our own psychological state. Similarly
the expression “I believe that p” need not have the function of performing a self-attribution
of a doxastic commitment. Sometimes it is used just to endorse the claim that p, while at
other times the phrase has a different use altogether, such as marking one’s uncertainty.
Still, philosophically speaking, we should be careful not to blur the line between attributing
and undertaking a commitment.
³⁵The requirement on which this passage is based is the requirement to be prepared to
take a proposition as a premise in further theoretical arguments. We may say that this is
similar to the enkratic principles noted above.
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Scanlon rejects the idea that what makes agents reason in accordance
with rational principles is their explicit or propositional awareness that
the behavior in question is required by the principle. The agent relies on
the premise that p and argues in accordance with modus ponens, not be-
cause of a premise-form awareness of the principle but simply because
he is committed to p being the case. The principle itself remains trans-
parent. Similarly, one might mistakenly think that the agent draws the
conclusion she draws because she would rather not be irrational. Scanlon
rightly rejects this suggestions as well. Although it would be true that, if
the agent failed to conform to the principle, she could be accused of irra-
tionality, surely this is not the agent’s operative concern. The concern is
with the content p and with all that this commitment implies.
Scanlon points out that what is true for modus ponens also holds for the
instrumental principle. If an agent takes the required means to an en-
dorsed end, this is not in the light of the rational requirement, but rather
because of the endorsed end itself. Nor is she likely to take action in order
to evade the charge of irrationality. Summarizing his criticism, Scanlon
writes:
Ideas of rationality and irrationality belong to a higher-order
form of reflective thought that we need not engage in when,
for example, we see that we have reason to do what will ad-
vance one of our ends. (Scanlon 2007: 86)
To suppose that means-end reasoning or modus ponens always involves
the conscious reflection involving the notion of rationality or irrational-
ity is to overintellectualize the simple process of the theoretical or prac-
tical syllogism. Regular reasoning is object-level reasoning, not reason-
ing about reasoning. The requirements are content-directed and remain
transparent to the agent.
6.4 Inferential requirements
To summarize, rational requirements play an important role in reasoning.
Principles are not just dispositions or evaluative standards, so a concep-
tion will be adequate only to the extent that it shows how the require-
ments are norms in the full sense. Further, rational requirements should
play a role in first-person deliberation. Even if they do not constitute
premises of reasoning, they play a role in guiding our reasoning. Finally,
we have observed that the requirements must be content-directed: they
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must be interpreted as operating on the level of what is believed or in-
tended, rather than, as the wide-scope principles we have examined sug-
gest, on the level of attitudes.
Moving on to a positive conception of the principles, we can draw upon
results we have obtained earlier in our reflections on the nature of practi-
cal reasoning.³⁶ Recall the lessons we drew from Caroll’s story of Achilles
and the Tortoise. On an adequate picture of reasoning, it is hopeless to
try, like Achilles in the story, to make explicit everything that is responsi-
ble for making a piece of reasoning go through as valid. Inevitably, some
aspects of the reasoning are bound to remain implicit in a shared practice
of common ways of treating inferential transitions as good. Moreover,
as we have seen, we should countenance short arguments moving from
a single premise to a conclusion. We can see short arguments such as
It’s raining. Thus I shall open the umbrella.
as complete, materially valid arguments rather than as enthymemes. Sim-
ilar, consider the single-premise inference:
(8) Argos is a dog.
(9) Thus Argos is a mammal.
This inference, aswe emphasized, is a good inference as it stands. Nonethe-
less, it is still possible to challenge the argument. Through Socratic prompt-
ing, we may be led to wonder whether this inference really is one that
ought to be accepted. As we have seen, a response may introduce a con-
ditional, in the simplest case:
(10) If Argos is a dog, Argos is a mammal.
This conditional makes explicit that it is correct to move from (8) to (9).
By adding (10) to the short argument, we explicitate a propriety that was
already implicit in the original argument. Now (10) is a rather specific
proposition, which involves the proper name “Argos”. Clearly another,
more general premise would do the same job:
(11) For all x, if x is a dog, then x is a mammal.
or
³⁶§4.4.
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(12) Dogs are mammals.
Like themore fine-grained conditional about Argos, this principle licenses
the inference leading to “Argos is a mammal”. But it also licenses many
other inferences like “Kerberos is a dog, thus Kerberos is a mammal” and
“Fido is a dog, thus Fido is a mammal.” Its function is similar to that of
(10), but it has more general application.
As we have seen, this challenge can be repeated. Thus in response to
doubts about an inference, we can point to a proposition that makes the
propriety of this first-level inference explicit. In the same spirit, we can
ask whether the argument comprising (8), (9) and (10) is a valid inference.
To answer this challenge, we can follow Achilles in producing another
proposition:
(13) If (i) Argos is a dog and (ii) if Argos is a dog thenArgos is amammal,
then (iii) Argos is a mammal.
Again this premise makes explicit what is implicit in regarding the previ-
ous argument as valid. Notice that this is a conditional proposition which
itself includes a conditional premise. This proposition is of a higher order
than (10). As to responses to the first challenge, (11) and (12) were more
general alternatives to (10). Now in the second challenge, there is again
an alternative way of making the inference explicit. To see this, notice
that (13) has a pragmatic force similar to:
(14) “Argos is a dog” and “If Argos is a dog then Argos is a mammal”
imply “Argos is a mammal”.
We can generalize this statement to:
(MPI) “p” and “If p then q” imply “q”.
In going from (10) to (11), we replaced the individual constant Argos with
a variable x ranging over a set of individuals. The step from (14) to (MPI)
is similar: we replace specific propositions with schematic letters p and
q, whereas p and q range over whole propositions. Thus we move from a
formulation that licenses one particular inference to a more general for-
mulation that governs not just this inference butmany inferences besides.
Of course, what we arrive at is just a formulation of the rational require-
ment MP. It follows that we can conceive of a rational requirement as the
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result of a general way ofmaking explicit the inference underlying a regu-
lar argument. As we saw, MP is a natural extension of what we do when
we make explicit what is implicit in a single-premise inference. Com-
pared to the proposition (10), extracting a rational requirement means
going one step further or climbing another rung on the ladder of explicit-
ness. Whereas the earlier step was captured in a conditional, MPI makes
explicit the transition from premises which include a conditional.
What MPI in effect says is that a certain sort of inference is good. Thus
we can see it as equivalent to the inference-schema:
p.
If p then q.
Thus, q.
How does this compare to the way we have talked about rational require-
ments in previous sections? Recall the original formulation of modus po-
nens:
(MP) Rationality requires of you that, if you believe p and
you believe (if p then q), then you believe q.
We ought to regard the inference schema above as an alternative way
of expressing the rational requirement MP. It is worth noting that the
inference-schema is clearly a content-directed principle rather than an
attitude-directed principle. The present strategy can be applied to the
other rational requirement we have been concerned with:
(IP) Rationality requires of you that, if you intend to φ and
you believe that ψ’ing is a necessary means to φ’ing, then
you intend to φ.
Following the train of thought above, this principle can be seen as a way
of making explicit what we regard as a good inference, namely an infer-
ence of the form:
Shall[φ]
φ requires ψ
Thus, Shall[ψ].
This inference-schema is general in contrast with specific relations of in-
ference between, say, intending to clean the kitchen and intending to
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take out the trash. Compared to the latter inferences, it applies to a large
number of intended contents.
According to the present view, then, rational requirements can be con-
ceived as explicitations of general inferential relations. Introducing a ra-
tional requirement does not add a new element but brings to the fore
something that is already active in the practice, although one needs to as
it were read between the lines to see it. It is for this reason that rational
requirements seem both familiar and exotic at the same time. They are
familiar because we rely upon them in all reasoning, even if we aren’t
necessarily explicitly aware of them. Yet they are also exotic because we
do not commonly ascend to the level of abstraction required to give them
expression in the form of explicit claims or schemas.
A few clarifications are in order. To begin with, rational requirements
are a tool of abstraction, but conditionals can function as tools of abstrac-
tion in a similar way. Thus it will be useful to briefly compare require-
ments to this use of the conditional. As we have seen, conditionals can
be thought of as explicit inference-licenses: if you have the antecedent in
your commitment-box, you are entitled to having the consequent in your
commitment-box.³⁷ Similarly, rational principles are explicit inference-
licenses which entitle you to put the consequent in your commitment-box
if you have the antecedent conditions in your commitment-box. Onemay
think that it follows that rational principles must be conditionals, consid-
ering that Broome’s original formulation has the “if… then” structure. But
whereas Broome’s formulation IP is in terms of the ascription of attitudes,
the inference-schema operates on the level of content. A form aimed at
attitudes allows the use of the conditional, but the content-directed form
does not.
In fact, the new formulation of the principles cannot be put in terms of
the conditional because of two evident problems. First, suppose that we
formulate the content-directed principles using the conditional:
If p and if p then q then q.
This statement is a mere logical tautology which doesn’t capture the in-
ference licensed by the rational requirement. Second, we cannot use the
conditional to express specifically practical requirements such as the in-
strumental principle. The difficulty is that the natural suggestion,
If Shall[φ] and φ only if ψ, then Shall[ψ].
³⁷See §4.4.
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is not a viable option because it is doubtful that the sentence is logically
well-formed.³⁸ The logic of “shall” doesn’t allow us to embed the operator
in the antecedent or, for that matter, in the consequent of a conditional. It
is true that, the “will” or “shall” of the future tense can be embedded. But
this is not true for the expression of intention. That there are major prob-
lems doing this can easily be seen by considering the fact that “Shall[φ]”
doesn’t have a truth-value. Although an intention can be satisfied or dis-
appointed, it is not true when satisfied or false when disappointed. If it
is true that one can falsely attribute an intention to an agent, the agent
cannot express a false intention. Embedding, on the other hand, requires
truth-apt expressions.
Thus although we can understand what rational requirements are on the
model of the conditional, a rational requirement ought not to be under-
stood as a kind of conditional but instead as represented by the inference-
schema. The conditional is an elegant instrument to make explicit infer-
ential relations between propositions, but its use, however versatile, is not
universal: it cannot be used in general to express rational requirements
on the content level. The reason might be that rational requirements are
very general, compared to the relations commonly expressed using condi-
tionals. As to why the conditional isn’t capable of doing this job, we can
only speculate. Our natural language hasn’t developed an elegant tool
such as the conditional to make explicit the very general kinds of infer-
ential relations involved. We have to make do with inferential relations
that cannot be put into conditional form.
Further, inferential relations are governed by ought-to-be rules.³⁹ Accept-
ing the premises of modus ponens in a sense compels you to accept the
consequence as well. The compelling force is not, of course, the force of
psychological or physical necessity. It is rationality that forces you to ac-
cept the claim. This doesn’t mean that the agent cannot possibly accept
the premises without admitting the conclusion. But it does mean that
there is something wrong rationally speaking if he doesn’t make this in-
ferential step. At the fundamental level, the principles that ground MP
and IP are inference licenses (and sets of inferential prohibitions).
In keeping with the distinction introduced earlier between consequen-
tial and acknowledged commitments, we can see how we can criticize
an agent for failing to honor a rational requirement.⁴⁰ By making one
claim X, a speaker undertakes a further commitment Y without neces-
sarily being aware that he does. In other words, the speaker need not
³⁸Cf. Sellars (1968: ch. 7).
³⁹See §4.1.
⁴⁰For the distinction, see §5.3.
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acknowledge a consequential commitment. Applied to rational require-
ments, we can say that the agent is already committed to the conclusion,
even if he is not prepared to acknowledge it or doesn’t actually follow out
the inference.
Consider an agent who holds that Argos is a dog and that dogs are mam-
mals. Rationality requires that he also believe that Argos is a mammal.
This means that he is consequentially committed to the claim that Argos
is a mammal. He may not realize this. He may even believe that Argos
is not a mammal. In that case his irrationality would be evident, as he
would be committed to a claim and to its contradiction at the same time.
Again suppose that the agent intends to clean the kitchen and that he
believes that this entails taking out the trash. This means that he is con-
sequentially committed to taking out the trash. He may not have noticed
this, but it is a consequence of his other commitments, one that he cannot
evade. Whether he acknowledges the practical commitment or not, it is
required by principles of rationality.
This can be exploited by a critical observer when an agent doesn’t accept
the conclusion of the inference-schema corresponding to MP or IP. He
can remind the agent of his original commitment — for example to p or
to doing φ — and of the consequences he has to accept on account of it.
In fact the agent has already undertaken the commitment to p or to do φ
by endorsing other commitments. The critic can point out that by failing
to acknowledge the consequence, the agent fails to do something that he
is rationally supposed to do. The relevant inferences aren’t optional, and
it is not entirely up to the agent whether or not to acknowledge the com-
mitment, given that he has bound himself to (what presents itself as) the
premises of the inference-schema. By appealing to rational requirements
we can urge a subject to acknowledge his own rational obligations.
Interpreting rational requirements in the way just sketched meets the
three conditions we started with. To begin with, (i) rational requirements
are content-directed because as inferential practices they operate on the
object level rather than on the attitude level. What is more, (ii) they pro-
vide guidance to the subjects. It is true that we do not necessarily grasp
the principles, but they are responsible for they way we reason in the
form of ought-to-be rules. As one writer usefully puts it, although we do
not reason from the principles, we reason with the principles.⁴¹ When an
agent reasons from a proposition, she needs to have it before her mind,
⁴¹Hussain writes that “an agent S reasons from one set of attitudes to another by rea-
soning with principles of rationality” (Hussain n.d.: 2). He explains that “to reason with
a principle of rationality does not require believing that a norm, N, is a norm S ought to
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but that isn’t true for the principles she reasons with. We have seen that
the rational principles are implicit in our practice when we treat the rele-
vant transitions as good. We are committed to these principles: we have
a rational disposition to conform to the principles and we are commit-
ted to the correctness of behavior conforming to them. It is true that we
are not committed to the principles in exactly the same way in which we
are explicitly committed to a proposition. Instead when we reason with
the principles, we are taking part in a practice that involves regarding
the inferences permitted by the principles as good. To use a Brandomian
phrase, we have an inferential commitment to these principles.⁴²
Finally, (iii) according to the proposal rational requirements are genuine
norms. Being committed to modus ponens and other principles is part of
what it is to be rational. The reason for this is that the principles are con-
stitutive of the conceptual contents of our intentional attitudes. Part of
what it means to be committed to the claim that p is to base one’s further
reasoning on the premise that p. In particular, it entails being committed
to detaching the consequent from a conditional whose antecedent is p. In
other words, part of what it means to believe that p is to have an obliga-
tion or responsibility to followmodus ponens — to be committed tomodus
ponens. Similarly, the instrumental principle is constitutive of having an
intention — of being practically committed to doing something. One can-
not have a practical commitment without being inferentially committed
to the instrumental principle.
6.5 Narrow scope and the Detachment Problem
Equippedwith an alternative conception of rational requirements, we can
now turn to the two questions raised at the beginning of this chapter:
the dispute between narrow-scopers and wide-scopers, and the alleged
normativity of rational requirements. Starting with the first, we have
already made progress towards an answer. Wide-scope principles are
concerned with combinations of attitudes. Now we have seen that some
arguments against the existence of wide-scope principles fail. It is not
true that the wide-scope formulations of the principles are false. But we
follow or that N is the norm rationality requires S to follow. Indeed, such beliefs by them-
selves could never be sufficient for reasoning since S would always need to be reasoning
with some other principle in order to reason from — in order to use in her reasoning — any
such belief”.
⁴²Cf. Brandom (1994: 247ff) for the introduction of the term “inferential commitment”
in the context of practical inferences.
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have also seen that wide-scope principles have crucial deficiencies. Our
theoretical and practical reasoning is evidently guided by principles, but
the wide-scope versions cannot fulfill this function.
What has not been shown yet is that in the version in which they are
represented by inference-schemas, the principles have narrow scope. To
see that they do, notice that the requirements are operative in our actual
thought processes. They are inferential commitments: they are commit-
ments to make certain transitions. But an inference rule must give us
specific instructions as to which contents to accept. In other words, it
must be possible to detach a particular conclusion from the rule.
Korsgaard provides a helpful comparison when she asks us to consider
what the wide-scope view would mean for cookbook writing.⁴³ A nor-
mal, narrow-scope, recipe for a pasta sauce would be comprised of in-
structions such as “After you sauté the tomatoes and the mushrooms, you
should add a little salt to the mixture.” Now imagine the recipe written by
a wide-scoping chef. This would not instruct us to use particular ingredi-
ents in given circumstances. Indeed the wide-scoping chef would insist
that these instructions are faulty. After all, you might have added salty
olives or bacon instead of mushrooms, in which case adding salt would
be a mistake. The wide-scoper would argue that the instruction should
read: “Either you should add a little salt or you should previously have
added olives by mistake.” Evidently, instructions like this would make it
hard to actually finish a meal. They do not prescribe which ingredient to
add; they only state that certain combinations of ingredients do not go
together well. But this is not sufficient for preparing a dinner. Far from
guiding our cooking, they would leave us disoriented.⁴⁴
As Korsgaard’s analogy suggests, inference rules are not merely con-
cerned with constellations of attitudes because that would mean that the
lessons we could draw from the rule would be vague. The wide-scope
recipe only tells us that if you add both salt and olives, something is
wrong — perhaps you ought not to have added olives, perhaps you ought
not to add salt. Similarly from the wide-scope principle, we only learn
that something is amiss with respect to the commitments involved, but
we do not learn how to go about resolving the conflict. If they allowed no
detachment, inferential principles would leave us disoriented and would
⁴³Korsgaard (2009).
⁴⁴As Korsgaard points out, “If you hope ever to get your dinner made, you want to avoid
recipes written by the wide-scoping chef. If the job of rational requirements is to govern
the activities of thought and deliberation, and the point of those activities is to direct us
to belief and action, then rational requirements cannot be wide scope, since wide scope
requirements cannot do the job” (Korsgaard 2009: 29).
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thus be useless. But inference rules are evidently not useless: they form
the backbone of our reasoning.
It is true that, as we formulated them, the inference-schemas for MP and
IP don’t include the word “ought”, but that doesn’t mean that the question
of wide or narrow scope doesn’t arise. An inference-schema represents
a rule of inference, and all rules involve an ought. We could bring the
“ought” out in this way:
‘p’ and ‘p → q’ ought to be followed by ‘q’.
Here the ought cannot take wide scope, because the rule is an instruction
of the form “When in situation X, you ought to do Y.” It gives us partic-
ular instructions, so it must have narrow scope. Where does this leave
us with the original question? Rational requirements are primarily in-
ference rules which are usually implicit in practice. We identified these
with inference-schemas operating on the level of content. According to
the present view, they are narrow-scope principles. On the other hand,
as we have seen in §1, attitude-directed wide-scope principles exist, al-
though they are of secondary importance. These two sets of principles
can coexist without causing a conflict. Their function is complementary.
Wide-scope principles inform us of a conflict in a given combination of
attitudes. But as they only give us vague advice, narrow-scope inference
rules are required which govern our reasoning. These latter principles
recommend a particular content to accept, which makes them suitable as
principles of reasoning.
In their principal form, rational requirements have narrow scope. As we
have seen, however, an important motivation for the wide-scope view,
and the reason why many philosophers have rejected narrow scope re-
quirements, is that from the narrow-scope formulations, along with sim-
ple psychological facts, we can infer purportedly objectionable conclu-
sions. Suppose that David, who intends to get the promotion, believes
that the only way to get the promotion is to kill his colleague, Don. The
instrumental principle says that, if David has these attitudes, he ought
to intend to kill his colleague. Given that David has these attitudes, we
can infer that David ought to kill his colleague. But doing so would be
cold-blooded murder – surely David ought not to kill his colleague! It
cannot be true that David both ought and ought not to kill Don. Using
the narrow-scope principle, we have detached a seemingly unacceptable
normative statement. A similar problem arises in the theoretical case.
Suppose that Sarah believes she has $500 in her wallet and that if she
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does, she can afford a new bicycle. Modus ponens says that, if Sarah has
these attitudes, she ought to believe that she can afford a new bicycle. But
how could she? Really her wallet is empty and she can’t even afford a bus
ticket. The narrow-scope principle has enabled us to detach a seemingly
unacceptable normative statement.
To avoid these unwelcome consequences, we do not need to give up the
narrow-scope view in favor of a wide-scope view. The natural reaction
to the Detaching Problem – and, I think, the right reaction – is to appeal
to the distinction between two kinds of oughts.⁴⁵ When we say to David:
“You really ought not to kill your colleague”, wemean that doing sowould
be wrong no matter what his own psychological state is. What we mean
is that David has a substantive or objective reason not to act, and he has
this reason whether he knows it or not. Furthermore, David’s objective
reasons for not killing his colleague are conclusive: they cannot be over-
ridden by other considerations. On the other hand, without giving up our
view that murder is unacceptable, we could still say to David something
along the lines of: „From the point of view of your own attitudes, you
ought to kill your colleague.“ In other words, although it would be objec-
tively wrong for him to commit murder, David nonetheless ought subjec-
tively to kill Don. The subjective ought flows from his own commitments
and does not directly track his moral and other substantive reasons.
It is not hard to see how to apply the distinction of two sorts of ought to
the detachment problem. It is true that the narrow-scope instrumental
principle allows us to detach the normative conclusion that David ought
to kill Don, but the “ought” detached in the conclusion should not be
confused with the substantive ought of objective reasons. Rather, it only
follows from the principle that David ought subjectively to kill his col-
league. Similarly, it is true that narrow-scope modus ponens permits de-
taching the conclusion that Sarah ought to believe that she can afford a
bicycle. But she doesn’t have a substantive reason to believe this propo-
sition; she only has a subjective reason, and subjective doxastic reasons
do not track truth. “X subjectively ought to φ” means that it would be
irrational for X not to φ. For this reason, the subjective ought can also be
called the ought of rationality.⁴⁶
However, Broome regards the distinction between subjective and objec-
tive ought as dubious. He remarks that he lacks a firm grasp of what it
⁴⁵Cf. Kolodny (2005).
⁴⁶Some philosophers reserve the word “ought” to substantive reasons or oughts. For
them, there is no ought of rationality. Instead of saying that S ought subjectively to do φ,
they say that rationality requires S to do φ. This is just a terminological difference. As I find
it natural to speak of subjective oughts, I will use the word and disambiguate if necessary.
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means to have a subjective rather than an objective reason, or to be sub-
ject to a subjective ought rather than an objective ought. As he writes,
he is clear about the meaning of “X ought to do (or believe) Y” but he
claims not to be clear about the change of meaning when we say instead
that “X ought only subjectively to do (or believe) Y”.⁴⁷ I disagree with
Broome’s contention that the notion of a subjective ought is incompre-
hensible. Hence it will be useful to give a more detailed account of the
distinction. We can take his remarks as a challenge to clarify the distinc-
tion.
Before proceeding to a defense of this difference, however, we need to
consider an objection raised by Jonathan Way.⁴⁸ According to Way, we
cannot escape the Detachment Problem by introducing the ought of ra-
tionality since in some cases, even with the distinction in mind, it can
still be problematic to say that the agent ought subjectively to intend the
objectionable action or believe the objectionable proposition. In our ex-
ample, Sarah believes wrongly that she has $500 in her pocket. But now
suppose that here idea is not just wrong but outright irrational — inWay’s
words, “obviously crazy”. Then the original belief could be the result of
a non-rational belief-forming process such as self-deception or wishful
thinking. In that case, Way contends, we can no longer say that rational-
ity requires Sarah to follow the consequences of the belief because that
belief is itself irrational. It strikesWay as unintuitive that Sarah is subject
to an ought of rationality derived from an irrational premise.
We should be clear about what from Way’s perspective is unintuitive
about the result. Owing to its provenance in wishful thinking, Sarah’s
resultant attitude, the belief that she can afford the bike, is itself irra-
tional. And according to Way, rationality cannot require you to hold an
irrational attitude. The idea is that the fact that the premise was due to
wishful thinking is a taint that, by way of the argument, is transferred
from the premise to the conclusion. However, this idea should give us
pause. For one thing, it raises the question whether the intuition that the
requirement cannot mandate a belief with irrational ancestors depends
⁴⁷Broome writes:
“Ought” is our most basic normative term. I understand it well. But “sub-
jectively ought” and “objectively ought” are philosophers’ terms, and their
meaning needs to be specified. What is the meaning of “You subjectively
ought to F?” It is evidently supposed to assign some normative property to
your F ing: the word “ought” indicates that much. “You subjectively ought
to F” is supposed to say something a bit like “you ought to F”. But what like
it, exactly? (Broome 2005: 326)
⁴⁸Way (2011: 228f).
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on how far back in the inferential ancestry of a premise the taint lies. Is it
still unintuitive that Sarah rationally ought to have the belief if the belief
has, as it were, an irrational great-grandfather? If not, where should we
draw the line? If a belief early on in my inferential history was acquired
irrationally, surely it should not for that reason be impossible for modus
ponens to mandate my believing things that derive from it. More gener-
ally, it is not clear that irrationality, as a feature of belief, is a property
that can be transferred from premise to conclusion in argument. The idea
that irrationality is such a property seems to construe a belief’s being ra-
tional or irrational as an inheritable property. But whether or not a belief
is rational can only be decided by checking whether it is justified, which
in turn often means that it must be the result of good reasoning. A be-
lief’s status as irrational often depends on the inferential processes it was
based on, but Way’s argument requires that we can identify a belief as
irrational globally, without attention to its context.
The rational requirements we are concerned with are local rather than
global requirements. I agreewith Kolodny, who points out that “[r]ational
requirements […] ought to be local. In each instance in which one is un-
der a rational requirement, what it ought to require of one is to avoid
or resolve some specific conflict among one’s attitudes — as opposed to,
say, to satisfy some global constraint on all of one’s attitudes” (Kolodny
2005: 516). Although there might be global constraints that apply to the
whole set of our attitudes, it is clear that modus ponens and the instru-
mental principle are about specific conflicts in a certain constellation of
attitudes. As a consequence, it is possible that several rational require-
ments are in play simultaneously. The case Way imagines seems to be of
this type. On the one hand, there is a requirement according to which
forming the original belief is illegitimate because, as wishful thinking,
it lacks any sound evidential basis. On the other hand, modus ponens
requires us to acknowledge the commitment implied by earlier commit-
ments. If we properly take into account that rational requirements are
local, we should not be surprised by the fact that such a constellation is
possible. That it follows from modus ponens that, as far as this require-
ment is concerned, Sarah ought to form the belief that she can afford the
bicycle is not incompatible with the fact that this may not be right thing
to believe all things considered. To assume, as Way seems to do, that in-
dividual requirements necessarily yield the substantively right result is
to mistake them for global requirements.
If this is right, thenWay’s objection does not succeed in raising additional
worries about the narrow-scope view. Nonetheless it might still seem
inappropriate to say that it follows from a rational requirement that an
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agent ought subjectively to do things that he really ought objectively not
to do. To dispel this appearance, we need to clarify what it means to say
that an agent ought subjectively to have a certain belief or intention. The
key to the answer is that, as we have construed rational requirements, the
inference-schemas operate on the level of content. Rational requirements
are inferential commitments, and the inferential relations they represent
cover, not attitudes — not the belief that p and the belief that p→q and the
belief that q — but contents: “p”, “p→q” and “q”. We should not interpret
the rules as telling you that you ought to form the belief that q but, quite
simply, as rules that mandate that q.
To return to the example, modus ponens entails that Sarah ought subjec-
tively to believe that she can afford the bike. The inference-rule that gov-
erns her commitments causes her to put the commitment that q into her
commitment-box. The result of her doxastic deliberation is that q. The
narrow-scope principle functions on the level of the expression of com-
mitments. So she does not attribute to herself the doxastic commitment
that q but rather expresses it in thought. This contrasts with wide-scope
requirements, which can only be interpreted as attributions of commit-
ments. With wide-scope requirements, we take the perspective of an ob-
server who attributes commitments to the agent, and the only way an
observer can make claims about the reasoning of another agent is by at-
tributing to her commitments and entitlements: they concern the agent’s
attitudes. The observer can only evaluate or criticize the agent from the
outside. By contrast, as narrow-scope requirements,modus ponens yields
contents that ought to be adopted. This is something only the agent her-
self is capable of doing, as she is the only one who can reason fromwithin
her own system of commitments on the level of content.
To say that Sarah ought subjectively to believe that she can afford the bike
is to attribute to her a commitment. It is to say that, whether she knows it
or not, she has undertaken a commitment to the propositional content. As
we have said, she may not be prepared to acknowledge the commitment,
but her earlier commitments, about the contents of her pocket and the
conditional assumption, are binding. The observer deploys the subjective
ought to attribute a consequential commitment, one that is appreciable
from the subject’s first-person perspective. By contrast, to say that Sarah
ought objectively to have the belief in question is not just to ascribe the
commitment but also to endorse it. In this linguistic act, the ascriber not
only takes another person to be committed to a belief but also undertakes
the commitment in question himself. To do this, for a belief, is to hold
the belief in question true.
Notice that the two oughts express two different linguistic acts. Whereas
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the objective ought involves a substantive commitment on the part of the
ascriber, the subjective ought allows the ascriber to abstain from under-
taking any commitments of his own about what should in fact be done
or believed: he only expresses a view about what the subject, from his
own standpoint, is committed to. Accordingly, the narrow-scope prin-
ciples do not prescribe what attitudes the subject ought to have, as that
would inevitably involve endorsement of the particular contents in ques-
tion. Narrow-scope principles, which are inferential principles, do not,
and could not, prescribe what is the substantively correct thing to be-
lieve or do. Their job is to ascribe consequential commitments, which
they do because they only say which content follows from the existing
commitments, from the perspective of doxastic or practical deliberation.⁴⁹
We can conclude, then, that the Detachment Problem is not a real diffi-
culty. Broome’s complaint that rational requirements yield objectionable
oughts only seems cogent on the assumption that the oughts in question
involve the endorsement of attitudes. On this assumption, the require-
ments appear to force us observers to agree with the attitudes that ratio-
nality requires Sarah to have. But if we recognize that the requirements
only yield contents and subjective oughts rather than attitudes and ob-
jective oughts, we see that they do not imply that the observer has to
agree with what it would be best for the agent to think or do. Rational
requirements imply simply that the observer takes the subject to be con-
sequentially committed to a propositional content. What we can detach
⁴⁹Here it is perhaps appropriate to register a reservation about the use of the words
“subjective” and “objective” in this context. These expressions have connotations that may
mislead. When we say that an agent (really) ought to have a belief, this is no more objective
(in the sense of “truly true”) than what we say when we say that an agent ought, rationally
speaking, to have a belief. In both cases, it is possible that what we are claiming is false,
and in both cases what is believed is purported to be correct. Rather than in a possible
degree of reality, the difference between the two lies in the person who is committed to the
correctness or truth of the belief. With a “subjective” ought, the responsibility lies with
the agent: it is she who ought to know better. Even by her own lights, she is committed
to the claim. An “objective” ought, on the other hand, places the responsibility on the
observer: it is possible that an agent ought to believe that p even though she is not aware
of it, through no fault of her own. But it is not necessary that the observer’s perspective is
more objective, or more true, than that of the agent. Likewise, the ought of rationality is
not subjective in the sense having an inherently personal quality. It is true that this ought
is relative to the point of view of the agent concerned. But objective oughts are also, in
a sense, relative to a point of view, albeit not only to that of the subject but also to that
of the ascriber. The crucial difference is that when we say that a person ought objectively
to believe something, we thereby ourselves endorse the claim, whereas with a subjective
ought, although we assign to the person a commitment to the claim, we do not ourselves
endorse the claim. The contrast pertains to who is committed to the content. Perhaps the
unhappy terminology is to blame, at least in part, for Broome’s insistence that he doesn’t
know the difference between the two types of ought.
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from a narrow-scope requirement is not that the person in question ought
objectively to have the attitude in question; that would imply that we, as
observers, ought to endorse the attitude. As we have seen, it may well
be that the agent is committed to a claim that is false or an intention that
is foolish, as seen from the observer’s perspective. The principle entails
not that from the observer’s perspective a certain attitude is appropriate,
but that from the subject’s perspective a certain content follows from
other contents held. We can attribute consequential beliefs and inten-
tions without thereby endorsing them.
6.6 The normativity of rational requirements
We have yet to discuss the second puzzle raised at the beginning of this
chapter: do rational requirements give us reasons? Broome considers
the question whether rational requirements are normative in a series of
papers.⁵⁰ An answer to this question requires becoming clearer about
what Broome means by the word “normative” in this context. We can
distinguish three possible interpretations of what an affirmative answer
to the question might mean:
a) Rational requirements are rule-like. To be subject to a rational re-
quirement is to be subject to a norm.
b) Rational requirements are valid principles that apply to us. Rational
requirements have normative force for us.
c) Rational requirements provide us with substantive or objective rea-
sons. Whenever the antecedent condition is true of an agent, he
has some good reason to adopt the attitude the principle requires
of him.
Beginning with the question of rulishness, we have already seen that in
this rather basic sense rational requirements are evidently normative. As
inference principles, they form the backbone of our reasoning processes.
The inference-schemas they correspond to have the form of an inference-
rule: they mandate which content is appropriate, which content ought to
be inferred from which content, and so forth. However, it is not this
interpretation that Broome has in mind when asking this question.⁵¹ He
accepts that, as a system of requirements, the principles of rationality
⁵⁰Including Broome (1999), Broome (2005), Broome (2007) and Broome (2010).
⁵¹Broome (2007: 162).
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have to do with correctness according to rules. But he notes that some
systems of requirements such as the rules of freemasonry, which require
you to roll up one trouser-leg in certain circumstances, should not be
seen as telling you that you ought to do so.⁵² On the other hand, there
are other sources of requirements that do tell you what you ought to do;
these requirements are normative in a stronger, more contentious sense.⁵³
Broome’s question is whether, unlike freemasonry, rationality falls into
the category of bona fide normative sources. One way to tackle this ques-
tion would be to attempt to vindicate rational requirements — to show
that the requirements have normative force for us. This interpretation,
item (b) in the list above, is not the approach Broome pursues directly,
so we will put it aside for the moment. Instead Broome bases his discus-
sion on interpretation (c) and asks whether rational requirements give us
substantive reasons. He writes:
Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational —
to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute
the faculty of rationality. Most of us also take it for granted
that we ought to satisfy various individual requirements of
rationality: we ought not to believe it is Monday and also
believe it is not Monday; we ought to intend to catch the
12.50, if we intend to get to a meeting and believe catching
the 12.50 is the only way to get there; and so on.
There is a genuine questionwhether these things are so: ought
we to be rational, and ought we to satisfy the individual re-
quirements of rationality? (Broome 2005: 321)
Three immediate comments are in order. According to Broome, the ques-
tion is whether having a rational requirement apply to oneself entails an
ought with respect to one’s attitudes. To him, that X ought to do φ in
turn implies that X has a reason to do φ. In effect the ought amounts to
having a reason that trumps all other reasons one might have. The chief
point at issue is the Reasons Claim:
Reasons Claim If one is rationally required to φ, then one has conclusive
reason to φ.⁵⁴
⁵²Broome (2005: 324).
⁵³Broome suggests that morality may be one such source of requirements that is nor-
mative in the more forceful sense, though he still seems to be undecided whether or not
this ultimately will turn out to be the case (Broome 2007: 165). Way (2010) suggests that
prudence and epistemic evidence belong to this category as well.
⁵⁴See §1.
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The contrast here is between having a pro tanto reason, on the one hand,
and a conclusive reason, on the other. As the distinction will not be im-
portant in what follows, I will assume, with Kolodny and Broome, that
the contentious point is whether it is the case that whenever rational-
ity requires an attitude of us, we have a conclusive reason to adopt the
attitude.
Second, in the passage above, Broome mentions two distinct claims. The
idea that we have a reason to be rational may mean that in each particular
case in which a rational requirement applies, we ipso facto have a reason
to conform to the requirement. This claim, which is captured by Reasons
Claim, contrasts with the claim that there is in general a reason to do the
things that rationality requires of us. This latter idea is that we have a
generic reason to have a certain disposition, namely the disposition to
conform to a system of rational rules. Broome takes this second claim to
be less contentious and also less interesting. The idea will be relevant be-
low, but for the moment it will be useful to follow Broome in disregarding
the idea to focus on the first — the claim that there are particular reasons
to follow the individual requirements of rationality, which Broome insists
is a genuine question.⁵⁵ Broome finds this question intriguing because, in
his view, the Reasons Claim may turn out to be false despite its intuitive
plausibility, despite the fact that we “take it for granted”.
Third, we distinguished above between subjective oughts and objective
oughts, and we can correspondingly distinguish between subjective rea-
sons and objective reasons. The Reasons Claim is intended to mean that
we have objective or substantive reasons to follow the requirements. This
is clear because claiming that rational requirements give us subjective
reasons would not be controversial because what you subjectively ought
is a content that follows from your other commitments, which is just
what rational requirements prescribe. What is more, Broome counte-
nances only one type of ought, so the ought he talks about must be of the
substantive or objective kind.⁵⁶
This last point leads us to the chief difficulty for the Reasons Claim: it
is hard to see how it can be true in general that rational requirements
⁵⁵This is worth emphasizing because initially Broome did not doubt the reason-giving
character of the requirements, as in his early paper, “Normative Requirements” (Broome
1999). Later he came to question this assumption. The change of mind is reflected in the
terminology used in later papers. Whereas in the early paper he is happy to call ratio-
nal principles like modus ponens “normative requirements”, in later papers (Broome (2005),
Broome (2007)) he chooses to speak of “rational requirements” instead, thereby leaving open
the question whether the principles really are normative in his sense.
⁵⁶That Broome has more in mind than just the ought of rationality is also clear from his
examples (Broome 2005: 332–333).
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can give us objective reasons. Sometimes we are rationally required to
take the means to an end although the end itself is foolish. In this case, it
seems, there is no substantive reason to pursue the end, and there may be
substantive reasons not to pursue it. But then neither is there a substan-
tive reason to take the means, whose only claim to being something we
ought to pursue derives from its relationship to the end. It would seem
that it is not true that we always ought substantively to do what we are
rationally required to do because sometimes we have no reason at all to
follow the dictates of rationality.
The same point can be made using scorekeeping vocabulary. If I say that
you ought objectively to undertake a commitment, I thereby endorse the
commitment. But surely it is possible to attribute to you the consequen-
tial commitment without thereby endorsing it. This is what we do when
we say that a rational requirement applies to another subject. But if so,
then the Reasons Claim seems to lead us back to the implausible thesis
rejected above that in saying that a requirement applies, we necessarily
endorse the commitment mandated by the requirement.
It would, however, be too rash to give up the Reasons Claim immediately.
In response to the obvious difficulty, Broome writes:
if rationality is indeed normative, that seems likely to be be-
cause of what we can achieve by being rational. It seems
likely to be for instrumental reasons, as I shall put it. (Broome
2007: 171)
The idea is that we have a reason to be rational because being rational
is useful. The usefulness of rationality lies in the fact that it enables us
to achieve goals that we actually have reason to achieve, goals that we
ought substantively to achieve. This is what Broome has in mind when
he writes:
In general, there are some Gs such that you ought to G. Satis-
fying the requirements of rationality seems plausibly a good
way of coming to G in many instances when you ought to G.
(Broome 2007: 171)
Notice that, except for some very simple goals, we have to engage in in-
strumental reasoning in order to achieve our goals. If my goal is to eat
and I have nothing but a coconut, then I need to crack open the coconut
in order to satisfy my hunger. Suppose that it is true that I ought to eat.
However, imagine also, per impossibile no doubt, that I lack instrumental
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rationality entirely. In that case, I would not make the inference required,
from “Let me eat” to “I shall crack open the coconut”. Perhaps it would
not even occur to me that cracking the nut is what I need to do. As a con-
sequence, the fact that I do not engage in correct instrumental reasoning
would lead to my failing to do something I ought to do, viz. eating. So the
fact that, contrary to this imaginary scenario, I do honor the instrumental
principle is useful for my doing what I ought to do and my getting what
I ought to have. Being rational opens up these possibilities to me.⁵⁷
Still by all accounts this is only one half of the story.⁵⁸ The description
of the case included the assumption that it is in fact the case that I ought
to eat. But suppose that, as a matter of fact, this is not so: eating really
would be foolish — perhaps I have already eaten enough or someone else
is more in need of the available food than I. In that case, doing what the
instrumental principle instructs me to do is not something that I ought to
do. Doing the action might even prevent me from performing a different
action that I objectively ought to do. If so, conforming to the requirement
is not, to put it simply, a good thing: it does not help me achieve goals
that I ought to pursue and might even actively hinder me from achieving
them. Surely in such a case, all things considered it would be better if
I didn’t follow the requirement.⁵⁹ It may be that doing what rationality
tells you to do leads you to do things you ought to do in many cases, but
it clearly isn’t always or necessarily so. It is not in general true that, in
any given instance, you have a substantive instrumental reason to follow
the dictates of rationality.
We should concede that in amajority of cases we have a reason to dowhat
rationality prescribes. According to many philosophers, this means that
we have a general reason to adopt the attitudes required by rationality — a
reason to have a tendency to be rational. That is what Broome is thinking
of when, in the passage cited above, he says that we plausibly have a
reason “to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute
the faculty of rationality”. We are tempted to say that we are better off
with the capacity to be instrumentally and epistemically rational than
without it, because if we didn’t have that capacity we would never reach
any goals. Then it would seem to follow that we have an instrumental
⁵⁷Note that when Broome assumes, in the passage cited, that “there are some Gs such
that you ought to G”, he does not take “you ought to G” to be tantamount to “you desire to
G” or some other form of extrarational preference. There may be Gs that you ought to do
although you have no desire for them.
⁵⁸As Broome readily admits (Broome 2007: 172). See also Kolodny (2005: 543).
⁵⁹Here again we need not construe “better” as “helping me better to satisfy my prefer-
ences”. Broome assumes that a realist conception of what I ought to do is available that also
accounts for the relation of one action being objectively better than another.
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reason to be follow the rational requirements.
However, there are two problems with this way of conceiving of the nor-
mativity of rational requirements. The first problem is specific to the idea
that the substantive reasons we have for being rational are reasons to be
disposed to be rational. We may concede, for the sake of the argument,
that it is useful to have the disposition to be rational and that this useful-
ness gives us a substantive reason to have this disposition. Still it does
not follow that we have an instrumental reason to be rational in particu-
lar cases. The general reason to be rational does not transfer to particular
instances. Suppose again that I shouldn’t really eat the coconut and that,
as I know, my eating it requires cracking it open. It may be that I have
a general reason to act rationally. Nonetheless in this particular case it
is not instrumentally helpful to do as rationality requires. Compare an
analogical case. I have good instrumental reason to have the disposition,
in general, to drive on the right side of the road in continental Europe.
But perhaps today, although the road is almost empty, there is a drunken
driver speeding toward me, driving on the wrong side of the road. Then
surely today, at least, because of the danger of a crash, I have no reason
to follow the right-driving rule. That I have a reason to have a general
disposition to follow the traffic rules does not entail that I have a reason,
just now, to drive on the right side. Similarly I may have an instrumental
reason to be disposed to follow the instrumental principle, but perhaps
today my plans are foolish and, if executed, will lead me to trouble. In
these circumstances, surely I have no substantial reason to follow the
rules of rationality. If a reason is generated by the disposition, it can only
be a subjective reason.
Broome is aware of this difficulty but he doesn’t consider it a fundamental
problem.⁶⁰ Although the difficulties move him to become agnostic about
the question whether rationality really is normative, he seems to think
of the issue as a mere technical difficulty.⁶¹ But even if we waive the
difficulties associated with the transfer of reasons to have a disposition
to individual reasons, there is a second and more fundamental problem:
there are principled grounds for doubt that the normativity of rationality
can be constituted by instrumental reasons.
To see what is problematic, suppose that Tom has a substantive reason
to get something to eat and that he knows that the only way to get food
is to crack open the coconut. According to the instrumental principle,
Tom ought (subjectively) to intend to crack open the coconut. Broome
⁶⁰Broome acknowledges the problem in Broome (2007) and Broome (2005).
⁶¹Broome (2007: 177).
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claims that Tom really does have a reason to follow the dictate of the re-
quirement. What justifies his claim that Tom has a substantive reason
to open the coconut? His answer is that there are instrumental reasons
for following the dictates of rationality. Specifically, following the in-
strumental principle is part of the best way of achieving something that
he ought objectively to achieve, i.e. bringing it about that he gets food.
Doing the rational thing has instrumental value, which Broome seems to
regard as independently valuable, as something we automatically have a
substantive reason to pursue.
However, our topic is the question what reason there is to do what the
instrumental principle prescribes. If doing the rational thing has only in-
strumental value, it is something we ought to pursue only to the extent
that the instrumental principle is capable of providing us with reasons.
But this is exactly the point we were unsure about in the first place. In
other words, it seems that Broome’s argument presupposes the very prin-
ciple he is trying to defend. Because Broome’s story about how rational
requirements give us reasons relies on instrumental values and, thereby,
on the instrumental principle, he cannot appeal to the same idea in a de-
fense of the instrumental principle itself. Accordingly, we can once again
ask whether Tom really has a substantive reason to do what this instru-
mental connection dictates. Does the fact that it is useful to be rational
give him a substantive reason to this? Here Broome seems forced to re-
peat the account. And when he says that doing what the instrumental
principle tells him to do is part of the best way of achieving something
that he ought to achieve anyway, he seems already embarked on a vicious
regress of justification.
The trouble is not just with the instrumental principle but with the idea
of invoking instrumental reasons to support the normativity of rational
requirements in general. As we have seen, the status of rational require-
ments is elementary. They represent inferential relations that we are
committed to simply by virtue of having particular doxastic or practical
commitments. Rational requirements govern the inferential transitions
that make up the very core of our reasoning lives. For this reason, claims
about the usefulness of the requirement should be taken with a grain of
salt. Our reasoning is governed by the inference-rules whether they are
useful or not. As principleswith this fundamental status, rational require-
ments are not susceptible to instrumental justification. On the contrary,
all instrumental justification presupposes that a network of inferential
relations, including those set up by principles such as modus ponens and
the instrumental principle, are already in place.
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What is more, as we have seen, undertaking a practical commitment by,
say, adopting the goal of getting food already involves undertaking fur-
ther commitments, some of which are determined by rational require-
ments. In particular, one cannot commit to doing φ without thereby
committing to doing ψ should it turn out that ψ’ing is required for φ’ing.
In other words, having an intention involves having a responsibility to
respect its inferential consequences. The very fact of being practically
committed, then, already suffices to conceding authority to the instru-
mental principle. Given this status, a further justification of the require-
ment in terms of substantive reasons is redundant. On our conception of
rational principles as an implicit practice that can be made explicit using
inference-schemas, we need not and cannot find instrumental reasons to
support them.
In the light of these problems we ought to give up the project of look-
ing for reasons that support rational requirements. However, we may
still wonder why philosophers find this project attractive or why Broome
holds that the notion that rational requirements are normative is intu-
itively true. We can find two motivations in Broome’s papers. Imagining
an agent who fails to follow a rational requirement, he writes:
Whenwe are accusing someone of irrationality, we are surely
criticizing her. How could we be entitled to do so if there is
no reason for her to satisfy the requirements of rationality in
the first place? (Broome 2007: 177)
We can see this passage as containing an argument in favor of the claim
that rationality must be normative. The idea behind Broome’s remark
is that we can criticize the agent for an irrational act by citing rational
requirements only on the conditions that she has a substantive reason to
satisfy the requirement. If it is true that criticism or evaluation inevitably
require the existence of a substantive reason to latch on to, our desire to
criticize agents for rational failings explains why we should be looking
for reasons generated by rational requirements. However, it is simply
not true that criticism presupposes a substantive reason. It is true that, in
order to criticize an agent for an action or attitude, there needs to be an
ought that applies to her and that forbids the action. But this need not be
an objective ought that involves the endorsement of the act in question.
External criticism draws on all considerations that count against the act.
Internal criticism, on the other hand, draws on other commitments of
the agent. To criticize an agent internally is to appeal to the subjective
6.6. THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 281
oughts associated with narrow-scope requirements, in which case there
is no need to invoke any further substantive reasons.
We can criticize an agent for not making the inference she ought to make
according to the inference-rule that underlies the rational requirement.
To do this, we can point out to her that, for instance, from “p” and “p→q”
the proposition “q” follows, or that from “Shall[φ]” and “φ only if ψ” the
proposition “Shall[ψ]” follows.⁶² Internal criticism as it were reminds the
agent of her inferential obligations. For instance, we may point out to
her that in the past she has followed this schema for other inferences.
Such a reminder requires no substantive reason on the part of the agent.
We need not prove to the agent that it is in her best interest to make the
inference; it is enough to display the inference as valid.
There is a second, related motivation of the search for a substantive rea-
son behind rational requirements. If we are looking for a substantive
reason to be rational, we might as well ask whether doing as rational-
ity mandates is warranted. In other words, we may doubt the validity of
principles such as MP and IP.Thus an agent who consciously fails to con-
form tomodus ponensmay be interpreted as unwilling to acknowledge the
force of the principle. He may ask, “How can we be so sure that the prin-
ciples we know really are correct?” This skeptical question may elicit an
attempt to prove that the requirements of rationality are valid. Here we
have reached the final sense of the word “normative” that was mentioned
at the beginning of this section. Interpretation of the question “Are ratio-
nal requirements normative?” is: “Do rational requirements have norma-
tive force for us?”This is a demand for the vindication of the principles. It
is true that we generally assume without hesitation that our conforming
to rational requirements is warranted. This explains why Broome finds it
“intuitively plausible” that rationality is normative.⁶³ We do not usually
question the validity of principles such as MP or IP. But as philosophers,
we can nonetheless ask if our practice of relying on the principles can be
vindicated.
In my view, the vindication of rational requirements is an interesting and
worthwhile challenge. In practice we arguably have no choice except to
assume that the requirements are valid, but it doesn’t follow that the de-
mand for a justification of the inferential rules is illegitimate. However,
pursuing this question is beyond the scope of the present project.⁶⁴ Before
⁶²Cf. Kolodny’s transparency account of rational requirements (Kolodny 2005).
⁶³Broome (2007: 177).
⁶⁴One way to approach the task is this. We may be prompted to justify an inferential
practice when an agent, after being criticized for irrational behavior, refuses to accept the
assessment. Refusing to conform to the rational principle presents a skeptical challenge to
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concluding, I will therefore only make a final point that connects with
what was said above. Thus Broome’s exploration of instrumental sub-
stantive reason for being rational may be seen as one way of approach-
ing the project of vindicating rationality. On Broome’s view, the basic
normative unit is the reason for action or ought.⁶⁵ A general method of
vindicating a principle is to identify underlying substantive reasons. In
some area, this is in fact possible. If our goal is to vindicate our continen-
tal European practice of driving on the right side of the road, a good way
to do this would be to find substantive reasons that all the participants in
the practice share. To the question “Why drive on the right?” we would
reply that such a rule leads to fewer accidents and that we have a substan-
tive reason to avoid accidents. Now on the assumption that everything
there is to normativity must have to do with substantive reasons, it is nat-
ural to conclude that a vindication even of so basic a principle as modus
ponens ultimately needs to invoke such reasons.⁶⁶ Following this line of
reasoning, we are led to ask, as in the title of Kolodny’s paper: Why be
rational?⁶⁷ Broome’s assumption seems to be that an answer to this ques-
tion concerning rationality would not be unlike an answer to the request
for a vindication of the traffic rule.
However, from the above it is clear that we cannot agree with Broome
about the way to go about justifying the principles of rationality. Vin-
dicating a principle like modus ponens by supplying substantive reasons
is impossible if, as we have argued, rational requirements do not supply
the validity of the principle in question. The skeptic may question whether it is really true
that I ought to accept the claim just because doing so is required by modus ponens. We can
think of vindicating the principles as a response to a skeptical challenge of this kind. Such a
response could take different forms. Hussain proposes to respond to the normative question
by quasi-metaethical considerations (Hussain n.d.: 46–56). His approach is similar to the
way some writers in metaethics respond to challenges to the institutions and principles of
morality. Hussain’s suggestion is to start with the observation that the rational principles
outlined are the ones we actually use in practice and then to use the Rawlsian method of
reflective equilibrium to show that the norms of rationality hang together in a coherent way.
If successful, this method would lend support to the whole edifice of principles. A different
approach is taken by Nicholas Southwood, who argues that rational requirements belong
to the class of what he calls “first-personal, standpoint-relative demands” (Southwood 2008:
28). On his view, the normativity of rational requirements is a matter of our honoring our
first-personal authority.
⁶⁵As we saw above, Broome says that he has a good grip on what “X ought to φ” means,
whereas he does not know what the role of a subjective ought is supposed to be.
⁶⁶Cf. Raz’s view: “The normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or
provides, or is otherwise related to reasons […] So ultimately the explanation of normativity
is the explanation of what it is to be a reason, and of related puzzles about reasons” (Raz
1999: 67).
⁶⁷Kolodny (2005). Although he poses the “why”-question in the title of his article,
Kolodny does not share Broome’s optimism that we have a good answer to the skeptical
question that involves substantive reasons.
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us with substantive reasons. But this does not mean that we should de-
spair of finding a way of justifying our inferential practice. Normativity
comprises more than just substantive reasons. Our conclusion should be,
then, that the vindication of rational requirements as inferential princi-
ples must proceed in a way that does not rely on the existence of sub-
stantive reasons to be rational.
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